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Abstract: The thesis seeks to explain the emergence of the EU’s international investment 
policy since the 1980s. Building on theories of European Integration, it tests two ex ante 
hypotheses. Hypothesis H1 builds on supranational thinking and stipulates that the 
Commission acted as policy entrepreneur and pushed for the communitarisation of 
international investment policy-making. Hypothesis H2 builds on liberal intergovernmental 
thinking and stipulates that European business successfully lobbied the Member States for a 
communitarisation of international investment policy-making in order to ensure access to 
competitive state-of-the-art international investment agreements. To assess the validity of 
these hypotheses, the thesis traces throughout history and examines policy-making instances, 
which decisively shaped the EU’s de facto and legal competences in international investment 
policy since the 1980s. It examines the EU’s involvement in investment-related negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round, on the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), on the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) and on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Mexico and 
Chile. It, moreover, analyses EU-internal debates on the EU’s legal competences in 
international investment regulation in the context of intergovernmental conferences on 
Treaty revisions and legal proceedings before the European Court of Justice.  
 
The joined analysis of international and EU-internal negotiations suggests that supranational 
thinking and Commission entrepreneurship best describe the integration process leading to 
the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The Commission acted as 
resourceful policy entrepreneur and used agenda setting, invoked the evolving trade agenda, 
fringe, implied and de facto competences, strategically used different international 
negotiating fora and legal review in order to consolidate the EU’s role in international 
investment policy. Functional and power considerations fuelled the Commission’s policy 
entrepreneurship. European business, on the other hand, was hardly informed, organised and 
interested in international investment policy-making. It did not seek to influence European or 
national policy-makers. The Member States, finally, occasionally favoured cooperating in 
certain international negotiating fora in order to maximise their bargaining power and to 
reach for the best possible deals with third countries. More often, however, they sought to 
contain the EU’s involvement and competences in international investment policy.  
 
The thesis makes an important empirical contribution to our knowledge of EU foreign 
economic policy. It is the first study to comprehensively document and to explain the EU’s 
role in the global investment regime. It, moreover, contributes to the long-standing debate 
between supranational and intergovernmental accounts of European Integration. It 
challenges mainstream assumptions on the role of business in the international investment 
regime and global political economy and finally contributes to historical institutionalist 
research on endogenous agency-driven institutional change.  
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Chapter I – Introduction 
!!!
In June 2010, the European Commission published a communication and draft regulation 
dealing with international investment regulation (European Commission, 2010a, 2010b). The 
communication, entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive European international investment 
policy’, underlined that the Lisbon Treaty (2009) had extended the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) to the regulation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It discussed 
how the Commission envisaged using the European Union’s (EU)! 1  new exclusive 
competence in international investment policy to the benefit of Europe. The draft regulation 
discussed how to deal with the Member States’ regulatory legacy in the form of some 1,300 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). It proposed to review all Member State BITs in view of 
their legality and conformity to European law and policy objectives. 
 
While the two documents were hardly spectacular in purpose and content, they stirred furore 
among investment policy officials of the Member States. National investment policy 
officials, it seemed, had so far lived in denial, or indeed not known about, the new legal 
situation. During the following months, national investment policy officials publically 
accused the Commission of having surreptitiously usurped the competence to regulate 
international investment flows. They pointed out that many Member States had clearly 
opposed the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation during the relevant debates in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (2002/2003) and the following Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGCs) on the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaty. They, moreover, warned that 
the Commission lacked the necessary expertise to adequately represent and defend European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For the sake of simplicity this thesis uses the term European Union / EU in order to refer to 
precursor organisations like the European Economic Communities (EEC) or the European 
Communities (EC). It does not assume that these organisations had the same political, economic and 
legal properties as today’s EU.   
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interests in the international investment regime. They pointed to the Commission’s draft 
regulation on how to deal with existing Member State BITs as an example of the 
Commission’s technical incompetence and disregard for the needs of European investors. 
They claimed that the proposed review process for Member State BITs would create legal 
uncertainty for European investors and thereby hinder investment activity. Some Member 
States such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, furthermore, continued 
negotiating and signing BITs with third countries despite being arguably in breach of 
European law (UNCTAD, 2014a). The atmosphere between the Commission and the 
relevant national ministries was extraordinarily tense at this time. And even today – five 
years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and with the EU involved in major 
investment negotiations with countries like the USA, Canada and China – some Member 
States question the EU’s competences in international investment policy. Debates in the 
Trade Policy Committee (TPC) between the Member States and the Commission regularly 
end with mutual accusations of ignorance and incompetence. It will only be a question of 
time before the Commission or some Member States will ask the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) to examine the scope of the EU’s new exclusive legal competence to regulate 
international investment flows.  
 
The Member States’ opposition to the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation is remarkable 
in the global scheme of things. It stands in contrast to the Member States’ previous 
behaviour in this policy domain. The Member States temporarily empowered the EU on 
several occasions to participate in international investment negotiations since the 1980s. The 
Commission represented the Member States, for instance, in investment-related negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreeement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and in 
the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Commission was also deeply 
involved in the most ambitious modern investment negotiations on the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Since the late 1990s, the 
Member States even empowered the Commission to seek the inclusion of investment 
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provisions into European Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Hence, the EU has been playing 
an increasingly central role and acquiring so-called de facto competences in international 
investment policy since the 1980s. The term ‘de facto competences’ refers to the Member 
States agreeing on informal policy-making rules to jointly govern policy issues 
predominantly coming under Member State competences. De facto competences are thus 
tantamount to an informal ‘Brusselisation’ of policy-making (Woolcock, 2011, pp. 33–34). 
 
The preceding discussion draws a conflicting and intriguing picture of the EU’s involvement 
in international investment regulation. The Member States, on the one hand, readily 
cooperated and temporarily empowered the EU to participate in major international 
investment negotiations. But on the other hand, the Member States – ultimately 
unsuccessfully – opposed the extension of the EU’s legal competences in this key domain of 
global economic governance. On the whole, these observations seem inconsistent with 
mainstream theories of the fields of European Integration and International Relations and 
trigger several questions. Why did the Member States readily cooperate and empower the 
EU to participate in international investment negotiations since the 1980s? And why did the 
Member States then oppose the extension of the EU’s legal competences in this domain? 
And finally, why did the Lisbon Treaty extend the EU’s exclusive competence to FDI 
regulation despite the reported opposition from Member States? The thesis seeks to answer 
these questions. The research objective of the study is to trace and to explain the emergence 
of the EU’s international investment policy from the EU’s first involvement in international 
investment negotiations in the 1980s until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
extension of the CCP to FDI regulation in 2009. The overarching research question of the 
study thus reads as follows:  
 
Why did the EU acquire de facto and legal competences to regulate international 
investment flows since the 1980s? 
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Research on the EU’s involvement in international investment policy is scarce and 
underdeveloped (Billiet, 2006; Meunier, 2013; Niemann, 2013, 2012; Young, 2001). As 
discussed in detail in Chapter III, the few existing studies neither provide fully convincing 
theoretical nor empirical accounts of the EU’s involvement in this key domain of global 
economic governance. Drawing on European Integration, International Relations (IR) and 
International Political Economy (IPE) theories, the thesis explores two competing 
explanations for the gradual extension of the EU’s de facto and legal competences in 
international investment regulation. Hypothesis H1 builds on supranational thinking and 
stipulates that the Commission acted as policy entrepreneur using various strategies to 
advance a communitarisation of international investment policy-making. Hypothesis H2, on 
the other hand, builds on liberal intergovernmental thinking. It stipulates that European 
business sought access to ambitious, state-of-the-art international investment agreements 
(IIAs) so as to better compete in the world economy and therefore lobbied the Member 
States to start cooperating and delegating international investment policy-making to the EU-
level. The thesis thereby ties into the classic contestation between supranational and 
intergovernmental explanations of European Integration. Whereas supranational scholars 
assume that the Member States have lost at least partly control over European Integration to 
supranational agents like the Commission, scholars of intergovernmentalism insist that the 
Member States remain in full control of the integration process (Börzel, 2013; Rosamond, 
2000; Wiener, 2009).  
 
The thesis evaluates the validity of the hypotheses and thereby underlying theoretical 
accounts of European Integration on the basis of several in-case studies. The in-case studies 
are policy-making instances, which significantly shaped the EU’s de facto and legal 
competences in international investment policy since the 1980s. The thesis primarily uses 
analytical process tracing in order to evaluate why and how the EU acquired de facto and 
legal competences. To that end, it draws on a considerable number of primary documents, 
extensive press and archival research, 41 anonymised research interviews, secondary 
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literature and insights from a five-month internship at the investment policy unit of the 
Directorate General for Trade in the European Commission and various informal encounters 
with Member State officials during meetings of the Trade Policy Committee (TPC). The 
thesis first analyses why the EU acquired de facto competences and was allowed to negotiate 
on investment disciplines in the context of the Uruguay and Doha Round, in negotiations on 
the ECT, MAI and FTAs with Mexico and Chile. On the other hand, the thesis examines 
whether Commission entrepreneurship or business and government preferences better 
account for the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in the context of legal proceedings 
at the ECJ, IGCs and in the Convention on the Future of Europe. In order to increase the 
robustness of the findings, the thesis seeks to assess which factors shaped the BIT programs 
of the Member States. It analyses the content of 475 Member State, US and Canadian IIAs. 
It seeks to evaluate whether international regulatory competition and thereby, indirectly 
sectorial preferences and lobbying shaped Member States’ BIT programmes prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty. The rationale is that if Member States’ BIT programmes bore the traces of 
regulatory competition and business lobbying, one may assume that these factors also played 
a role in the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy.  
 
1.1 A brief outlook on the findings of the thesis 
The empirical findings lend support to supranational thinking and hypothesis H1. They 
challenge hypothesis H2 and liberal intergovernmemtal thinking on European Integration. 
European business was mostly uninformed, unorganised, passive or divided over the benefits 
of a communitarisation of international investment policy-making. Except for the FTA 
negotiations with Mexico and Chile, when European business pushed policy-makers to reach 
for investment liberalisation commitments of NAFTA-parity, the thesis finds little evidence 
of decisive business involvement in the emergence of the EU’s international investment 
policy.  
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The Member States were happy to cooperate in certain negotiating fora such as in the 
GATT/WTO or ECT negotiations in order to maximise bargaining power and to reach for 
better deals. Yet, the Member States also sought to contain the EU’s involvement in 
international investment negotiations and regulation such as in the MAI and temporarily in 
FTA negotiations in order to protect their competences against a too ambitious and intrusive 
Commission. They vehemently opposed an extension of the EU’s legal competences in this 
policy domain during ECJ proceedings, IGCs and the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
The Member States thus acted as brakemen rather than as motor behind the emergence of the 
EU’s international investment policy.  
 
The Commission, finally, acted as policy entrepreneur and persistently pushed for a 
consolidation of the EU’s de facto and legal competences in international investment policy-
making. It used its agenda setting powers, invoked the evolving trade agenda, fringe and 
implied competences, pointed out that the EU already held de facto competences in this 
domain, strategically used different international negotiating fora and had recourse to legal 
review in order to convince and to pressure the Member States into cooperating and 
delegating international investment policy-making to the EU-level. While the Commission’s 
policy entrepreneurship worked fairly well in extending the EU’s de facto competences in 
international negotiations, the Commission struggled for many years to attain an extension of 
the EU’s legal competences. It was only due to the procedural particularities of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe that the Commission’s policy entrepreneurship finally 
succeeded. The Convention method limited the control of Member State governments and 
notably technocrats over Treaty revisions and thereby facilitated Commission 
entrepreneurship and paved the way toward an extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. The 
Convention’s end result – the Lisbon Treaty – finally provided the EU with a solid legal 
competence in international investment policy.  
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1.2 Empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions of the thesis 
The thesis makes several contributions. The main contribution is of an empirical nature. It is 
the first study to comprehensively examine the EU’s growing involvement in international 
investment regulation during the last three decades. Taking into consideration the 
considerable importance of international investment for modern economies as well as the 
growing political salience of the international investment regime and investment arbitration, 
this thesis indeed closes a remarkable gap in the literature. It thereby prepares the ground for 
future research and political debates on this ever more important domain of global economic 
governance.  
 
The thesis, moreover, takes uncommon methodological paths. It jointly examines the EU’s 
involvement in international investment negotiations and grand bargains in IGCs on Treaty 
revisions. Most political scientists deliberately seek to disentangle these policy-making 
spheres. IGCs function according to different rules than those of daily policy-making. Many 
scholars therefore analyse these spheres in separation in order to reduce ‘noise’ and allow for 
the development of more parsimonious theories of European Integration and international 
cooperation (Grieco, 1995; Moravcsik, 1998; Rosamond, 2000; Schmitter, 2009). The thesis, 
however, builds on two key assumptions, which rule out the analytical separation of daily 
policy-making and IGCs. First, temporary Member State cooperation in daily policy-making 
shapes the EU’s legal competences. The exclusive analysis of IGCs is thus likely to blur the 
actual causalities shaping the EU’s legal competences. Second, European Integration in 
foreign economic policy occurs and progresses most of the time through temporary, informal 
Member State cooperation in daily policy-making and not through grand intergovernmental 
bargains (Klein, 2013). So if the purpose of research is to understand why the Member States 
cooperate, it is misleading to exclusively focus on IGCs. This approach of the thesis indeed 
delivers a much richer and more diverse empirical and theoretical picture of the emergence 
of the EU’s international investment policy than the narrow analytical focus of the standard 
approach could have delivered. As will become clear in the course of this thesis, the standard 
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approach would have produced incomplete and eventually erroneous explanations for the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The thesis thus makes the plea to re-
evaluate the benefits of theoretical parsimony vis-à-vis empirical depth. Parsimony is to be 
welcomed, but only if it allows formulating correct assumptions about reality.   
 
The thesis makes four theoretical contributions to different literatures. First, the thesis 
contributes to the long-standing theoretical contestation between supranational and 
intergovernmental explanations of European Integration. Intergovernmentalists argue that 
the Member State governments hold full control over cooperation and integration in the EU. 
Cooperation and integration is always a state-led and state-serving process (Börzel, 2013, pp. 
504–506; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 135–139). 
Supranationals – such as neofunctionalist and institutionalist scholars – claim that the 
Member State governments have at least partly lost control. Cooperation and integration may 
occur without government support or even in the face of government opposition (Börzel, 
2013, pp. 504–505; Haas, 1958; Hoffmann, 1966; Lindberg, 1963; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 51–
52). While this controversy may appear purely theoretical, it implicitly raises the question 
whether the EU resembles more a federation of sovereign states or a federal state. This thesis 
does not seek to take sides in this philosophical and political debate. But it lends support to 
the supranational camp and sheds new light on how suparanational actors such as the 
Commission may promote integration despite Member State opposition. It demonstrates that 
Commission entrepreneurship decisively promoted the emergence of the EU’s international 
investment policy despite Member State opposition and identifies several successful 
strategies of Commision entrepreneurship.    
 
Second, the thesis challenges the mainstream assumption in IPE research that business – as 
main beneficiary of IIAs – decisively shapes international investment policy (see Gus Van 
Harten, 2007; Yackee, 2010). The thesis draws a striking picture of business lethargy in 
international investment policy. Business was uninformed, unorganised and uninterested 
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most of the time – notable exceptions were the negotiations on investment liberalisation with 
Mexico and Chile. Business afforded no attention to questions related to post-establishment 
treatment and protection provisions. These observations suggest that in particular old-
fashioned BITs, which do not cover investment liberalisation, had only a limited perceived 
welfare impact and do not significantly affect investment decisions and the profitability of 
subsidiaries abroad. The thesis thereby ties into a growing econometric literature, which 
seeks to evaluate the impact of IIAs/BITs on investment flows, home and host economies. 
According to this literature, it remains unclear yet whether and when IIAs/BITs actually 
affect investment activities and economic growth (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009; Hallward-
Diremeier, 2013; Neumeyer and Spess, 2005; Busse et al., 2010; Egger and Merlo, 2007; 
Colen et al., 2014; Yackee, 2009). This finding raises question marks over the drivers and 
nature of today’s international investment regime and more generally the role of business in 
shaping today’s complex global political economy. Moreover, it has policy-making 
implications for the EU’s future approach and content of IIAs.  
 
Third, the thesis ties into historical institutionalist research on agency-driven endogenous 
institutional change. Hitorical institutionalists seek to explain institutional stability and 
change on the basis of concepts such as critical junctures and path dependence. For many 
years, scholars of historical institutionalism assumed that institutional change could only 
come about if development paths and social feedback processes break down due to 
exogenous shocks. Recently scholars have challenged this assumption and pointed to various 
sources of endogenous institutional change (Deeg, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). Streek and Thelen (2005) as well as Thelen and 
Mahoney (2010), moreover, highlight that institutions are rules governing interactions 
affecting the power and welfare of social and political actors. Due to their distributive 
effects, institutions are subject to endogenous contestation and pressure for change. This 
thesis uncovers such an instance of endogenous agency-driven institutional change and 
identifies an intriguing strategy of change-oriented agents to force change upon stability-
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oriented agents. It shows that the Commission (change-oriented agent) wanted to reform the 
CCP to extend its powers in international investment policy. As the Member States 
(stability-oriented agents) were unwilling to cease power, the Commission inter alia shaped 
the international trade agenda in the GATT/WTO and FTAs so as to then invoke the 
evolving trade agenda and to step up pressure on the Member States to cooperate and to 
delegate international investment policy-making to the EU-level. In more abstract terms, the 
thesis suggests that change-oriented agents may mobilise and shape the extra-institutional 
context in order to force institutional change on stability-oriented agents.  
 
Finally, the thesis contributes to the literature on system and unit-level theories of IR and 
IPE. A core literature of IR and IPE suggests that the international system determines 
countries’ foreign economic policies (Kindelberger, 1976; Krasner and Webb, 1989; 
Keohane, 1984). Several scholars argue along similar lines that the EU’s foreign economic 
policy forms in response to systemic developments (Manger, 2009; Dür, 2007). This thesis 
demonstrates that the EU’s growing role in international investment policy was indeed at the 
most fundamental level a reaction to changes in the global trade regime. It, however, shows 
that the Commission was instrumental in transmitting such systemic changes into the EU-
internal policy-making debate and policy outcomes. The thesis thereby adds another ‘causal’ 
layer to the theoretical discussion. Systemic pressures do not automatically affect Member 
State and business preferences and strategies but may require agency to get transmitted into 
policy-making.  
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II provides an introduction to international 
investment and international investment policy. It summarises essential background 
information for the understanding of the research topic and the empirical chapters which 
follow. Chapter III lays the theoretical groundwork of the thesis. It discusses in more detail 
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the concepts of de facto and legal competences and how they relate to Member State 
cooperation. It reviews the theoretical literature on European Integration in general as well as 
the limited literature on the EU’s growing role in international investment policy. Building 
on this review, it develops the two competing hypotheses on the emergence of the EU’s 
international investment policy. Chapter IV turns to the empirical analysis. It examines the 
EU’s involvement in investment-related negotiations during the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT (1986-1994). Chapter V shifts the analytical focus to the EU’s role in investment-
related negotiations on the ECT (1990-1998). Chapter VI analyses the EU’s participation in 
the MAI negotiations (1995-1998) and the closely related but short-lived investment 
negotiations as part of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round (1996-2003). Chapter VII 
examines how investment provisions made their way into European FTAs. The focus lies on 
the EU-Mexico negotiations (1996-1999) and EU-Chile negotiations (1999-2002), which 
marked the beginning of investment provisions in European FTAs. Chapter VIII analyses the 
EU-internal debates during legal proceedings, IGCs and the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, which shaped the EU’s legal competences. Chapter IX takes a new direction. It 
conducts a large-n comparison of IIAs and BITs of Member States and third countries in 
order to evaluate to what extent international regulatory competition and underlying business 
lobbying shaped Member States’ BIT programmes prior to the Lisbon Treaty. It concludes 
that regulatory competition and business lobbying are unlikely to have shaped Member State 
BIT approaches, which raises question marks over the importance of these factors in the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. Chapter X concludes. It discusses the 
empirical findings and theoretical implications and embeds the thesis in broader debates on 
the global political economy, the international investment regime and institutional change.   !
 
 
  
24 
 
Chapter II – An introduction to international investment 
and its regime 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces international investment and its regime. It seeks to provide 
background information which is useful for the comprehension of the following chapters. 
The chapter does not claim scientific originality and the expert reader may decide to skip it. 
The chapter first discusses definitions of international investment, its effects on economies, 
as well as states’ policy instruments to deal with the phenomenon. It then traces the legal and 
economic history of the international investment regime. It concludes with a brief summary 
of the EU’s legal competences in this domain.   
 
2.1 Defining international investment  
Many policy-makers, academics – and also this thesis – frequently use the layman’s term 
‘international investment’. But what exactly is international investment? International 
investment is normally used in order to refer to the more technical concept of ‘foreign direct 
investment’ (FDI). The concept of FDI is mainly used in statistics, law and economics and 
carries similar yet slightly different meanings in these disciplines. The following sections 
briefly discuss the meanings of the concept in these fields for the sake of completeness. This 
thesis builds in the following chapters on a broad economic, rather than purely legalistic 
reading of the term international investmet (see section 2.1.3).  
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2.1.1 International investment as a statistical concept 
Central bankers and statisticians initially created the concept of FDI as a category of balance 
of payments statistics. These seek to quantify to what degree, and how, an economy is 
integrated into the world economy. Such statistics list capital stocks and capital flows related 
to long-term cross-border investments and production processes of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) under the category ‘FDI’. The category FDI comprises the initial investment2 to 
establish, merge or buy an affiliated enterprise3 abroad as well as consequent bidirectional 
operational capital flows4 between the parent and affiliated enterprises. Although FDI has 
become a widely used term, there is no universally accepted detailed definition. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have sought to consolidate existing definitions of FDI in order to 
facilitate statistical data collection and comparisons, and policy-making debates, and to 
promote a harmonisation of national legislation on this matter. The official IMF and OECD 
definitions are by and large identical and state the following.  
 
“Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in 
one economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an 
enterprise that is resident in another economy.” 
 (IMF, 2009, p. 100) 
 
According to the IMF and OECD definitions, the key characteristic of FDI is thus that the 
investor maintains a lasting economic relationship and exercises influence or control over the 
affiliated enterprise abroad. The OECD and IMF definitions state that a lasting relationship, 
influence and control can be assumed, if the investor holds 10% of equity share or voting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This includes, for instance, the acquisition of real estate, licences or machinery and most other 
expenditures related to setting up or buying an affiliated enterprise abroad.  
3 Three types of affiliated enterprises exist. First, branches belong 100% to the investor or parent 
company. Second, subsidiaries belong 99-50% to the investor. Finally, associates belong 49-10% to 
the investor.  
4 This includes the repatriation of profits, disinvestment, re-investment, intra-firm loans, etc. 
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power in the policy-making of the affiliated enterprise (IMF, 2009, p. 100; OECD, 2008, pp. 
17–18). In cases where an investor holds less than 10% of equity share or voting power, their 
investment might still qualify as indirect FDI. An investment qualifies as indirect FDI if the 
investor has an ‘effective voice’ in the management of the affiliated enterprise through staff 
or a seat on the board (etc.) (IMF, 2009, p. 100). Cross-border investments which do not 
fulfil these criteria, are considered as portfolio investments. These are typically short-term 
investments of a speculative nature. The investor does not exercise influence or control over 
the affiliated enterprise. The investor has a narrow focus on the short-term rate of return 
(Alvarez, 2009, p. 204; Johannsen, 2009, pp. 11–15; Jones, 2005, p. 5).  
 
2.1.2 International investment as a legal concept  
The distinction between FDI and portfolio investments might appear at first to be a statistical 
detail. It is, however, of importance for European policy-makers. Since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the regulation of FDI comes under the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) and exclusive Union competence. The regulation of portfolio 
investment, on the other hand, comes under shared competence between the EU and the 
Member States under articles 63-66 TFEU on the free movement of capital (Dimopoulos, 
2011, pp. 78, 123; Krajewski, 2005, p. 112). Hence, the applicable European decision-
making rules, policy-making objectives, the prerogatives of the Member States, the 
Commission and the European Parliament differ considerably between the two types of 
investment. It is thus important to define FDI under European law.  
 
The European Treaties refer to the term FDI. They do not, however, define the term in any 
detail. The scope of the new Union competence under articles 206-207 TFEU is therefore a 
priori unclear. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has, however, developed a binding 
definition of the term ‘direct investment’ and thereby indirectly of the term ‘foreign direct 
investment’ in its case law. FDI in the EU context should be understood as cross-border 
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direct investment between EU Member States and third countries instead of cross-border 
direct investment among EU Member States. The ECJ drew heavily on the above-mentioned 
OECD and IMF definitions as well as the nomenclature of the famous capital movements 
directive 88/361/EEC to that effect. The nomenclature states the following:   
 
“[Direct investments are…] investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, 
industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to maintain lasting and 
direct links between the person providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the 
undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity. 
This concept must therefore be understood in its widest sense.”  
(European Communities, 1988, p. 11) 
 
The ECJ clarified in its case law that an investment should be considered as direct 
investment under European law, if the investor holds a lasting interest and exercises control 
or influence over the enterprise abroad. Referring to the OECD and IMF definitions, the ECJ 
stated that a lasting relationship and control could generally be assumed, if the investor held 
at least 10% of equity shares and voting power in the policy-making of the affiliated firm 
(Johannsen, 2009, pp. 11–13). The ECJ qualified, however, that this was only a rule of 
thumb. So-called “golden share” rules for instance decouple ownership and influence on 
management decisions, which might increase or decrease the relative influence of an 
investor on the policy-making of an affiliated enterprise. The corporate law of host countries 
can decisively shape the degree of control of investors and hence affect the legal status of an 
investment (Johannsen, 2009, pp. 13–14). Furthermore, the ECJ stressed the IMF and OECD 
concepts of an effective voice and indirect FDI were valid in EU law. These concepts imply 
that an investment might still qualify as FDI in cases where the investor holds less than 10% 
of votes or shares, but dispose of other influence channels. The literature draws on a position 
paper of the EU and Member States on FDI tabled in 2002 at the World Trade Organisation 
in order to concretise possible influence channels. Accordingly, non-vote based influence 
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stems from representation on the board of the affiliated enterprise; participation in the 
decision-making; exchange of managerial staff; inter-company transactions; provisions of 
loans at lower than market rates (Johannsen, 2009, p. 14; WTO, 2002a, p. 4). The ECJ 
endorsed this argument in a series of recent judgements (Johannsen, 2009, pp. 14–15).  
 
In summary, European law recognises an investment – comprising the initial investment and 
consequent operational capital flows – as FDI, if the investment establishes an economic link 
between a Member State and extra-EU third country and if the investor controls at least 10% 
of votes or equity shares or has an effective voice in the management of the affiliated 
enterprise. The legal interpretation of term FDI under European law is thus largely identical 
to globally recognised interpretations of the IMF and the OECD. It needs to be mentioned 
though that in particular the USA and Canada have started advancing a narrower definition 
of the term FDI in their IIAs. The Commission seems inclined to follow this trend in current 
negotiations. This development may soon also translate into an altered ECJ interepretation of 
the term.   
 
2.1.3 International investment as an economic concept 
The preceding paragraphs discussed statistical and legal definitions of FDI. These advance a 
simplistic view of FDI. Economists think of FDI as a much more complex phenomenon than 
the mere cross-border movement of capital. In economics, FDI designates the international 
investment and production activities of MNEs. The following paragraphs present the major 
economic theories of FDI, MNEs and international production.  
 
The understanding of FDI as financial capital – dominant in the above-discussed statistical 
and legal definitions – has its roots in the convenient measurability of capital as well as neo-
classical theories on international trade. Neo-classical theories like the Heckscher-Ohlin 
Theorem seek to explain international trade patterns through diverging factor endowments of 
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national economies. From a neo-classical perspective, MNEs represent vehicles of excess 
capital leaving capital-rich economies for capital-scarce ones in order to increase rates of 
return for capital. Scholars increasingly questioned this understanding of MNEs and FDI 
during the 1960s. They found that the bulk of FDI was exchanged between economies with 
comparable factor endowments. Capital invested abroad could not have yielded superior 
rates of return than domestically invested capital. Hence, neo-classical theories of trade 
failed to account for the increasing number of MNEs, international production chains and the 
rising volume of FDI among industrialised economies since World War II (Jones, 2005, p. 
7).  
 
In the 1960s, scholars started investigating this theoretical puzzle and sought to explain the 
diffusion of MNEs and growth of FDI flows. They found that firms turned into MNEs in 
order to get access to cheap input factors or new consumer markets, and to exploit firm-
specific technological and managerial expertise as well as intellectual property rights. In the 
scholarly debate, FDI turned from mere financial excess capital into a more comprehensive 
concept encompassing immeasurable and intangible assets like managerial know-how, 
intellectual property rights, patents, licences or access to transnational distribution, sales and 
financial networks. It became clear that MNEs and FDI played a central role in the diffusion 
of economic and technological progress (Jones, 2005, pp. 7–8).  
 
John Dunning’s so-called OLI framework outlines this new view of MNEs and FDI. It seeks 
to explain why and when firms become MNEs and start placing FDI abroad. Dunning 
identified in his OLI framework three categories of factors, which condition the 
transformation of a firm into a MNE (Dunning, 2008, 1981). First, firms need to hold 
ownership-specific advantages, which give it a competitive edge over other firms in a 
potential host economy. Ownership-specific advantages can be technological and managerial 
expertise, economies of scale or intellectual property rights (etc.). Second, firms must 
identify a location-specific advantage in a potential host economy in order to expand abroad 
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and invest there. Location-specific advantages might be the geographical position of a 
country, good infrastructure, a cheap input like labour, scarce raw materials, high trade 
barriers or membership in a regional economic integration organisation, or treaties like the 
EU, EFTA or NAFTA. Finally, firms must perceive the internalisation of business activities 
abroad as preferable to arm’s-length contractual relations via markets. Factors influencing 
the choice between internalisation and market-based coordination might be the insufficient 
protection of intellectual property rights, patents, licences or high costs and scarce 
information for identifying partner firms. If the firm finds ownership-specific, location-
specific and internalisation advantages, it is likely to turn into a MNE and to place FDI 
abroad (Jones, 2005, p. 12).  
 
Table 2.1 Overview of OLI framework 
Advantages  Examples for OLI advantages 
 
Ownership-specific Economies of scale, intellectual property rights, patents, technological 
expertise, managerial expertise, transnational sales and production networks, 
access to cheap capital, etc. 
 
Location-specific Raw materials, cheap input factors, market size, jumping trade barriers, 
geographical location, etc. 
 
Internalisation State of rule of law and enforcement, reputation concerns, lack of adequate 
local partner firms, etc.  
 
Dunning’s model seeks to explain why firms turn into MNEs and place FDI abroad. But FDI 
can take different forms. Horizontal FDI seeks to replicate the entire parent company abroad. 
Vertical FDI replicates or ‘offshores’ only certain production steps abroad. A second order 
question is therefore: what determines the organisational form of FDI? The question is of 
importance, because vertical and horizontal FDIs have different side effects on the home and 
host economies of MNEs (Navaretti and Venables, 2004, p. 39). Scholars have identified 
three factors, which arguably determine the organisational form of FDI. First, plant-level 
economies of scale determine whether a firm is likely to concentrate or disperse production 
processes. If plant-level economies of scale are high, firms should concentrate production 
processes in few places with low input factor prices. Hence, firms are likely to engage in 
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vertical FDI. If plant-level economies of scale are low, firms should replicate their entire 
production process in several places. Firms should thus engage in horizontal FDI. Second, 
trade costs – including transport, customs, licensing, etc. – determine how far firms should 
engage in intra-firm trade or produce locally. High trade costs should foster horizontal FDI, 
whereas low trade costs should trigger vertical FDI. Finally, the factor endowment of 
involved economies should influence the choice between vertical and horizontal FDI. MNE 
activities between countries with comparable factor endowments should promote horizontal 
FDI. MNE activities between differently endowed countries should trigger vertical FDI 
(Navaretti and Venables, 2004, pp. 30–35).  
 
The preceding discussion has implicitly pointed to four motivations underlying FDI flows 
and MNE activities. Depending on the underlying motivation, FDI is likely to have different 
effects on home and host countries. First, many firms place FDI abroad in order to access 
scarce resources, like petrol, gold or diamonds. Such resource-seeking FDI drove most early 
MNE activities. Second, firms often place FDI abroad in order to access strategic assets like 
innovative technology, know-how or acquire an advantageous position in a newly emerging 
sectoral market. Such strategic asset-seeking FDI is likely to help firms in maintaining a 
competitive edge. It normally takes the form of mergers and acquisitions instead of green 
field investments. Third, many firms establish affiliated enterprises abroad in order to access 
consumer markets. The literature refers to this as market-seeking FDI. Firms engaging in 
market-seeking FDI often consider a regional presence as important for acquiring new 
clients or seek to circumvent high trade barriers. Finally, many firms engage in efficiency-
seeking FDI. They establish affiliated firms abroad in order to have access to cheaper input 
like labour (Dunning, 2008).  
 
In conclusion, FDI is not mere capital crossing borders. It is a much more complex 
phenomenon. It encompasses, besides capital, many other – often immeasurable and 
intangible – business assets. In the following chapters, this thesis will build on a broad, 
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economic rather than narrow understanding of international investment and FDI. MNEs and 
FDI thus promote the diffusion of economic and technological innovation. Moreover, FDI 
complements and substitutes for traditional trade flows. And like traditional trade flows, 
MNE activities and FDI flows affect their host and home economies in positive and negative 
ways. As discussed in detail below, these negative and positive externalities of FDI are 
ultimately the reason why states pursue international investment policies. The following 
paragraphs discuss the negative and positive externalities on host and home economies in 
detail.  
 
2.2 The economic and political impact of foreign direct investment on 
states 
FDI flows and MNE activities have always been the subjects of lively policy debates and 
populist rhetoric. The reason behind the interest of the general public in FDI and MNE 
activities is that they are not neutral on home and host countries. FDI and MNE activities 
have manifold positive as well as negative economic and political effects on countries. The 
following section first briefly discusses the positive and negative effects of outward FDI on 
the home countries of investing MNEs. The section then examines the negative and positive 
effects of inward FDI on the host countries, which welcome foreign MNEs.  
 
Outward FDI has several positive effects on home countries. Outward FDI should increase 
the competitiveness and productivity of the investing MNEs. MNEs investing abroad face 
the choice of whether to invest abroad, invest at home or to save capital. Econometric 
research suggests that FDI normally yields higher returns than forced domestic investment or 
saving. The more efficient use of MNEs’ capital increases their productivity and 
competitiveness. Furthermore, the productivity and competitiveness gains are likely to spill 
over to domestic suppliers and competitors and lastly to the entire home economy. Outward 
FDI has, moreover, two positive effects on factor markets. On the one hand, outward FDI 
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should promote the upgrading of domestic labour toward higher value-adding activities. It 
normally increases MNEs’ demand in headquarter services like management, research and 
development (R&D), legal affairs or accounting. On the other hand, outward FDI often 
unlocks new supply markets. It thereby reduces the costs for input factors like labour, 
capital, land or natural resources. Access to cheaper input factors again increases 
productivity and competitiveness while lowering consumer prices (Navaretti and Venables, 
2004, pp. 39–48; Sunesen et al., 2010, pp. 5–11).  
 
Outward FDI has also several negative effects on home countries. Most importantly, outward 
FDI is often equated with the offshoring of production. Re-imports of goods and services 
substitute for national production, which is seen to lead to higher unemployment. It needs to 
be mentioned here, however, that economic research on the impact of outward FDI on 
overall unemployment finds no significant correlation. Rather, demand for skilled workers 
increases in home economies, while demand for unskilled workers decreases. In the absence 
of corrective welfare policies, outward FDI thus increases social inequality. Moreover, 
outward FDI should increase the price of capital in home countries thereby potentially 
reducing GDP growth rates. Finally, outward FDI might in certain cases reduce the 
competitiveness of a country due to exports of innovative technologies and managerial skills 
(Dunning, 2008; Sunesen et al., 2010, p. 5).  
 
Turning now to inward FDI, it has several positive effects on host countries. Inward FDI 
should increase labour demand and employment rates. As inward FDI is a capital inflow, it 
should lower capital prices and increase GDP growth rates. Inward FDI should also promote 
the diffusion of new technologies and skills to affiliated enterprises, suppliers and the rest of 
the economy. Research furthermore suggests that MNEs pay, on average, higher wages and 
provide better working conditions than domestic firms. Inward FDI should also enhance the 
host economies’ access to international markets through MNEs’ sales and distribution 
networks. Regarding product markets, inward FDI should increase competition, lower 
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consumer prices and generally increase consumer welfare (Dunning, 2008; Lipsey, 2002, pp. 
17–40).  
  
Inward FDI also has negative effects on host countries. It can increase prices on factor 
markets thereby hampering national economic development and growth. MNEs generally 
dispose of greater capital reserves and purchasing power than domestic competitors. The 
presence of MNEs – notably in developing countries – might thus push domestic competitors 
out of the market. The literature labels this undesired effect of inward FDI as a ‘crowding 
out’ of factor markets. Inward FDI might also threaten countries’ national security (BDI, 
2008). Inward FDI into defence industries, public services5 or strategic economic sectors6 
often triggers concerns about the underlying objectives and reliability of foreign investors. 
These concerns have become particularly salient since state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF) from emerging markets have become potent international 
investors. Many countries – and most EU Member States – therefore maintain so-called 
national security screening mechanisms so as to evaluate, condition or prohibit foreign 
investments in sensitive economic sectors. It remains to be seen how the EU will deal with 
investment screening following the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation.  
 
In conclusion, FDI flows have a multitude of positive and negative effects on the involved 
countries. History and research suggest that FDI is neither exclusively good, nor exclusively 
bad for home and host countries. The impact of FDI on home and host countries depends on 
the volume, purpose and type of FDI. Resource- and strategic-asset-seeking FDI often yield 
limited benefits for host countries, whereas market- and efficiency-seeking FDI can promote 
their economic growth and development. On the other hand, efficiency-seeking FDI can 
have negative labour market impacts on home countries, whereas resource-, market- and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Under European law the term public services typically comprises telecommunications, postal 
services, transport services, education, emergency services and hospitals as well as water and energy 
supply.  
6 Countries consider different sectors as strategic or sensitive. Typical sectors, however, are extractive 
and mining industries, aviation and high-tech industries as well as financial services.  
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strategic-asset-seeking FDI should foster growth in the home countries of MNEs. The 
volume, purpose and type of FDI generated by economies depend on three variables – 
countries’ resource endowment, their factor endowment and, finally, national investment-
related policies (Dunning, 2008; Velde, 2006). Countries cannot influence their resource or 
factor endowments in the short or medium term. They can, however, pursue international 
investment policies, which maximise positive effects while minimising negative effects of 
FDI flows and MNE activities. International investment policy is therefore a key instrument 
of states in mitigating the effects of economic globalisation on society.  
  
2.3 International investment policy – objectives and policy instruments 
Countries seek to minimise negative effects while maximising positive effects of FDI flows 
and MNE activities. This broad objective by and large translates into the following structural 
preferences nowadays. Developed and capital-abundant developed countries normally seek 
to promote outward and inward FDI flows. Developing and capital-scarce countries normally 
want to attract FDI inflows. Which policy tools do states have at their disposal to pursue 
these objectives? The following paragraphs present the main investment policy tools, which 
European governments have traditionally been using in order to influence FDI flows and 
MNE activities: investment guarantees, diplomatic protection and support for national 
investors abroad, and finally international investment agreements. It needs to be mentioned 
here that it is difficult to delimit investment policy from other policies. The business 
activities of MNEs typically touch upon a wide range of economic regulations and public 
policies like environmental, social or health policies.  All these policies might potentially 
affect investment decisions. It is nevertheless evident that governments cannot and must not 
adjust all their policies to their investment policy objectives.  
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2.3.1 Investment guarantees  
Most investors seek insurance for investment projects abroad. Many commercial and natural 
risks can be covered through private insurance companies. So-called non-commercial risks, 
however, are not normally insurable through private insurance companies. Non-commercial 
risks are, for instance, riots, civil war, terrorism, currency risks, expropriation through host 
state authorities or breaches of contracts and non-honouring of sovereign financial 
obligations (MIGA, 2011). The limited availability of insurance coverage might prevent 
promising investment projects abroad despite a low likelihood that a non-commercial risk 
materialises. The limited availability of insurance coverage for non-commercial risks is seen 
to diminish economic activity and to slow down economic growth.  
 
Investment guarantees seek to correct this alleged market failure. Investment guarantees are 
state-backed schemes, which insure investors against non-commercial risks. They thereby 
seek to support the realisation of generally promising investment projects abroad. Investment 
guarantees are thus a policy instrument to promote outward FDI. Most EU Member States 
have investment guarantee schemes in place so as to support the internationalisation of 
national business. In order to prevent an unfair distortion of international competition 
through such schemes, the members of the World Bank Group as well as of the OECD have 
formulated common guidelines regarding the allocation of state-backed investment 
guarantees (OECD, 2011). The guidelines inter alia stipulate that investment guarantee 
schemes must be self-supporting in order to prevent an international race of subsidies. Since 
the 1970s, the EU has been transposing the OECD guidelines into binding EU legislation 
under the CCP.  
 
2.3.2 Diplomatic intervention and technical support for investors 
Diplomatic intervention and technical support constitute soft policy instruments to promote 
inward and outward investment (Kaufmann-Kohler, 2013). Many states have created 
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specialised agencies, which provide information to national investors going abroad as well as 
foreign investors entering their economy. 7  These agencies inform about important 
regulations, the general investment climate and possibilities for cooperation with local 
enterprises. Moreover, most states use their diplomatic representations and ties so as to help 
national business abroad as well as to attract foreign business. Diplomatic support can be 
effective in communicating the problems of investors to host country governments. It might 
also help to mitigate discriminating and protectionist government policies and anti-
competitive behaviour of state-owned enterprises. Diplomatic protection and support is a 
particularly important investment policy instrument in host countries with an 
underdeveloped rule of law and strong state intervention in markets.  
 
2.3.3 International investment agreements 
International investment agreements (IIAs) are the most important investment policy 
instrument today. Most IIAs are bilateral and therefore also called bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). Both terms are largely synonymous. Approximately 3,500 IIAs between 
more than 150 states have been concluded to date (Mills, 2011, p. 472; UNCTAD, 2014a). 
IIAs are treaties of public international law between two or more states. In these agreements, 
states typically commit to grant investors from the other contracting state(s): 1) certain 
market access rights, 2) post-establishment treatment standards as well as 3) protection and 
compensation standards within their territory. IIAs are thus interstate agreements which 
create rights for private third parties. Capital-exporting developed countries traditionally 
conclude such agreements with capital-importing developing states. The former seek to 
promote outward FDI, while the later hope to attract inward FDI (Dolzer and Schreuer, 
2012; Dolzer and Stevens, 1995).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Ubifrance, Trade and Invest Germany, etc.  
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IIAs allegedly address a key problem in the political economy of international investment 
activities. The literature refers to it as the mousetrap problem or dynamic inconsistency 
problem (Elkmans et al., 2006; Guzman, 1997, p. 658). Foreign investors are in a position of 
force vis-à-vis potential host states before investing, because most states seek to attract 
inward FDI. Foreign investors become, however, vulnerable to host state pressure once the 
investment is made, as it is normally impossible to recover invested capital and resources 
without major losses. It follows that prior to the placement of an investment, host states have 
a strong incentive to signal to potential foreign investors that they are reliable business 
partners8 and provide stable economic and regulatory environments. Once an investment is 
placed, host states have an incentive to renege on prior commitments and to redistribute the 
risks, burdens and benefits arising from an investment project. Such state behaviour can take 
the form of direct expropriation or creeping regulatory expropriation9 of foreign investors. 
Even if host states have no intention of engaging in expropriation or creeping expropriation, 
they cannot credibly commit this to foreign investors. States are sovereign and cannot 
credibly bind themselves vis-à-vis private actors located in their jurisdiction. Foreign 
investors therefore face considerable legal uncertainty when investing abroad. They have to 
evaluate the investment environment and prospects of their project merely on the basis of a 
host country’s reputation and past behaviour. So as to enhance legal certainty for foreign 
investors, states have started committing to their peers i.e. other sovereign states to 
adequately treat and protect their investors. IIAs thereby arguably enhance legal certainty for 
investors and stimulate international investment activity.  
 
The effectiveness of IIAs is disputed. It is uncontroversial that IIAs enhance the legal 
certainty for foreign investors notably in countries with a weak rule of law. It is, however, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Investors enter into business relationships with host states for instance in joint venture agreements 
with state enterprises, under licensing agreements for the extraction of natural resources or as 
providers of public services.  
9 If governments renege on their prior commitments and/or introduce new costly regulations, it may 
undermine business plans and reduce the investment value and profitability of projects. Lawyers call 
this phenomenon creeping expropriation. Creeping expropriation is today more common than direct, 
abrupt expropriation.  
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open to discussion whether IIAs actually foster international investment activity. Research 
suggests that IIAs with investment liberalisation commitments have a robust impact on the 
volume and direction of international investment flows. The matter, however, become more 
complicated with traditional BITs, which conatin only post-establishment treatment and 
protection clauses. While some studies stipulate that BITs have only marginal effects on 
investment activity, others find statistically significant effects. Yet other studies find that the 
effects of IIAs vary in function of level of development of the contracting states or economic 
sectors and activities. The challenge of determining the impact of BITs on investment flows 
arguably derives from poor data as well as from an endogeneity problem. It is difficult to 
evaluate whether certain states conclude BITs because their investment relationship is 
intensifying, or whether the conclusion of BITs leads to an increase in investment activity. 
Finally, many international investment projects do not directly evolve between the home and 
host country but are routed through intermediary jurisdictions further complicating 
measurement (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009; Hallward-Diremeier, 2013; Neumeyer and Spess, 
2005; Busse et al., 2010; Egger and Merlo, 2007; Colen et al., 2014; Yackee, 2009; 
Copenhagen Economics, 2012, pp. 46–47).  
 
The effectiveness of IIAs in enhancing legal certainty as well as in increasing investment 
activities obviously also depends on their respective content. One can distinguish two 
models of BITs/IIAs today. European BITs merely cover post-establishment treatment 
standards as well as investment protection provisions. The so-called NAFTA-like IIA10, 
moreover, comprises binding investment liberalisation commitments. The main similarities 
and differences between these two approaches are briefly discussed below.  
 
Investment and investor 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 NAFTA stands for North American Free Trade Area. It is a comprehensive regional trade and 
investment agreement concluded between the USA, Canada and Mexico (1994). The NAFTA model 
agreement is generally synonymous with the US model BIT. 
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All IIAs seek to regulate international investment and investors. European and NAFTA-like 
IIAs by and large advance similar definitions of investors. Investors are natural or legal 
persons holding the nationality of one of the contracting states according to its national laws. 
European and NAFTA-like IIAs, however, advance slightly different definitions of the term 
investment, which theoretically translates into differences in the coverage of agreements. 
European IIAs typically contain an open-ended list of assets qualifying as investments. 
NAFTA-like IIAs, on the other hand, contain a similar list but enumerate also several assets 
(e.g. commercial loans), which do not qualify as investment under these agreements. Both 
types of IIAs albeit cover not only FDI but also portfolio investments and other investment-
like or related business assets (e.g. real estate, intellectual property rights, patents, licences, 
etc.) (see Dolzer and Stevens, 1995; Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013; Lavranos, 2013). 
 
Market access  
 
European and NAFTA-like IIAs differ also in regard to their market access provisions. 
NAFTA-like IIAs often contain negative lists indicating economic sectors open and closed to 
foreign investors. They normally provide for Most Favoured Nation (MFN) or National 
Treatment (NT) of foreign investors wishing to enter a liberalised economic sector. 
European IIAs/BITs, on the other hand, do not contain binding market access provisions. 
They merely include ‘best endeavour’ statements, which encourage the parties to gradually 
dismantle market access barriers (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012, p. 89). Prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty, market access provisions mostly came under shared competence between the EU and 
the Member States. Hence, neither the Member States, nor the EU could individually 
regulate in this domain and include such provisions into their IIAs (Dimopoulos, 2011, pp. 
78, 86). The EU and the Member States however jointly negotiated and concluded several 
‘mixed’ trade agreements with market access provisions for investors since the 1990s. The 
most notable agreements being: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (see 
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Chapter IV), the Energy Charter Treaty (see Chapter V), the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (see Chapter VI) and several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (see Chapter VII).  
 
Post-establishment treatment  
 
European and NAFTA-like IIAs contain provisions regulating the post-establishment 
treatment of foreign investors. They contain relative treatment standards like MFN and NT 
as well as absolute treatment standards like ‘treatment in accordance with Customary 
International Law’ (CIL), ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) or ‘full protection and 
security’ (FPS). Recent NAFTA-like IIAs mostly provide for CIL treatment, whereas 
European IIAs normally afford FET and FPS treatment to foreign investors. It is 
controversial whether FET and FPS represent higher minimum treatment standards than CIL 
(see Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008; Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013; Lavranos, 2013). 
 
Investment protection 
 
Investment protection provisions are the cornerstone of IIAs. They seek to ensure states’ 
respect for the substantive commitments to foreign investors under IIAs. Investment 
protection clauses contain provisions on dispute settlement procedures, which allow the 
contracting states and, normally, foreign investors to enforce their substantive rights in case 
of mistreatment in a host country. IIAs normally provide for state-to-state dispute settlement 
and for investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS). While the former is of little relevance 
today, investors increasingly draw on ISDS. Investors use ISDS to see the removal of 
nonconforming measures affecting the operation and value of a foreign investment and/or to 
claim financial compensation for any damages accruing from such measures or acts of 
outright expropriation. The advantage of ISDS for foreign investors is the possibility of 
circumventing national courts in host countries, which might be biased. European and 
NAFTA-like IIAs typically state that ISDS can be held under the rules of ICSID, 
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UNCITRAL, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce and the like. These rules regulate the selection and composition of arbitration 
panels, working method, decision-making, enforcement and annulment of awards. It needs to 
be mentioned that the approaches to investment protection of European and NAFTA-like 
IIAs differ in two important regards (see Alvarez, 2009, pp. 220–246). First, NAFTA-like 
IIAs deliberately complicate the access of foreign investors to ISDS. They may, for instance, 
oblige foreign investors to wait for a certain time period, to first seek mediation with the host 
country or to exhaust local remedies before turning to ISDS. European IIAs, on the other 
hand, typically impose little or no conditions on the use of ISDS. Second, the substantive 
provisions of NAFTA-like IIAs are much more detailed than those of European IIAs. The 
underlying objective is to limit the room for interpretation by ISDS panels, to make ISDS 
awards more predictable and thus to safeguard states’ regulatory space (Fontanelli and 
Bianco, 2013; Gugler and Tomsik, 2006; Lavranos, 2013). 
 
Today’s international investment agreement landscape 
 
IIAs are primarily bilateral today. About 3,500 BITs have been concluded among ca. 150 
states. Despite this high number, BITs only cover approximately 13% of all possible 
interstate investment relations (Mills, 2011, p. 472; UNCTAD, 2011, p. 84). On the other 
hand, only a few plurilateral and multilateral investment agreements exist. The European 
Treaties establishing the EU, the North American Free Trade Area, the Energy Charter 
Treaty and the General Agreement on Trade in Services are the only binding multi- and 
plurilateral agreements which contain noteworthy market access, post-establishment 
treatment and/or investment protection rules. The OECD Guidelines on Multilateral 
Enterprises and the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and Current 
Invisible Operations are furthermore gentlemen’s agreements, which encompass rules on 
pre-establishment treatment, market access commitments and post-establishment treatment. 
These agreements are of a plurilateral nature. Attempts to negotiate truly global and 
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comprehensive investment agreements have failed on several occasions during the last 60 
years (see Chapters IV and VI) (Dattu, 2000; Vandevelde, 1997).  
 
Academics debate whether today’s BIT network, nevertheless, exhibits the characteristics of 
an international regime. In public international law, a regime is conventionally defined as a 
coherent set of rules, standards and objectives governing a particular issue area of 
international relations. It has been pointed out that almost all countries have signed BITs. A 
big majority of states therefore subscribes on a bilateral basis to the fundamental principles 
enshrined in BITs. Such fundamental principles are, for instance, FET, post-establishment 
treatment no worse than provided under CIL, and the prohibition of expropriating from 
foreign nationals without paying adequate and prompt compensation. One may, however, 
also refute the argument that today’s network of BITs establishes de facto a multilateral 
investment regime. The provisions in BITs vary and provide for different standards of 
treatment as well as different levels of protection for foreign investors. States, moreover, 
arguably conclude BITs so as to provide their economies with a competitive edge in the 
international race over capital and investment opportunities. As BITs are arguably 
instruments to increase the competitiveness of national business and states in the 
international race for investment, they cannot aim to establish a global regime of public 
international law ruling international investment (Alvarez, 2009; Mills, 2011).  
 
2.4 A brief history of international investment  
The preceding sections might have created the impression that investment policy is a dull, 
technocratic and dry matter. This impression is, however, erroneous. International 
investment flows and their regulation have always been a politicised and ideological 
battleground of international relations. The following pages first summarise the development 
of the modern international investment regime since the 18th century. Afterwards, it briefly 
discusses geographical and sectoral trends of international investment flows in the recent 
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past. The term international investment regime is broadly understood here so as to 
summarise the rules governing international investment. The study does not seek to take 
sides in the academic debate on the regime-like qualities of today’s IIA network.  
 
2.4.1 The emergence of the modern international investment regime 
The economic phenomenon of international investment is as old as humanity. As long as 
3,000 years ago, the Phoenicians invested outside their territories and established trading 
posts around the Mediterranean Sea. During the middle ages, the merchants of the English 
Russia Company and of the Hanseatic League established kontors in trading hubs all over 
Northern Europe. During the Renaissance, Florentine and Lombard banking houses founded 
branches in London and the Low Lands. Since these times, states have pursued – at least 
implicitly – investment policies and concluded investment-related agreements.  
 
The origin of the modern international investment regime can be traced back to the late 18th 
century. In 1778, the USA and France concluded a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which is 
sometimes considered to be the precursor of the first modern investment agreement. It 
sought to protect the property of French and US nationals abroad. It referred to the principle 
of due process, which is similar to the FET standard in modern IIAs (Dattu, 2000, p. 303; 
The Avalon Project (Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library), 1999).  
 
What is more, in 1789, the French National Constituent Assembly adopted the Declaration 
of Rights of Man and of the Citizens. The declaration established the right to property. States 
should only expropriate property in exceptional circumstances, for public purposes, on a 
non-discriminatory basis and following due process of law. Other European and American 
states gradually endorsed the fundamental right to property in the early 19th century, which 
also affected customary international law on the protection of foreign property (Dattu, 2000, 
pp. 280–281). Since the Middle Ages, it was assumed in Europe that states had the right to 
45 
 
protect their nationals abroad against harm from other states. When the right to property 
became a fundamental right in Europe and Northern America in the early 19th century, the 
right of diplomatic protection was logically extended to the protection of nationals’ property 
abroad (Vandevelde, 1997, p. 379).  
 
In the first decades of the 19th century, the opinio juris formed that foreigners were entitled 
to non-discriminatory treatment and fair compensation in case of expropriation. In cases 
where the overall level of protection of property or compensation was inadequate in a host 
state, home states were entitled to seek redress with legal and military means in the name of 
their injured nationals (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012, pp. 1–12). CIL thus established national 
treatment of foreign investors and set a minimum standard of treatment, protection and 
compensation for foreign-owned property. This CIL standard later became known as the 
Hull Doctrine.11 The Hull Doctrine prevailed as a CIL standard during the entire 19th and 
first half of the 20th century (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012, p. 12). CIL standards are non-
codified albeit binding obligations of public international law. A legal standard becomes part 
of CIL if a vast majority of states adheres to it.  
 
In 1868, Carlos Calvo published an economic nationalist critique of the Hull Doctrine. The 
so-called Calvo Doctrine suggests that CIL merely requires states to afford national 
treatment to foreign investors. CIL arguably does not establish a minimum treatment and 
protection standard or the right of foreign investors to financial compensation for 
mistreatment. Foreign investors should only seek legal redress for controversial treatment 
through national courts of the host country. Home country governments must not resort to 
diplomatic protection and physical violence in order to protect the property rights of their 
nationals abroad. The Calvo Doctrine was a reply to the aggressive ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of 
capital-exporting European and Northern American states during the 19th century. Although 
the Calvo Doctrine stood in the tradition of economic nationalism, which flourished in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The doctrine was named after Cordell Hull, who was US Secretary of State in the 1930s. 
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Europe and Northern America throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was never 
endorsed by leading nations. European and Northern American capital-exporting states as 
well as their dependencies and colonies held on to the Hull Doctrine in order to protect assets 
abroad. In 1907, European and Northern American countries, nevertheless, partly conceded 
to critics like Calvo. The second Hague Conference on International Peace adopted the so-
called Drago-Porter Convention, which prohibited the use of force in case of commercial, 
investment or financial interstate disputes. The prohibition on the use of military intervention 
also further reduced the appeal of the Calvo Doctrine among capital-exporting states and 
their dependencies (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008, pp. 1–12, 378–381; UNCTAD, 1999a, p. 13; 
Vandevelde, 1997, pp. 378–381).  
 
In 1917, a third doctrine regarding the treatment and protection of foreign property emerged. 
The new Bolshevik government of the Soviet Union nationalised all private property – 
regardless of the owner’s nationality – and refused to pay compensation (Vandevelde, 1997, 
pp. 380–381). Private property and its protection were seen as incompatible with the socialist 
ordre public of the Soviet Union. From a Marxist-Leninist perspective the non-compensated 
nationalisation of foreign-owned investments was just and desirable, because it arguably 
weakened the international class of capital owners, strengthened the proletariat and promoted 
the world revolution (see Cain, 1978). 
 
The Socialist assault on the Hull doctrine remained, at first, without consequences. It was 
only in the late 1940s that three developments gradually eroded the status of the Hull 
Doctrine as CIL standard. First, the failure to establish the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO), inter alia due to disagreement on investment disciplines between the USA and its 
closest allies, indicated the absence of a policy consensus among Western, capital-exporting 
democracies (Dattu, 2000, pp. 287–288). Second, the gradual expansion of socialism in 
Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa was accompanied by large-scale 
nationalisations of private property without any form of compensation. This wave of 
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nationalisations decisively weakened the Hull Doctrine (Vandevelde, 1997, pp. 383–384). 
Third, the decolonisation of large parts of Africa and Asia between 1945 and the mid-1970s 
was a further blow for the Hull Doctrine. The newly independent states engaged in large-
scale expropriation of foreign-owned property without paying compensation to foreign 
investors. Foreign investors were mostly from the former colonial motherlands and were 
active in agriculture, mining and extractive industries. They thereby controlled vast parts of 
national territories and natural resources. Many newly independent countries felt it necessary 
to expropriate these foreign investors in order to gain not only de jure independence on 
paper, but to re-assert their economic, territorial and ultimately political sovereignty 
(Vandevelde, 1997, pp. 383–384). 
 
The demise of the Hull Doctrine as a standard of customary international law became ever 
more obvious during the 1950s. Several resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (UN) – where developing and socialist countries represented the majority – 
documented this change in public international and customary law. In 1962, resolution 1803 
on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources was adopted. The resolution clarified 
that states had the right to expropriate foreigners’ assets, but should pay appropriate 
compensation. The wording of the resolution neither invalidated the Hull Doctrine, nor 
confirmed the Calvo or Socialist Doctrine as a standard of customary international law 
(Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012, p. 4). An international consensus emerged in 1973/74, when the 
UN General Assembly adopted by a large majority a declaration and several related 
resolutions on the establishment of a so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO). 
The NIEO documents stated that states have the right to nationalise foreign-owned property 
and should pay ‘appropriate compensation’. In cases where an expropriation or 
compensation gives rise to disputes, these should be settled using the host country’s laws and 
courts, unless a host country had agreed to other dispute settlement procedures. The NIEO 
declaration thereby decisively weakened the Hull Doctrine and implicitly confirmed the 
Calvo Doctrine as a new standard customary international law. Rather than having a right to 
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‘fair compensation’ foreign investors could only ask for compensation deemed approapriate 
by a host country government or court as suggested by the Calvo Doctrine (Dattu, 2000, pp. 
283–285; Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012, p. 5; Vandevelde, 1997, p. 384).  
 
The demise of the Hull Doctrine entailed the so-called treatification of the international 
investment regime. As customary international law did not provide sufficient protection of 
international investments, governments of capital-exporting states started concluding BITs in 
order to restore adequate standards of treatment and protection for national business abroad. 
The Federal Republic of Germany led the way in the treatification of the international 
investment regime. It concluded the first modern BIT with Pakistan in 1959. Today, 
Germany is the state with the highest number of BITs with third countries; it is party to 134 
BITs (UNCTAD, 2014a). Other European states did not immediately follow the West 
German example. It was only in the 1970s that other European states like the United 
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy started negotiating BITs with 
developing economies (see Figure 2.2) (Vandevelde, 1997, p. 386).  
 
Figure 2.2 Number of ratified BITs of leading capital-exporting countries 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2014b, author’s own calculations.  
 
The number of BITs in force has surged since the 1980s. Between 1959 and 1980, less than 
200 BITs had been signed. By the end of the 1980s, states had signed about 400 BITs. Today 
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some 3,500 agreements are in force (UNCTAD, 2014a, 2006, p. 3). Three developments 
fuelled the abrupt diffusion of BITs since the 1980s. First, the economic decline of the 
Soviet Union and its partners apparently demonstrated the superiority of the Western market 
economy. In this context, developing countries came to see BITs as ‘admission tickets’ to the 
Western international economy (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008, p. 5). Second, in the 1980s 
many developing, and in particular Latin American, countries suffered from severe financial 
crises. These countries badly needed capital and hard currency inflows in order to recover. 
As former proponents of the Calvo Doctrine, these countries felt the need to send a signal to 
Western investors that their capital was welcome and secure. Hence, many Latin American 
countries altered their stance on BITs and started concluding them (Vandevelde, 1997, pp. 
387–390). Third, the USA finally endorsed investment agreements as an instrument of 
investment policy in the early 1980s. Until then, the US government did not conclude IIAs, 
because it sought to defend the status of the Hull Doctrine as a standard of customary 
international law. The US government, however, revised its position in the early 1980s and 
concluded its first IIAs. The reorientation of the US approach to BITs arguably intensified 
international regulatory competition (Bungenberg, 2008, pp. 1–6). 
 
Figure 2. 3 Number of IIAs concluded per year 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2012, p. 84.  
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The 1990s were a crucial decade for the evolution of the international investment policy in 
four regards. First, the speedy diffusion of IIAs practically re-established, and even 
enhanced, the worldwide level of investment treatment and protection vis-à-vis the 
previously abandoned Hull Doctrine (see figure 2.3). The 1990s thereby saw a significant 
improvement in the global investment climate. States also launched negotiations on a 
codified multilateral investment regime for the first time since the early post-war years and 
the failure of the ITO in 1950. NAFTA and the ECT are, for instance, products of the spirit 
of the 1990s. Negotiations on a multilateral set of investment rules were also conducted in 
the Uruguay and Doha Rounds of the GATT/WTO (see Chapters IV and VII) as well as in 
the OECD (see Chapter VII). These multilateral attempts, however, ultimately failed. 
Second, investment disciplines gradually became part of the standard agenda of international 
trade talks. Whereas investment and trade policy were neatly separated policy areas until the 
late 1980s, in particular the USA started including IIA-like investment chapters into bilateral 
and regional trade agreements and also pushed for investment negotiations in the GATT. As 
will become clear in the empirical chapters, the extension of the standard agenda of 
international trade negotiations to investment disciplines triggered functional pressures on 
the the Member States to cooperate and to delegate negotiating on investment disciplines to 
the EU/Commission. After all, the EU traditionally speaks with a single voice in trade policy 
fora such as the GATT/WTO and FTA negotiations regardless of the EU-internal 
distribution of legal competences. Third, until the 1990s investment arbitration was a 
sporadic occurrence. It was only in the 1990s that investors started frequently launching 
arbitration proceedings against host countries thereby giving proper meaning to the ISDS 
clauses of modern IIAs. By 2012, at least 514 cases had been filed and the number is 
constantly rising (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 1, 2005). Finally, the late 1990s were characterised by 
an unprecedented increase in the volume of international investment flows mostly due to 
major advances in communications and transport technology as well as continued 
deregulation and privatisation policies (see figure 2.4).  
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Source: UNCTADSTAT, 2014b.  
 
The last ten years have brought a further increase in international FDI flows, arbitration 
proceedings and international investment agreements. In particular, one major change in the 
political economy of international investment flows has affected the international investment 
regime and national policies during the last years. In the past, Northern American and 
Western European states were net capital exporters. During the last two decades, North 
America and Western Europe have become net capital importers. In 2010, 30% of the EU’s 
inward FDI originated from Russia, India, China, Hong Kong and Brazil (Eurostat, 2011). 
The partial reversal of international investment flows has significant consequences for the 
international investment regime. In the past, IIAs were de facto instruments to discipline and 
bind policy-makers in developing countries, which imported capital. The partial reversal of 
FDI flows means that IIAs now also constrain Western policy-makers. Firms from emerging 
and developing markets have started investing in OECD economies and now draw on IIAs 
and ISDS so as to bring claims against these states. The US government has therefore 
repeatedly readjusted its model investment agreement since 2004. The pre-2004 model 
agreement was worded in rather broad terms so as to provide for a high level of protection 
for US investors abroad. The reversal of investment flows and first arbitration cases against 
the USA motivated the US government to narrow down the provisions of its model 
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agreement. The US government thereby seeks to reduce its vulnerability to claims under 
ISDS as well as to maintain its regulatory space (Alvarez, 2009, pp. 301–305). While some 
Member States have been critical of such reforms, it seems that the EU will follow the US 
example. The Commission seeks to ring-fence states’ regulatory space and to scale back 
investor rights under future EU IIAs and FTAs like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the USA and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
with Canada (CETA) (see for instance Peterson, 2011). 
 
2.4.2 Geography and sectors of international investment activity in historical 
perspective 
The preceding discussion indicated that the volume and direction of international investment 
flows affected the substantive provisions of IIAs, national investment policies and lastly the 
international investment regime. The following paragraphs briefly trace the evolution of FDI 
flows in terms of volume, geographical direction and economic sectors for the last century in 
order to complete the picture.  
 
Prior to World War I (1914-1918), international investment was of comparable economic 
importance to Western European and Northern American economies as in the late 1980s (see 
Table 2.3) (Velde, 2006, p. 5). International investment was then, to a large extent, a North-
South phenomenon. Firms from Northern America and Europe invested in colonies and 
developing countries in the south. Two economic sectors attracted the bulk of investment 
during this time. European and American MNEs invested heavily into the transport sector 
and in particular in railway networks. Furthermore, investment flowed into mining industries 
(Velde, 2006, p. 5). International investment was therefore primarily strategic asset- or 
resource-seeking and unlike the bulk of modern international investment.  
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The interwar period (1918-1939) brought considerable economic, financial and political 
turmoil. During World War I, economic nationalism and protectionism had spread in Europe 
and Northern America and persisted during the inter-war period. Furthermore, the war had 
irrevocably destroyed the former international currency system. Attempts to restore the pre-
war gold standard de facto failed. States engaged in ‘beggar-your-neighbour’ policies by 
under- or overvaluing their currencies as well as adopting inflationary monetary policies. 
These developments led to a disintegration of the international economy and considerable 
decline in MNE and international investment activities. Nevertheless, Western European and 
Northern American countries partly saw rising inward FDI stocks in relation to GDP. Two 
factors explain this counterintuitive observation. On the one hand, countries’ GDP had 
decreased due to the war and economic crises. On the other hand, most countries in the 
world prohibited disinvesting or repatriating profits in order to prevent capital flight. Hence, 
MNEs had to reinvest their profits in the host economy leading to an increase in FDI stocks. 
During 1930, MNEs also became forces of economic disintegration. International cartels 
emerged, which dominated domestic and international markets. These cartels effectively 
closed down their markets thereby inhibiting further international investment activities 
(Jones, 2005, pp. 29–31).  
 
After World War II, the United Kingdom and the USA intended to prevent the economic 
mistakes of the interwar period. They sought to establish an open and liberal international 
economy under the auspices of the Bretton Woods System. This attempt succeeded in part. 
States in Western Europe, Northern America and Japan gradually opened up their economies 
for trade and investment flows during the decades following World War II. Until the mid-
1960s, US capital accounted for 80% of worldwide FDI flows. Then, Western European 
states and Japan started investing abroad and became important creditor regions. FDI flows, 
however, remained primarily transatlantic. By 1980, two-thirds of worldwide FDI stocks 
were concentrated in the EU, the USA and Canada. FDI was mostly market- or strategic-
asset-seeking. It was concentrated in the manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, service 
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sectors. It was only in the late 1980s that FDI stocks attained comparable levels and 
economic importance in Western European and Northern American countries to those of the 
pre-1914 period (Dunning, 1997, pp. 3–5; Jones, 2005, pp. 33–35; United Nations, 1993, p. 
55).  
 
Table 2.5 North-South FDI stock as percentage of GDP 1913-2004 
 1913/14 1930s 1950s 1970/1 1980 1995 2003/4 
Developed countries Outward stock of FDI/GDP (per cent) 
Canada 6 25 6 7 9 20 37 
France 23 10  5  25 38 
Germany 11 5  3 4 10 31 
Japan 11 47  2 2 5 8 
Netherlands 82 28  35 25 47 94 
UK 49 18 9 17 15 28 65 
US 7 8 4 8 8 18 17 
Developing contries Inward stock of FDI/GDP (per cent) 
Average 
colonies 
42 61 35 14  19  
Average 
Independent 
36 37 17 9  14  
Average  40 51 30 13  18 26 
Latin 
America 
    4 12 38 
Asia     4 12 24 
Africa     8 15 32 
Source: Velde, 2006, p.5.  
 
The increasing concentration of FDI flows and stocks in the manufacturing sectors in North 
America and Western Europe was mirrored by a marginalisation of developing and socialist 
countries in the international investment landscape (see Table 2.3 above). As previously 
explained, many developing and socialist countries engaged in large-scale nationalisation of 
foreign-owned property in the late 1940s and 1960s. These nationalisation programmes 
scared off inward FDI. Second, most developing countries adhered to economic nationalism 
and adopted protectionist foreign economic policies. Inward FDI was generally undesired 
(Jones, 2005, p. 31).  
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Figure 2.6 Global FDI inflows in billions of US Dollars (1980-2010) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011, p.3.  
 
The international investment landscape changed after the late 1980s. Five trends must be 
highlighted. The demise of socialism and widespread sovereign debt crises in developing 
countries in the mid-1980s entailed the adoption of liberal economic, trade and investment 
policies in many countries. This move toward liberal, market-based policies – in 
combination with technical improvements in transport and telecommunications – triggered 
an unprecedented surge in the volume of worldwide FDI flows (Jones, 2005, p. 35; Velde, 
2006, p. 5). Around the mid-1990s, the volume of international FDI flows started exceeding 
the volume of traditional trade in goods and services. Only the Dot-com and Subprime crises 
temporarily interrupted the growth of FDI stocks and flows (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 3). Second, 
the increase in the volume of world FDI stocks and flows was not limited to North America, 
the EU and Japan. Developing and emerging countries also experienced increasing volumes 
of FDI stocks and inflows. In 2010, developing and emerging countries received 52% of 
worldwide inward FDI flows (see figure 2.4; UNCTAD, 2011, p. 3). This trend is, 
nevertheless, geographically limited. Since 1980, eight developing and emerging 
economies12 have accounted for more than 75% of inward FDI into this group of countries. 
The leading 25 developing and emerging countries account for 95% of inward FDI in this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 China, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, Russia, Chile and India.  
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Figure I.2.  UNCTAD’s Global FDI Quarterly Index,a  2007 Q1–2011 Q1
(Base 100: quarterly average of 2005)
Figure I.3.  FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1980–2010
(Billions of dollars) 
Source:  UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/
fdistatistics).
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Global FDI inflows in 2010 
reached an estimated 
$1,244 billion (figure I.1) – a 
small increase from 2009’s 
level of $1,185 billion. How-
ever, there was an uneven 
pattern between regions 
and also between subregions. FDI inflows to devel-
oped countries and transition economies contract-
ed further in 2010. In contrast, those to developing 
economies recovered strongly, and together with 
transition economies – for the first time – surpassed 
the 50 per cent mark of global FDI flows (figure I.3). 
FDI flows to developing economies rose by 12 
per cent (to $574 billion) in 2010, thanks to their 
relatively fast economic recovery, the strength 
of domestic demand, and burgeoning South–
South flows. The value of cross-border M&As into 
developing economies doubled due to attractive 
valuations of company assets, strong earnings 
growth and robust economic fundamentals (such 
as market growth). 
As more international production moves to 
developing and transition economies, TNCs are 
increasingly investing in those countries to maintain 
cost-effectiveness and to remain competitive in the 
global production networks. This is now mirrored 
The shift of FDI inflows to 
developing and transition 
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2010: for the first time, 
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together account for roughly 90 per cent of global flows. The index has been calibrated such that 
the average of quarterly flows in 2005 is equivalent to 100.
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group (Velde, 2006, p. 6). Third, the increasing share of developing and emerging economies 
in worldwide FDI flows has partly reversed the direction of FDI flows. The last 20 years 
produced a significant increase in South-South FDI flows. Moreover, emerging and 
developing countries have started investing in Northern America, Europe and Japan. In 
2010, 30% of the EU’s inward FDI, for instance, came from emerging countries (Eurostat, 
2011). Fourth, during the last 20 years the share of FDI flowing into the services sector has 
constantly increased, while the share flowing to the manufacturing and agriculture sectors 
has decreased (UNCTAD, 2014b, pp. 9–10). Finally, whereas greenfield investments 
constituted the bulk of FDI in the past, today MNEs often invest abroad in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions with existing local enterprises (UNCTAD, 2014b, p. 7).  
 
2.5 A short overview of the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment policy 
The following chapters discuss the evolution of the EU’s legal and de facto competences in 
international investment policy in detail. It is, nevertheless, helpful to the reader to briefly 
summarise the EU’s legal competences in this field. The summary should enable the reader 
to better identify the relationship between the empirical observations in Chapters IV to VIII 
and the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The section – as the entire 
thesis – primarily focuses on the EU’s competences to conclude IIAs. For the sake of 
completeness, it also briefly evaluates the EU’s legal competences regarding investment 
guarantee schemes and diplomatic protection. The following discussion is not conclusive. 
The legal literature on this matter is voluminous and continues to grow. The exact 
delimitation of the national, shared and exclusive Union competence remains controversial 
despite the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
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2.5.1 The EU and investment guarantee schemes  
The EU mostly plays a supervising role regarding investment guarantee schemes. Article 
112 EC of the Treaty of Rome stipulated that the EU should ensure a harmonisation of 
Member States’ export policies. The term export policy comprises investment guarantee 
schemes. In 1975, Opinion 1/75 of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed that the 
EU was indeed competent under the CCP to adopt autonomous measures and to conclude 
international agreements aiming at the harmonisation of Member States’ export policies. 
Since then, the EU unilaterally adheres to and transposes OECD guidelines on export 
policies into binding European legislation. The references to export policies in the Treaty 
were later deleted through the Treaty of Nice. The EU remains, nonetheless, competent to 
adopt general rules and to harmonise Member States’ export policies. Some scholars suggest 
that the EU is competent to launch a proper European investment guarantee scheme, but so 
far the Member States administer and finance their own export policy programmes including 
investment guarantees (Bourgeois, 2003, pp. 638–762; Dimopoulos, 2011, pp. 103–104; 
Vedder, 2008, p. 28).  
 
2.5.2 The EU and diplomatic support 
The EU and the Member States jointly provide diplomatic protection and support to 
European investors. Taking into consideration that measures of diplomatic protection and 
support are mostly political in nature, there was never a controversy about the distribution of 
legal competences in this domain. The EU/Commission and the Member States both 
maintain a multitude of bilateral committees with third country governments in order to 
discuss any problems relating to trade or investments. What is more, the EU and the Member 
States also use their formal diplomatic channels to raise attention to the problems of 
European investors. The EU and the Member States, moreover, both provide information to 
European investors who plan to invest in third countries. Most Member States, finally, have 
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established so-called investment promotion agencies, which advise foreign investors seeking 
to enter their economy.13 
 
2.5.3 The EU and the conclusion of international investment agreements 
Today, IIAs are the main instrument of international investment policy. Since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU is exclusively competent to regulate FDI. 
Hence, the EU is in general competent to conclude IIAs. The Member States, on the other 
hand, must abstain from concluding new IIAs with third countries. The EU’s new 
competence under Articles 206 and 207 TFEU to conclude IIAs is comprehensive, albeit not 
exclusive, regarding all elements of IIAs. Certain elements of IIAs still come under national 
or shared competence. The following paragraphs briefly evaluate the EU’s legal competence 
regarding the core elements of IIAs: market access, post-establishment treatment and 
investment protection.  
 
Market access 
The EU holds an exclusive competence to regulate market access for FDI under Articles 206 
and 207 TFEU. It holds merely a shared competence to regulate market access for portfolio 
investments under Article 63 TFEU. IIAs typically cover both types of cross-border 
investments. It follows from this review that only the EU can enter into market access 
commitments vis-à-vis third countries, but that the Member States have an important say 
over any decision in this domain. It needs to be mentioned here that the Lisbon Treaty did 
not significantly change the situation in this domain. The EU was already competent to 
regulate market access for service-related FDI under Article 133 TFEU after the entry into 
force of the Nice Treaty (2003). The EU, moreover, held a shared competence regarding the 
regulation of market access for FDI and portfolio investments under Article 57 TFEU of the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993). It is, however, the subject of academic dispute whether this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See for instance UBI France, Trade and Invest Germany, etc.  
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competence basis ruled out that the Member States act and regulate in this domain. While the 
Member States did not conclude BITs with investment liberalisation commitments, some 
lawyers take the view that the EU was too passive during the 1990s to prevent Member State 
action in the domain. Regardless of this theoretical debate, it is fair to say that the Lisbon 
Treaty did not significantly extend the EU’s legal competences in this particular domain 
(Dimopoulos, 2011, pp. 94–108, 123). 
 
Post-establishment treatment 
The EU is exclusively competent under Articles 206 and 207 TFEU to enter into 
international commitments regarding the post-establishment treatment of foreign investors. 
The EU is furthermore competent to regulate trade- and currency-related performance 
requirements under articles 207 and 219 TFEU. The EU also holds the exclusive competence 
to regulate the movement of investment-related key personnel under article 207 TFEU. The 
EU holds a mixed competence regarding the treatment of other established investments 
under article 54 TFEU (freedom of establishment), article 56 TFEU (free provision of 
services) and article 90 TFEU (common transport policy) (Dimopoulos, 2011, pp. 94–108, 
123). In summary, the EU is the key regulator in this domain, while the Member States 
exercise varying influence on European regulatory activity in function of the concerned 
investment and policy domain. The EU was already competent to regulate many of the 
discussed issues before the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, however, established a 
crosscutting competence for post-establishment treatment regarding FDI.  
 
Investment protection  
The EU arguably holds the exclusive competence to enter into investment protection 
commitments under Articles 206 and 207 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty. The regulation of 
investment protection was a largely unchallenged stronghold of Member State competence 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty’s investment-related key 
innovation is thus the extension of the scope of the CCP to investment protection. The 
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question whether the EU is now indeed (exclusively) competent to enter into investment 
protection commitments remains controversial. Several Member States – notably the 
Netherlands and Germany – as well as some academics, have challenged this assumption. 
They inter alia argue that Article 345 TFEU rules out an exclusive competence of the EU in 
regard to investment protection. Article 345 TFEU stipulates that European measures must 
not affect the system of ownership of the Member States. Investment protection provisions 
of IIAs nevertheless seek to circumscribe states’ right to expropriate i.e. to freely regulate the 
national ownership system. Critics thus conclude that the EU could not hold an exclusive 
competence under the CCP in this domain. Opponents of this view have advanced several 
counter arguments. They caution that Article 345 TFEU does not bring Member States’ 
systems of ownership under exclusive Member State competence. The EU has, for instance, 
adopted many measures concerning intellectual property rights. The ECJ has, moreover, 
delivered several judgements, which contributed to the harmonisation of expropriation 
procedures and compensatory rules across Member States. Article 17 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is an integral part of European primary 
law, furthermore jointly obliges the EU and the Member States to protect the right to 
property. Investment protection provisions and ISDS are indisputably the cornerstone of 
international investment policy, which implies that the authors of the Lisbon Treaty arguably 
must have intended to bring investment protection under the scope of the CCP. Finally, 
lawyers have argued that alongside Articles 206 and 207 TFEU, Article 352 TFEU 
(extension of Union competence if necessary by unanimity in Council of Minister) as well as 
Articles 114 and 115 TFEU (approximation of laws) also provide a competence basis for the 
EU to enter into investment protection commitments (Dimopoulos, 2011, pp. 108–116). In 
summary, it remains unclear as yet whether the EU holds an exclusive, shared or concurrent 
competence regarding investment protection. Critical Member States have adopted a more 
reconciliatory position on this question during the last two years, following the Repsol v. 
Argentina case (Rucinski et al., 2014). It seems, nonetheless, likely that the ECJ will 
ultimately have to decide on this issue. On the whole, however, the Member States seem to 
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have recognised that they are not competent anymore to individually enter into international 
commitments in this domain.  
 
The preceding discussion underscores that the EU holds comprehensive – albeit not always 
exclusive – competences to enter into IIAs. While the exact nature of the EU’s competences 
under the Lisbon Treaty remains controversial, the Member States have by and large 
accepted that they need to abstain from unilateral action in this domain. The EU has finally 
replaced the individual Member States as the main actor in the international investment 
regime.  
 
  
62 
 
Chapter III – The analytical and methodological 
groundwork 
!!!
This study seeks to explain the emergence of the EU’s new international investment policy. 
In theoretical terms, it raises the question of why the Member States of the EU started 
cooperating, at first temporarily and then permanently, in international investment policy. 
This chapter first defines the concepts of international cooperation and integration and 
expounds how they relate to EU competences. The following section reviews the literature 
on European Integration. It puts special emphasis on the research on expanding Member 
State cooperation and integration in EU foreign economic policy. The section then develops 
two competing explanations for intensifying Member State cooperation in international 
investment policy. The final section discusses the methodological strategy employed to 
verify the validity of these explanations.  
 
3.1 International cooperation, integration and EU competence  
During the last thirty years, the Member States decided to cooperate, at first temporarily and 
then permanently, in international investment policy-making. The EU thus acquired first de 
facto and then legal competences in international investment policy. International investment 
policy-making was thereby gradually integrated at the European level. But what exactly is 
international cooperation and integration? And how do these concepts relate to EU 
competence? This section addresses these conceptual questions.  
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Axelrod and Keohane famously coined the term ‘international cooperation’ for the 
adjustment of states’ behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of other states 
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, p. 226). In their view, international cooperation is a tacit 
process. It does not require directed communication among states or explicit coordination of 
state behaviour. While this definition has become the benchmark in international relations 
research, it is inappropriate for the purposes of this study. The Member States are highly 
interconnected within the EU. Hence, it is difficult to think of any Member State behaviour 
which would not qualify in some way as international cooperation under this very broad 
definition.  
 
Zartman and Touval propose a more adequate definition for the purpose of this study, which 
advances a higher threshold for international cooperation. They suggest that international 
cooperation is a “…situation where states agree to work together to produce new gains for 
each of the participants unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost.” (Touval and 
Zartman, 2010, p. 1). The definition builds on two defining elements. First, states explicitly 
agree on cooperation. It does not come about tacitly. And second, cooperation manifests 
itself in states actively working together. Cooperation is thus an observable work process 
between government administrations. Integration, finally, is widely considered to be the 
process of institutionalising and formalising such Member State cooperation at the European 
level.  
 
International cooperation among the Member States can take various forms. The literature on 
EU foreign economic policy traditionally focuses on one particular form of cooperation 
among the Member States. It mostly discusses Member State cooperation in the form of a 
comprehensive and permanent delegation of policy-making and negotiating powers to the 
EU and Commission. This narrow view of cooperation as permanent delegation and 
integration stems from the literature’s traditional focus on trade in goods and the 
GATT/WTO negotiations. Other forms of Member State cooperation, however, frequently 
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occur in issue areas beyond the Union’s exclusive competence under the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) (Woolcock, 2011). In some fora, the Member States, for instance, 
negotiate with third countries on their own behalf but closely coordinate their positions and 
strategies within the EU. In other fora, the Member States negotiate on certain issues but in 
parallel empower the Commission to speak on issues of common European interest. In other 
fora again, the Member States sometimes empower the Council Presidency to represent their 
interests vis-à-vis third countries. These examples qualify as international cooperation, as the 
Member States explicitly agree to cooperate and engage in an observable administrative 
work process. The examples, moreover, clarify that Member State cooperation entails a 
complete or partial aggregation and merging of Member State preferences and activities into 
European preferences and activities. Hence, the Member States fully or partially disappear as 
international actors, while the EU emerges as a substitute and ‘collective’ actor on the 
international stage. Member State cooperation thus is closely tied to ‘EU actorness’ in 
international affairs (Groenleer and Van Schaik, 2007; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998).  
 
But how do Member State cooperation and integration actually relate to EU competences? 
One must distinguish between de facto and legal competence. Woolcock argues that the EU 
holds de facto competences if the Member States and the European Institutions agree on and 
use informal policy-making rules so as to jointly govern issue areas, which de jure lie outside 
the scope of Union competence (Woolcock, 2011, pp. 33–34). The term de facto competence 
is by and large synonymous to the definition employed here of Member State cooperation. It 
refers to a ‘Brusselisation’ of policy-making in issue areas which legally speaking fall within 
Member State, or eventually shared, competence. Legal competences, on the other hand, are 
codified in European primary and secondary law. Legal competences enshrine the EU’s 
formal, permanent and institutionalised powers to regulate in certain policy domains, which 
are thus subject to compulsory Member State cooperation. De facto and legal competences 
are intimately linked. In EU foreign economic policy, the informal ‘Brusselisation’ of 
policy-making often precedes the institutionalisation of cooperation through a codification of 
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legal competences under European law. De facto and legal competences should therefore be 
considered as different stages of Member State cooperation and integration.  
 
3.2 European Integration in theoretical perspective  
Why do the Member States of the EU cooperate and integrate policy-making tasks? And 
why does cooperation evolve and expand to new policy areas over time? This thesis 
addresses these questions at the example of the emergence of the EU’s international 
investment policy. The raised questions are not the exclusive object of inquiry of this thesis. 
They lie at the very heart of an extensive theoretical literature and academic debate on 
European Integration.  
 
The literature can be broadly divided into intergovernmental and supranational explanations 
of European Integration. The two approaches primarily differ on the importance of 
governments and supranational actors in European Integration. Intergovernmental 
explanations claim that the Member State governments are in full control and that 
supranational actors such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) do not 
significantly influence European Integration. Supranational explanations, on the other hand, 
stress that governments have at least partly lost control and that supranational actors do 
significantly shape European Integration. In the last years, scholars of European Integration 
have turned toward other approaches such as new institutionalism and multilevel governance 
in order to account for cooperation and integration in the EU. Unlike supranational and 
intergovernmental explanations, which are rooted in International Relations, these 
approaches originate in comparative politics. They seek to transcend the traditional 
opposition between intergovernmental and supranational theories. They adopt a more 
nuanced approach to the study of European Integration. Rather than categorically claiming 
that either governments or supranational actors shape European Integration, they ask when, 
why and how governments or supranational actors shape European Integration. But despite 
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this more nuanced approach, many studies – arguably unintentionally – lend support to either 
one of the two theoretical camps. The following section discusses the literature in more 
detail. 
 
3.2.1 Intergovernmental theories of European Integration 
Intergovernmental explanations of European Integration form part of the neo-realist school 
of International Relations (Waltz 1979). Like neo-realism, intergovernmentalism considers 
states to be the only actors of causal importance in international affairs. Cooperation and 
European Integration should reflect Member State preferences. Member States should be in 
full control of cooperation and integration. Cooperation and integration should be state-
driven and state-serving processes (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993).  
  
Andrew Moravcsik’s ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ is the main exponent of 
intergovernmentalism today (Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1998). Moravcsik claims that 
cooperation and integration within the EU only occur in policy areas, where states want to 
address collective action problems as described in the prisoner’s dilemma. Put differently, 
states should resort to integration, if non-institutionalised cooperation or individual action 
can be expected to deliver suboptimal outcomes. Moravcsik models European Integration as 
a three-step process. First, societal preferences – in most cases business demands – should 
inform government preferences on European Integration. Societal preferences on European 
Integration should form in function of the expectable welfare impact of (non-)integration in a 
given policy area. Governments should take societal preferences into account to maximise 
national welfare and their chances for re-election. Second, governments should then enter 
into substantive international negotiations. The outcome of these negotiations, Morvacsik 
argues, should depend on the asymmetrical interdependence of the Member States14 as well 
as the availability/manipulation of information by supranational actors like the Commission. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 In other words, states incurring higher opportunity costs from non-cooperation should be 
more willing to compromise to ensure cooperation.  
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Third, the Member States should then engage in international negotiations on the 
institutionalisation of their cooperation. Moravcsik primarily draws on rational 
institutionalism and principal-agent theory to explain why the Member States opt for 
different degrees of institutionalisation for different issues. Hence, the choice of 
institutionalisation should depend on the need for technical expertise and management, 
credible commitment concerns and eventually federalist ideology.  
 
Intergovernmentalists, moreover, challenge on several grounds the supranational claim that 
the Commission and the ECJ shape cooperation and European Integration. First, 
intergovernmentalists argue that the powers of the Commission and the ECJ to actually push 
for greater cooperation in certain policy areas merely reflect Member State preferences to 
have cooperative agreements monitored, neutrally interpreted and enforced (Garret 1992; 
1995; Pollack 2003; Caporaso and Keeler 1995). Second, the Commission and the ECJ 
should only dare to push for greater cooperation and integration, if the Member States do 
support such measures. If the Commission and the ECJ push for greater cooperation despite 
public Member State opposition, the Member States are likely to pursue a “blame-
avoidance” strategy in the light of domestic opposition. In other words, the Member States 
silently support greater cooperation, but leave it to supranational agents to push for it in 
order to avoid domestic controversy (Garret 1992; Schmidt 1998; Weaver 1986; Woll 2006). 
Finally, intergovernmentalists also reject the supranational claim that the expansion of 
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers has limited national sovereignty. 
Intergovernmentalists stress that Member State governments should approach decision-
making in the Council of Ministers as a re-iterated long-term game. All Member State 
governments should fear to get outvoted at some point and thus collectively nurture a culture 
of compromise building (Moravcsik 1991).   
 
Intergovernmentalism enjoys considerable prominence in European Integration research. 
Episodes like the Empty Chair Crisis (1965/66), the Eurosclerorsis of the 1970s and 1980s 
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and today’s Eurocrisis with a surge in intergovernmental policy-making in issue areas of 
vital importance to the European Integration Project seem to confirm the 
intergovernmentalist assumption that cooperation and European Integration remain 
essentially government-driven. But while intergovernmentalism – and in particular 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmnetalism – are of great theoretical appeal, they also suffer 
from important shortcomings. First, the wholesale rejection of supranational actors playing 
no significant role in shaping cooperation and integration across all policy areas seems over-
determined and little credible. Various studies have shown that the Commission and the ECJ 
do affect cooperation and integration directly but also indirectly by re-shaping Member State 
preferences in various policy areas (Woll 2006; Schmidt 1998; Young 2001, 2002). Second, 
liberal intergovernmentalism draws heavily on societal and in particular business preferences 
to account for Member State preferences and ultimately Member State decisions to cooperate 
and to integrate. It does not, however, provide indications on how societal preferences form. 
While this theoretical gap is understandable, it nevertheless partially externalises the 
explanatory challenge. Third, liberal intergovernmnetalism is a theory of institution building. 
It intends to explain why and how states establish new institutions for cooperation. But 
despite its inherent focus on institutions, it does not take the institutional and legal context of 
debates on cooperation and integration into account. It disregards pre-existing institutions as 
well as the setup and procedural rules employed to review the European Treaties. The latter 
has become important with the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002/3). The 
Convention drafted the Lisbon Treaty and differed considerably from classic 
intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) with regard to its composition, working method and 
self-conception. The Convention’s peculiar functioning is likely to have affected debates and 
outcome. Finally, liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory of grand integration bargains and 
Treaty revisions. It does not seek to explain the EU’s de facto competences i.e. informal ad 
hoc cooperation among the Member States in daily policy-making and international 
negotiations. At first sight, liberal intergovernmentalism seems therefore of rather limited 
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avail to this dissertation. It does not account for the EU’s de facto competences in 
international investment policy since the 1980s.  
 
In EU foreign economic policy, informal cooperation and de facto competences almost 
always precede formal integration and legal competences. Scholars of EU foreign economic 
policy hardly ever explicitly draw on liberal intergovernmentalism to analyse and to explain 
the EU’s evolving role in this domain. Many studies, nevertheless, advance arguments, 
which implicitly reflect a liberal intergovernmental logic (Young, 2001, 2002). As Woolcock 
notes “… the broad EU trade policy position over the past decades can be summarised as 
the defensive interests of agriculture competing against the market opening interests of 
manufacturing and services. These interests reflect the competitive positions of the 
respective sectors…” (Woolcock and Bayne, 2007, p. 26). If business decisively shapes the 
substantive policy preferences of the Member States and the EU, business should equally 
shape cooperation and integration in this domain. Business demands are unlikely to perfectly 
mirror the EU’s often uncertain legal competences. Hence, business may – unintentionally – 
push the Member States into cooperation and integration on issues beyond Union 
competence. So while most studies drawing on business preferences to explain substantive 
policy outcomes may not actually intend to uncover integration dynamics, they nevertheless 
convey information about such dynamics (Baccini and Dür, 2012; M. Baldwin, 2006; R. 
Baldwin, 2006; De Bièvre and Jappe, 2010; Dür, 2007; Manger, 2009; Nicolaidis and 
Meunier, 1999; Young, 2001, 2002). A good example is Manger’s work (2009) on the global 
proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs). He explains that European business lobbied 
the Commission and Member State governments to conclude competitive FTAs with 
services and investment chapters with Mexico and Chile in order to mitigate negative effects 
arising from US FTAs. While the EU did not yet hold the necessary legal competences, these 
FTAs nevertheless became the first to encompass comprehensive services and investment 
chapters. Manger’s work thus implies that business lobbying – in response to an evolving 
standard agenda of trade negotiations – pushed the Member States into cooperation in new 
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issue areas beyond the EU’s legal competences. Nicolaidis and Meunier (1999) adopt an 
even more state-centric intergovernmental approach. They observe that the 1990s brought an 
intergovernmental backlash in CCP policy-making. The Member State governments 
successfully defended their competences over the so-called “new trade issues” such as 
services against the Commission’s attempts to assert its political and legal influence. They 
suggest that this intergovernmental backlash in CCP policy-making reflected an altered 
perception of the economic benefits of cooperation in foreign economic policy-making as 
well as ideological changes within government administrations.  
 
3.2.2 Supranational theories of European Integration 
Supranational accounts of European Integration stress that supranational actors like the 
Commission and the ECJ exert decisive influence on cooperation and European Integration. 
Hence, cooperation and integration do not necessarily reflect Member State preferences, 
which have lost at least in part control over European Integration (Haas, 1958; Lindberg 
1963; Schmitter, 2009). David Mitrany’s (1943) functionalism is considered as the 
intellectual prime father of modern supranational theories of European Integration. Mitrany 
argued that governments should serve human needs and not become an end in itself like the 
nation state in realist, liberal or federalist thinking of international relations. In accordance 
with his technocratic understanding of government, Mitrany suggested that policy issues 
transcending the boundaries of the nation state should be dealt with at an appropriate 
supranational or sub-national level of governance. Such effective multilevel governance 
should shift the expectations and loyalties of domestic interest groups from the nation state 
to new supranational authorities thereby promoting international cooperation and integration. 
Mitrany predicted that a functionalist system of multilevel governance should ultimately 
bring about a peaceful world order.  
 
71 
 
Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalism (1958) elaborates on Mitrany’s reasoning. Neo-functionalism 
is less normative and more analytical than Mitrany’s functionalism. While Mitrany pondered 
about the question why and how states should cooperate, Haas sought to theorise why and 
how states actually cooperate. He observes that the initial integration of few strategic 
economic sectors and the creation of a supranational authority, which monitors and sponsors 
further integration, should trigger functional pressure – i.e. spill-overs – to integrate 
additional economic sectors at the European level. Domestic interest groups should slowly 
shift their expectations and loyalties to the European level and the supranational authority 
thereby sponsoring further integration. Progressing economic integration should require an 
ever more intense institutionalisation of European cooperation as well as ever more complex 
and intrusive transnational regulation. Hence, political cooperation and integration should be 
an inevitable side product of initial economic cooperation. Mitrany, Haas and other neo-
functionalists thereby argue that cooperation among the Member States of the EU is a self-
sustaining process fuelled by functional spillovers, domestic interest groups and 
supranational institutions (Haas, 1958; Lindberg 1963; Hoffmann, 1966; Schmitter 2009; 
Börzel 2013; Rosamond, 2000).  
 
During the last years, new institutionalism has gained considerable prominence in research 
on European Integration. In essence, it claims that international institutions shape 
cooperation and outcomes (Pollack 2003, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2006; Schmidt 1998; 
Scharpf 1998; De Bièvre and Dür, 2005; Da Conceiçao-Held, 2009; Damro 2007; Pierson, 
1994). Intergovernmentalists criticise that institutionalism – and in particular historical 
institutionalism – are only a rebranding of neofunctional thinking (Schmitter, 2009; 
Moravcsik, 2005). One may broadly distinguish two strands of institutionalist research. First, 
rational and sociological institutionalism depicts institutions – defined as implicit and 
explicit norms and rules – as exogenous rules on political games. In other words, intuitions 
should shape the preferences and strategies of the Member States and supranational actors 
and thereby affect cooperative and integrative outcomes within the EU. Scharpf’s work 
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(1988) on the “joined decision trap” is a prime example of this strand. He argues that the 
decision-making rules in the EU lead to structurally suboptimal cooperative outcomes. Also 
Dinan (1997), Schmidt (1997, 1998), Meunier (2000), Menon and Kassim (2004), Hooghe 
and Kassim (2008) and Woll’s (2006) research on how the Commission – as policy 
entrepreneur – exploits its agenda-setting power, decision-making rules and means of 
judicial review to build political alliances for its preferred policies underscore the core 
argument that institutions shape cooperative outcomes. Second, historical institutionalism 
depicts institutions as endogenous. It seeks to explain why, when and how institutions evolve 
over time and thereby alter cooperation and policy outcomes. Historical institutionalism 
builds in particular on the concepts of path dependence and critical junctures. Pierson (1994) 
and Elsig (2002) for instance draw on these concepts to account for evolving Member State 
cooperation in social and trade policy. Finally, Mark Pollack’s application of principal-agent 
models to cooperation and integration in the EU partly bridges the analytical distinction 
between an exogenous and endogenous take on institutions. Pollack, on the one hand, uses 
principal-agent models to explain the initial decision of the Member States to cooperate and 
to delegate – to varying degrees – certain policy tasks to supranational agents. Delegation 
should lower transaction costs, facilitate the neutral enforcement of cooperation and lower 
monitoring costs. Limited or far-reaching delegation of policy tasks to supranational agents 
should therefore depend on the importance of transaction costs, enforcement and monitoring 
of cooperative arrangements. On the other hand, Pollack uses principal-agent models to 
explain how institutions affect daily cooperation and outcomes. He argues that the Member 
States and supranational actors often hold diverging preferences. Policy outcomes are thus a 
product of varying Member State oversight and control over supranational agents. It follows 
from this discussion that the various strands of institutionalism indeed adopt a more nuanced 
take on the role of governments and supranational actors in cooperation and integration. 
Unlike neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, instititionalist research seeks to 
understand when, how and why either governments or supranational actors and institutions 
influence European Integration and cooperation.  
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Supranationalism – in particular institutionalism and to a lesser extent neo-functionalism – 
enjoys considerable prominence in research on EU foreign economic policy-making. This 
observation can hardly surprise taking into consideration the dense institutional web 
governing foreign economic policy in the EU (Woolcock, 2010; Woolcock and Bayne 2007). 
De Bièvre and Dür (2005) explain evolving Member State cooperation in the form of 
varying delegation in EU trade policy management through a principal-agent approach. 
Member States, they argue, delegate trade policy-making in order to shield themselves from 
protectionist and liberal societal demands while maintaining an inflow of lobbying resources. 
Reiter (2005) draws on principal-agent models and advances a functionalist explanation for 
the Commission’s varying powers as representative of the EU in different international 
organisations such as UNCTAD, the OECD and the WTO. Meunier (2000, 2007) examines 
how the EU’s institutional setup for trade policy-making shapes its bargaining power in 
negotiations with third countries and thereby cooperative ouctomes. Elsig (2002) draws on 
various institutionalist approaches – including principal-agent models and historical 
institutionalism – to account for daily policy-making in EU foreign economic policy as well 
as the evolution of Member State cooperation and integration in this domain.  
 
3.2.1 Supranational accounts of the EU’s role in international investment policy 
Special attention should be given here to the few studies, which seek to explain the extension 
of the EU’s de facto and legal competences to the regulation of foreign direct investment. All 
existing studies build onto supranational thinking on European Integration. Young (2001, 
2002) seeks to solve the puzzle of why the Member States closely cooperated and jointly 
negotiated in issue areas beyond the CCP – air transport, telecommunication services and 
international investment – despite diverging government and sectorial preferences. In 
accordance with institutional reasoning, he argues that the Member States started 
cooperating in these areas due to implied external powers, a European socialisation of 
74 
 
policy-makers and the growing opportunity costs of non-cooperation in these issue areas. 
Young’s analysis provides valuable insights, but exhibits empirical and theoretical 
weaknesses. Young cannot explain varying degrees of Member State cooperation across 
different investment negotiations. His focus on endogenous institutional dynamics, 
moreover, seems to understate systemic, exogenous factors. Young’s analysis is, moreover, 
empirically incomplete. He examines only one (MAI) of several international investment 
negotiations in the 1990s and ignores debates on the EU’s legal competences.  
 
Billiet advances another institutionalist explanation for the EU’s involvement in international 
investment policy. Drawing on principal-agent models, he argues that the Commission – as 
self-interested agent – consciously shaped the negotiating agenda of the WTO so as to 
increase functional pressures on the Member States to cooperate and delegate international 
investment regulation to the Commission (Billiet, 2006). Billiet’s argument is convincing, 
but suffers again from shortcomings. His explanation leaves open why the EU got involved 
in international investment negotiations on the MAI, ECT and FTAs. He does not, moreover, 
explain how the EU’s temporary involvement in investment negotiations in the WTO relates 
to the extension of the EU’s legal competences under the CCP.  
 
Meunier (2013) seeks to explain the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation in the Lisbon 
Treaty. To that end, she examines the relevant debates during the Convention on the Future 
of Europe (2002/2003). She finds that the Member State governments and European 
business were opposed or ambivalent regarding an extension of the EU’s legal competences 
in this domain. She suggests that the CCP nevertheless got extended to FDI regulation due to 
Commission entrepreneurship and ‘by accident’. Meunier thus concludes that the EU’s new 
international investment policy is not the product of functional considerations as often 
assumed. Meunier’s study offers valuable insights. She provides a rather accurate empirical 
account of the Convention debates. Her theoretical analysis is, however, disappointing. She 
does not seriously attempt to explain the key puzzle of why the Commission succeeded in 
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extending the CCP to FDI regulation despite significant Member State opposition. She 
simply discounts it as ‘chance’. This shortcoming is striking, as Meunier and Nicolaidis 
argue elsewhere that Member State preferences are absolutely central to the evolution of the 
EU’s legal competences under the CCP (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999).  
 
Niemann, finally, develops a new theoretical perspective. He builds on neo-functionalism in 
order to explain the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation in the Lisbon Treaty. He argues 
that the CCP extension is in essence the consequence of functional, cultivated and social 
spill-over dynamics. While these spill-overs did not lead to a CCP reform during the IGC on 
the Nice Treaty, the procedural features of the Convention weakened Member State 
opposition and paved the way toward the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation (Niemann, 
2013, 2012).! Niemann’s analysis is thorough and in many regards convincing. It, 
nevertheless, has deficiencies. Niemann’s understanding of spill-overs is remarkably broad, 
which blurs his analysis. He labels socialisation effects and policy entrepreneurship as spill-
overs, for instance. This broad understanding bears the risk of transforming the concept into 
a meaningless placeholder. Niemann’s selection of spill-over dynamics is, furthermore, 
surprising. He focuses on short-lived phenomena like the upcoming Eastern Enlargement in 
order to account for the decision to streamline the CCP, but ignores long-term interactions 
between international investment regulation and EU policies. Finally, Niemann’s exclusive 
focus on spill-overs equates to a purely endogenous explanation for the emergence of the 
EU’s international investment policy. This focus on endogeneity and consequent disregard 
for developments in the world economy is questionable.  
 
In conclusion, the debate between intergovernmentalists and supranatioalists has been 
structuring research on Member State cooperation and integration for many years. Both 
approaches have inspired work on Member State cooperation in the form of daily policy-
making in foreign economic policy as well as research on grand Member State bargains on 
Treaty revisions. In particular supranational approaches have been applied to account for the 
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EU’s growing de facto and legal competences in international investment regulation. These 
studies, however, suffer from theoretical and empirical shortcomings. Most notably, work on 
the EU’s involvement in international investment policy examines only short instances of 
policy-making, which inherently rules out the formulation of a comprehensive explanation 
for the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy since the 1980s. What is more, 
these studies generally remain vague regarding Member State and business preferences, 
which must be considered as weakness taking into consideration the prominence of these 
factors in European Integration research.  
 
3.3 The analytical framework  
The section develops a framework to comprehensively analyse the emergence of the EU’s 
international investment policy. Building on the theoretical literature review above, it 
formulates two competing – a supranational and an intergovernmental – explanation. These 
explanations form the basis for the subsequent empirical investigation.  
 
3.3.1 A supranational explanation – Commission entrepreneurship for a EU 
international investment policy  
A sizeable literature inspired by supranational theories argues that the Commission 
frequently acts as policy entrepreneur and pushes for an extension of the EU’s de facto and 
legal powers in various policy domains (Haas, 1958; Lindberg 1963; Hoffmann, 1966; 
Schmitter 2009; Schmidt, 1998; Kassim and Menon, 2004; Hooghe and Kassim, 2008; Woll, 
2006). Schumpeter (1934) and Weber (1930) coined the concept of policy entrepreneurship. 
Policy entrepreneurs seek to innovate policy – normally to further their own welfare. Policy 
innovation is a disruptive process. Other actors are likely to resist attempts to innovate 
policy. Hence, a policy entrepreneur invests political resources and thereby takes risks 
hoping to mitigate opposition against its policy innovation.  
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It is reasonable to assume that the Commission acted as policy entrepreneur and pushed for 
an extension of the EU’s de facto and legal competences in international investment policy 
since the 1980s for functional as well as power consideration. On the one hand, the 
Commission should have felt the need for an extension of EU competences in this domain 
due to the growing role of investment disciplines in trade policy and negotiations (see 
chapter II). The non-adjustment of the CCP to the evolving realities of international trade 
should have threatened the effectiveness of this key policy. On the other hand, the 
Commission should have pushed for an extension of the EU’s de facto and legal 
competences in order to increase its power and influence in European politics and foreign 
economic relations. As mentioned in the introduction, several Member State administrations 
indeed reproached the Commission in the aftermaths of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty that it had surreptitiously usurped competences in this domain.  
 
While the assumption of the Commission acting as policy entrepreneur seems realistic, it is 
equally manifest that the EU’s de facto and legal competences considerably varied across 
different policy-making fora despite the Commission’s allegedly continuous efforts. Hence, 
other factors must have conditioned the effectiveness of Commission entrepreneurship. In 
theoretical terms, Commission entrepreneurship might be considered as a ‘necessary’ but not 
‘sufficient’ condition. It is therefore important to identify the factors and strategies, which 
the Commission may have used to overcome resistance and to successfully push for an 
extension of the EU’s de facto and legal competences. The supranational literature points to 
five factors/strategies conditioning the success of Commission entrepreneurship: 1) the 
Commission’s agenda setting powers and ability to shape the EU-internal discourse; 2) the 
Commission’s ability to exploit and/or to shape the standard agenda of international trade 
negotiations for its purposes; 3) the Commission’s ability to push negotiations into 
international fora where it traditionally acts as the EU’s single voice; 4) the Commission’s 
ability to invoke fringe, implied and de facto competences to make the EU’s participation in 
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international negotiations a legal or functional necessity; 5) the Commission’s strategic use 
of judicial review through the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to assert legal competences. 
The following paragraphs discuss how the Commission may have used these factors and 
strategies to convince and/or to pressure the Member States to step up cooperation and 
delegation, which should ultimately have led to the emergence of the EU’s international 
investment policy.  
 
Agenda-setting powers in daily policy-making and Treaty revisions: Research on 
principal-agent relationships implies that the Commission as agent of the Member States 
should significantly influence the policy-making agenda in EU foreign economic and trade 
policy (see Hooghe and Kassim, 2008; Pollack, 2003; De Conceiçao-Heldt, 2009; 
Kerremans, 2004; Delreux and Kerremans, 2008). The Commission’s ability to broadly 
delimit the EU-internal policy-making debate on trade policy should enable it to emphasise 
vis-à-vis the Member States the need to extend cooperation and EU competences toward 
new issues such as international investment policy. The Commission’s agenda setting 
powers should derive from its ‘first-mover’ privilege and informational advantages. 
 
The Commission’s ‘first-mover’ privilege is enshrined in the European Treaties. The 
Commission holds the exclusive right to initiate trade measures and international 
negotiations with third countries. To that end, it submits draft negotiating mandates and 
autonomous draft measures to the Council of Ministers. The Council must then adopt, amend 
or reject these initiatives.15 Depending on the concerned issues areas, the Council adopts 
such measures and mandates by qualified majority or unanimity. In most cases – and in 
particular with regard to negotiating mandates – the Council does not comprehensively 
amend the Commission’s draft texts. The Commission’s right of initiative thus grants it 
considerable influence on the policy agenda. The Council of Ministers and nowadays the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament also has a say on 
many draft measures.  
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European Parliament must discuss and position themselves regarding the Commission’s 
policy proposals. If the Commission proposes to regulate or to negotiate with third countries 
not only on classic trade policy issues but also on international investment disciplines, the 
Member States and the European Parliament have to evaluate this proposal.  
 
The Commission’s informational advantages and expertise should reinforce its influence on 
the policy agenda and ability to press for an extension of Member State cooperation and EU 
competence (Pollack, 2003; Kerremans, 2004). The Commission administers daily trade 
policy-making at the domestic and international level. Hence, it is generally more aware of 
developments in the international trade policy context than most Member State governments. 
Its evaluation of adequate policy responses to international developments should carry 
significant weight in EU-internal debates. What is more, the Commission also holds greater 
technical expertise of trade policy than most Member State governments. As administrator 
and negotiator of trade agreements, the Commission has specialised and experienced staff, 
which many Member States administrations lack. So if the Commission recommends 
extending Member State cooperation and empowering the EU to negotiate on international 
investment disciplines, the Member States are likely to take such advice seriously (Pollack 
2003, 2006).  
 
The Commission’s agenda setting powers based on its ‘first mover’ privilege and its 
informational advantages should not be limited to daily policy-making. They should extend 
to intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) on Treaty revisions (Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos, 
2007; Hassim and Menon, 2004). The Commission typically drafts a report on the 
functioning of the EU and advisable reforms prior to IGCs. The Commission’s report serves 
as initial working basis for negotiations among the Member States on Treaty modifications. 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU uses the so-called Convention method16 to draft and to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16  The Convention Method seeks to provide Treaty revisions with greater democratic 
legitimacy. In a first step, democratically legitimised representatives of national parliaments 
80 
 
modify Treaties. The new method should have further strengthened the Commission’s 
agenda setting powers in Treaty revisions for three reasons. First, the Commission still briefs 
the Convention on advisable Treaty reforms through lengthy interventions in dedicated 
Convention working groups. Second, the Commission now directly participates in 
deliberations on Treaty reforms alongside Member State governments, national parliaments 
and the European Parliament. It is thus not only an advisor but stakeholder. Third – and most 
importantly – the Commission’s informational advantages should be significantly greater in 
the context of the Convention than in classic IGCs. Classic IGCs bring together national 
technocrats and experts of the policy fields under discussion. In the Convention, on the other 
hand, politicians with little technical expertise discuss about Treaty changes. National 
technocrats have only very limited and indirect access due to the intention of holding 
democratically legitimate and transparent discussions. Hence, the technocratic expertise of 
the Commission representatives briefing dedicated working groups on sector-specific 
reforms should carry even greater weight in this context.  
  
Exploiting the evolving standard agenda of international trade negotiations: The 
Commission may moreover exploit the evolving standard agenda of international trade 
negotiations to promote a brusselisation of new issue areas and to extend its influence in 
foreign economic policy (Young, 2001, 2002; Elsig, 2002). The EU traditionally speaks with 
a single voice in trade negotiations in the GATT/WTO or on FTAs with third countries. The 
Member States have come to accept that it is generally in their best interest to empower the 
Commission to speak for them with a single voice in these fora so as to take advantage of the 
EU’s collective bargaining power. Hence, the negotiating agenda practically determines the 
EU’s de facto competences in these fora. The delimitation of legal competences is of little 
importance. So if third countries push for an extensive negotiating agenda covering issue 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and governments as well as the European Institutions deliberate in public about necessary 
Treaty reforms. In a second step, Member State governments meet for a classic IGC to 
hammer out the last controversial details. The bulk of the Treaty should be the product of 
democratic deliberations rather than opaque diplomatic and technocratic bargaining.  
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areas beyond the EU’s legal competences, the Member States should feel obliged to adjust 
the EU and Commission’s de facto competences accordingly. Otherwise they may face high 
opportunity costs in the form of foregone bargaining power and thus suboptimal negotiating 
outcomes.  
 
The Commission – as the EU’s single voice in pre- and core negotiations in the GATT/WTO 
and FTA negotiations – may play a two-level game (Putnam, 1988) vis-à-vis third countries 
and the Member States in order to increase the EU’s de facto competences in foreign 
economic policy. It may support or encourage third countries’ demands for extensive 
negotiations. At the same time, it may underline vis-à-vis the Member States that it is 
unavoidable to give into such third country demands in order to not jeopardise negotiations. 
In other words, the Commission may use its role as interface between third countries and the 
Member States to exploit and to shape the standard agenda of international trade negotiations 
so as to manipulate Member State preferences and to increase support for Member State 
cooperation in foreign economic policy beyond the EU’s legal competences under the CCP.  
 
Strategic use of international negotiating fora: In a similar vein, the Commission may 
strategically use different international negotiating fora in order to advance the brusselisation 
of policy-making in certain policy domains and to extend its influence in foreign economic 
policy. The EU speaks with a single voice in some, nonetheless, not in all international trade 
policy fora. The Member States for instance continue speaking on their own behalf on trade-
related issues beyond the EU’s narrow legal competences in the OECD, the UNCTAD, the 
World Bank and alike (Woolcock, 2011; Reiter, 2005; Young, 2001, 2002). In these fora, the 
Commission only speaks on core trade policy issues, which indisputably come under 
exclusive Union competence. So if an international consensus emerges to negotiate about 
‘new trade policy issues’ in the OECD rather then the GATT/WTO, the Member States are 
likely to negotiate on their own behalf. If a similar consensus emerges that such negotiations 
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should take place in the GATT/WTO, the Member States are likely to cooperate and to 
empower the Commission to speak with a single voice.  
 
Hence, the Commission may again play a two-level game (Putnam, 1988) to push 
negotiations into those international fora, where the Member States traditionally cooperate 
and empower the Commission to act as their single voice. It may use its EU-internal agenda 
setting powers (see above) to convince the Member States of the functional advantages of 
negotiating for instance in the GATT/WTO rather than the OECD. On the other hand, the 
Commission may build alliances with similarly minded governments of third countries in 
order to ensure that the negotiations in question are held in the desired forum. By pushing 
negotiations into particular international fora, the Commission may thereby consolidate its 
influence and advance the brusselisation of policy-making in policy areas beyond the 
Union’s exclusive competences under the CCP.    
 
Invoking fringe, implied and de facto competences: The Commission may, moreover, 
invoke fringe, implied and de facto competences to maintain/advance the brusselisation of 
policy-making and a consolidation of the EU’s de facto competences in policy areas beyond 
the EU’s exclusive legal competences under the CCP (Young, 2001, 2002; Elsig, 2002).  
 
The term ‘fringe competences’ refers to competences, which have an undisputable yet 
indirect bearing on the regulation of the issue area in question. International investment 
regulation, for instance, does not only touch on trade policy but also on the regulation of 
capital movements. So while the EU may not hold sufficient legal competences under the 
CCP to regulate international investment flows, it may nonetheless have to participate in 
international negotiations and the adoption of autonomous measures regarding international 
investment flows due to its fringe competences under the capital movements chapter of the 
European Treaties. The term ‘implied competences’, on the other hand, refers to the legal 
reasoning that if the EU is for instance competent to regulate a policy issue within the Single 
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Market, it should hold the ‘implied’ external competence to equally regulate it in relations 
between the Single Market and third countries. The underlying logic is that the EU must be 
competent in such situations to ensure regulatory coherence and effectiveness. If the 
Member States remained competent to unilaterally regulate the same policy issue in relation 
to third countries, it would potentially undermine the EU’s internal rules. The ECJ 
formulated the concept of implied competences in its famous ‘ERTA ruling’ of 1971 (Case 
22/70) (Kuijper, 2007, p. 1578; Leal-Arcas, 2006, p. 330; Nawparwar, 2009, p. 17). The 
term ‘de facto competences’ refers to the informal brusselisation of policy-makers in policy 
domains beyond the EU’s legal competences. Unlike fringe or implied competences, ‘de 
facto competences’ do not create a legal necessity to cooperate. The Commission may, 
however, point to functionalist pressures to deal with a policy issue at the EU-level, if the 
EU has been dealing with it in the past in order to ensure policy coherence. Invoking ‘de 
facto competences should have been a particularly important strategy in debates on the 
extension of the CCP to investment regulation during IGC and ECJ proceedings. 
 
The discussion on invoking fringe, implied or de facto competences to promote Member 
State cooperation and delegation has an important implication for integration dynamics. The 
Commission should find it easy to push for cooperation and delegation in policy domains, 
which are closely tied or adjacent to policy domains coming under Union competence. The 
Commission should, however, find it difficult to push for cooperation and delegation in 
policy domains, which are by and large disconnected from existing European policies and 
competences. Hence, policy substance should affect integration dynamics.  
 
As Young (2001, 2002), Elsig (2002) and others observe, the Commission regularly invokes 
fringe and implied competences to force the Member States to cooperate and to accept the 
EU’s involvement in policy areas beyond the EU’s undisputed legal competences. The 
existence of such fringe and implied competences makes it impossible for the Member States 
for instance to individually enter into international agreements or to adopt autonomous 
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measures. Even if the fringe or implied competence in question is very narrow but yet of 
central importance to the overall agreement or measure, the Member States practically need 
to get the Commission and the EU fully involved in the policy-making process. Hence, a 
brusselisation of policy-making takes place.  
 
It should be mentioned that the Commission’s alleged use of fringe, implied and de facto 
competences to extend the EU’s de facto competences resembles a lot to the neofunctional 
concept of ‘spill-overs’ and the historical institutionalist concept of ‘unintended institutional 
effects’ (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Schmitter 2009; Pierson, 2004; Pierson and Skocpol, 
2002). The concept of ‘spill-overs’ stipulates that integration of one policy is likely to spill 
over into adjacent policies due to functional interdependencies between policy domains. The 
concept of ‘unintended institutional effects’, on the other hand, stipulates that institutions 
have various – often unintended and unknown – effects on society and other institutions. 
One may therefore argue that the Commission’s alleged use of fringe, implied and de facto 
competences echoes the logic of neofunctionalism and historical institutionalism. It is, 
however, critical to underline that the focus lies on agency here. Put differently, while 
neofunctionalism and historical institutionalism largely ignore the role of actors in bringing 
to bear fringe, implied or de facto competences so as to advance integration, the emphasis 
lies here on how the Commission deliberately exploited such dynamics to advance its own 
agenda and to force the Member States into cooperation on issue areas beyond the EU’s 
exclusive competence.  
 
Strategic use of judicial review: The Commission may use its right of legal recourse in 
front of the ECJ to intensify or to bring about Member State cooperation in new policy areas. 
The Commission is known to use two strategies of legal recourse. First, it has been 
demonstrated that the Commission uses legal recourse in order to manipulate the balance of 
preferences in the Council of Ministers to its favour thereby facilitating the adoption of 
controversial measures (Schmidt, 1997, 1998; Woll, 2006). Schmidt for instance argues that 
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the Commission’s success to liberalise certain economic sectors despite considerable 
Member State opposition reflects the Commission’s strategic use of legal recourse. The 
Commission sued key governments opposing its liberalisation proposals over protectionist 
national legislation. Critical ECJ judgements then made these governments reconsider their 
positions in order to either take advantage of the newly emerging market structures or to 
avoid even more far-reaching liberalisation measures.  
 
The Commission may also use legal recourse to have the ECJ recognise disputed Union 
competences despite Member State opposition. This kind of legal recourse regularly unfolds 
out of controversies between the Member States and the Commission over the competence 
basis and ratification modalities for international agreements with third countries (see for 
instance ECJ Opinions 1/75, 2/92, 1/94). While the Commission traditionally advances 
extensive teleological interpretations of the EU’s legal competences and claims exclusive 
competence to ratify an agreement, the Member States typically advance narrow 
interpretations and call for mixed ratification so as to protect their competences against 
European encroachment. The Commission may then ask the ECJ to recognise its extensive 
interpretation of Union competences. The ECJ often agrees with the Commission – thereby 
forcing the Member States into cooperation and delegation. In other cases, the ECJ disagrees 
but identifies relevant fringe or limited implied competences, which nevertheless strengthen 
the EU’s role in the policy domain under discussion. Legal recourse thus enables the 
Commission in many instances to force the Member States into cooperation by extending the 
EU’s undisputed legal competences.  
 
Hypothesis on the conditions for successful Commission entrepreneurship: The 
preceding section developed the supranational argument that the emergence of the EU’s 
international investment policy is in essence the doing of the Commission. The Commission 
may have acted as policy entrepreneur and pushed for the gradual extension of the EU’s de 
facto and legal competences in international investment regulation. The Commission’s 
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alleged success in consolidating the EU’s role in international investment policy, however, 
markedly varied across international negotiations and intergovernmental conferences since 
the 1980s. The observation implies that the success of the Commission’s policy 
entrepreneurship may have have hinged on other factors. The section therefore discussed 
five factors and strategies, which the Commission may have used to increase the 
effectiveness of its policy entrepreneurship: its agenda setting powers; its ability to exploit 
the evolving trade agenda; its strategic use of international negotiating fora; its use of fringe, 
implied and de facto competences; and its strategic recourse to legal review. The varying 
availability of these strategies and factors should account for the varying success of the 
Commission’s policy entrepreneurship during the last 30 years.  
 
Hypothesis H1: The Commission acted as policy entrepreneur pursuing the creation 
of a EU international investment policy since the 1980s. The Commission built 
support and/or pressured the Member States into cooperation in international 
investment policy by exploiting its agenda-setting powers, the evolving trade agenda, 
by pushing investment negotiations into certain international fora, by invoking 
fringe and implied competences and using legal recourse.      
 
3.3.2 A liberal intergovernmental explanation – Business pressure for a EU 
international investment policy  
As discussed above, intergovernmentalists meet supranational explanations of European 
Integration with scepticism. Intergovernmentalists assume that the Member States remain in 
full control of the integration process. Integration should only occur, if it benefits and 
increases the ‘capabilities’ of states at the domestic and/or the international level. Hence, 
government preferences are ultimately the key variable to account for integration. Scholars 
of intergovernmentalism primarily focus on domestic business lobbying and geopolitical 
considerations to explain the Member State preferences regarding cooperation and 
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integration. In a second step, they draw on bargaining theory and principal-agent theory to 
explain the Member States’ decision to cooperate and to integrate policy-making as well as 
the consequent institutionalisation of such agreements (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993, 1998; 
Rosamond, 2000; Börzel, 2013). 
 
Theorising business preferences: Many policy-makers and commentators indeed believe 
that the EU’s new international investment policy is ultimately the product of business 
lobbying vis-à-vis Member State governments (see inter alia Bungenberg, 2008; 
BusinessEurope, 2010; European Commission, 1995a, p. 42). Taking into consideration the 
general prominence of business-centred explanations in research on EU foreign economic 
policy, the assumption is hardly surprising (Baccini and Dür, 2012; M. Baldwin, 2006; R. 
Baldwin, 2006; De Bièvre and Jappe, 2010; Dür, 2007; Manger, 2009; Young, 2001, 2002; 
Woolcock and Bayne, 2007). Business-centred explanations of EU foreign economic policy 
typically draw on domestic theories of international political economy (IPE) to explain the 
formation of business preferences. Domestic theories build on the assumption that business 
lobbies governments over desired foreign economic policies to maximise profits. 
Governments should be receptive to business demands so as to maximise national 
capabilities, welfare and their chances for re-election. The bulk of research in this domain 
seeks to explain business preferences on trade policy. It focuses on factor endowments and 
factor mobility in order to explain the formation of domestic preferences. Owners of scarce 
production factors should hold protectionist preferences so as to keep prices for their factors 
high, whereas owners of abundant production factors should hold liberal preferences so as to 
bring prices for their factors up. In advanced economies, factors are, moreover, by and large 
immobile across economic sectors or firms. Hence, domestic preferences should form at the 
sector or even firm level (Frieden, 1991; Hiscox, 2002; Ravenhill, 2008, pp. 95–132; 
Rogowski, 1989). 
 
88 
 
Domestic theories can only be applied to the research topic of this study with two 
qualifications in mind. First, the study investigates the brusselisation of international 
investment policy-making and not policy substance per se. The models discussed! above, 
however, predict sectorial preferences on the basis of how policy substance might affect the 
welfare of domestic interest groups. The models are therefore only applicable to the extent 
that a brusselisation of international investment policy-making affects policy substance and 
the welfare of national business communities. Second, the study focuses on international 
investment policy and not international trade policy. Whereas trade policy is mostly about 
market access and thus of distributive nature, international investment policy mostly focuses 
on regulatory issues and only to a small extent on market access. Hence, models based on the 
abundance/scarcity of production factors and related price/market mechanisms only partly 
function in this context.  
 
Domestic theories, nevertheless, offer helpful guidance on the question why European 
business might have pushed for a brusselisation of international investment policy-making. 
First of all, domestic theories suggest that interest groups hold foreign economic policy 
preferences, if foreign economic policy significantly affects their welfare. Hence, European 
firms, which are affected in their business operations by international investment policy, 
should have held preferences and lobbied policy-makers. Generally speaking, international 
investment policy seeks to lower investment risks, to unlock new investment opportunities 
abroad and to increase profits of national investors. Hence, firms with a high propensity to 
outward investment should have been affected, held preferences and lobbied policy-makers 
on international investment policy.  
 
It follows from this analysis that European service providers should have been most actively 
lobbying on international investment policy. In 2011, European service providers accounted 
for 63% and manufacturing companies for 25% of European outward FDI stocks (see Graph 
3.3). More specifically, the three most FDI-intensive economic sectors were financial and 
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insurance services (37%), professional services (9%), and pharmaceutical and chemical 
producers (9%) (see Graph 3.4) (Eurostat, 2014). European investors were predominantly 
domiciled in five Member States – Great Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. These Member States accounted for 59% of European outward investment stocks 
in 2013 (see Graph 3.5) (UNCTAD, 2014b, p. 218). Their national business federations 
should have been the most active in debates on international investment policy.  
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2014. 
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Source: Eurostat, 2014.  
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2014a, p.218.  
  
Domestic theories, moreover, imply that business should have taken a strong interest in 
investment liberalisation and a moderate interest in the regulation of post-establishment 
treatment and investment protection. Investment liberalisation has immediate welfare 
impacts. The liberalisation of protected economic sectors in third countries through 
ambitious IIAs should create new business and profit opportunities abroad for European 
companies. The potentially welfare-enhancing effects of investment liberalisation should 
motivate European firms to lobby policy-makers over investment liberalisation. Provisions 
regarding post-establishment treatment and protection of investments abroad, on the other 
hand, should promise distant, long-term and uncertain benefits to European firms. As 
explained in detail in chapter II, these provisions seek to ensure a minimum level of 
treatment and protection for established investors in host countries. While these provisions 
may acquire crucial importance for international investors once they face discrimination and 
expropriation in host countries, investors often discount for these risks in their initial 
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investment decisions. In other words, most investors tend to take their investment decisions 
based on the assumption that they are unlikely to face discrimination or expropriation in the 
chosen host countries. Otherwise they would not choose the host country. Hence, they 
should consider post-establishment treatment and protection provisions as comparatively 
little welfare-enhancing (Yackee, 2009, 2010). The phenomena of Treaty shopping and 
inoking the so-called MFN clause for investment protection purposes may further amplify 
this effect. Both phenomena enable businesses to internationally re-structure their 
investments in a way that allows them to take advantage of BITs concluded among two third 
countries (Schill, 2009). Hence, the pressure to lobby Member State or European policy-
makers for ambitious provisions may further diminish. Econometric research partly supports 
the assumption that ost-establishment and protection provisions have little impact on 
business but also suggests that that some sectorial variation may exist. Many studies find 
limited overall effects of classic BITs containing post-establishment treatment and protection 
provisions on the direction and volume of international investment flows. Some studies, 
however, stipulate that such BITs may have a stronger effect on investment projects in 
politically sensitive sectors and with high sunk costs (e.g. energy, commodities, 
infrastructure, etc.) (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009; Hallward-Diremeier, 2013; Neumeyer and 
Spess, 2005; Busse et al., 2010; Egger and Merlo, 2007; Colen et al., 2014). According to 
domestic theories, the arguably more limited welfare impact of post-establishment treatment 
and protection provisions should have translated into only moderate business interest and 
lobbying in this domain.  
 
The focus on welfare effects enshrined in domestic theories, furthermore, stipulates that 
business lobbying should primarily focus on influencing policy substance and not policy 
process. This study, however, seeks to explain procedural changes in the form of a 
brusselisation of international investment policy-making. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate 
how the brusselisation may have affected policy substance and thereby welfare of European 
investors? The integration of international investment policy-making is generally thought to 
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affect policy substance in two regards. First, the integration of international investment 
policy-making should enable the EU to conclude state-of-the-art trade and investment 
agreements with third countries. During the 1990s, a new type of IIA emerged, which 
contains not only traditional post-establishment and protection provisions but also 
investment liberalisation commitments. FTAs came to include similarly comprehensive 
investment chapters. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the legal 
competences necessary for the conclusion of such state-of-the-art IIAs and FTAs were 
scattered between the EU and the Member States. Hence, neither the Member States nor the 
EU could arguably act individually in this domain, which should have complicated policy-
making and eroded Europe’s international competitiveness (Meunier, 2013; Dimopoulos 
2011). Second, the integration of international investment policy-making should have 
increased Europe’s bargaining power in the global investment regime thereby ensuring the 
conclusion of competitive investment agreements with third countries. Since the 1990s, the 
global political economy has considerably evolved. New economic powers such as China, 
Brazil, India or the Gulf countries have emerged and compete nowadays with OECD 
economies and firms for capital and investment opportunities in third countries. In this 
context of increased global competition, speaking with a single voice should allow Europe to 
retain its dominant role in the global investment landscape and to reach for ambitious trade 
and investment agreements with third countries.  
 
In summary, the preceding analysis suggests that in particular the business associations of 
Great Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium should have lobbied for 
Member State cooperation in international investment policy-making. In terms of sectors, 
financial and insurance service providers, chemical and pharmaceutical companies should 
have been particularly active. Business lobbying should have pushed for Member State 
cooperation so as to get access to ambitious, state-of-the-art trade and investment agreements 
with third countries. Business lobbying should have primarily focused on ensuring ambitious 
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investment liberalisation commitments rather than shaping approaches on post-establishment 
treatment and investment protection. 
 
Theorising Member State preferences: Liberal intergovernmentalism stipulates that the 
Member States – and in particular the British, German, French, Dutch and Belgian 
governments – should have given into business demands for more cooperation to the extent 
that cooperation indeed promised to increase their domestic and/or international capabilities. 
After all, liberal intergovernmentalism does not consider governments as mere executors of 
business demands. Integration is thought to be a state-driven and state-serving process 
(Börzel, 2013, pp. 504–506; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 
135–139). The Member States’ evaluation of the costs and benefits of cooperation – and thus 
of following business demands for cooperation – should have hinged on 1) the policy 
substance and 2) the policy-making context of potential cooperation.   
 
First, the Member States’ willingness to cooperate and to give into alleged business demands 
should have hinged on the policy substance under consideration for cooperation. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the Member States were generally more inclined to cooperate on 
investment liberalisation than on post-establishment treatment and protection provisions. On 
the one hand, cooperation on investment liberalisation should have had a greater capability-
maximising effect in the form of greater international bargaining power than cooperation on 
post-establishment treatment and protection provisions. Whereas bargaining power is crucial 
for outcomes of negotiations on investment liberalisation, it is arguably of limited 
importance in negotiations on in comparison fairly standardised post-establishment and 
protection provisions. On the other hand, cooperation on post-establishment treatment and 
protection provisions should have imposed higher costs in the form of sovereignty losses on 
the Member States than cooperation on investment liberalisation. Cooperation on post-
establishment treatment and protection should have directly interfered with and challenged 
the continuation of Member States’ BIT programs. What is more, investment protection 
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partly annuls state immunity under international law and significantly extends state liability 
(Dimopoulos, 2011; Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012; Kleinheisterkamp, 2014; Van Aaken, 2010). 
As investment protection provisions significantly circumvent sovereignty, the Member 
States might have been more hesitant to cooperate and to delegate policy-making on this 
matter.  
 
Second, the Member States’ willingness to give into business demands for cooperation and 
delegation should have hinged on the policy-making context and fora. Cooperation should 
have promised greater benefits in some than in other policy-making fora. The Member States 
might have felt compelled to cooperate and to speak with a single voice, for instance, in 
major GATT/WTO negotiations facing hundreds of third countries or in negotiations with 
ambivalent superpowers. Cooperation should have seemed like a reasonable strategy to 
increase bargaining power. In other fora such as in bilateral talks or in “friendlier” 
negotiating contexts such as in the OECD, the Member States may have seen less need to 
cooperate. On the other hand, the policy-making context and forum determine the lead 
department within government administrations. Depending on the policy-making forum – 
GATT/WTO, ECT, OECD, FTAs, IGCs or the Convention on the Future of Europe – 
investment policy officials, trade policy officials, diplomats or politicians should have been 
in the lead and shaped government preferences. These different groups of policy-makers will 
have held diverging preferences on cooperation in international investment policy-making. 
Investment policy officials should have been rather hesitant to cooperate and to delegate 
policy tasks to the Commission. Trade policy officials, diplomats and politicians, on the 
other hand, should have held a more welcoming attitude toward cooperation in international 
investment policy-making. Sociological and rational considerations inform this assumption. 
Whereas diplomats, trade policy officials and politicians have cooperated with and within 
the European Institution for many decades, specialised investment policy officials hardly 
ever cooperated with their counterparts from other Member States or the European 
Institutions prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This lack of experience of 
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investment policy officials should have translated into hesitation toward cooperation and 
delegation. Furthermore, investment policy officials should have been critical toward 
cooperation and delegation due to the likely implications for their careers and competences. 
Investment policy officials should have approached cooperation from a ‘turf war’ 
perspective. As investment regulation was their sole area of expertise and competence, they 
should have worried about the long-term consequences of cooperation and delegation for 
their jobs. Diplomats, trade policy officials or politicians, on the other hand, deal with 
various policy fields and should therefore have been less opposed to cooperation and 
delegation. Hence, cooperation and delegation of international investment policy-making 
should have been more likely to occur in policy-making fora, where trade policy officials, 
diplomats or politicians were in the lead.  
 
Theorising the institutionalisation of cooperation: In function of business and government 
preferences, cooperation in international investment policy should have occurred on a 
temporary basis. Liberal intergovernmentalism, however, also raises the second-order 
question of why and how Member States may institutionalise temporary cooperation. It 
draws on rational institutionalism and principal-agent theory to predict the 
institutionalisation of new cooperative arrangements (Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009; Pollack, 2003; Hawkins et al., 2006). Principal-agent theory suggests 
that states institutionalise cooperation and delegate policy-making to international agents 
such as the Commission in order to 1) to draw on technical expertise, 2) to credibly commit 
to cooperation (monitoring, enforcement, interpretation of incomplete contracts) and 3) to 
render policy-making more effective and efficient.  
 
It is implausible that the Member States decided to institutionalise and to delegate 
international investment policy-making to the EU in the Lisbon Treaty so as to draw on the 
technical expertise of the European Institutions. Many Member State governments ran 
extensive BIT programs since the 1960s and held by far greater expertise in this policy 
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domain than the European Institutions. It seems more reasonable to assume that the Member 
States ultimately institutionalised cooperation and delegated international investment policy-
making to the EU in the Lisbon Treaty for credible commitment and efficiency purposes. As 
discussed in chapter II, international investment and IIAs have gained ever greater economic 
and regulatory importance since the 1990s. Investment flows increasingly substitute and 
complement traditional forms of trade. Hence, Member States’ international investment 
policies and BIT programs may have become a source of competitive distortions in the 
Single Market’s external relations. As this runs counter the spirit of the European Treaties, 
the Member States may have decided to institutionalise cooperation and to delegate 
international investment policy-making to the EU so as to ensure a level playing field 
regarding international investment policy. Finally and inline with the alleged business 
interest in the creation of a EU international investment policy, the Member States may have 
felt the need to delegate international investment policy-making to the EU/Commission so as 
to ensure swift and efficient policy-making in this new key domain of global economic 
governance. Principal-agent theory indeed suggest that delegation for credible commitment 
and efficiency purposes is the most likely to entail comprehensive agency discretion – i.e. 
policy autonomy of the Commission – as can be observed in this policy domain.  
 
Hypothesis on business- and state-driven integration: The preceding section developed 
the argument that European business lobbied for the creation of a EU international 
investment policy vis-à-vis their Member State governments to ensure access to ambitious, 
state-of-the-art IIAs. The Member States should have given into business demands in case 
cooperation in the policy-making forum under discussion was likely to increase their 
domestic and/or international capabilities. Due to the arguably greater welfare impacts and 
less sensitive nature of investment liberalisation commitments, business and the member 
States should have been more interested and willing to cooperate on investment liberalisation 
than in post-establishment treatment and protection provisions. The ultimate decision of the 
Member States to permanently delegate all aspects of international investment policy-
97 
 
making in the Lisbon Treaty should reflect the growing need to ensure effective policy-
making and a level playing field in international investment policy among Member State 
economies.  
 
Hypothesis H2: European business lobbied Member State governments for a 
communitarisation of international investment policy-making so as to ensure access 
to ambitious, state-of-the-art international investment and trade agreements. The 
Member States gave into such demands so as to increase their domestic and 
international capabilities ultimately leading to the permanent delegation of 
international investment policy-making to the EU.  
 
3.4 Methodological strategy 
The study draws on qualitative as well as quantitative methods in order to test the analytical 
framework and two competing ex ante hypotheses. Qualitative methods are suitable for 
projects which examine a few cases which have a small number of variables but complex 
and diverse dimensions of variations. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are 
appropriate for projects which examine a high number of cases with many variables but few 
dimensions of variations. While quantitative methods allow for a ‘shallow’ large-scale 
analysis of data, qualitative methods permit conducting in-depth analysis in a relatively 
limited field of research (King et al., 1994, pp. 3–6). Both methodological approaches thus 
have strengths and weaknesses. Methodological triangulation seeks to combine the strengths 
of both approaches so as to overcome their respective weaknesses. The purpose of 
methodological triangulation is to increase leverage i.e. the validity of research findings.  
 
The research project focuses on a single case – the emergence of the EU’s international 
investment policy – which a priori favours the use of qualitative methods. The main 
qualitative method used in the project is analytical process tracing. This goes beyond mere 
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historiography and the description of a series of events in the past. Instead, it approaches 
case studies with pre-defined theoretical assumptions about variables and causalities. It 
recounts in detail the examined periods through an analytical lens and summarises the data 
accordingly. Analytical process tracing enables the verification of hypotheses as well as the 
identification of unexpected but potentially important alternative variables, causalities and 
explanations (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 211). The key independent variables of the 
project are Commission entrepreneurship as well as business and Member State preferences. 
The dependent variable are the EU’s de facto and legal competences in international 
investment policy. To gather the necessary data, the research project draws on academic 
literature, policy documents, archival research, extensive press research, 41 semi-structured 
anonymised research interviews, an internship at the Investment Policy Unit of the 
Directorate General for Trade at the European Commission and on countless informal 
discussions with policy-makers and academics.  
 
The project examines several in-case studies. In-case studies do not follow the logic and 
method of comparative case studies. They seek to shed some light on the causalities at work 
in different fora and points of time within the overarching and long-term process of the 
emergence of the EU’s new international investment policy (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 
178–179). In accordance with this approach and the research question, the project examines 
EU-internal debates on legal competences as well as international investment negotiations 
with EU involvement. The joint analysis of these policy-making fora should produce a 
comprehensive picture of the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. Two 
criteria must guide the selection of these in-case studies. First, the in-case studies must be 
representative. In other words, an in-case study should not be a known exception to general 
policy patterns. The representativeness is a prerequisite so as to prevent biased findings. 
Second, the in-case studies should have had bearing on the EU’s legal or de facto 
competences in international investment policy. In other words, the in-case studies should 
encompass a period of variation in the EU’s competences so as to observe underlying 
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causalities. In accordance with these criteria, the project examines all intergovernmental 
conferences and relevant ECJ proceedings since 1980. What is more, it examines all 
multilateral negotiations on investment in which the EU took part – namely the GATS and 
TRIMs talks within the Uruguay Round, the negotiations on the Energy Charter Treaty, 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the OECD and the Singapore Issues. Finally, the 
study analyses how investment disciplines became a standard agenda item of FTAs between 
the EU and third countries. The analysis focuses in particular on the EU-Mexico and EU-
Chile FTA negotiations. While the inclusion of comprehensive, consolidated investment 
disciplines into the EU-Mexico FTA unexpectedly failed, the EU-Chile FTA which quickly 
followed does comprise such investment disciplines.  
 
The thesis, furthermore, draws on quantitative methods in order to cross-validate the findings 
of the in-case studies. The cross-validation proceeds indirectly and builds on the following 
reasoning. The analytical framework proposed that business promoted the communitarisation 
of international investment policy in order to get access to more competitive and state-of-
the-art IIAs. The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that international regulatory 
and economic competition manifests itself in IIAs and promoted the communitarisation of 
international investment policy-making. If this assumption is correct, international regulatory 
competition should not only have shaped the EU’s de facto and legal competences in 
international investment policy. It should also have shaped Member States’ BIT 
programmes. The last substantive chapter of the study thus develops hypotheses about how 
international regulatory competition might have affected the content of Member States’ IIAs. 
It consequently examines 475 IIAs concluded by the Member States and major competitor 
countries in order to verify whether these IIAs bear the traces of international regulatory 
competition.  
 
Finally, three important caveats to this research design need mention. First, testing the 
hypotheses is challenging due to a problem of observational equivalence. Business, 
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government and Commission preferences might at times be equivalent and interdependent in 
an examined policy-making instance. While this problem is certainly not unique or even rare 
in research on European politics, it may render it difficult to identify the actual independent 
variables behind policy outcomes. In order to prevent erroneous conclusions, it is necessary 
to carefully evaluate the relationship between these actor categories and the direction of 
influence. Second, the project faces a potential cognitive bias. The Commission is a much 
more cohesive actor than the Member States or business. Hence, researchers risk 
overestimating the causal importance of the Commission, while underestimating the 
importance of Member State or business preferences and activities. The best remedy is the 
conscious handling of the problem. Third, the quantitative cross-validation of the hypotheses 
– at best – sheds further light on the proposition that business preferences promoted the 
communitarisation of international investment policy making. It does not allow for insights 
into the validity of the other propositions.  !
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Chapter IV – The EU in investment-related negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round 
 
 
 
The EU first acquired de facto competences to negotiate on international investment 
disciplines during the Uruguay Round. The Member States decided to temporarily cooperate 
and to empower the Commission to speak on their behalf in investment-related negotiations. 
This chapter analyses and seeks to explain with reference to the analytical framework and 
hypotheses the initial decision of the Member States to cooperate and to empower the 
Commission as well as the EU’s subsequent use of its new de facto competences in 
investment-related negotiations.  
 
The findings of the chapter primarily lend support to the supranational hypothesis (H1) and 
in part invalidate the intergovernmental hypothesis (H2). The Commission – after an initial 
learning phase during the pre-negotiations of the Uruguay Round – started acting as policy 
entrepreneur calling on European business and the Member States to endorse the US 
proposal to negotiate on the so-called ‘new trade issues’ including investment and services. 
To that end, the Commission primarily used its its agenda setting powers in EU-internal 
debates, its credibility as technical expert and also tentatively pointed to the evolving trade 
agenda requiring an adjustment of Member State cooperation. The Commission acted as 
policy entrepreneur at this stage mostly for functional considerations. It came to the 
conclusion that the multilateral liberalisation of investment and services complemented its 
Single Market Program, that such negotiations allowed for new trade-offs between Member 
State preferences and that the EU was competitive in these domains and thus stood to 
significantly benefit from a multilateral framework. European business was, however, little 
receptive to the Commission’s campaigning. Most investors and service suppliers did not yet 
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apprehend the meaning of multilateral investment and services negotiations, their potential 
effects on their operations and did not have the necessary lobbying structures to develop an 
informed position and to influence policy-making. Several Member States after initial 
reluctance started supporting the idea to negotiate and to cooperate on investment and 
services in the Uruguay Round despite a manifest lack of business demands. The change of 
mind among many Member States reflected the Commission’s pedagogical campaigning and 
the realisation that their economies would significantly benefit from a multilateral 
liberalisation of investment and services trade. The observations thus lend strong support to 
the supranational hypothesis H1 but challenge the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2. 
The Member States consequently agreed to cooperate and to empower the Commission so as 
to speak with a single voice and to wield greater barraging power vis-à-vis more than 100 
third countries. They, nevertheless, put on record that their decision to cooperate and 
delegate was of temporary nature and that they did not cede powers to the EU. The analysis 
of how the EU actually used its new de facto competences in investment-related negotiations 
in the TRIMs17 and GATS18 negotiating groups draws a similar picture. The Commission 
sought to proactively advance in particular the GATS negotiations supported by many 
Member States but hardly by business.  
 
4.1 The way toward Punta Del Este 
This section first provides an overview of the pre-negotiations and the agenda-setting phase 
of the Uruguay Round until the Council decision to cooperate and to delegate negotiating on 
investment-related provisions to the Commission (1980-1986). The section then analyses the 
observations with reference to the analytical framework and hypotheses.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Trade-related investment measures form a subcategory of post-establishment treatment measures applied to 
foreign investors and their produce. TRIMs are, for instance, local content requirements or export performance 
requirements. Local content requirements force investors to use a certain quantity of local input products so as to 
stimulate domestic demand and growth. Export performance requirements oblige foreign investors to export a 
certain amount of their produce abroad in order to strengthen the external trade balance of their host country. 
TRIMs artificially inflate or reduce the volume of countries’ trade flows. What is more, they come with often 
substantial costs for the investors concerned, who are limited in their managerial decision-making.  
18  
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4.1.1 The pre-negotiations on the new multilateral trade round 
Discussions on a new multilateral trade round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) started in the early 1980s. In June 1981, the so-called ‘Consultative Group of 
Eighteen’19 first discussed how to strengthen and extend the GATT regime to new issue areas 
beyond the traditional trade in goods. As these questions ultimately required political 
answers, the GATT Council decided to hold a ministerial meeting in November 1982 (Glick, 
1984, pp. 151–152; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 31). In November 1981, the GATT 
Secretariat circulated a draft ministerial declaration (GATT, 1981) in preparation of the 
upcoming ministerial meeting. The draft declaration proposed holding a new multilateral 
trade round, which should tackle leftover issues from the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) and 
extend the GATT regime to the regulation of international investment and trade in services 
(Croome, 1995, p. 12; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 31–32; Schott, 1994, pp. 4–5). Many 
developing and developed countries were, however, sceptical of these plans. When the 
ministers met in Geneva in November 1982, they agreed on a more cautious approach. They 
merely decided to engage in a two-year reflection period on the future of the GATT regime 
and, notably, its extension to ‘new trade issues’ like trade in services (European 
Commission, 1982; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 32–37; Schott, 1994, p. 5; Stewart, 1993, 
p. 2062).  
 
Behind the scenes, the USA had been the initiator and driver of these debates. It wanted a 
new multilateral round in order to advance the liberalisation of agricultural trade, to cut 
industrial tariffs and to establish full-fledged multilateral frameworks for international 
investment flows and services trade under the GATT regime. The draft declaration of the 
GATT Secretariat was thus widely seen as a hidden attempt by the US to set the GATT !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19  The ‘Consultative Group of Eighteen’ reassembled the Geneva-based representatives of the USA, the EU 
Member States, Canada, Japan and major developing countries. While it was an informal grouping, it had 
considerable influence on the work of the GATT.  
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agenda (European Commission, 1982, p. 12; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 33; Interview, 
Brussels, 24 September 2013). The outcome of the ministerial meeting of 1982 caused 
considerable frustration and disappointment in Washington (Glick, 1984, p. 161; Paemen 
and Bensch, 1995, p. 32). The USA underscored its determination to launch a new round by 
resorting to a twofold strategy. First, it engaged in informative debates with third countries in 
order to highlight the potential benefits of a new round and an extension of the GATT 
regime to trade in services and investment regulation. Most governments had never 
examined the possibility of multilaterally liberalising services trade and investment. They 
did not know whether, and to what degree, such liberalisation efforts would benefit or harm 
their economies (Croome, 1995, pp. 20–27; Stewart, 1993, p. 2347). Second, the USA 
announced that if the GATT parties did not agree to hold a new extensive round, the USA 
would pursue its foreign economic policy objectives outside of the GATT regime. Non-
cooperative countries would therefore get locked out of the policy-making process and the 
US economy in these booming domains of the world economy. To emphasise its threat, the 
USA presented its first model bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in 1982 (Wayne, 1984). It 
also started negotiations on comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) covering, for the 
first time, services and investment disciplines with Israel and Canada (Auerbach, 1985) and 
announced the establishment of a comprehensive ‘mini GATT’ with interested parties if 
need be (Stewart, 1993, p. 2355; Tyler, 1985).  
 
US pressure for a new comprehensive multilateral trade round succeeded in the end. By 
September 1985, the USA had build sufficient support among developed and developing 
countries to launch the formal preparations for a new multilateral trade round. Only a few 
developing countries like Brazil and India were still strongly opposed, but they could not 
stop the course of events (Croome, 1995, pp. 20–27; Stewart, 1993, pp. 2357–2358). In the 
following months, a preparatory committee was commissioned to determine the agenda of 
the upcoming round. This task proved to be challenging. The USA insisted on including 
services and investment on the agenda, while the Group of Ten – led by India and Brazil – 
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argued that these issues did not fall within GATT competence. Debates on the guidelines for 
agriculture were, moreover, complicated due to the clashes between the EU and major 
agricultural producers (Stewart, 1993, p. 2356). The so-called Swiss-Colombian draft 
agenda, which foresaw negotiations on trade in services and ‘trade-related investment 
measures’, gained the greatest albeit not unanimous support in the preparatory committee. In 
the end, the preparatory committee failed to define a negotiating agenda (Croome, 1995, pp. 
28–29).  
 
The ministers reconvened in the Uruguayan city of Punta Del Este in September 1986 in 
order to formally launch the new multilateral trade round. The first task of the ministers was 
to finally pin down the negotiating agenda of the new round. The USA continued its efforts 
to include services and investment on the negotiating agenda. In the weeks before the 
ministerial meeting, US diplomats spread the rumour that the USA would still walk away 
from the negotiating table in the event that services and investment were not part of the new 
round (Croome, 1995, p. 30). US President Ronald Reagan, moreover, sought to personally 
convince the leaders of several opposing countries in telephone calls and underlined in a 
radio address on the eve of the ministerial meeting that a new round had to liberalise trade in 
services and investment so as to take account of the changing realities of the modern 
economy (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 51; Reagan, 1986). At the end of the ministerial 
meeting, a hard-fought compromise emerged. The compromise agenda provided for services 
negotiations, which, however, would take place as parallel, independent negotiations outside 
the GATT regime in order to prevent issue linkages. The agenda also foresaw negotiations 
on trade-related investment measures, which – as result of a hard-fought compromise – 
provided for much more limited negotiations than the USA had hoped. The USA had entered 
the debate with a maximalist position demanding the establishment of a full-fledged 
multilateral investment framework within the GATT (Croome, 1995, p. 138; Guisinger, 
1987, pp. 222–223; Woolcock, 1990, p. 25). The reference to ‘TRIMs’ did not preserve 
much of this US objective. The ministers adopted the agenda in the form of a ministerial 
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declaration on 20 September 1986. The core negotiations of the Uruguay Round started in 
early 1987.   
 
4.1.2 The EU in the pre-negotiations 
What role did the EU play in the pre-negotiations? And how do these observations it reflect 
on the theoretical hypotheses formulated in the analytical framework?  
 
Sprouting Commission entrepreneurship: The Commission was initially hesitant 
regarding the plan to hold a new multilateral trade round and to extend the GATT regime to 
services and investment. As the Commission’s lead negotiator recalled, the Commission at 
first perceived the proposal primarily as a US attempt to dismantle the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), which would hardly entail adequate compensation in the form of enhanced 
industrial market access for European exporters. Many leading Commission officials – even 
within the Directorate General for Trade – moreover struggled with the idea that the 
liberalisation of services trade and investment could qualify as trade policy and thus be dealt 
with within the GATT regime. The question reportedly triggered turf wars within the 
Commission. Some Commission officials also challenged the assumption that the 
international liberalisation of services trade and investment would be beneficial to the 
European economy (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). The Commission thus 
stressed on the eve of the ministerial meeting of 1982 that the meeting should not be 
misinterpreted as the prelude to a new round (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 32–34).  
 
Toward the mid-1980s and after lengthy internal debates, the Commission albeit gradually 
bought into the US proposal. In line with hypothesis H1, the Commission consequently 
started campaigning and using its agenda setting powers but also invoked the changing 
economic realities and policy agenda at the domestic level and in international trade  to 
convince the Member States and European business of the opportunities of a new 
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comprehensive GATT round. The Commission’s change in mind reflected three realisations 
and functional considerations. First, the Commission understood that a new trade round 
extending the GATT regime to investment and services would actually deliver significant 
economic gains for the EU (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). In late 1982, 
Christopher Tugendhat, Vice-President of the Commission, thus publically endorsed the 
British proposal for an international standstill clause for services trade, which implied a 
generally positive view on the liberalisation of international service trade (Agence Europe, 
1983). In the following year, Leslie Fielding, Director General in charge of trade policy, 
lamented that the EU and the Member States did not know yet what they wanted regarding 
the liberalisation of services trade and investment despite the fact that Europe was the world 
market leader in these domains. The link between the liberalisation of services trade and 
economic growth, he added, had not yet been universally accepted within Europe. He called 
upon the Member States to finally step up their efforts to study these issues and to develop 
informed positions on these new key issues of national and international economic policy. 
He regretted that – with the exception of British business – European service providers were 
not organised and invested in these debates (Cheeseright, 1983). The Commission therefore 
demanded European service providers to get involved and asked the Member States to 
finally prepare studies on the effects of international liberalisation on their service sectors 
(Cheeseright, 1985a). The Commission even started funding a research centre to further 
study these issues (Tyler, 1983).  
 
The Commission’s change in mind, moreover, reflected the insight that the proposed 
multilateral liberalisation of services trade and investment within the GATT complemented 
the Single Market programme put forward by the Commission. The Single Market 
programme focused on dismantling the remaining barriers to trade in goods, labour mobility, 
trade in services and investment activities within the EU. The overarching objective was to 
lift the European economy out of recession. The investiture of the Delors Commission in 
January 1985 and the publication of the white paper ‘Completing the Single Market’ in June 
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1985 illustrated this reorientation of the EU and its Member States from Keynesian policies 
toward liberal economic ones. The Commission declared in policy debates that the proposed 
multilateral liberalisation of services trade and investment to be in accordance with its 
domestic liberalisation agenda (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013; Interview, Oxford, 
11 October 2013). 
 
Finally, the Commission realised that the proposed comprehensive GATT agenda would 
facilitate its role as administrator of the CCP. The proposed extensive GATT agenda allowed 
for new trade-offs among the Member States in the Council of Ministers. It in particular 
promised to facilitate dealing with France. France had met the US proposal of new round 
with considerable hesitation as it expected a new US attack on the CAP. France, however, 
was also a leading exporter of services and stood to significantly gain from a new 
comprehensive GATT round. The Commission thus started highlighting the economic 
opportunities of a new comprehensive round in particular vis-à-vis France and other 
sceptical Member States in EU-internal debates (Buchan, 1992; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, 
pp. 34–35; Stewart, 1993, p. 2350).  
 
Lethargy and incomprehension in the European business community: European 
business initially remained silent in debates on a new multilateral trade round and an 
extension of the GATT regime to services and investment (Tyler, 1983; Interview, Brussels, 
24 September 2013; Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013; Interview, telephone, 17 June 
2013; Interview Brussels, 25 September 2013b).  British service providers marked a notable 
exception. The Liberalisation of Trade in Services (LOTIS) Committee brought together 
banks, law firms, and accounting and insurance companies from the City. The LOTIS 
Committee welcomed the plan to hold a new round and to extend the GATT regime to trade 
in services and investment regulation. Similar cross-sectorial associations of service 
providers did not exist in other Member States or at the European level. Architects, lawyers, 
management consultants or hoteliers did not apprehend themselves as ‘service providers’ 
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with common interests and thus took little interest in debates on the creation of the GATT 
framework for the liberalisation of services trade (Agence Europe, 1983; Tyler, 1983; 
Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013b). The LOTIS Committee, in cooperation with its 
US-American counterpart – the International Committee on Trade in Services – sought to 
raise awareness and to mobilise service providers from other Member States like Germany; 
this, however, was of little success (Tyler, 1983). Over the next years, similar attempts of the 
Commission also failed and caused considerable frustration in Brussels. The LOTIS 
Committee remained the only proactive business voice during the pre-negotiations on an 
extension of the GATT agenda to services trade and investment (Dullforce, 1986). 
 
From Member State opposition to moderate support: Most Member State governments 
met the US demand for a new comprehensive multilateral trade round with considerable 
mistrust at first. Like initially the Commission, they perceived the US proposal as another 
‘attack’ on the EU’s CAP (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 32). The plan to extend the GATT 
regime to trade in services and investment was, at first, a secondary issue for most Member 
States, and did not receive a lot of attention (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013). Many 
European policy-makers initially took the view that the GATT parties should first fully 
implement their commitments of the Tokyo Round before aiming for a new round 
(Woolcock, 1990, p. 4). France and Italy were the most vocal exponents of this view, while 
Germany and the Netherlands adopted more welcoming positions and rhetoric (Farnsworth, 
1982; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 34; Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). The 
subsequent nomination of Clayton Yeutter – a renowned expert of agricultural economics – 
as new US Trade Representative (USTR), however, increased hesitation in many Member 
State capitals. As a high-ranking Commission official recalled, Yeutter made it clear that he 
saw it as a matter of personal honour to reverse the agricultural concessions made to the EU 
by the USA in previous rounds (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013.). A notable 
exception was the British government in this context. The British government was barely 
preoccupied with the implications of a new round for British farmers, but primarily focused 
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on the potential gains for its growing service sector. During the ministerial meeting of 1982, 
Peter Rees, the British Minister for Trade, thus proposed to his colleagues to agree on a 
standstill clause to prevent the erection of new barriers to services trade and, moreover, 
supported the idea of holding a new round in order to discuss the creation of a framework for 
the liberalisation of trade in services within the GATT regime (Financial Times, 1982).  
 
The Commission manages to convince a critical mass of Member States: Toward the 
mid-1980s, several Member States started tentatively reconsidering their stances on the US 
plan to launch a new round and to extend the GATT regime to services trade and investment. 
This change in mind at least partly reflected the Commission’s campaigning but not – as 
stipulated in hypothesis H2 – lobbying of European business. Many Member States slowly 
realised that a reform of the CAP was inevitable regardless of a new multilateral trade round. 
In 1985, the OECD released a report which qualified the CAP as unsustainable and wasteful. 
The potential costs of a new round in the form of agricultural concessions were thus limited 
(Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 34–35). Second, the German, French and other Member 
State governments underwent a learning process after the ministerial meeting of 1982. On 
insistence of the Commission, the Member States studied their services sectors, external 
trade balances for services and likely effects of a multilateral liberalisation in these domains!
for the first time. They gradually understood that the liberalisation of services trade and 
investment indeed promised considerable benefits (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 34–35). 
As the Commissioner for Trade, Willy De Clercq emphasised vis-à-vis the Member States, 
the EU was actually the “superpower in trade in services, with exports three times higher 
than those of the US” (Dullforce, 1986). Finally, many Member States agreed with the 
Commission that the proposed multilateral liberalisation of services trade and investment 
was complementary to the EU’s new liberal economic orientation enshrined in the Single 
Market programme.  
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By late 1985, international support for a new round had grown to such an extent that the 
GATT Council formally launched preparations and commissioned the preparatory 
committee to define the negotiating agenda of the upcoming round. In the following months, 
the Commission vigorously supported the plan for a new round and the extension of the 
GATT regime. It continued highlighting that a liberalisation of services would be beneficial 
for Europe and had to go hand in hand with the creation of a multilateral framework for 
investment (Dullforce, 1986). In June 1986, the Commission submitted to the Council of 
Ministers the so-called ‘overall approach’ outlining the EU’s position for the upcoming 
round. The ‘overall approach’, inter alia, indicated that the EU sought negotiations on 
services trade and investment disciplines. The Member States generally agreed to this 
objective and did not raise competence concerns. Only Greece and Italy criticised that the 
EU should not aim for an across-the-board liberalisation of services trade (Paemen and 
Bensch, 1995, pp. 43–48; Peel, 1986). The Council endorsed the ‘overall approach’, which 
did not, however, represent a legally binding negotiating mandate for the Commission. But 
despite the EU’s documented interest in negotiating on services trade and investment, the EU 
did not push for these issues during negotiations on the agenda of the upcoming round. 
During debates in the preparatory committee and at the ministerial meeting of Punta Del 
Este, the EU primarily focused on defending its agricultural interests against developing 
countries. The EU left it to the USA to battle for the inclusion of services trade and 
investment, as the EU arguably did not want to fight developing countries in yet another 
domain (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 49). Even without the active support of the EU, the 
USA managed to strike a deal with the developing countries at the ministerial meeting in 
Punta Del Este, which paved the way toward negotiations on trade in services and 
investment in the upcoming round.  
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4.2.3 The Commission’s non-mandate of Punta Del Este  
The ministers of the GATT parties adopted the negotiating agenda and formally launched the 
Uruguay Round on 20 September 1986 – the last day of the ministerial meeting of Punta Del 
Este. Until this day, the Commission and the Member State had managed to sidestep formal 
discussions on competence questions. The Council of Ministers had not yet adopted any 
legal measures in these domains, which would have triggered debates about the appropriate 
competence basis and distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States. 
And as customary in GATT debates, the Member States had tacitly agreed that the 
Commission should speak on their behalf in the run-up to the Uruguay Round even on issues 
like services trade and investment. The pending opening of the Uruguay Round put an end to 
this pragmatic approach. The Council of Ministers, on the one hand, had to formally endorse 
the draft ministerial declaration of Punta Del Este and the therein-enshrined negotiating 
agenda so as to establish the EU’s assent to opening the Uruguay Round. On the other hand, 
the Council of Ministers had to issue a negotiating mandate in order to legally empower the 
Commission to participate in the Uruguay Round. In other words, the Member States had to 
take an explicit decision on whether and how to cooperate on investment disciplines in the 
context of the Uruguay Round.  
 
The Commission invited the Council of Ministers to convene on the fringes of the ministerial 
meeting in the early hours of 20 September 1986 in order to establish the EU’s assent to the 
draft ministerial declaration and to adopt the legal negotiating mandate for the Commission. 
The Commission and the British Presidency of the Council of Ministers energetically 
pleaded for the endorsement of the draft ministerial declaration and the opening of a 
comprehensive and ambitious multilateral trade round (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 56). 
The British minister chairing the meeting was very much inspired by the proactivity and 
vigour of the US delegation during the weeklong ministerial meeting and sought to emulate 
this atmosphere within the Council of Ministers (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 56). But 
while all Member States endorsed the draft ministerial declaration, it became evident that 
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many Member States were not yet fully convinced by the economic opportunities of the new 
round (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). 
 
The then following discussions among the ministers on the negotiating mandate drew an 
interesting picture. In essence, it shows that the Commission and the Member States agreed 
that as customary the Commission should speak on the EU’s behalf on all GATT agenda 
items, including this time services trade and investment. Senior Member State and 
Commission officials recalled that the representation modalities were never the object of 
serious discussions among the minister or in the ‘113 Committee’ (Interview, telephone, 17 
June 2013; Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013; Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). 
This tacit agreement, on the one hand, reflected the long-established division of labour 
among the Member States and the Commission under the CCP. In the absence of a veritable 
bilateral trade strategy, the CCP and the Directorate-General were practically the EU’s 
mouthpiece for GATT negotiations. Member State and Commission officials met in small 
circles once or twice per month over years to determine the EU’s positions within the GATT 
and came to trust and respect each other. Nobody, therefore, seriously challenged the 
Commission’s traditional role and claim to be the EU’s single voice on all items of the 
evolving trade agenda in this key policy forum. The expanding trade agenda functioned as an 
external constraint promoting Member State cooperation and delegation of powers for ‘new 
trade issues’. On the other hand, the ministers seemed to agree that the Commission should 
act as their single voice in order to wield greater bargaining power. The Member States thus 
perceived cooperation and delegation as capability-maximising strategy (Interview, 
telephone, 17 June 2013; Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013; Interview, Brussels, 24 
September 2013). Only the French delegation occasionally ‘grumbled’ about the 
Commission intruding into domains of Member State competence. A high-ranking 
Commission official commented in that regard that “If the Member States believe that it is in 
their interest to negotiate through the Commission, competence issues never play a role. 
Competence questions only surface, if somebody wants to block things.” (Interview, 
114 
 
Brussels, 24 September 2013). But while the ministers agreed on cooperating and 
empowering the Commission to negotiate, inter alia, on services trade and investment 
disciplines on their behalf, they also feared that this pragmatic decision might compromise 
their legal competences. The ministers thus put on record the following formal statement in 
Punta Del Este:  
 
“The Council, acting on a recommendation from the Commission, approved the Punta Del 
Este Declaration annexed to these minutes and authorised the Commission to open the 
negotiations provided for in that declaration within the framework of the directives which 
the Council will issue to it. The Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
also approved that Declaration to the extent that they are concerned.  
The decision does not prejudge the question of the competence of the Community or the 
Member States on particular issues.”!
(Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 56) 
  
The ministers apparently held the view that the ‘new trade issues’ – with the notable 
exception of TRIMs – came under Member State competence and anticipated a future 
competence dispute with the Commission. They manifestly worried that the Commission 
could exploit the mandate in order to later claim legal competences over these issues. These 
concerns were justified, as Opinion 1/94 (discussed in Chapter VIII) demonstrated. At the 
end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the Commission endorsed a teleological interpretation of 
the Treaty articles on the CCP and indeed argued that all so-called ‘new trade issues’ would 
come under exclusive Union competence. At the end of the meeting in Punta Del Este in 
September 1986, the ministers announced they would be issuing a legal mandate 
empowering the Commission to negotiate on all issue areas of the Uruguay Round in due 
course. While it did not affect the Commission in its function as negotiator, it needs mention 
here that the Council of Ministers never issued this legal mandate. The Council of Ministers 
only provided the Commission with a legal mandate for agricultural negotiations. Regarding 
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all other issues, the Commission represented the EU and the Member States on the basis of 
the overall approach of 1986 and continuous coordination meetings with the Council of 
Ministers and the ‘113 Committee’ (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). 
 
A theoretical evaluation of the pre-negotiations: The section reported that the 
Commission – after initial hesitation – became for functional consideration a proponent of 
the US proposal to hold a new GATT round encompassing negotiations on the multilateral 
liberalisation of services trade and investment. It consequently started acting as policy 
entrepreneur, sought to raise awareness and to inform the Member States and European 
business about the economic opportunities of a new comprehensive GATT round. But 
whereas a critical mass of Member States showed receptive to the Commission’s 
campaigning, European business remained by and large passive and uninterested in these 
debates. The Member States and the Commission finally agrred in Punta Del Este that the 
Commission should act as the EU’s single voice – including on services trade and 
investment – as customary in the GATT. While the Member States had generally endorsed 
the rationale for a new round and far-reaching delegation, they remained cautious and 
underlined that they remained competent regarding these new trade issues. These 
observations mostly lend support to the supranational hypothesis H1, which stipulates that 
the Commission acted for functional and/or power consideration as policy entrepreneur and 
sought to consolidate the EU’s role in international investment policy. The Commissoion 
drew on its agenda setting poweras and invoked the evolving international trade agenda to 
convince and to pressure the Member States into cooperation and delegation in this instance 
of international investment policy-making. It lends only little support to the 
intergovernmental hypothesis H2, which stipulates that business lobbied the Member States 
to cooperate and to delegate in order to get access to state-of-the-art investment disciplines. 
While the Member States gradually endorsed the plan to cooperate on services and 
investment disciplines, this was not the case due to business lobbying but due to the 
Commission’s efforts to communicate the economic opportunities of a new round. The 
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following sections examine how the EU used its new de facto competences in the TRIMs 
and GATS negotiations and how this reflects back on the two ex ante hypotheses.  
 
4.2 The TRIMs negotiations  
The preceding section shed light on the question of why the Member States decided to 
cooperate in international investment policy in the context of the upcoming Uruguay Round. 
This section complements the analysis. It examines how the EU subsequently used its new 
de facto competences in international investment policy in the TRIMs negotiating group. 
TRIMs are in essence measures affecting the post-establishment treatment of foreign 
investors. It first provides a brief overview of the negotiating history and then seeks to 
explain the EU’s role in the TRIMs negotiations.  
 
4.2.1 A brief negotiating history 
A senior GATT official once commented that “The TRIMs negotiations were to be among 
the most frustrating and least productive of the Uruguay Round” (Croome, 1995, p. 138). 
Several factors explain this observation. The TRIMs negotiations were a domain of stark 
confrontation between the USA, Japan and major developing countries. The USA and Japan 
advanced a maximalist position in the TRIMs negotiations. The USA adopted an extensive 
definition of TRIMs and sought to establish a multilateral framework agreement prohibiting 
the use of these measures against goods and foreign investors (GATT, 1987a, 1987b). The 
EU held an intermediate position. As explained in more detail in the following subsection, 
the EU adopted a more limited definition of TRIMs and pleaded for the creation of a 
framework agreement, which would circumscribe and only prohibit the use of certain TRIMs 
(GATT, 1989a, 1988, 1987c). Most developing countries – and notably India and Brazil – 
categorically rejected the plan to establish a framework agreement regulating the use of 
TRIMs in the first place. They were unwilling to accept any limitation of their sovereignty in 
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this domain. They underlined that TRIMs were essential instruments of their development 
policies. They stressed that the vague negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round merely 
provided for an examination of ‘the applicability of GATT articles to trade-distorting effects 
of TRIMs’. The agenda did not allow for negotiations on a new framework agreement 
limiting, or even prohibiting, the use of TRIMs (Croome, 1995, pp. 138–142; GATT, 1987d, 
1987e). These starkly contrasting positions between developed and developing countries 
made the negotiations in the TRIMs negotiating group a tedious enterprise. The situation was 
further exacerbated by the unwillingness of the key actors to invest political capital into 
advancing the TRIMs negotiations. All countries – even the USA which had initially spared 
no efforts to include investment into the negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round – 
considered TRIMs to be a secondary issue within the overall negotiating process of the 
Uruguay Round (Croome, 1995, p. 138).  
 
The TRIMs negotiations produced no results in the first two years of the Uruguay Round. 
The USA and major developing countries fought over the interpretation of the negotiating 
agenda and the definition of TRIMs without any signs of a convergence of minds. When the 
ministers reconvened for the midterm review in Montreal in December 1988, the ministers 
did not even discuss TRIMs as no controversial issue had reached the decision-making stage 
yet (Croome, 1995, pp. 141–142). After the midterm review, the TRIMs negotiating group 
sought to overcome the deadlock. It limited its discussion on studying the trade-distorting 
effects of certain TRIMs (GATT, 1989b). Progress seemed possible at first; notably, when 
the USA moved away from its maximalist position and endorsed a narrower definition of the 
term TRIMs (GATT, 1989c). In the run-up to the ministerial meeting in Brussels in 
December 1990, which was intended to close the Uruguay Round, it  became clear, however, 
that all countries were sticking to their entrenched positions. The USA, the chairman of the 
TRIMs group Kobayashi and the lead negotiator of Hong Kong successively tabled draft 
texts of a TRIMs Agreement, which helped to identify the key controversies but failed to 
gain broad support (Croome, 1995, pp. 259–261; Stewart, 1993, p. 2123). As a high-ranking 
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GATT official recalled “no negotiating text went to Brussels in worse shape than the one on 
TRIMs…” (Croome, 1995, p. 261). The ministers would finally try to resolve the 
controversies over TRIMs in a Green Room session during the ministerial meeting of 
Brussels. The ministerial meeting, however, ran into complete stalemate over agriculture one 
day before the scheduled Green Room session on TRIMs (Croome, 1995, p. 284). The 
Uruguay Round negotiations only restarted in February 1991. The negotiations on TRIMs 
slowly struck new paths as the USA and developing countries gradually revised their 
preferences on TRIMs. US policy-makers grew concerned with a hike in Japanese FDI in the 
USA and started pondering about the benefits of TRIMs, while many developing countries 
adopted more liberal policies toward FDI (Croome, 1995, p. 308). In autumn 1991, George 
Maciel, the new chairman overseeing the TRIMs negotiations, started bilaterally and 
informally consulting with countries over a new draft text for a TRIMs Agreement. In 
December 1991, Maciel released his non-negotiated draft text and sent it to lead negotiators 
of the Uruguay Round in the trade negotiating committee (TNC). The TNC did not challenge 
Maciel’s draft text, which ultimately became part of the WTO Agreement in April 1994. The 
final text of the TRIMs Agreement is of rather humble nature. It prohibits TRIMs which are 
incompatible with GATT articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions), such as investment incentives or trade performance requirements (Croome, 
1995, pp. 284–286, 309).  
 
4.2.2 The EU in the TRIMs negotiations  
The EU as a reactive and marginal actor in the TRIMs negotiations: What role did the 
EU play in the TRIMs negotiations? The EU did not proactively use its new de facto 
competences in international investment policy in the TRIMs negotiating group. And 
although the EU spoke through the Commission with a single voice, the EU remained a 
marginal and reactive party in this negotiating forum. As explained above, the key bargains 
took place between the USA and Japan, on the one hand, and major developing countries on 
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the other. The EU did not belong to these camps and did not attempt to play a moderating 
role. The EU’s submissions to the TRIMs negotiating group confirm this view. While the 
USA tabled a draft working agenda, followed by 9 position papers and a draft text for a 
TRIMs Agreement, the EU tabled merely 3 position papers in the course of the TRIMs 
negotiations.20 The EU’s submissions did not develop a new, distinctly European approach 
to the regulation of TRIMs or add decisive ideas and issues to the discussions. The EU’s 
position papers mostly clarified the EU’s position in relation to the language and substance 
of US position papers. Regarding substance, the EU adopted an intermediate position 
between the USA, Japan and major developing countries. It stressed that only some of the 
TRIMs, which the USA sought to outlaw within the GATT regime, had a direct and 
significant effect on trade flows and could therefore be tackled under a TRIMs Agreement 
(GATT, 1989a, 1988, 1987c). The EU referred to the so-called FIRA Case21 in order to 
evaluate the relevance of existing GATT rules for the regulation of TRIMs and the potential 
need for new GATT norms in this domain (GATT, 1987c). Neither the USA and Japan, nor 
major developing countries, showed support or interest in the EU’s position.  
 
The Commission treats TRIMs as an issue of secondary importance: The Commission 
did not attach great importance to the TRIMs negotiations. Senior Commission officials 
recalled that the TRIMs negotiations were only discussed in passing within the Commission. 
It was a clearly an issue of secondary importance in Commission-internal deliberations 
(Interview, Brussels, 5 October 2011). A high-ranking Member State official confirmed this 
and lamented that the Member States occasionally had to figuratively ‘drag the Commission 
to the negotiating table’ in this field (Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See GATT Digital Library of Stanford University for a comprehensive archive of negotiating documents 
http://gatt.stanford.edu.   
21 The acronym FIRA stands for Foreign Investment Review Act. The USA brought a claim against Canada, 
because it took the view that local content and export performance requirements imposed on US investors under 
FIRA were illegal under the GATT. The FIRA Case thus had a direct bearing on the TRIMs negotiations.  
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The Commission’s lack of interest in the TRIMs negotiations reflected two considerations. 
On the one hand, the Commission took the view that the TRIMs negotiations were mostly 
about the interpretation, application and elaboration of existing GATT articles in regard to 
TRIMs. The TRIMs negotiating group would not work towards a comprehensive multilateral 
investment framework. Hence, the TRIMs negotiations did not offer the Commission the 
opportunity to prove itself as international negotiator or the opportunity to shape the global 
political economy. As will become clear below, moreover, the Commission did not get 
pressure from the Member States or European business to push for specific TRIMs 
disciplines. This combination translated into the Commission dealing with the TRIMs 
negotiations as a mandatory exercise rather then economic and political opportunity 
(Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). 
 
European business lacks interest: Business showed little interest in the TRIMs 
negotiations. This observation holds true for European as well as national business 
federations. The European umbrella federation UNICE, the Confederation of British 
Industries, the German Federation of Industries or the German Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce and others occasionally encouraged negotiations on TRIMs, but according to all 
accounts did not engage in meaningful lobbying in order shape the negotiations (Agence 
Europe, 1992a; Montagnon, 1988; Thomson, 1990; Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013). 
How can one explain that European business representatives by and large disregarded these 
negotiations while US business reportedly pushed for ambitious TRIMs disciplines? First, 
many European investors arguably incurred lower TRIMs-related costs than US firms, as 
they benefited from the BIT networks of their Member States (Interview, telephone, 17 June 
2013; Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). Second, many European investors had 
arguably already put up with TRIMs and the related costs in developing countries, because 
they had been active in many developing countries since colonial times. US investors, on the 
other hand, had been less active in most developing countries in the past and perceived 
TRIMs as significant barriers to market entry. Third, those European companies which 
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nonetheless showed some interest in the TRIMs negotiations, cautioned that the EU should 
not push for overly ambitious TRIMs disciplines in the GATT so as not to antagonise 
developing countries. A TRIMs Agreement would only make sense if developing countries 
would agree to sign up to such an agreement (Woolcock, 1990, pp. 25–26). Finally and in-
line with the above, many European investors felt that the TRIMs negotiations tackled 
irrelevant investment barriers. The position of the European Chemical Industries Federation 
(CEFIC) – a very investment-intensive sector – illustrates this view. CEFIC stressed that 
European chemical companies were highly interested in the creation of a multilateral 
investment framework under the auspices of the GATT. CEFIC and its national members 
strongly lobbied the Member States and the European Institutions to this end. CEFIC 
clarified, however, that European chemical companies mainly sought enhanced market 
access for investments and a better protection of their patents abroad. Both issues were not 
discussed in the TRIMs negotiating group, which therefore received little attention from 
European chemical producers (Montagnon, 1989).  
 
The Member States divided and uninterested: Like the Commission and European 
business, the Member States, on the one hand considered the TRIMs negotiations as an issue 
of secondary importance in the big scheme of things. The TRIMs negotiations were unlikely 
to generate important benefits for the European economy and business. Unlike the USA, 
several Member States had already started establishing sizeable BIT networks with third 
countries, which limited the applicability of certain TRIMs to their investors. The Member 
States concentrated their attention and political capital on the economically more potent 
negotiations on agriculture, non-agricultural market access and services (Interview, Brussels, 
5 October 2011; Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013). On the other hand, the Member States 
had difficulties agreeing on a clear-cut position and strategy for the TRIMs negotiations. The 
lead negotiator of the Commission observed that the EU constantly sat on the fence in the 
TRIMs negotiations (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 86–87). The divisions among the 
Member States mirrored in many respects the divisions at the international level in the 
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TRIMs negotiating group. All Member States used TRIMs to regulate inward FDI, but 
certain Member States imposed TRIMs much more frequently on foreign investors than 
other Member States. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany for instance used 
TRIMs only in a few circumstances. France, on the other hand, drew heavily and frequently 
on TRIMs. France considered TRIMs an indispensable instrument for its industrial policy 
and its national economic development strategy. So while liberal Member States were ready 
to limit the use of TRIMs within the GATT regime so as to facilitate the operations of their 
multinational companies abroad, protectionist Member States were sceptical (Paemen and 
Bensch, 1995, pp. 86–87; Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013; Interview, Brussels, 24 
September 2013). In 1988, this divide between the Member States came forcefully to the 
fore. France restricted the import of Nissan cars produced in a plant in the United Kingdom. 
It argued that the cars produced in the British Nissan plant did not attain a local content 
threshold of 80% so as to qualify as European produce. Hence, they had to be considered as 
Japanese imports and counted against France’s unilaterally imposed import quota for 
Japanese cars. So far the French import quota had gone unchallenged within the EU and the 
GATT, but the Commission and the British government now announced that they would 
challenge the French measure. Italy expressed its sympathy for the French position (Buchan, 
1989; Montagnon, 1988; Montagnon and Dullforce, 1988). The Nissan dispute raised 
question marks about the legality of TRIMs in the context of the Single Market. As the 
Member States and the Commission got into internal quarrels about the legality of certain 
TRIMs, the EU could not play a leading role in international negotiations. The Nissan 
dispute, moreover, complicated negotiations in the TRIMs negotiating group, as it signalled 
to developing countries that not even the developed countries could agree on a common 
position.  
 
A theoretical evaluation of the TRIM’s negotiations: The EU made only limited use of its 
de facto competences in investment regulation in the context of the TRIMs negotiations. 
While this observation generally speaks against both ex ante hypotheses, it nevertheless 
123 
 
weakens the intergovernmental hypothesis H2 more than the supranational hypothesis H1. 
The analysis of the TRIMs negotiations demonstrated that European business did not lobby 
for the EU’s involvement in this domain. Also it suggested that the Member States were 
uninterested and divided over the EU’s approach to TRIMs and could not effectively 
cooperate in this international investment policy-making forum. Hence, it is impossible to 
claim that the EU’s involvement and role reflected either business or government 
preferences as suggested by liberal intergovernmentalism. Yet, while the Commission did 
not act as a policy entrepreneur in this context – as stipulated in the supranational hypothesis 
H1 – the EU’s involvement in these investment negotiations still reflects in essence 
supranational and institutionalist dynamics. Member State cooperation and delegation 
occurred, nevertheless, as TRIMs became part of the GATT agenda and trade policy 
encroached into investment regulation. The EU had to play a role for legal reasons and 
because the Member States had generally agreed to speak with a single voice in the GATT.  
 
4.3 The GATS negotiations  
In the beginning, the TRIMs negotiations were the focus of investment-related negotiations 
in the Uruguay Round. As the Round progressed, it became clear that the GATS negotiations 
would aim to liberalise service-related investments and the creation of general post-
establishment treatment standards for investors in services sectors. The GATS negotiations 
thereby turned into the epicentre of investment-related negotiations in the Uruguay Round. 
The following section examines how the EU used its new de facto competences in 
international investment policy in the GATS negotiations. It first provides a brief overview 
of the GATS negotiations and then evaluates to what extent the EU’s use of its de facto 
competences and its role in the GATS negotiations lends support to one of the two ex-ante 
hypotheses.   
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4.3.1 A brief negotiating history  
The negotiations on services trade were highly complex and controversial. As explained 
above, the USA had fought hard with developing countries to set services trade on the 
negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round. In the end, the developing countries accepted 
negotiations on services trade, but their hesitation translated into a vague and contradictory 
negotiating mandate for the Group on Negotiations on trade in Services (GNS). The 
negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round stipulated that the GNS should, on the one hand, 
establish a framework for the liberalisation of services trade and, on the other hand, preserve 
the policy space of governments to regulate – and de facto to protect – their national services 
sectors (Stewart, 1993, p. 2359). The GNS was, therefore, set for onerous negotiations. In 
order to facilitate the negotiations, they proceeded in a two-step approach. Until the midterm 
review, the GNS should examine definitions, volume and geography of services trade and 
should eventually draft a framework agreement. After the midterm review, the GNS should 
then start negotiations on liberalisation commitments.  
 
The initial stocktaking phase was meant to ease tensions among the parties by disseminating 
knowledge about services trade. It evolved, however, into a confrontational exercise. 
Discussions started out with an argument between the USA, the EU and developing 
countries over the representativeness of the examined data on the volume and geography of 
services trade. Several developing countries suspected that behind this data lay a hidden 
attempt by developed countries to reduce the developing countries’ bargaining power in 
subsequent negotiations on liberalisation commitments (Stewart, 1993, pp. 2362–2363). 
Moreover, the parties could not agree whether the definition of services trade should 
encompass service-related investments and the movement of natural persons. The USA had 
initially proposed a narrow definition, which only encompassed cross-border supply and 
consumption abroad. The USA had feared that a broad definition including service-related 
investments would antagonise developing countries too much. Developing countries, 
however, rejected this narrow definition. They stressed that the definition had to encompass 
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the movement of natural persons in order to allow the competitive advantages of developing 
countries to play out (Hindley, 1990, p. 14; Stewart, 1993, pp. 2362–2363). Thereupon, the 
USA and the EU underlined their demand to include the establishment of commercial 
presences i.e. service-related investments into the definition of services trade (Sidhu, 2004, 
p. 188). The USA, the EU and other developed countries repeatedly pushed for ending this 
stocktaking phase and to start with veritable negotiations on a framework agreement and 
liberalisation commitments. Developing countries, however, resisted these demands 
(Croome, 1995, pp. 127–128).  
 
The first two years of negotiations produced no results. Only the midterm review during the 
ministerial meeting in Montreal delivered progress. The ministers decided that the term 
services trade should encompass cross-border supply, consumption abroad, movement of 
natural persons and the establishment of commercial presences (Stewart, 1993, p. 2369). The 
GATS negotiations thereby became multilateral investment negotiations. The adoption of 
this broad definition of services trade had reportedly become possible, as major developing 
countries like India and Brazil had slowly warmed to the idea of a comprehensive 
multilateral services agreement (Croome, 1995, p. 242). In the following two years, the USA 
and a group of developing countries tabled and discussed several draft texts for a future 
GATS, while the EU gave detailed comments (GATT, 1990, 1989d, 1989e, 1989f, 1989g). 
The discussions in the GNS, inter alia, focused on four questions. First, how could one apply 
GATT principles like MFN or NT to trade in services? The GNS carried out several sectorial 
tests to determine the likely impact of such principles (Stewart, 1993, pp. 2372–2373, 2376–
2378). Second, should a framework agreement cover all or only selected service sectors? 
The EU and many other countries were pleading for a framework agreement applying to all 
sectors in order to facilitate an equitable liberalisation of services trade. The EU argued that 
if need be, the parties could add sector-specific protocols to complement general rules. The 
USA rejected the EU’s position and pleaded for a framework agreement applying to a 
limited number of service sectors. The USA added that sensitive sectors like financial 
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services required sector-specific rules and discussions (Croome, 1995, pp. 250–251; 
Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013; Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). Third, should 
the MFN principle apply unconditionally or conditionally? The USA stressed the need for a 
conditional MFN clause in order to promote the liberalisation of services trade. The USA 
explained that an unconditional MFN clause would provide protectionist countries with full 
access to liberal services markets like the USA, while US service providers would gain no 
additional market access to generally closed markets. The EU, and almost all other parties, 
harshly criticised the US position. They argued that the reasoning of the USA ran counter to 
the very purpose of the MFN principle and was incompatible with general GATT rules 
(Croome, 1995, pp. 250, 282; Stewart, 1993, pp. 2378–2379, 2393–2394). Finally, should 
investment liberalisation proceed on the basis of a positive or negative list? And relatedly, 
should liberalisation commitments take force immediately or be the result of on-going 
negotiations? The USA and the EU pleaded for liberalisation on the basis of negative lists. 
Developing countries opposed this proposal. They argued that negative lists would result in a 
too speedy and comprehensive liberalisation of service sectors. The USA, moreover, 
demanded an immediate liberalisation, whereas the EU and developing countries initially 
favoured a progressive liberalisation. In the end, the parties agreed to undertake some 
immediate liberalisations as well as to continue negotiations on the basis of positive lists 
(Croome, 1995, pp. 245–246; Stewart, 1993, pp. 2371–2372, 2397–2399). As the Brussels 
ministerial meeting approached, the GNS drew up a draft text of the GATS in mid-1990, 
which consolidated the state of negotiations and was rife with brackets (Stewart, 1993, pp. 
2394–2395). 
 
The ministers convened in December 1990 in Brussels with the formal – while unrealistic – 
objective of concluding the Uruguay Round. The key priority of the ministers regarding the 
GATS negotiations was to finalise the framework agreement. The objective slowly shifted 
beyond reach, as the USA voiced ever more radical demands in the days prior to the 
ministerial meeting. The USA now demanded to exclude entire service sectors from the 
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negotiations and emphasised that it would only accept a conditional MFN clause (Dullforce, 
1990). The USA thereby transformed from being the engine driver to being the brakeman of 
the GATS negotiations. The shift in US attitude de facto put the EU, as second economic 
heavyweight and major liberal actor, into the driver’s seat of the GATS negotiations 
(Croome, 1995, pp. 250–251). The following ministerial negotiations could not resolve the 
many disagreements on the GATS, but ran anyway into complete deadlock over agriculture. 
The GNS reconvened in June 1991 and subsequently focused on three issue areas. The 
negotiators sought to finalise the framework agreement. The task was difficult taking into 
consideration that the central questions of the scope of the framework agreement and the 
MFN controversy could only be resolved in the light of countries’ final liberalisation efforts 
(Croome, 1995, pp. 312–314). The negotiators, moreover, started talks on sector-specific 
annexes notably for telecommunications, maritime transport and financial services (Croome, 
1995, pp. 314–316). The negotiators finally started with discussions on liberalisation 
commitments. The scheduling exercise was challenging, as the negotiators at first did not 
know how to identify and measure barriers or how to codify commitments (Croome, 1995, 
pp. 316–318). As the extended deadline of December 1991 for the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round approached, the chair of the GNS drew up a draft framework agreement 
based on his personal judgement. The draft foresaw universal coverage of the framework 
agreements, but allowed countries to file temporary MFN exceptions for certain sectors 
(Croome, 1995, pp. 317–318; Stewart, 1993, pp. 2394–2395). The TNC – the highest 
negotiating organ of the Uruguay Round under the ministerial level – accepted the draft, 
which became part of the final WTO Agreement. The as yet incomplete liberalisation 
schedules for services trade and in particular frictions over agriculture, however, prevented 
the end of the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round continued for another two years. The 
negotiations on services trade mostly focused on finalising the liberalisation schedules for 
particularly sensitive sectors like financial services, maritime transport or cultural and 
audiovisual services. The USA and the EU stood at the very centre of this nerve-wrecking 
bargaining exercise (Croome, 1995, pp. 332–333, 355–358; Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 
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233–235). On 15 December 1993, the negotiating parties were finally ready to sign the WTO 
Agreement. The final text of the GATS covers all services sectors, provides for general MFN 
treatment and contains several sector-specific annexes. The GATS decisively liberalised 
service-related investment flows and until today constitutes the most important multilateral 
investment agreement.  
 
4.3.2 The EU in the GATS negotiations 
The EU proactively and ambitiously uses its new de facto competences: What role did 
the EU play in the GATS negotiations? It shone through in the preceding subsection that in 
comparison to the TRIMs negotiations, the EU proactively used its new de facto 
competences in international investment policy in the GNS. The EU spoke through the 
Commission with a single voice and became a central negotiating party in the GNS. The 
EU’s important role in the GNS manifested itself in several ways. First, the EU acted as 
driver and broker in the GNS negotiations. While the EU was clearly part of the liberal 
camp, it successfully managed to maintain the dialogue with the opposing camp of 
developing countries (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, p. 132). As discussed above, the EU 
supported the developing countries, for instance, in rejecting the US demand for a 
conditional MFN clause. The EU also pushed for a framework agreement covering all 
service sectors in order to enable the adoption of an equitable package of liberalisation 
commitments. Second, the EU gradually became the leader of the liberal camp in the GNS 
talks. The EU pushed for a comprehensive liberalisation of service trade including service-
related investments on the basis of a negative list. The EU – together with the USA – thereby 
spearheaded the liberal camp in the GNS negotiations. When the USA gradually adopted a 
more protectionist position in the GNS negotiations after 1990, the role of leader of the 
liberal camp quite naturally fell to the EU (Croome, 1995, p. 163). Finally, the EU played a 
decisive role in the GNS negotiations, because it possessed badly needed expertise for the 
highly technical negotiations in the GNS. Due to the EU’s on-going internal liberalisation of 
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services and capital flows in the context of the Single Market Program, the Commission and 
the Member States had acquired expertise which most other countries lacked. In summary, it 
seems fair to say that the EU proved itself for the first time in its history as a serious actor in 
investment regulation in the context of the GNS talks.  
 
The Commission – an ambitious and resourceful policy entrepreneur: Commission 
preferences and behaviour had a decisive influence on the EU’s proactive use of its de facto 
competences and central role in the GNS talks. As explained in the section on the pre-
negotiations, the Commission had turned into an outspoken supporter of multilateral 
negotiations on services trade within the EU in the mid-1980s. From the Commission’s point 
of view the negotiations promised to deliver significant welfare gains for the European 
economy and offered the rare opportunity to design a new central building block of the 
future global political economy. The Commission thus attached great importance to the GNS 
negotiations and promoted them in EU-internal debates (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 
2013; Interview, Brussels, 5 October 2011). The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship for a 
proactive and ambitious use of the EU’s de facto competences came to the fore in several 
ways.  
 
The Commission drew on its agenda setting powers and expertise to mobilise and maintain 
support for the GNS talks and to consolidate the EU’s role in services and investment 
regulation. The Commission, for instance, conducted inter-service consultations so as to 
elaborate an informed position and strategy papers and to guide the initial debates in the 
Council of Ministers (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013). The Commission also strongly 
propelled the Member States to conduct similar inter-service consultations and to share their 
results in Council meetings. These inter-service consultations brought together officials from 
diverse ministries with different outlooks and preferences, which made them a challenging 
while very productive exercise. The Member States developed increasingly informed 
positions (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013). The Commission also called upon the 
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Council of Ministers to establish a new ‘113 sub-committee’ on trade in services so as to 
finally create a permanent forum for expert discussion and build up an institutional memory. 
The debates in the new sub-committee were complex and the Commission had the influential 
yet challenging task of reconciling the many Member State demands with those from third 
countries in the GNS. The Commission’s lead negotiator on services commented that his 
work sometimes felt like ‘herding cats’ (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013). At the same 
time, the Commission continued calling on European business to get more engaged in these 
debates. As discussed in detail below, European business showed little responsiveness to 
these invitations (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013).  
 
The Commission, moreover, used the progressing EU-internal liberalisation of services trade 
in order to consolidate the EU’s role in international services and investment regulation. The 
finalisation of the Single Market – inter alia for intra-EU service trade and related 
investments – clearly shaped and facilitated the EU’s central role in the GNS talks. While 
many GNS parties struggled, for instance, with a broad definition of the services trade 
encompassing service-related investments and movements of persons, the Commission could 
easily convince the Member States of this broad approach by pointing to EU-internal 
legislation and the Single Market programme, which built on a similarly broad definition of 
cross-border service provision. Hence, the broad definition of services – encompassing 
cross-border investment – showed uncontroversial within the EU, which enabled the 
Commission to push in the name of the EU for a multilateral service framework 
encompassing service-related investments (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013). What is 
more, the Single Market programme supported the formation of fairly homogenous Member 
State preferences and thereby a strong European position on service-related investment 
liberalisation commitments. The EU-internal liberalisation facilitated international 
liberalisation, as it incidentally also eliminated barriers to international services trade and 
service-related investment. It, moreover, fostered the competitiveness of European service 
providers and prepared them for global markets (Messerlin, 1990, pp. 132–134, 137). In 
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consequence, the Member States and thus the EU generally held firm offensive positions in 
EU-internally liberalised service sectors, while they continued holding rather defensive 
preferences on yet protected service sectors such as postal, telecommunications, audio-visual 
or cultural services. Homogenous Member State preferences generally facilitate the 
Commission’s role as single voice, which allows the Commission and the EU to build up a 
reputation as serious negotiating parties and skilful negotiators thereby consolidating their 
role in new policy areas such as investment regulation.  
 
European business remains passive and lethargic: Sectoral preferences, on the other 
hand, cannot account for the EU’s central role and proactive use of its de facto competences 
in the GNS negotiations. All business representatives, Member State and Commission 
officials interviewed for this thesis agreed that – with the exception of very few sectors and 
associations – European business did not take a genuine interest and shape debates within the 
EU on the GNS negotiations. National and European federations and business leaders 
occasionally and publically supported ambitious negotiations on services trade, but did not 
get wholeheartedly involved in policy-making debates or provide technical expertise to the 
Member States and Commission (Agence Europe, 1991a; Cheeseright, 1985b). The Member 
States and the Commission repeatedly called on service companies to provide technical 
expertise. The Commission, moreover, demanded European service providers to finally get 
organised and learn a lesson from the International Committee on Trade in Services in the 
USA, which played a decisive role in shaping the US position and strategy in the GNS 
negotiations. The Commission’s calls showed, however, only limited success. Some time 
after the launch of the Uruguay Round, the European Communities Services Group (ECSG) 
formed in order to provide European service providers with a common voice across sectors 
and Member States in the GNS negotiations (Dullforce, 1987). But the ECSG reportedly did 
not exert great influence on European policy-making, as service providers from different 
Member States and sectors found it difficult to identify common objectives and to agree on 
common positions (Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013b). Among the few proactive and 
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interested business representatives in this domain were reportedly the LOTIS Committee, 
audio-visual service companies, maritime transport companies, the Dutch business 
federation and the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) (Interview, 
telephone, 17 June 2013; Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013b). This heterogeneous 
group could not, however, make up for the general lack of business interest and input.   
 
The Member States in support of ambitious GNS talks: Despite the lack of business 
lobbying and in contrast to liberal intergovernmental assumptions and hypothesis H2, many 
Member State governments took a sincere interest in the GNS negotiations. In comparison to 
other negotiating formations of the Uruguay Round, the Member States held rather 
homogenous and overall offensive preferences regarding the liberalisation of services trade. 
All in all, Member State governments considered the liberalisation of services trade to be in 
their national economic interest and therefore readily cooperated and delegated negotiating 
powers to the Commission in order to attain a good deal. As discussed above, the Member 
States’ support for ambitious negotiations and readinessa to cooperate to a large extent 
reflected the Commission’s pedagogical campaigning prior and during the Uruguay Round. 
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Spain, Belgium and Germany 
were eager to see a comprehensive liberalisation of services trade (Interview, Brussels, 24 
September 2013; Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013, Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013). 
Italy, Portugal and Greece, on the other hand, were initially sceptical and then neutral 
regarding the plan to liberalise services trade within the GATT regime (Interview, Brussels, 
24 September 2013; Peel, 1986). France, finally, held a peculiar position in these debates. 
France had manifestly offensive interests in services trade. The French economy comprised a 
large and competitive services sector, which stood to significantly gain from a multilateral 
liberalisation of services. France was nevertheless ready to sacrifice gains for its services 
sector to protect its agriculture (Interview, Oxford, 11 October 2013; Buchan, 1992). It 
repeatedly applied the brakes to the GNS negotiations if, for instance, the USA voiced 
unacceptable agricultural demands. These observations suggest that the size and 
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competitiveness of their respective service sectors and, ultimately, their national economic 
welfare shaped government preferences and their willingness to cooperate – not however 
business lobbying.  
 
A theoretical evaluation of the GNS negotiations: The EU played a proactive role in the 
GNS talks and fully exploited its new de facto competences in international investment 
regulation. The EU’s central role and proactive use of its new de facto competences 
primarily reflected Commission entrepreneurship and thus lends support to hypothesis H1. 
The Commission’s proactive attitude, its recourse to agenda setting powers and referral to 
the emerging Single Market managed to mobilise and to convince the Member States to 
closely cooperate in this forum of international investment policy-making. The Member 
States bought into the Commission’s argument that participation and cooperation in the GNS 
promised to deliver considerable economic benefits. European business, on the other, 
remained passive and lethargic. These observations contradict hypothesis H2. While the 
Member States indeed happily cooperated in this instance of international investment policy-
making, it did not reflect business lobbying but the Commission’s resourceful campaigning.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter traced the EU’s involvement in investment-related negotiations during the pre- 
and core negotiations of the Uruguay Round (1982-1994). The chapter primarily lends 
support to supranationalism and hypothesis H1 and only partly to liberal 
intergovernmnetalism and hypothesis H2. Member State cooperation and the EU’s in part 
central role in investment-related negotiations during the Uruguay Round mostly reflected 
Commission entrepreneurship. After initial hesitation, the Commission came to see the US 
proposal to hold a new comprehensive GATT round including negotiations on services trade 
and investment as being in the EU’s very own economic interest. During the pre- and core 
negotiations, the Commission thus heavily used its agenda setting powers and referred to the 
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evolving trade agenda so as to convince European business and the Member States of the 
benefits to endorse the launch of investment negotiations within the GATT. It encouraged 
and funded research on services trade and investment, promoted the establishment of a 
dedicated Council committee for services trade, called on business to establish lobbying 
structures and pointed to the complementarity between the EU-internal liberalisation 
enshrined in the Single Market program and the upcoming GATT round. While European 
business hardly responded to the Commission’s proactive stance, the Member States 
gradually came around and bought into the Commission’s argument and agreed to cooperate 
and to delegate on investment regulation in the GATT. The Member States, nevertheless, 
underlined that this decision was of temporary and not permanent nature. In conclusion, the 
chapter showed that European cooperation and integration occurred at this instance due to 
supranational rather than liberal intergovernmental dynamics.  
 !  
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Chapter V – The EU in investment-related negotiations on 
the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
 
 
The previous chapter examined the EU’s involvement in investment negotiations during the 
Uruguay Round. The present chapter shifts the focus of enquiry to the EU’s involvement in 
the negotiations on the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The ECT is little known to the general 
public. Its content and geographical scope nevertheless make it a milestone agreement of 
global economic governance. The much discussed arbitration award of some $50bn in the 
case of Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) vs Russia (ITA Law, 2014) and the pending 
proceeding Vattenfall vs Germany (II) (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Hoffmann, 2012) 
concerning Germany’s nuclear phase-out were both filed under the ECT and underline the 
importance of the agreement. The ECT was negotiated between 1990 and 1998 and governs 
energy trade and investment among the contracting parties. It contains, inter alia, soft law 
provisions on market access for investors in the energy sector, and binding post-
establishment treatment and protection standards as well as investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) provisions. The content of the ECT is thus in many regards identical to 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Fifty-two parties from Europe, Asia and Oceania have 
signed the ECT and some 20 parties from the Americas, Middle East and Africa have 
observer status under the agreement (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2003). Hence, the ECT is 
the only existing truly multilateral investment agreement. The ECT is, moreover, of special 
importance to this study. The EU was closely involved in the negotiations on the ECT and 
acceded – next to its Member States – as full-fledged party to the agreement. The ECT is the 
only veritable investment agreement, which has been concluded by the EU so far. What is 
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more, the ECT is the only agreement in force which entitles investors to file investment 
arbitration claims against the EU.  
 
The chapter finds that supranational theories and hypothesis H1 better capture the 
surprisingly high degree of Member State cooperation and delegation during the ECT 
negotiations than intergovernmental thinking and hypothesis H2. Even for today’s standards, 
the EU held significant de facto competences in this investment policy-making forum. The 
EU’s extensive de facto competences reflected to a large extent Commission 
entrepreneurship. The Commission skilfully used its agenda setting powers, invoked fringe 
competences and pointed to synergies between the emerging Single Market for energy and 
the ECT talks so as to ensure the central role of the EU in this international investment 
policy-making forum. European business was lethargic and partly even opposed to the ECT 
project, which it perceived as a Commission-led liberal attack on its business model. Despite 
the critical attitude of business – and in contradiction to hypothesis H2 – the Member States 
were increasingly receptive, supportive and grateful for the Commission’s proactive attitude. 
They felt that it was in their best geopolitical and economic interest to speak with a single 
voice in the ECT talks. They hoped to thereby exert greater influence on the collapsing 
Soviet Union and to ensure better access to the Soviet Union’s huge energy resources. 
Hence, they gradually allowed the Commission to play an ever more important role in the 
ECT negotiations. The chapter first provides an empirical account of these important – yet 
often overlooked – international negotiations. In a second part, it theoretically analyses the 
observations in order to explain the EU’s extraordinary role in this forum.  
 
5.1 A negotiating history of the Energy Charter Treaty 
The negotiations on the ECT evolved in four stages. First, the EU conceived the ECT project 
as ‘Lubbers Plan’ and conducted pre-negotiations with the Soviet Union (June 1990 – July 
1991). Second, the parties negotiated the European Energy Charter, which was a political 
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agreement (July 1991 – December 1991). It documented the overarching objectives of the 
ECT project and the intention of the contracting parties to subsequently enter into a binding 
‘basic agreement’. The ‘basic agreement’ is better known today as the ECT and is referred to 
here as such henceforth. Third, the parties then engaged in negotiations on the binding ECT 
(February 1992 – December 1994). Finally, the parties conducted negotiations on the so-
called ‘supplementary protocol’ of the ECT (January 1995 – autumn 1998). The parties had 
initially agreed to include binding investment liberalisation commitments into the ECT but 
failed to reach a compromise on this issue. Hence, they decided to exclude the issue from the 
ECT negotiations and to deal with it in a ‘supplementary protocol’. The negotiations on the 
‘supplementary protocol’ produced an elaborate draft text, but ultimately collapsed. The 
chapter examines each stage in turn. The analytical focus of this section primarily lies on 
international negotiating activities between the EU and third countries. EU-internal 
dynamics shaping the EU’s negotiating behaviour and de facto competences in international 
investment policy are analysed in the second section of this chapter.   
 
5.1.1 The Lubbers Plan 
Discussions on a ‘European Energy Community’ started in June 1990. The Dutch Prime 
Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed the creation of such a community to his fellow heads of 
state during a session of the European Council . Under his proposal, the ‘European Energy 
Community’ should establish a trade and investment regime for the energy sector 
encompassing the Single Market of the EU, the Soviet Union and the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The ‘European Energy Community’ should allow the parties to 
capitalise on their complementary relationship. While the Member States of the EU were in 
need of secure and affordable access to energy, the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern 
European countries urgently needed Western capital, technology and know-how to 
modernise their ailing energy sectors and to revive their economies. Lubbers underlined that 
such a ‘European Energy Community’ would support a peaceful transition of the Soviet 
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Union and the Central and Eastern European countries from autocratic command economies 
toward democratic capitalism (Buchan, 1990; Doré, 1996, p. 138; European Commission, 
1991). The so-called Lubbers Plan clearly echoed classic liberalism and the paradigm of 
Western European Integration to overcome entrenched hostility and to foster peace through 
economic cooperation and the integration of strategic economic sectors. One may recall here 
that in the early 1950s the EU had started out as an energy community known as the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Konoplyanik, 1996, pp. 156–157).  
 
The ECT as a geopolitical tool: The Lubbers Plan reflected the preoccupations of its time. 
On the one hand, it echoed the mounting geopolitical challenges in Europe due to the 
upheavals in the Soviet Union and its satellite states since the late 1980s. The Soviet Union 
had fallen into a state of economic, political and social paralysis during the 1970s and early 
1980s. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party. 
Between 1987 and 1989, Gorbachev launched hitherto unseen reforms in order to lead the 
country out of its paralysis. He introduced private ownership of business to boost the Soviet 
economy. He loosened control over media, adopted a liberal stance on civic rights and 
tentatively democratised the electoral system of the country (Thompson, 1998, pp. 268–283). 
Gorbachev’s reforms had, however, unintended dramatic consequences. Instead of reviving 
the Soviet Union, they spurred destabilising dynamics. The social and political reforms 
deeply divided the political elite of the country. The economic reforms, on the other hand, 
did not ease the country’s economic problems but exposed its dysfunctional allocation 
mechanisms, severe shortage of capital and lack of modern technologies and know-how. In 
the late 1980s, the Soviet economy slipped into an ever-deeper recession. Material scarcity 
grew, public finances rapidly degraded and the Soviet government had to ask for emergency 
loans from Western countries in order to ward off sovereign default. The Soviet Union’s 
economic and financial difficulties kindled old ethnic, religious and national tensions within 
the country. These tensions increasingly undermined the control of the federal government in 
Moscow over the Soviet territory and the satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe 
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(Evtuhov et al., 2004, pp. 779–799; Thompson, 1998, pp. 283–289). The creeping collapse 
of the Soviet Union slowly reconfigured the political and security landscape of Europe. 
Western and Soviet policy-makers faced the question of how to ensure a peaceful and 
orderly disintegration and transition of the Soviet Union. The Lubbers Plan – and the 
therein-enshrined idea of economic integration for the sake of peacebuilding and friendship – 
constituted a Western answer to this geopolitical challenge.  
 
The ECT as the external relations component of the emerging Single Market for 
energy: The Lubbers Plan, on the other hand, sought to complement the beginning creation 
of a Single Market for energy. In response to the failure of Keynesian macroeconomic 
policies in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Member States and the Commission launched the 
Single Market Programme in the mid-1980s. This was a manifestation of the emerging 
neoliberal economic paradigm at that time. The Single Market Programme foresaw the 
finalisation of the Single Market by 1993 through the strengthening of market mechanisms 
and the dismantling of persisting barriers to trade in goods, services, capital and labour 
movements within the EU. The creation of the Single Market should allow for economies of 
scale, foster efficiency and European competitiveness and ultimately lead the European 
economy out of crisis (Moravcsik, 1991). The Commission took the view that the Single 
Market Programme also had to encompass Member States’ energy sectors (European 
Commission, 1985, p. 24). The transition from fragmented, monopolistic national markets 
toward a competitive European energy market should lower energy prices equivalent to 
0.5% of the EU’s GDP, increase energy security and create vital background conditions for 
economic prosperity (Eikeland, 2004, pp. 4–5; Padget, 1992, p. 57). As the energy sector had 
always been a domaine reservé, most Member States initially met the Commission’s 
proposal with hesitation (Padget, 1992, pp. 58–59). However, they could not deny the 
benefits of a Single Market for energy, as they had endorsed the general economic rational 
underlying the Single Market Programme. In 1988, the Council of Ministers formally 
endorsed the proposal and asked the Commission to elaborate adequate measures so as to 
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create a Single Market for energy. In the following years, the Commission tabled a number 
of measures in order to advance this objective. The Commission notably proposed measures 
providing for ‘third party access’ (TPA) to energy networks as well as measures providing 
for greater transparency in energy pricing. TPA proved to be particularly sensitive in Council 
debates and among national utilities. Progress on the implementation of TPA thus took until 
the late-1990s. The Commission argued that TPA was a prerequisite for competition in the 
energy sector, as it enables consumers to buy gas and electricity from any supplier within the 
market regardless of ownership of interjacent transmission networks (Padget, 1992, p. 59). 
National utilities questioned the technical feasibility and the Commission’s expertise in this 
domain (Padget, 1992, pp. 69–72). In many regards, the Lubbers Plan can be considered as 
an initiative to extend the emerging Single Market for energy to the main transmission and 
supplier countries of the EU. The underlying reasoning was that the Single Market for 
energy needed to be embedded into an appropriate regional energy regime to properly 
function (European Commission, 1991, pp. 3, 4).  
 
The Member States bring in the Commission to wield greater influence on the Soviet 
Union: The European Council welcomed Lubbers’ proposal for a ‘European Energy 
Community’ in its session in June 1990. The heads of state decided to further study the 
proposal. They entrusted the Commission to examine it on behalf of the Member States. The 
central role of the Commission reflected the intention of the heads of state to sell the ECT as 
a “European project” and to appear as a unitary actor in order to exert greater geopolitical 
influence and ensure a better economic deal with the Soviet Union. In the following year, the 
Commission – and more specifically the Directorate General for Energy (XVII) and for 
Trade (I) – fathomed the interest of Soviet Union (Buchan, 1990). The Soviet government 
embraced the proposal for a ‘European energy community’. The proposal promised to 
accelerate the modernisation of the antiquated and highly inefficient Soviet energy sector, to 
boost exports, to deliver technology spill-overs into further economic sectors and to generate 
badly needed hard currency inflows. It thereby bore the opportunity for the Soviet 
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government to lead the country out of its economic crisis and to get away from short-term 
economic aid from Western countries. Soviet and Western policy-makers drew parallels 
between the Lubbers Plan and the Marshall Plan, which had financed the reconstruction of 
Western Europe after World War II (Konoplyanik, 1996, pp. 156–158; Laurance, 1991). The 
Commission, moreover, continued consultations with the Member States in order to pin 
down the general objectives and institutional layout of a European energy community. The 
Dutch and British governments strongly supported the Commission in these efforts (Buchan, 
1991). In November and December 1990, Commission President Delors sketched the 
Commission’s ideas for a European energy community in different international fora 
(Agence Europe, 1990a). The European Council reacted positively to these ideas and 
expressed its hope of starting negotiations in 1991 (Agence Europe, 1990b).  
 
The Commission enthusiastically assumes its role: Following the preliminary green light 
from the European Council, the Commission published a communication and draft text for a 
European Energy Charter in February 1991 (Agence Europe, 1991b, 1990c). The draft 
charter, inter alia, provided for free trade in energy resources, access to transmission 
networks and provisions on technical and environmental cooperation. More importantly for 
this study, the draft charter stipulated the liberalisation of the exploration and exploitation of 
energy resources and the enhancement of the level of post-establishment treatment and 
protection afforded to foreign investors in the energy sectors of host countries. The 
Commission’s draft charter thereby foresaw the establishment of a full-fledged international 
investment agreement governing market access, post-establishment treatment and investment 
protection under the participation of the individual Member States and the EU (European 
Commission, 1991).  
 
The Council of Ministers of the EU examined and formally endorsed the draft text of the 
European Energy Charter in April 1991 (Agence Europe, 1991c). The Soviet government 
also expressed its support. In the following months, the Commission – again in close 
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cooperation with the Dutch government – started the preparations for the launch of the 
negotiations on the European Energy Charter scheduled for July 1991. Two problems 
overshadowed this preparation period. The Commission and the Member States initially did 
not agree on which countries to invite to the negotiations. In the end, the Council of 
Ministers took the decision to invite all European and OECD countries to the ECT 
negotiations (Agence Europe, 1991d, 1991e). The second problem concerned the growing 
political instability in the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 
early 1991, the Red Army intervened in Lithuania and Latvia to oppress demonstrations for 
the independence of the Baltic Soviet Federal Sociatlist Republics (SFSRs). Several people 
died during these interventions, which triggered demands in the EU for an end to 
consultations with the Soviet government (Buchan, 1991; Palmer, 1991). Several SFSRs, 
moreover, raised first question marks over the competence of the central Soviet government 
to negotiate with Western Europe on a European Energy Charter. In particular, the Russian 
SFSR sought to assert exclusive competence over all energy resources within its territory in 
spring 1991. As the bulk of the Soviet Union’s gas and oil deposits were located in the 
Russian SFSR, these quarrels threatened the ECT project. In the light of this situation, the 
Member States and the Commission stressed that they would exclusively negotiate with the 
central Soviet government and not engage in consultations with the SFSRs. The unclear 
distribution of competences, nevertheless, caused a headache in Brussels (Buchan, 1991).  
 
5.1.2 The European Energy Charter 
Despite these obstacles, the negotiations on the European Energy Charter started on time. On 
15 July 1991, the delegates of about 50 European and OECD countries gathered in Brussels 
for the first day of negotiations. During the first session, the delegates elected Charles 
Rutten, a senior Dutch diplomat, as chairman of the conference. They agreed to structure the 
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negotiations in five working groups22 , which would jointly elaborate the text of the 
European Energy Charter and prepare the text of the ‘basic agreement’. All negotiating 
parties sent representatives to all working groups. The Council Presidency and the 
Commission jointly represented the EU and the Member States in the negotiations. The 
individual Member States only rarely intervened in the negotiations in order to clarify their 
national positions in relation to the EU position previously presented by the Council 
Presidency or the Commission. Such interventions mostly concerned highly technical issues 
or issues coming predominantly under Member State competence (Interview, London, 16 
January 2014). The working groups and their chairmen could draw on the support of a small 
conference secretariat. The secretariat was formally independent, but staffed with officials 
and hosted in the offices of the European Commission (Interview, London, 16 January 
2014). During the first session, the delegates agreed to meet at first in their respective 
working groups and to reconvene for a second plenary session in late October in order to 
adopt the final text of the Charter. The energy ministers of the participating countries should 
then meet in The Hague on 17 December 1991 in order to sign the Charter (Agence Europe, 
1991f).  
 
The tight timetable of the conference reflected the pre-existing, high degree of support for 
the Commission’s draft text for a European Energy Charter as well as the non-binding, 
political nature of the Charter. The Commission’s Director General for Energy, Clive Jones, 
commented to that effect that the only unclear issue was “the degree to which the Soviet 
Union will be willing to accept an attempt to reform its energy policy along market lines to 
give confidence to western companies and bankers to invest in the industry” (Hill and 
Hargreaves, 1991). The timetable also echoed the concerns of the delegates with the 
increasingly unstable political situation in the Soviet Union (Agence Europe, 1991f). The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Working group I in charge of drafting the European Energy Charter (chaired by Director General 
for energy Maniatopoulos); working group II in charge of drafting the ECT (chaired by British 
diplomat Duncan Slater); working group III in charge of energy efficiency and environmental 
protection (chaired by Hungarian official); working group IV in charge of questions relating to oil and 
gas (chaired by Norwegian official); working group V in charge of nuclear energy and safety (chaired 
by Canadian official).  
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seriousness of these concerns forcefully manifested itself in mid-August 1991, when 
conservative forces in the Communist Party, the KGB and the Red Army staged a coup 
d’état against Gorbachev. The coup was unsuccessful. It nevertheless raised doubts about the 
prospects of the ECT project and the sustainability of East-West cooperation (Hill and 
Gardner, 1991). After the coup, a sense of urgency spread among Western policy-makers. 
Jacques Delors voiced the criticism that Gorbachev had managed to destroy the old Soviet 
system, but had failed in establishing a new order. Delors reasoned that the EU and the G723 
had to step up their assistance to the Soviet government in managing the transition of the 
country, and underlined that the European Energy Charter constituted a core element of 
Western assistance to the Soviet Union (Agence Europe, 1991g).  
 
The delegates reconvened in the working groups in mid-September 1991. Despite the 
political turmoil in the Soviet Union, the delegates made excellent progress on the substance 
of the European Energy Charter in the following weeks. In early October the working group 
overseeing the drafting of the European Energy Charter announced that they had already 
reached general agreement on content. They added that the Charter could be adopted as 
planned in the plenary session of the conference in late October (Agence Europe, 1991h). 
The delegates of the Soviet Union, Eastern and Central European countries merely cautioned 
that their countries would need a transition period to undertake the economic reforms 
necessary so as to conform to the objectives of the Charter (Hill, 1991a). Judging from press 
coverage and secondary literature, one must assume that the swift agreement was possible 
due to the pre-existing consensus on the general content of the non-binding charter. What is 
more, it was reported in later stages of the negotiations that the delegates of the Soviet 
Union, Eastern and Central European countries often did not understand the meaning and 
implications of the discussed clauses. The Charter project, its concepts and terminology were 
rooted in Western international economic law, which was yet unchartered territory for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The ‚Group of Seven’ encompasses Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America.  
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formerly socialist countries. Hence, the delegates from East and West did not, de facto, 
discuss as equals. Soviet, Eastern and Central European delegates acted as eager students of 
Western experts, listening to the elaborations of their Western counterparts (Doré, 1996, p. 
146).  
 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union applies the brakes: While the substantive work on 
the European Energy Charter could be concluded by early October, the overall negotiating 
process nevertheless stalled in autumn 1991. The failed coup d’état of August 1991 had 
kicked off the territorial disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Baltic SFSRs gained their 
formal independence from the Soviet Union and consequently participated in the conference 
on the European Energy Charter as sovereign states. Other SFSRs followed the example and 
sent ‘observers’ to the negotiations in Brussels (Agence Europe, 1991i). The delegation of 
the central Soviet government tried to reassure Western delegates that it remained fully 
competent to negotiate on the Charter. This position was, however, soon overtaken by 
events. On 22 October 1991, several SFSRs signed the Treaty on an Economic Community. 
The treaty was intended to create an economic community – similar to the EU – among 
sovereign SFSRs (Brzezinski and Sullivan, 1997, pp. 32–37). The treaty, inter alia, implied 
that the SFSRs were in control of energy resources and energy policy. In the following days 
and weeks, nascent energy companies, local authorities and newly created energy ministries 
of the SFSRs sought to assume control over the energy sector in the Soviet Union. The 
transfer of control remained, however, incomplete, and the resultant power vacuum made the 
planned adoption of the final text of the European Energy Charter in the plenary session of 
late October impossible. The delegates agreed that the text was ripe for adoption, but nobody 
knew whether the central Soviet government or the individual SFSRs should adopt the final 
text (Hill, 1991b; Hill and Lloyd, 1991). The delegates finally agreed on 21 November 1991 
that the interstate economic committee of the central Soviet government as well as the 
governments of the SFSRs should jointly sign the European Energy Charter. The 
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compromise was not intended to prejudge the sensitive competence question of who was in 
control over energy resources and policy within the Soviet Union (Hill, 1991b).  
 
On 16 and 17 December 1991, the energy ministers of the negotiating parties met in The 
Hague to sign the European Energy Charter (Agence Europe, 1991j). The group 
encompassed representatives of 46 parties, namely of the Soviet Union and the SFSRs, 
Eastern and Central European countries, the Commission, the Member States of the EU, the 
USA, Canada and Japan.24 The final text of the European Energy Charter still clearly bore 
the signature of the Commission. While the wording of the final text (Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2004, pp. 209–226) diverged from the Commission’s draft text (European 
Commission, 1991) of February 1991, the general content and objectives of the final 
document had remained unchanged. The Charter documented the intention of the parties to 
establish a binding regulatory framework to promote, liberalise and protect investments in 
the energy sector (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2004, p. 216). At the occasion of the closing 
ceremony, the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers called upon the parties to conclude the 
subsequent negotiations on the ECT by the end of 1992 in order to quickly harvest the 
economic and political benefits of the European Energy Charter (Agence Europe, 1991j; 
Hill, 1991c). Lubbers’ optimism was, nevertheless, premature (Hill, 1991d). One week after 
the signing of the European Energy Charter in Brussels, the SFSRs concluded the so-called 
Alma Ata Protocols. The signing of these protocols led to the resignation of the Soviet 
government, the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and marked the beginning of a 
decade of considerable political and economic instability within the successor states of the 
Soviet Union (Evtuhov et al., 2004, p. 799; Thompson, 1998, pp. 288–289).  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, European Communities, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Interstate Economic Committee of the Soviet Union, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, The Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, The United Kingdom , The United States of 
America, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia.  
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5.1.3 The Energy Charter Treaty 
The negotiations on the binding ECT started in late February 1992 (Agence Europe, 1992b). 
Working group II was commissioned to elaborate the draft text of the ECT. As its task 
overlapped with the work of all other working groups, it rapidly absorbed the entire 
negotiating process (Interview, London, 16 January 2014). The negotiations on the ECT 
advanced at a good pace at first. The negotiating sessions of March and April 1992 produced 
progress; notably on disciplines for investment protection, energy trade, energy transit and 
environmental protection. The progress reflected, on the one hand, the increased interest of 
Russia and Eastern and Central European countries in the negotiations. They faced an 
increasing number of energy-related disputes among themselves and came to see the ECT as 
a framework to amicably settle these disputes (Hill, 1992). On the other hand, the 
Commission had come forward with a first draft text of the ECT in order to speed up the 
negotiations and to ensure the compatibility of ECT provisions and the Single Market for 
energy. The Council of Ministers endorsed the draft text, sent it to the other negotiating 
parties and underlined that the ECT negotiations should first forge agreement on trade, post-
establishment treatment and investment protection provisions and only then discuss 
investment liberalisation commitments (Agence Europe, 1992c). But despite this fresh 
impetus, the negotiations soon ran into stalemate. It became clear that the legal systems of 
Russia and the Central and Eastern European countries were not sufficiently developed to 
honour obligations under Western international economic agreements. In April, the delegates 
therefore agreed to postpone further negotiating sessions. The negotiating pause was 
intended to allow the delegates of the former socialist countries to enhance their knowledge 
of western international economic law (Agence Europe, 1992d, 1992e). The substantive 
negotiations only started again in September 1992. The hope of concluding the negotiations 
on the ECT by the end of 1992 rapidly vanished. By spring 1993, a glut of disagreements 
had piled up, which delayed the negotiations on the ECT for almost two years. The 
following paragraphs summarise the most important disagreements.  
 
148 
 
Deadlock over investment disciplines: Investment disciplines stood very much at the 
centre of the deadlock. A key controversy concerned the question of whether investment 
liberalisation should proceed on the basis of NT or MFN treatment. The EU and the USA 
favoured the application of NT to the pre-establishment stage including the distribution of 
exploration and exploitation licences. They thereby sought to unlock the energy reserves of 
Russia and Central Asia for their national energy companies (Doré, 1996, p. 139; Wälde, 
1996, pp. 277–284). Norway – silently supported by other countries – nevertheless rejected 
these demands. Norway proposed to provide market access for foreign investors on the basis 
of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment i.e. the obligation to treat all foreign investors 
alike. Norway also sought to keep the possibility of privileged treatment of national energy 
companies vis-à-vis foreign companies. The EU and the US strongly opposed the Norwegian 
proposal. European policy-makers reportedly even publicly pondered importing the dispute 
into the accession negotiations between the EU and Norway in order to increase pressure on 
Oslo (Agence Europe, 1993a, 1993b).  
  
Another key controversy concerned the scope of acceptable reservations to the envisaged 
general investment liberalisation commitment under the ECT. Once the delegates had agreed 
to liberalise market access for foreign investors on the basis of negative lists, several 
countries – including some Member States – tabled lengthy lists with reservations. The 
Commission criticised such lengthy lists, saying they would unbalance the benefits of the 
ECT among the parties and might ultimately obstruct agreement. Russia and most Eastern 
and Central European countries, moreover, cautioned that they were unable to table 
conclusive lists of reservations or to commit to a planned standstill clause (Doré, 1996, p. 
146). Under a standstill clause, a country must not introduce new! restrictive measures, but 
may dismantle existing ones. As Russia wanted to attract foreign capital and gain access to 
downstream markets in Western Europe, it was generally in favour of liberalising market 
access for investors on the basis of NT (Konoplyanik, 1996, pp. 166–172). Russia stressed, 
however, that its investment and economic law was still in a formative stage (Konoplyanik, 
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1996, p. 173). It proposed, at first, an open-ended and then a 10-year transition period for the 
applicability of a standstill clause and most other key provisions of the ECT. The Russian 
proposal foresaw that transition countries could enact and dismantle restrictive investment 
measures and reservations under the ECT as deemed necessary by them. The US and the EU 
rejected the Russian proposal. Russia was, de facto, asking for a blank cheque to unilaterally 
determine and alter its liberalisation commitments. It took a considerable time before the EU 
and the USA came around and accepted a transition period in principle (Agence Europe, 
1993c, 1993d; Doré, 1996, pp. 146–147). 
 
Negotiations on post-establishment treatment, protection clauses and dispute resolution 
mechanisms were less controversial while no less complicated. The specific regulatory 
challenges of energy investments25 and the diverging Northern American and European 
approaches to investment regulation triggered lengthy expert discussions on the design and 
wording of concepts like expropriation. These expert discussions mostly evolved between 
the delegates of the EU and other OECD countries. The delegates of Russia, and Eastern and 
Central European countries, were bystanders in these debates, as they did not possess the 
necessary expertise (Agence Europe, 1993e; Doré, 1996, p. 146; Interview, Brussels, 19 
October 2011) 
 
The USA and the EU, moreover, clashed over the so-called Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation (REIO) clause and the applicability of the ECT to sub-federal entities. The 
Commission and the Member States insisted that the ECT had to contain a REIO clause. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The regulatory challenges of investments in the energy sector differ in two important regards from 
investments in most other economic sectors. First, investments in the energy sector are normally of 
considerable volume, complexity and duration. Energy exploration, exploitation, transport and 
distribution are highly capital-intensive activities. Investment projects often run over a period of 20 
years or more before amortisation. And they are structured in a sequence of sub-projects and 
investments (construction of base camps, exploration and initial drilling, building of pipelines, roads, 
harbours, etc), which blurs the distinction between the pre- and post-establishment stage under 
international investment law. Second, host country governments normally assume a dual role in the 
energy sector. Governments act as supposedly neutral regulators of the national energy sector as well 
as proper economic actors. Many governments, for instance, act as business partners of foreign 
investors in joint ventures with state-owned energy companies. See Wälde (1996) for more 
information on this matter.   
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They wanted to prevent a multilateralisation of all benefits of EU-membership under the 
MFN clause of the ECT to non-EU members. The USA rejected the European demand as 
hidden protectionism (Agence Europe, 1994a; Doré, 1996, pp. 149–150). The USA, on the 
other hand, reiterated that it could not conclude the ECT for constitutional reasons unless the 
ECT would not apply to its sub-federal entities i.e. the federal states of the USA. The EU 
stressed that it was unable to accept such a broad carve-out under the ECT (Agence Europe, 
1994a; Doré, 1996, pp. 150–151).  
 
By late summer 1993, the ECT negotiations had ground to a halt. Policy-makers started 
pondering the possibility that the ECT negotiations might collapse without agreement 
(Agence Europe, 1993f). The chairman of the ECT negotiations called upon the Commission 
to resume its “driving seat” and to inject new dynamism into the negotiating process 
(Agence Europe, 1993g). In order to avert failure, the EU, Russia and the US met for 
trilateral talks in Moscow in mid-September to hammer out compromises for the key 
controversies (Agence Europe, 1993h). The outcome of the trilateral summit was, however, 
disappointing. The EU, Russia and the US were unable to bridge their differences; notably 
on Russia’s demand for a transition period (Agence Europe, 1993d). 
 
The Commission assumes leadership and successfully unties the Gordian knot: 
Following the unsuccessful trilateral meeting, the Commission grew determined to finally 
achieve a breakthrough. In October 1993, the Commission presented a proposal to resolve 
the crucial transition period issue. The Commission proposal consisted of a sequenced entry 
into force of the ECT. The negotiating parties should conclude the ECT as quickly as 
possible. The provisions on energy trade and transit, as well as on post-establishment 
treatment, protection standards and dispute settlement, should take effect directly after 
signing. Regarding investment liberalisation, a transition period of three years should apply. 
Countries with mature legal systems should table conclusive reservation lists and grant NT at 
the pre-establishment stage to foreign investors directly after the signing. Countries with as 
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yet maturing legal system should grant MFN treatment to foreign investors during the 
transition period. They should be allowed to enact new restrictive measures during this 
period. Toward the end of the transition phase, these countries should compile conclusive 
reservation lists. The delegates should then reconvene to examine and to jointly approve 
these lists. The Commission thereby sought to accommodate Eastern demands for a 
transition phase as well as Western concerns over providing these countries with a blank 
cheque for investment liberalisation (Agence Europe, 1993c). What is more, the Commission 
once more assumed international responsibility for the successful conclusion of the ECT 
negotiations and sought to demonstrate that it was an important actor in international politics 
capable of taking the lead (Doré, 1996, p. 148).  
 
The Commission’s proposal gained broad support among the delegates. In particular Russia 
praised the new approach as a breakthrough (Agence Europe, 1993c; Doré, 1996, p. 147). In 
the following weeks, the delegates slightly altered the Commission’s proposal. Instead of 
concluding one international agreement with comprehensive provisions on a transition 
period, they agreed to conclude two separate agreements in an interval of three years. The 
ECT should be concluded first and encompass trade, transit, environmental, competition, 
post-establishment, protection and dispute settlement provisions. The later concluded 
‘supplementary protocol’ should then contain binding provisions on investment liberalisation 
commitments (Agence Europe, 1993i; European Commission, 1993).  
 
On 4 November 1993, the Commission formally informed the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament about the new two-stages approach in its communication “The 
European Energy Charter: fresh impetus from the European Community”. 26  In this 
communication, the Commission requested the Council of Ministers to adjust the negotiating !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The communication is of considerable relevance for today’s policy debate on future EU investment 
agreements. It addresses the question of how to ensure the supremacy of EU law in intra-EU 
investment relations as well as how to ensure the judicial monopoly of the European Court of Justice 
to authoritatively interpret European law. In particular the latter question is of considerable relevance 
today.  
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mandate to this new approach. The ministers changed the mandate accordingly on 10 
November 1993 (Agence Europe, 1993j) and underlined that the ECT had to provide, in any 
case, for NT at the post-establishment stage and for investment protection provisions 
(Agence Europe, 1993k).  
 
The Commission had hoped to conclude the ECT negotiations on the basis of the new 
approach before the end of the year 1993. These hopes were frustrated in December, when 
the Commission openly clashed with France. The Commission held on to its plan to include 
in the ECT a preliminary, albeit binding, MFN treatment obligation for the pre-establishment 
stage. The NT obligation, enshrined in the supplementary treaty, should later supersede this 
MFN obligation (Doré, 1996, p. 148). France, on the other hand, opposed to a binding MFN 
treatment obligation in the ECT. It stressed that some negotiating parties had largely opened 
their energy sectors and, de facto, granted NT to foreign investors, while other negotiating 
parties had isolated their energy sectors. A MFN obligation would thus cement vastly 
different levels of openness and distort the bargaining positions of the parties in the 
negotiations on the ‘supplementary protocol’ (Doré, 1996, pp. 148–149). The US introduced 
yet a third opinion into this debate. It underlined that it still sought an agreement providing 
for NT at the pre-establishment stage. It insisted that it preferred no agreement to a shallow 
agreement (Doré, 1996, pp. 148–149). In search for an ambitious compromise, it proposed 
allowing parties at least to annexe positive lists containing unilateral commitments to grant 
NT (European Commission, 1993, p. 5). In the end, the interest to swiftly conclude the 
negotiations prevailed. The delegates agreed to the French demand that the ECT should 
merely provide for voluntary MFN treatment. The delegates discarded US concerns that the 
pre-establishment provisions were not ambitious enough. The European Energy Charter 
secretariat tellingly commented that “you need Russia and the EC [to have a Treaty], and 
you hope to have the US as well” (as cited in Doré, 1996, p. 149). 
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The final rounds of negotiations took place in early 1994. The delegates mostly focused on 
the rules for trade in nuclear goods; the cast of an envisaged Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation (REIO) clause; the applicability of the treaty to sub-federal entities, notably in 
the US; technical aspects relating to dispute settlement; and Norway’s general concerns 
about joining the treaty. These remaining disagreements were controversial but manageable 
details within the overall negotiating process (Agence Europe, 1994a). In late April 1994, the 
chairman, Charles Rutten, therefore tabled a draft text for the ECT. The Rutten text sought to 
balance the different positions on these matters and indeed earned considerable support 
among the delegates. The EU’s Council of Ministers expressed its support for the Rutten text 
in May. The delegates, nonetheless, continued haggling over details until mid-September, 
when the final text was sent out to the negotiating parties for approval (Agence Europe, 
1994b, 1994c).  
 
The signing of the agreement was set to take place on 17 December 1994 (Agence Europe, 
1994c). In October, the US, however, demanded the reopening of the negotiations. The US 
expressed the criticism that it was unwilling to conclude an agreement without ambitious 
pre-establishment commitments, and could not accept the REIO clause or the provisions 
relating to the application of the treaty to sub-federal entities (Agence Europe, 1994d). Most 
other parties and the chairman of the negotiations rejected the US demand and held on to the 
planned signing of the agreement on 17 December 1994. In consequence, the US announced 
that it would not sign the ECT. On 17 December 1994, 42 negotiating parties, including the 
EU and its Member States, signed the ECT. It immediately entered into force on a 
preliminary basis and thereby established a new international organisation and multilateral 
framework for energy investment and trade (Doré, 1996, p. 151). The EU acceded to the 
ECT as a full-fledged party alongside the individual Member States.   
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5.1.4 The ‘Supplementary Protocol’ 
The negotiations on the ‘supplementary protocol’ started in early 1995, soon after the 
conclusion of the ECT. The ‘supplementary protocol’ should enshrine NT for foreign 
investors in energy sectors of host countries and promote the privatisation and 
demonopolisation of energy markets (Agence Europe, 1997a). In comparison to the 
preceding negotiations on the European Energy Charter and the ECT, the negotiations on the 
‘supplementary protocol’ attracted only a little attention. European policy-makers primarily 
focused on speeding up the ratification process and extending the ECT membership to 
interested third countries. The ratification process of the ECT, moreover, became 
increasingly complicated. The Russian Duma voiced concerns about the limitation of 
Russia’s sovereignty over its energy resources under the ECT and its ‘supplementary 
protocol’. By 1997, it became clear that Russia was unlikely to ratify the ECT and would 
abide to the ECT merely on a preliminary basis (Agence Europe, 1997b). Taking into 
consideration that the ECT project had been conceived in order to subject Russian energy 
policy and its energy sector to international economic law and market mechanisms, this 
development was a serious blow. European policy-makers spent most of their time trying to 
convince Russia to ratify the ECT. 
 
The negotiations on the ‘supplementary protocol’ rapidly progressed in the slipstream of 
these events (Agence Europe, 1997a). In January 1997, media reported that the negotiations 
on the ‘supplementary protocol’ could be wrapped up within hours, if the parties showed the 
political will to do so (Agence Europe, 1997b). Mostly Russia, Norway, Australia and 
Iceland remained critical of the ‘supplementary protocol’ due to the potential limitation of 
their sovereignty over their energy resources. France, on the other hand, disliked the idea of 
opening up its energy market to foreign investors. The French position not only slowed 
down the negotiations on ‘supplementary protocol’ of the ECT, but also undermined the 
finalisation of the Single Market for energy. France generally rejected measures which 
would challenge the monopolies of its utilities Electricité de France (EdF) or Gas de France 
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(GdF) or allow foreign investors to buy shares in these companies. In particular, the United 
Kingdom expressed criticism that French utilities were benefiting from the gradual 
liberalisation of energy trade and investment within the EU, while the French government 
went to great lengths to keep the French energy sector closed to foreign investors (Johnstone, 
1998). In December 1997, the chairman of the ECT, Charles Rutten, nevertheless, informed 
the public that most sensitive issues in the negotiations on the ‘supplementary protocol’ had 
been resolved. He stressed that the conclusion of the talks in early 1998 was realistic 
(Agence Europe, 1997a). Rutten’s optimism was premature. During spring 1998, France re-
emphasised its opposition to investment liberalisation in the energy sector. France, 
moreover, linked the conclusion of the ‘supplementary protocol’ to the conclusion of the 
stalled negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD. It 
stressed that the concerns of civil society against the liberalisation of international 
investment flows, which came forcefully to the fore in the context of the MAI negotiations, 
could not be discarded in the negotiations on the ‘supplementary protocol’ of the ECT. 
France consequently vetoed the assent of the Council of Ministers to the draft text of the 
‘supplementary protocol’ (Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a). As the EU was unable to 
formally endorse the draft text of the ‘supplementary protocol’, the conclusion of the 
negotiations was repeatedly postponed (Agence Europe, 1998a). In December 1998, and 
under the shadow of the collapse of the MAI negotiations, the negotiations on the 
‘supplementary protocol’ broke down without furore. The ECT thus only contains soft law 
provisions on investment liberalisation.  
 
5.2 The EU in the negotiations on the Energy Charter Treaty 
The preceding section traced the negotiations on the ECT from their earliest stages to the 
collapse of the negotiations on the ‘supplementary protocol’. It constitutes by far the most 
comprehensive and detailed account of the ECT negotiations so far available in the literature. 
It has already shed some light on the question of why the EU acquired sufficiently 
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comprehensive de facto competences to even enter into investment protection commitments 
in this forum. The following section complements this account. It first zeroes in on, and 
evaluates, the EU’s role in the ECT negotiations. It then examines whether supranational or 
intergovernmental accounts better explain the noteworthy degree of Member State 
cooperation and delegation in this instance of international investment policy-making.  
 
The EU acquires and uses comprehensive de facto competences in international 
investment regulation: The EU played a pivotal role and possessed extensive de facto 
competences in investment negotiations under the ECT. The ECT was from the outset a 
‘European project’ rather than an ‘intergovernmental project’. When Ruud Lubbers 
presented his plan to establish a European energy community during the session of the 
European Council of June 1990, his fellow heads of governments immediately decided to 
cooperate and to empower the Commission to manage the preparations of the ECT 
negotiations on their behalf across all issue areas (Buchan, 1990). The Member States and 
the Commission underlined in their discourse during this period that the EU as a cohesive 
actor of international affairs – rather than a group of states – sought to negotiate the ECT 
with the Soviet Union. What is more, not the individual Member States but the Commission 
conducted EU-internal and international consultations with the Soviet Union, drew up a draft 
text for a European Energy Charter and managed the logistics of the upcoming negotiations 
on the European Energy Charter and ECT. As the Lubbers Plan only vaguely foresaw the 
establishment of an energy trade and investment agreement with the Soviet Union, the 
Commission necessarily enjoyed some leeway in further defining the project including its 
investment disciplines.  
 
The EU acquired an even more important role during the core negotiations on the European 
Energy Charter, the ECT and its ‘supplementary protocol’ between July 1991 and December 
1998. The Member States closely cooperated on all agenda items – including investment 
liberalisation, post-establishment treatment and protection standards – and sought to speak 
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with a single voice in the ECT negotiations. At the beginning of the ECT negotiations, the 
Council Presidency was the main representative of the Member States and the EU. The 
Council Presidency typically outlined the EU position vis-à-vis third countries and then 
invited the Commission to elaborate on technical aspects of the position. The Member States 
were generally present in the negotiations and would – if necessary – intervene in order to 
provide technical expertise or to clarify their national position in relation to the EU position. 
The working method within the EU delegation was, nevertheless, to keep the number of 
Member State interventions limited and to confine such interventions to areas of Member 
State competence (Interview, London, 16 January 2014; Interview, Brussels, 18 January 
2012; Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a). The coordination between the Member 
States, the Council Presidency and the Commission was generally harmonious and trustful 
across all issue areas (Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a). As the ECT negotiations 
advanced, the representation modalities slightly evolved. The Commission gradually took 
over the role as the EU’s main representative from the Council Presidency (Interview, 
telephone, 4 February 2014a). The Commission’s increasingly central role was not limited to 
areas of exclusive or shared Union competence like trade or transport provisions. The 
Commission became the main representative of the EU in negotiations on investment 
disciplines, too. Third country negotiators recalled that the Commission official obviously 
spoke on behalf of the EU and its Member States in investment negotiations (Interview, 
Brussels, 19 October 2011). The Commission increasingly stood at the very centre of 
negotiations on investment liberalisation, post-establishment treatment and protection 
standards. Negotiators explained that the Commission gradually acquired this central role 
within the EU delegation, because the negotiations required considerable preparation and 
technical expertise, which the rotating Council Presidency and the Council secretariat could 
not provide. What is more, they underlined that the Commission official in charge of the 
investment negotiations was highly capable, motivated and thus naturally became a key 
figure in the negotiations (Interview, Brussels, 19 October 2011; Interview, telephone, 4 
February 2014a). Third countries, moreover, strongly felt the cohesiveness and importance 
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of the EU in the ECT negotiations in the form of lengthy negotiating breaks, which the EU 
delegation frequently demanded in order to coordinate its position. One third country 
negotiator recalled that about a third of the negotiating time elapsed while waiting for the EU 
to pin down its position in internal coordination meetings behind closed doors in a special 
room located next to the negotiating venue (Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a). 
Finally, the preceding analysis of the negotiating history of the ECT demonstrated that the 
EU was also the main driver of the negotiations. The EU – and more specifically the 
Commission – conceived the ECT project, repeatedly tabled draft texts for the Charter and 
the ECT, developed decisive compromise proposals to successfully conclude the 
negotiations and ratified the Charter and ECT as a full-fledged negotiating party. In 
conclusion, the EU was cohesive, proactive and acquired de facto competence in all areas of 
international investment policy in this forum.  
 
Commission entrepreneurship through agenda setting, fringe and de facto 
competences: In accordance with hypothesis H1, the Commission eagerly promoted the 
consolidation of the EU’s de facto competences in international investment policy during the 
negotiations on the ECT. While the EU was seen as the driver of the ECT project at the 
international level, the Commission was the main driver and architect of the ECT project 
within the EU including its ambitious investment provisions. When, in 1993, the ECT 
negotiations had for instance ground to a halt, the chairman of the negotiations Charles 
Rutten called upon the Commission to resume its “driver’s seat” and to lead the negotiations 
out of deadlock (Agence Europe, 1993g).  
 
The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship reflected power and functionalist considerations. 
On the one hand, the Commission reportedly sought to prove itself as a veritable actor of 
international affairs beyond the narrow field of trade policy. It wanted to play a proper role 
in global affairs next to the Member States. As this objective comprised in the given context 
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On the other hand, the Commission saw the ECT project as a crucial building block of its 
EU-internal energy policy. It argued that the Single Market would only function smoothly if 
embedded in an appropriate regional energy regime. From its point of view, it was thus 
crucial to have the EU and itself play a decisive role in the ECT project so as to ensure 
policy coherence.  
 
The Commission drew on three strategies to consolidate the EU’s role in the ECT 
negotiations and in particular in investment talks. First, it used its agenda setting powers in 
order to ensure its central role in the negotiations. The Commission decisively elaborated on 
Lubber’s first vague proposal of a ‘European Energy Community’. It, moreover, tabled 
decisive drafts of the European Energy Charter, the Energy Charter Treaty and critical 
compromise proposals, which paved the way to the successful conclusion of the negotiations 
and decisively shaped the investment provisions of today’s treaty. The Commission’s 
proactive and skilful negotiating behaviour and technical, administrative knowledge of its 
officials led to the concentration of all negotiating activity in the Commission’s hand with 
the Council Presidency and the individual Member States gradually withdrawing from the 
negotiating process (Interview, Brussels, 19 October 2011; Interview, telephone 4 February 
2014a).  
 
Second, the Commission invoked the EU’s fringe competences to ensure the EU’s central 
role in the ECT project. While the ECT is primarily known for its investment provisions, it 
also contains substantial trade, transport and other policy issues coming under exclusive or 
shared Union competences. The ECT was thus bound to become a so-called ‘mixed 
agreement’. Many ECT provisions govern trade in goods (i.e. energy commodities) and trade 
in services (i.e. exploration, exploitation, distribution, sales etc.). These ECT provisions fell 
into the Union’s undisputed exclusive competence under the CCP. The Member States were 
therefore obliged to cooperate on trade policy questions, the Commission was legally 
entitled to administer the preparations in this domain and the EU had to ratify the agreement 
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together with the Member States. As the Commission had to play an important role in the 
ECT project, it manifestly suggested itself to the Member States to cooperate and to 
empower the Commission to also assist in the elaboration of the project in domains beyond 
Union competences, like investment regulation (Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012; 
Interview, London, 16 January 2014). 
 
Third, the Commission invoked its Eu-internal de facto competences and emphasised the 
regulatory link between the ECT and the emerging Single Market for energy to promote 
Member State cooperation and delegation. From the beginning, the Commission underlined 
that the ECT was conceived as the international relations component of the emerging Single 
Market for energy. The ECT should extend the Single Market for energy beyond the EU’s 
borders. The underlying reasoning was that the Single Market for energy would only 
function efficiently and securely, if the supply and transmission countries also embraced a 
market-based approach to the regulation of their energy sectors. The Commission clearly 
formulated this view in its communication accompanying the draft text for the European 
Energy Charter of spring 1992.  
 
“[The European Energy Charter]… finds itself fully integrated within the energy policy 
which the Commission wishes to promote… with a view to completing the internal energy 
market and providing an external relations policy to back it up.” 
(European Commission, 1991, pp. 4, 3) 
 
As the Member States had agreed to cooperate on energy policy and had accepted the 
Commission’s decisive role in liberalising and deregulating the Single Market for energy, it 
was only natural for the Member States to engage in close cooperation and to extend the EU-
internal de facto competences of the Commission to the international sphere. The 
Commission could thereby play a central role in the ECT project and ensure regulatory 
coherence!(Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a).  
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European business opposes the Commission-led ECT project: In contrast to hypothesis 
H2, European business did not promote the EU’s pivotal role in investment-related 
negotiations under the ECT negotiations. European business took little interest in the project 
during the first two years. It only got involved in the project in early 1992, when the talks 
advanced from political deliberations on the Lubbers Plan and European Energy Charter to 
technical negotiations on the binding ECT and its ‘supplementary protocol’. It was around 
that time, moreover, that European policy-makers started regular consultations with 
European business (Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a).  
 
European utilities were the most active business actors in this process, and their attitude 
toward the ECT project was outright hostile. They perceived the ECT as a regulatory 
component of the creation of the Single Market for energy and thus as a threat to their 
monopolies. European utilities focused their lobbying activity on national ministries, which 
were often sympathetic to their concerns. (Doré, 1996, p. 142; Wälde, 1996, p. 255). 
European utilities sought to prevent the inclusion of too liberal clauses into the ECT and the 
supplementary protocol, such as provisions on ‘third party access’ to gas and electricity grids 
(Doré, 1996, p. 142; Wälde, 1996, p. 255). Representatives of trade unions from the energy 
sector backed the concerns of European utilities and warned that the ECT might contribute to 
increasing energy prices, a degradation of energy infrastructure and compromise the EU’s 
energy security (Agence Europe, 1992f). Representatives of European utilities, moreover, 
challenged the assumption of policy-makers that investment projects in the energy sectors of 
the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries could even be profitable in the 
first place (Riley, 1991). Other representatives of European utilities stressed that the key 
challenge in the Eastern countries was the modernisation of the antiquated energy 
infrastructure. They warned that a competitive market order and, notably, provisions on 
‘third party access’ would hinder a modernisation of the energy infrastructure in these 
countries (Müller, 1991). As the ECT negotiations advanced, European utilities did not drop 
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their opposition to the ECT project. They nevertheless understood that it was too late to nip 
the project in the bud and consequently adopted more nuanced and arguably constructive 
“token” positions (Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a). European upstream energy 
companies, on the other hand, were more open-minded vis-à-vis the ECT project. Most 
European energy companies active in upstream markets, like British Petroleum or Royal 
Dutch Shell, did not own distribution networks or engage in sizeable downstream business 
activities. Hence, they did not perceive the creation of the Single Market for energy or the 
ECT project as a major threat. The E&P Forum27 – a global federation of upstream energy 
companies – participated in regular consultations with European policy-makers and 
welcomed the plan to agree on binding investment liberalisation commitments, post-
establishment treatment and protection standards. It even supported the inclusion of weak 
provisions on ‘third party access’ in the form of energy transit provisions. But the E&P 
Forum, nonetheless, made no secret of its general scepticism regarding the ECT project. It 
questioned the assumption of policy-makers that the ECT would effectively enhance the 
trade and investment climate in the former socialist countries (Jenkins, 1996, pp. 190–193). 
Other business sectors, finally, did not take an interest or get involved in policy-making 
debates on the ECT project. Secondary literature and interviews with negotiators confirm 
this finding. Press research produced merely one generic statement of support for the ECT 
from the Belgian Federation of Large Industrial Energy Consumers (Agence Europe, 1992g). 
In conclusion, business preferences cannot be considered as a driver of the ECT project or 
the EU’s pivotal role in it.  
 
The Member States seek to enhance their geopolitical and economic capabilities: 
Despite the opposition of substantial parts of European business against the ECT project – 
and thus in partial disagreement to hypothesis H2 – the Member States generally favoured 
close cooperation and delegation in the ECT negotiations including for international 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The E&P Forum is the predecessor of today’s International Oil and Gas Producer Association 
(OGP).  
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investment disciplines. The Member States’ readiness to cooperate and to delegate reflected 
several considerations.  
 
Member State support for the Lubbers Plan was very high during the conception and pre-
negotiation period of the ECT project. The Member States immediately agreed to closely 
cooperate on the project due to economic and geopolitical considerations. The Member 
States felt that potentially cheaper and more reliable access to energy resources was 
desirable. They also welcomed the prospect of unlocking investment opportunities in up- and 
midstream energy markets for their national energy companies. All Member States, albeit to 
varying degrees, came to the conclusion that the Lubbers Plan would benefit their economies 
(Interview, 17 June 2013; Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012). The Member States, 
moreover, supported the Lubbers Plan as a geopolitical instrument to shape the transition in 
the Soviet Union and its satellite states. As the Soviet Union was still a hostile global 
superpower with huge armed forces and nuclear arsenal, the Member States considered it to 
be in their vital interest to stabilise the Soviet Union. They took the view that the Lubbers 
Plan – much like the ECSC after World War II – would promote cooperation and increase 
their influence on the country through international economic integration. By the same 
token, the Member States felt the need to empower the Council Presidency and the 
Commission to act as their single voice across all issue areas in order to wield more 
bargaining power vis-à-vis Moscow (Interview, Brussels, 19 October 2011; Interview, 
telephone, 17 June 2013). Concerns over the distribution of competences between the 
Member States and the EU therefore never surfaced (Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012). 
Commission and Member State officials commented to the effect that European and Member 
State policy-makers were aware that the ECT project was of a unique nature and constituted 
a ‘one off’ decision. What is more, the ECT negotiations, despite their complexities, were no 
‘ideological battlefield’ over competing regulatory approaches. Unlike GATT/WTO or the 
MAI negotiations in the OECD, European policy-makers knew and agreed that the ECT 
negotiations would not set a precedence for the division of labour, legal competences or 
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global regulatory approaches in future trade and investment negotiations, which the 
Commission could later invoke to demand for greater de facto or legal competences in other 
fora (Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013; Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012). Close 
Member State cooperation and delegation was thus inherently unproblematic. And as the 
Commission invested considerable resources in proving itself as a serious broker of 
international affairs, the Member States were willing to allow the Commission to play an 
increasingly central role in the negotiating process.  
 
During the core negotiations, Member State preferences nevertheless became more nuanced. 
The Member States started focusing on the economic rather than geopolitical aspects of the 
ECT. They increasingly evaluated the provisions of the ECT against the background of on-
going policy-making debates on the Single Market for energy (Interview, telephone, 4 
February 2014a). While all Member States continued to support the ECT project and were 
ready to closely cooperate and to speak with a single voice, EU-internal coordination grew 
slightly more complicated. The surfacing divisions among the Member States also affected 
the EU’s behaviour and position in the investment negotiations. All Member States could 
agree on the objective of working toward high post-establishment treatment and protection 
standards for energy investment. Hence, the EU firmly pushed for such provisions in the 
negotiations on the ECT (Agence Europe, 1993k, 1992c). The Member States nevertheless 
disagreed on the scope and desirability of investment liberalisation commitments under the 
ECT. Negotiations on investment liberalisation commitments under the ECT were intimately 
linked to debates on the liberalisation of energy investments within the emerging Single 
Market for energy, the privatisation of national utilities and the demonopolisation of national 
energy sectors through mandatory ‘third party access’ to gas and electricity networks. The 
privatisation, demonopolisation and ‘third party access’ were highly sensitive issues within 
the Council of Ministers as well as in Member State administrations. The Commission, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium were generally in favour of these measures. 
France, backed by southern European Member States, sought to contain liberalisation efforts 
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within the EU and under the ECT. Germany held an intermediate position in these debates 
(Padget, 1992; Interview, telephone, 4 February 2014a). These divisions made it difficult for 
the EU to develop and to defend a common position vis-à-vis third countries in negotiations 
on investment liberalisation under the ECT. The divisions repeatedly surfaced in the 
negotiations on the ECT as well as on the ‘supplementary protocol’ when, notably, France 
sought to prevent too extensive investment liberalisation commitments. These observations 
stand in opposition to the assumptions made in the analytical framework. The framework 
developed the argument that post-establishment treatment and protection clauses – unlike 
liberalisation commitments – should significantly circumscribe the policy space and 
sovereignty of states. Hence, they should be less likely to engage in cooperation and 
delegation. This case, however, shows that at least in sensitive sectors such as public 
services, states may have a different perception. It needs to be mentioned here that in the 
early 1990s, states were yet little experienced with ISDS and may not have fully grasped the 
sovereignty-limiting implications of investment protection. To conclude, Member State 
preferences clearly promoted the EU’s initial involvement as well as the subsequent use of 
its de facto competences at different stages of investment-related negotiations on the ECT. 
While these observations are in line with liberal intergovernmentalism and the assumption 
that the Member States seek to maximise their capabilities, they are in disagreement with the 
hypothesis H2, which stipulates that European business shaped Member State preferences 
and promoted cooperation and delegation.  
 
5.3 Conclusion  
The chapter traced the EU’s involvement in the ECT negotiations. It finds that the EU’s 
outstanding role and de facto competences in these negotiations confirm supranational 
theories and hypothesis H1, but partly invalidate liberal intergovernmentalism and hypothesis 
H2. The Commission engaged in policy entrepreneurship and decisively contributed to the 
EU’s central role and extensive de facto competences in this forum. To that end, it drew on 
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its agenda setting powers, invoked its fringe competences under the CCP as well as fringe 
and de facto competences stemming from its central role in the creation of the Single Market 
for energy. The ECT and this milestone project of the EU were linked. For exactly this 
causal link between the ECT and the Single Market for energy, most European energy 
companies opposed to the ECT project. They perceived it as another Commission-led attack 
against the monopolistic market positions. Due to their defensive interests and the liberal 
nature of the ECT project, they lobbied against the project and the Commission’s efforts. 
The Member States, finally, were eager to cooperate and to delegate negotiating to the 
Commission. They felt that it was in their best economic and geopolitical interest to appear 
as a unitary actor vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Commission’s campaigning, its proactive 
attitude and the ‘one-off nature’ of the ECT negotiations further propelled cooperation and 
delegation. This observation is in line with intergovernemntalism, which stipulates that states 
cooperate to maximise their capabilities, but it contradicts the assumption that business 
preferences decisively informed government preferences and drove integration. Hence, the 
chapter casts further doubts on hypothesis H2.  
 !
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Chapter VI – The EU in negotiations on the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment and the Singapore Issues 
 
 
 
The Chapter examines the EU’s involvement in the investment negotiations on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD as well as in the consequent 
negotiations on investment as part of the so-called Singapore Issues in the WTO. The 
negotiations on the MAI and the Singapore Issues are examined in one chapter, as they were 
intimately linked. The chapter examines on the basis of the analytical framework and ex ante 
hypotheses why the EU played a central role in both investment negotiations. The chapter 
draws a truly intriguing picture of European Integration. It demonstrates that supranational 
thinking and hypothesis H1 better account for the EU’s involvement in investment 
negotiations on the MAI and the Singapore Issues than intergovernmental theories and 
hypothesis H2. The EU’s involvement in both negotiations reflected Commission 
entrepreneurship, rather than business lobbying and Member State preferences.   
 
In short, the Commission ensured the EU’s participation in the MAI negotiations – in 
addition to the individual Member State delegations – by invoking fringe competences. The 
Commission saw the US-led MAI project critically for functional and power considerations. 
Hence, it went to great lengths to ensure that investment disciplines also became part of the 
WTO agenda as one of the so-called Singapore Issues. European business showed only 
moderate interest in the MAI project, as it was unlikely to deliver significant economic 
gains. The Member States met the MAI project with greater interest than the Commission 
and European business, but only unwillingly accepted the Commission’s demand to partially 
cooperate and to delegate negotiating to the EU-level. To the frustration of the Commission, 
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the Member States sought to keep the EU’s involvement in the MAI negotiations to the 
legally required minimum. So in 1997-1998 when the MAI negotiations ran into stalemate 
over substance, the US Trade Representative Office (USTR) in a remarkable alliance with 
the Commission reportedly exploited the situation to make the MAI negotiations collapse 
and to shift multilateral investment negotiations back to the WTO. The Commission openly 
favoured the WTO, as it was arguably serving European economic interests better and 
because it could act as the EU’s single voice without having to deal with hostile Member 
States at the negotiating table. This remarkable instance of Commission entrepreneurship 
clearly helped consolidating the EU’s role in international investment policy, as will become 
clear inter alia in chapter VIII.  
 
6.1 The way toward the MAI negotiations  
Plans to negotiate a binding multilateral agreement on investment under the auspices of the 
OECD reach back to the 1960s. In 1962, the OECD produced the Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property, which, however, was never adopted due to disagreements 
among its members. Instead the Draft Convention served afterwards as a model text for BITs 
for the coming decades. At the same time, the OECD elaborated the Codes of Liberalisation 
of Capital Movements and Invisible Operations. The Codes remain until today a key policy 
instrument in the liberalisation and treatment of capital and investment flows. The Codes are, 
however, mere gentlemen’s agreements, which are enforced through peer review in OECD 
meetings (Muchlinski, 2000, pp. 1035–1036). In 1988, the OECD countries explored the 
possibility of upgrading the Codes to a comprehensive multilateral investment agreement. 
The negotiations nevertheless quickly ended in stalemate. The US was unwilling to grant 
Canada a national treatment exemption for its cultural sector and started pushing for talks on 
ambitious investment liberalisation commitments. Negotiations on comprehensive 
investment liberalisation commitments, however, were not acceptable for most other OECD 
countries (Corporate Europe Observatory, 1998; Tieleman, 2000, p. 8). 
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A US initiative to increase pressure on developing countries in the Uruguay Round: 
The US government soon revived plans to negotiate a multilateral investment agreement in 
the OECD. US pressure led to the decision of the OECD Council of Ministers28  to 
commission a feasibility study on the prospects of establishing a multilateral agreement on 
investment. Observers interpreted the US efforts to re-launch negotiations in the OECD as a 
reaction to the onerous talks on investment disciplines in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. 
As described in Chapter IV, the US government had pushed investment disciplines onto the 
agenda of the Uruguay Round and remained throughout the entire negotiating process the 
demandeur of the creation of ambitious investment disciplines under the GATT. Developing 
countries, however, persistently opposed US plans to establish a full-fledged investment 
framework. The US government thus started pushing for negotiations on a multilateral 
investment agreement in the OECD in order to create an outside option to the Uruguay 
Round. The underlying reasoning of the US government was that developing countries could 
either cooperate by contributing to the Uruguay Round negotiations on an ambitious 
multilateral investment framework or else get sidelined in the form of an OECD investment 
agreement. The US government assumed that negotiations on investment disciplines in the 
OECD would be an easy and swift enterprise, which would produce a state-of-the-art 
multilateral investment agreement. The agreement should be open for accession of non-
OECD states and thereby, de facto, set global investment policy standards, which would 
practically also bind the opposing developing countries. The US government – and in 
particular the US State Department – thereby sought to increase pressure on developing 
countries to adopt a more collaborative attitude toward investment negotiations in the 
GATT. This strategy reportedly guided the US government throughout the MAI negotiations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 OECD membership comprised the following 29 countries at this point in time. Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The European Communities, represented by the European Commission, took part in the 
Council of Ministers as observer, and was allowed to speak but not to vote.  
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(Corporate Europe Observatory, 1998; Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 149–153; Smythe, 1998, 
pp. 242–245; Tieleman, 2000, p. 8).  
 
Due to US pressure, the OECD’s Committee on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprise (CIME) and the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions 
(CMIT) officially re-examined the possibility of establishing a multilateral investment 
agreement under the auspices of the OECD after 1991 (Henderson, 1999, p. 19). In early 
1994, the Committees set up five issue-specific working groups29 so as to examine important 
technical matters in more detail. The OECD Council of Ministers received a joint draft 
report of the CIME, CMIT and working groups in June 1994 and requested the OECD 
Secretariat to prepare a formal negotiating mandate (OECD, 1995a)-  
 
Business expresses moderate and conditional support: Business was involved in the 
preparations of the MAI negotiations and generally welcomed the project. The US Council 
on International Business (USCIB) was reportedly the most supportive national business 
federation and provided significant input. USCIB pointed out that investment had become 
even more important than traditional trade in goods and thus required multilateral rules 
(Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 152–153). The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the 
OECD (BIAC) – the official representative of the business community in OECD policy-
making – was closely involved in the discussions on the draft mandate and accompanying 
final report on the MAI. BIAC promoted the MAI negotiations and reportedly markedly 
influence the negotiating mandate and the accompanying final report. European business 
federations like UNICE – today BusinessEurope – also welcomed the MAI initiative and 
participated in discussions on the negotiation agenda of the MAI. UNICE commented at the 
end of preparatory discussions that it was satisfied with the mandate and final report 
(Tieleman, 2000, pp. 9–10). Several Member State business federations voiced similar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The working groups examined existing liberalisation commitments under OECD instruments, 
liberalisation commitments in new areas, institutional matters, investment protection and dispute 
settlement arrangements as well as the involvement of non-OECD countries.  
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general statements of support without voicing specific requests (Interview, by telephone, 3 
July 2013; Interview, by telephone, 17 June 2013). Unlike American business, which 
primarily focused on investment liberalisation, European business reportedly was mostly 
interested in enhancing post-establishment treatment and protection standards in developing 
countries (Woolcock, 1990, p. 25; Interview, Brussels, 13 June 2012). The support of 
European business thus hinged on the assumption that the MAI would be multilateralised 
either through subsequent WTO negotiations or the accession of non-OECD countries. Some 
business representatives however were more hesitant regarding the project. They feared that 
European policy-makers were unfamiliar with the NAFTA-approach of investment 
regulation, which clearly informed the MAI project. They cautioned that European policy-
makers might therefore lose out in negotiations on investment liberalisation to the detriment 
of European business (Interview, telephone, 3 July 2013). Finally, the Trade Union Advisory 
Committee to the OECD (TUAC) was also regularly consulted on the MAI initiative, but got 
less involved in the preparations (Tieleman, 2000, pp. 10–11). 
 
It needs mention that many experts questioned the authenticity of business support for the 
MAI project. Many business federations, which came out in favour of the MAI initiative, 
had very close ties with governments. Former diplomats of the US State Department – the 
main promoter of the MAI negotiations – for instance were heading USCIB. Many experts 
came to the conclusion that governments artificially triggered business demands for the 
MAI. Pierre Sauvé, then official at the OECD’s Trade Directorate, commented that “… 
bureaucracies were proposing an agreement that the private sector in most countries was 
not necessarily calling for” (as cited in Lawrence et al., 2006, p. 153). 
 
The OECD Council of Ministers reconvened and examined the proposed negotiating 
mandate and an attached final report in May 1995. The final report on the MAI initiative 
stated that the preceding years had brought a surge in international investment activities. It 
was now the right time to establish a multilateral framework for international investment. 
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The report lay out as negotiating objectives that the MAI should provide for ambitious 
investment liberalisation, investment protection and investment dispute settlement provisions 
(Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 153–156).  
 
On 5 May 1995 and largely in response to US instigation, the OECD Council of Ministers 
endorsed the final report, the negotiating objectives and the formal mandate without 
controversy (Graham, 2000, p. 2). It underlined in the formal mandate that the MAI should 
be a self-standing international treaty and open to accession by OECD countries, the 
European Communities and also non-OECD countries. The Council, moreover, indicated 
that the OECD ministerial meeting of 1997 should conclude the MAI negotiations. The 
literature reports that all OECD countries seemed to generally agree on the objectives and 
content of the MAI and were optimistic about bringing the negotiations to a successful and 
swift conclusion. Experts observed that the launch of the MAI negotiations took place in the 
favourable environment created by the recent wave of BIT conclusions, the successful 
ratification of NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty. In comparison to these complex 
negotiations, the MAI negotiations looked like a “walk in the park” – an easy stocktaking of 
best practices among like-minded capital-exporting Western democracies (OECD, 1995a).  
 
6.1.1 Commission entrepreneurship for WTO-based investment negotiations  
Not all participating parties shared the enthusiasm of the US government for the MAI project 
(Dymond, 1999, p. 26; Smythe, 1998, pp. 239, 244–245). In particular the European 
Commission – which participated in all OECD meetings as the representative of the EU – 
did not hide its half-hearted support for the initiative (Graham, 2000, pp. 23–25; Henderson, 
1999, p. 15; Muchlinski, 2000, p. 1039). Functionalist and power considerations explain the 
Commission’s scepticism regarding the MAI negotiations. First, the Commission argued that 
negotiations on multilateral investment disciplines in the OECD could only deliver second-
best solutions in comparison to negotiations in the WTO. About a month before the 
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endorsement of the mandate for the MAI negotiations in the OECD, the Commission 
published its communication “A level playing field for direct investment world-wide” in 
which it described its overall approach to international investment policy (European 
Commission, 1995a). The communication underlined that the WTO should be the primary 
forum for multilateral negotiations on investment disciplines so as to get developing and 
emerging countries aboard. Most investment barriers resided in developing and emerging 
countries, whereas OECD countries were already relatively open and granted high levels of 
investment protection. In the eyes of the Commission, and arguably European investors, the 
MAI initiative would marginally enhance the investment climate in the least critical 
countries, while excluding from the outset those countries where European investors suffered 
most from high market access barriers and insufficient protection. The MAI negotiations 
could deliver only marginal benefits for business and the contracting states. The 
Commissioner for Trade, Sir Leon Brittan, did not get tired of reiterating this position in 
public statements throughout the MAI negotiations.30 And a former top official of DG 
Trade, who oversaw the Commission’s participation from Brussels, recalled that he 
continuously qualified the MAI as a ‘bad and pointless project’ in Commission-internal 
debates (Interview, Brussels, 24 September 2013). The second reason for the Commission’s 
scepticism regarding the MAI negotiations was arguably its de facto representation 
monopoly in the WTO. The Commission reportedly favoured the WTO over the OECD, 
because it would act as sole representative of the EU and its Member States in WTO 
negotiations. It was nevertheless evident that the Commission would have to negotiate 
together with Member State delegations in the OECD, as the Member States were competent 
regarding many aspects of international investment policy and traditionally participated and 
spoke in the OECD on their own behalf. The Commission did not underline this motivation 
in public statements, but involved experts and the literature on the MAI almost unanimously 
point to this concern behind the Commission’s position. The view is also indirectly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 See for instance Commissioner Brittan’s speech on the MAI at the European Parliament on 10 
October 1998 (EP reference: Speech/98/212).  
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supported by the observation that most EU Member States were more supportive of holding 
multilateral negotiations on investment disciplines in the OECD, as it enabled them to 
negotiate for themselves (Dymond, 1999, p. 28; Lawrence et al., 2006, p. 151; Muchlinski, 
2000, p. 1039). 
 
Commission entrepreneurship through agenda setting and the strategic use of 
international negotiating fora: Even though the Council of Ministers of the OECD 
formally launched the MAI negotiations on 5 May 1995, the Commission did not drop its 
reservations or plan to hold negotiations on international investment disciplines under the 
auspices of the WTO. The Commission continuously expounded the problem that the MAI 
negotiations could only deliver second-best solutions. In EU-internal debates, the 
Commission persistently demanded the Council of Ministers of the EU for a mandate to push 
investment disciplines back onto the working agenda of the WTO. The Commission, 
moreover, continued international debates with Canada, developing countries and the US so 
as to gather support for also negotiating on investment disciplines under the auspices of the 
WTO. Many developing countries and the US were very critical regarding the Commission’s 
proposals, while Canada, Japan and South Korea were supportive (Smythe, 1998, pp. 244–
245; Woolcock, 2003, p. 251). In 1996, the Commission’s two-level game and advocacy for 
WTO work on investment played out. The Council of Ministers of the EU followed the 
Commission’s recommendations and provided it with a mandate to seek the inclusion of 
investment into the working agenda of the WTO on the occasion of the first ministerial 
meeting of the WTO in Singapore at the end of the year (Graham, 2000, pp. 24–25). 
 
The US government criticised the decision of the Council of Ministers of the EU. The US 
government felt that the EU – and more specifically the Commission – sought to sideline the 
MAI negotiations. Frustrated with these developments and the Commission’s activism, the 
US government directly addressed the EU Member States and demanded them to confirm 
their full commitment to the MAI negotiations in the OECD. In the course of these debates, 
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the US government, the Commission and the EU Member States ultimately reached a shaky 
compromise. The US government agreed that it would support the EU’s initiative to set 
international investment disciplines back onto the working agenda of the WTO. The EU 
Member States and the Commission, on the other hand, would publically acknowledge and 
accept that the MAI negotiations would remain the primary forum for negotiations on 
multilateral investment disciplines (Graham, 2000, pp. 24–25).  
 
In December 1996, the ministers of the newly created WTO gathered in Singapore so as to 
discuss the working agenda for the coming years. The discussions took place already under 
the impression that a new round of multilateral trade negotiations was in preparation. The 
EU, Canada, Japan and South Korea strongly pushed for establishing working groups on 
investment, competition, trade facilitation and government procurement. These working 
groups should examine the prospects of holding full-fledged negotiations on these issues in 
the coming round. The four issues became known as Singapore Issues. The US provided 
half-hearted support to the EU-led initiative during the deliberations in Singapore. Many 
developing countries strongly criticised the initiative. In the end, the EU and its supporters, 
however, prevailed and working groups on the four issues were established. The working 
group on investment started meeting in May 1997 and consulted on the general elements, 
benefits and risks of a Multilateral Investment Framework under the WTO. The EU and the 
US had informally agreed that in-depth discussions and veritable negotiations should only 
start once the MAI negotiations had ended (Graham, 2000, pp. 24–25; Kumar, 2003; 
Woolcock, 2003, p. 251). The creation of the WTO investment working group, which should 
later become the nucleus for investment negotiations during the Doha Round, is the product 
of the Commission using its agenda setting powers in EU-internal debates while at the same 
time mobilising like-minded third countries for its project. The creation of the WTO working 
group, on the other hand, consolidated the EU’s role in international investment policy by 
making the Commission the EU’s single voice in this key forum.  
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6.1.2 The Commission mandate for the MAI negotiations  
Despite only moderate interest of European business, the EU Member States had generally 
endorsed the MAI project during the preparatory debates on the MAI project. In particular 
Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had warmed to the project and 
showed sincere interest. France, on the other hand, formally supported the project, but 
worried about the implications of the MAI for its often discriminatory and dirigiste industrial 
policy (Interview, telephone, 17 June 2013; Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012; Interview, 
Brussels, 24 September 2013). In late 1994, EU-internal discussions on the EU’s 
representation modalities and a potential negotiating mandate for the Commission started.  
 
The Commission fails to become the EU’s single voice: The Commission reportedly soon 
tried to convince the Member States to assign it as their sole representative and single voice 
in the MAI negotiations even though its reservations vis-à-vis the MAI project were well 
known. The Commission sought to further consolidate the EU’s role in the MAI negotiations 
by referring to alleged relevant fringe and implied competences. It claimed that the EU was 
anyway likely to be competent to regulate international investment under the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP). It added that the upcoming Opinion 1/94 on the scope of the CCP 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was very likely to confirm its teleological 
interpretation of the CCP. Disgruntled with the Commission’s continuous attempts to expand 
the EU’s competences as inter alia illustrated in Opinion 1/94, the Member States discarded 
the Commission’s proposal and argument. They saw no need to pool negotiating efforts in 
the hands of the Commission in this forum. National investment policy officials had been 
successfully representing their governments in the OECD for decades. From their point of 
view, the pooling of negotiating in the hands of the Commission would merely undermine 
their competences and was unlikely to deliver a better deal. They, moreover, stressed that the 
upcoming Opinion 1/94 was likely to prove that most agenda items of the MAI negotiations 
still came under national competence (Interview, telephone, 3 July 2013). In Council debates 
prior to the start of the MAI negotiations, some Member States even underlined that they 
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saw no need to coordinate their positions with their counterparts from other EU Member 
States (Council of Ministers, 1995). In November 1994, the ECJ indeed ruled in favour of 
the Member States by advancing a remarkably narrow interpretation of the CCP (see Chapter 
VIII). The Commission’s attempt to even further extend the EU’s de facto competences in 
international investment policy thus failed as the Member States were fed up with the 
Commission’s competence usurping behaviour.   
 
Fringe competences nevertheless ensure the Commission’s participation: In May 1995, 
the Council of Ministers of the EU adopted, without much further debate, a mandate 
empowering the Commission to participate in the MAI negotiations alongside the Member 
States (Agence Europe, 1995a). The consensus in the Council of Ministers regarding the 
joint participation of the Member States and the Commission in the MAI negotiations 
primarily reflected the EU’s undeniable fringe and implied competences in MAI-relevant 
domains as well as the EU’s customary participation i.e. de facto competences in all OECD 
meetings as observer. Policy-makers from the Member States and the Commission shared 
the assumption that the MAI would be a ‘mixed’ agreement. The recent entry into force of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, and Opinions 1/94 and 2/92, left no doubt that the EU held fringe 
competences necessary for negotiations (see Chapter VIII, Section 3) (European Court of 
Justice, 1994, 1994; Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 40–48). In particular, the proposed disciplines on 
investment liberalisation, transfers of funds, trade-related investment measures and certain 
post-establishment treatment standards indisputably fell into shared or exclusive Union 
competences according to the Treaty chapter on capital movements and the CCP. The 
‘mixity’ of the MAI obliged the Member States to empower the Commission to participate in 
the negotiations. As it was impossible to disentangle agenda items in OECD negotiations 
according to the competence distribution within the EU, European policy-makers agreed that 
the Commission had to participate in all negotiating formations of the MAI talks. In addition 
to this EU-internal institutional constraint, the OECD functioned as an external institutional 
constraint promoting the EU/Commission’s involvement in the MAI negotiations. The 
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regulatory activity of the EU regarding the Single Market and the work programme of the 
OECD strongly overlapped, which made close cooperation between the EU and OECD a 
regulatory necessity. Hence, the EU had been a formal observer in the OECD for many 
decades. The Commission represented and spoke on behalf of the EU in the OECD 
meetings. As the EU and the Commission had well-established roles in the OECD, it was 
coherent for the Member States and other OECD countries to also accept their participation 
in the MAI negotiations (Dymond, 1999, p. 28; Interview, telephone, 3 July 2013; Interview, 
Brussels, 18 January 2012). 
 
After the adoption of the mandate, the Council of Ministers further underlined the Member 
States’ claim to competence over international investment regulation vis-à-vis the 
Commission in the choice of the EU-internal coordination setup for the negotiations. The 
Council discarded the possibilities of either holding formal coordination meetings on the 
MAI negotiations in the ‘113 Committee’ or of establishing a specialised Commission 
working group. Instead the Council decided to create an ad hoc Council committee. The 
committee directly reported to the General Affairs Council and was not linked to a specific 
Treaty chapter such as the CCP or Capital Movements. The Member States thereby 
underlined that the MAI negotiations primarily came under national competence. They also 
sought to prevent the creation of a precedent which the Commission could invoke so as to 
challenge the delimitation of the CCP in Opinion 1/94 (Interview, telephone, 3 July 2013). 
According to all accounts, European business did not take an interest in these debates, but 
occasionally repeated its statements of general support for the MAI project. In summary, 
neither the Member States nor European business were truly interested in speaking with a 
single voice in the MAI negotiations. Despite the tense relationship with the Member States 
in the light of Opinion 1/94, the Commission tried to become the EU’s single voice but 
without success. The EU’s undeniable fringe and implied competences, nevertheless, 
ensured a minimum level of EU involvement in the MAI negotiations.  
 
179 
 
6.2 The MAI negotiations  
In September 1995, the delegations of 29 OECD member countries and the Commission 
started meeting for the first negotiating sessions. The Dutch diplomat Frans Engering was 
appointed as chairman of the negotiations. The OECD Secretariat hosted and provided 
technical expertise to the negotiating parties and thereby acquired an important role in the 
negotiating process. BIAC and TUAC were regularly briefed and invited to submit 
comments to the MAI negotiations so as to integrate business and labour concerns 
(Tieleman, 2000, pp. 9–11). Furthermore, representatives of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) observed the MAI 
negotiations whenever agenda items concerned their work. In autumn 1997, finally, several 
non-OECD delegations – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, China, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia – gradually joined the negotiations as observers (Henderson, 1999, p. 
20). 
 
The negotiating process was structured in several negotiating formations. The so-called 
Negotiating Group assembled the national lead negotiators and oversaw the entire 
negotiating process. Deliberations in the Negotiating Group focused on six substantive areas: 
scope and application of the agreement, investment liberalisation, investment protection, 
dispute settlement, implementation, accession of non-OECD countries, and the relationship 
to other investment agreements (OECD, 1995b). The Negotiating Group would determine 
the general direction of the negotiations as well as resolve disagreements on controversial 
issues. Negotiations on technical details were delegated to five expert groups and three 
drafting groups.31 The similar and narrow foci of the drafting and expert groups underlined 
the considerable technicality of the MAI negotiations (OECD, n.d.). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 Expert group No. 1 focused on selected issues of dispute settlement and geographical scope. Expert 
group No. 2 examined the treatment of tax measures under the MAI. Expert group No. 3 focused on 
the so-called special topics like investment incentives, state monopolies, corporate practices and the 
movement of key personnel. Expert group No. 4 discussed institutional matters. Finally, expert group 
No. 5 finally addressed matters related to financial services. Discussions on more typical components 
of international investment agreements (IIAs) were held in three drafting groups. Drafting group No. 1 
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6.2.1 The EU in the MAI negotiations  
The Commission nonetheless proves itself as important negotiating party: The Member 
States and the Commission jointly participated and spoke in all negotiating formations of the 
MAI talks. The Commission typically spoke first in negotiations followed by the individual 
Member States. The EU was thus much less cohesive in the MAI negotiations than in the 
Uruguay Round or the ECT negotiations. All interviewees suggested that the Commission 
was a central negotiating party despite the Member States’ initial reservations about 
involving the EU/Commission in the negotiations. Several interviewees argued that the 
Commission managed to acquire a central role because of the proactive and constructive 
negotiating style of the political and technical lead negotiators (Interview, Paris, 1 October 
2012a; Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012b). The Commission reportedly frequently sought to 
forge broad coalitions with third countries and came up with compromise proposals so as to 
advance the negotiations. Despite this general perception, the Commission’s powers, and 
hence role, remained sometimes unclear and became the object of controversy. It was 
occasionally unclear within the EU delegation – i.e. among the delegations of the EU 
Member States and the Commission – as well as to third countries, whether the Commission 
could speak, whether only the Commission could speak and to what extent the 
Commission’s positions in deliberations were authoritative. A former US negotiator 
commented that the ambivalent powers and role of the Commission sometimes became a 
problem and slowed down discussions (Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012a; Interview, Paris, 1 
October 2012b). In addition to the Commission’s role as a proper negotiating party alongside 
the Member States, it sought to play an important role in coordinating the positions of the 
then 15 Member States of the EU. The Commission would typically organise coordination 
meetings in Paris with the delegations of the EU Member States on the morning of each !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
examined selected topics of investment protection. Drafting group No. 2 discussed selected topics 
concerning definition and treatment of investors and investments at the pre- and post-establishment 
stage. Drafting group No. 3, finally, examined selected topics of definition, treatment and protection 
of investors and investments.  
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negotiating day as well as before and after important negotiating sessions so as to forge and 
maintain a common EU position as far as possible.  
 
The Member States seek to contain the Commission: The readiness of the EU Member 
States to coordinate their positions nevertheless varied considerably across issue areas. Most 
EU Member State delegations accepted the Commission’s coordination attempts on issues 
like the Regional Economic Integration Clause (REIO) or capital movements, where the 
EU/Commission was undoubtedly competent to act. In these domains the EU Member States 
indeed jointly defended a common position, allowed the Commission to speak on their 
behalf and acted as a ‘collective actor’ (Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012a). Most EU 
Member State delegations refused, however, to coordinate on issues falling into national 
competence like investment protection or questions related to intellectual property rights. 
What is more, the so-called big four – France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom – continuously coordinated their positions in these domains among themselves and 
even with the US government, but deliberately excluded the Commission from these 
meetings. The Member States – and in particular France, the United Kingdom and Germany 
– were determined to protect their competences in international investment policy from any 
attempts by the Commission to interfere and to become active in this domain (Interview, 
Brussels, 18 February 2012). The Member States’ remarkable preoccupation with 
competences, on the one hand, reflected the great number of investment policy officials!
involved. Many governments sent – as customary in OECD Committee debates on 
investment – technical experts in charge of national BIT programmes as negotiators. These 
expert officials were arguably more concerned with protecting their competences than 
national trade policy officials and diplomats were, who were already used to close 
cooperation and did not risk losing any competences from cooperation in this domain. On 
the other hand, cooperation and coordination between the Commission and the Member 
States were also clearly influenced by the recent heated debates over the scope of exclusive 
Union competence under the CCP during the proceedings of Opinions 1/94 and 2/92 
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(Smythe, 1998, p. 248; Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012). A former negotiator of the 
Commission commented to the effect that cooperation with the Member States was very 
difficult and frustrating in comparison to the preceding ECT negotiations due to the latent 
struggle over competences (see Chapter VIII) (Interview, Brussels, 18 February 2012).! 
 
6.2.2 Substantive disagreements among the negotiating parties 
The MAI negotiations quickly gained momentum due to a very intense meeting rhythm. 
From September 1996 onwards, the negotiating group met 23 times – i.e. every six weeks – 
for three days each time in order to determine the overall direction of the talks. The three-
day sessions of the Negotiating Group were followed by three days of technical discussions 
in the expert and drafting groups so as to examine and hammer out details (Dymond, 1999, 
p. 29; Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012b). It became soon clear that the MAI negotiations 
would be a more challenging enterprise than initially thought. The negotiating parties 
broadly agreed on the key elements of the MAI, as most of them could be found in the more 
than thousand investment agreements which OECD countries had already concluded. 
Deliberations in the negotiating group, expert and drafting groups showed, however, that no 
common approach to these elements and provisions had emerged among OECD countries. 
Moreover, the negotiating parties showed unwilling and/or unable to bridge these differences 
in their national approaches. The following paragraphs briefly summarise technical and 
political controversies in the Negotiating Group and the degree of European unity on these 
questions for the period between September 1995 and early 1997 (Dymond, 1999, p. 29). 
 
Disagreements over post-establishment treatment and proetection provisions: 
Disagreements on technical questions were surprisingly frequent. Often these technical 
disagreements reflected the different regulatory approaches under NAFTA-type and 
European BITs. Many disagreements were thus transatlantic and promoted European unity 
despite latent competence struggles. The following list contains the most important 
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controversies and is not exhaustive. First of all, the negotiating parties could not agree on a 
definition of investment. While many European countries favoured a broad, open-ended, 
asset-based definition, Canada and the USA insisted on a narrow definition of investment, as 
under NAFTA. Second, the negotiating parties could not agree on disciplines regarding 
performance requirements and investment incentives. Some delegations considered certain 
performance requirements as valuable economic policy instruments, while others considered 
performance requirements as inherently wasteful and discriminatory. Third, the question of 
whether the MAI should require states to pay financial compensation only for direct or also 
indirect, creeping expropriation became another point of controversy. Negotiating parties 
with strong regulatory traditions feared that the obligation to financially compensate for 
indirect expropriation could become extremely costly and would undermine their right to 
regulate, while other parties considered such an obligation to be a quintessential element of 
an IIA. Fourth, the negotiating parties initially also attempted to establish rules preventing 
discriminatory tax treatment. The Commission, in particular, pushed for negotiations on this 
issue, as European investors reportedly faced discrimination in many US states. Discussions 
in a special working group showed to be so complicated that after one year of negotiations 
all parties agreed to drop the agenda item. Fifth, the inclusion of a non-lowering of standards 
clause regarding environmental and labour standards became a controversial issue toward 
the end of the negotiations, when NGOs started criticising the MAI negotiations. While, for 
instance, the Canadian and US delegations were sympathetic to the idea, many EU Member 
States rejected such plans. Sixth, although most negotiating parties had investor-to-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in their BITs, some delegations disliked the plan to 
provide for ISDS under the MAI and insisted on state-to-state dispute settlement. When, in 
late 1998, the MAI negotiations collapsed, no compromises had been found for most of these 
issues (Dymond, 1999, pp. 34–41; Graham, 2000, p. 27; Muchlinski, 2000, pp. 1040–1046; 
UNCTAD, 1999b). 
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Disagreements over investment liberalisation commitments: The high number of 
disagreements on rather technical questions was undoubtedly a burden for the MAI 
negotiations. Eyewitnesses, nonetheless, agree that it was instead a set of questions relating 
to investment liberalisation which seriously endangered and contributed to the collapse of 
the MAI negotiations. The most significant controversy concerned the question of whether 
the MAI negotiations should seek commitments on up-front investment liberalisation. The 
negotiating mandate stipulated that:  
 
“[The MAI]… should go beyond existing commitments to achieve a high standard of 
liberalisation covering both the establishment and post-establishment phase with broad 
obligations on national treatment, standstill, roll-back, non-discrimination/MFN, and 
transparency, and apply disciplines to areas of liberalisation not satisfactorily covered by 
the present OECD instruments;… [and] be legally binding and contain provisions regarding 
its enforcement.”  
(OECD, 1995a) 
 
The negotiating parties interpreted this clause differently. The US delegation argued that the 
mandate foresaw negotiations on up-front liberalisation commitments. Hence, the US pushed 
for bargaining in this area. Canada supported the US delegation. The US demand was widely 
perceived as an attempt to multilateralise NAFTA. European BITs normally did not bind 
governments regarding the regulation of inward investment. The chairman of the MAI 
negotiations, the EU Member States, the Commission and other negotiating parties, on the 
other hand, were surprised and taken aback by this US demand. The EU Member States and 
the Commission rejected the US reading of the mandate. They argued that the MAI mandate 
only foresaw the codification of existing levels of investment liberalisation. The EU Member 
States and the Commission pointed out that they were not ready to accept any liberalisation 
commitments in services which went beyond commitments under existing GATS and OECD 
commitments. The Europeans argued that any new liberalisation commitments under the 
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MAI would be multilateralised through the MFN clause of the GATS and thus enable third 
countries to free ride (Graham, 2000, p. 34). The EU Member States and the Commission 
instead proposed that the MAI should contain a standstill clause as well as a rollback 
obligation like the OECD Codes on Capital Movements and Invisible Operations. The US 
and Canadian delegation in turn disliked the idea of unconditional standstill and rollback 
clauses. The EU Member States and the Commission moreover stressed that any new 
liberalisation commitments should be non-reciprocal and arise from the long-established 
peer review process in the CIME and CMTE after the conclusion of the MAI negotiations 
(Dymond, 1999, p. 34; Lawrence et al., 2006, p. 157; UNCTAD, 1999b, pp. 11–13; 
Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012b).  
 
Discussions on the question of up-front liberalisation commitments stood increasingly at the 
centre of the negotiating process. They continued for more than a year without any 
significant convergence of minds. While the US strongly insisted on launching negotiations 
on up-front investment liberalisation, most other countries felt that such negotiations could 
only start – if at all – once the core text of the MAI was finalised. Unless the core text was 
agreed, the negotiating parties could not be certain about the actual implications of 
eliminating reservations. In late 1996, the chairman, nevertheless, proposed that the 
negotiating parties should table negative lists indicating existing market access reservations 
for foreign investors. He hoped that the lists would enable the Negotiating Group to find 
common ground and finally advance on the issue of up-front liberalisation. These hopes 
were frustrated when the OECD Secretariat received the lists in February 1997. The US, 
Canada, many EU Member States and the EU tabled very extensive lists. The US list 
counted more than 400 pages of highly detailed reservations enumerating non-conforming 
investment measures as well as a general disclaimer that sub-federal entities would not be 
bound by the MAI (Marchand, 1998). The lists of the EU Member States and the EU, on the 
other hand, were often long and very vague in their reservations. Only the Benelux countries 
tabled few to no reservations (Thomas, 1997). The US and Canada strongly criticised many 
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EU Member States, as they felt the vague wording of the reservations left many sectors 
outside the scope of the MAI. Disputes on liberalisation commitments even emerged among 
EU Member States, which made it impossible to develop and follow a unified EU position in 
this domain of the negotiations. Spain, for instance, strongly criticised the United Kingdom, 
which planned to keep access to its fishery sector closed to foreign as well as European 
investors (Thomas, 1997). A former negotiator recalled that at the end of the negotiations the 
“lists of reservations on market access filled three books of the size of telephone directories” 
(Interview, Brussels, 24 July 2012a) which clearly showed that the space for agreement 
among the negotiating parties was extremely limited in this key issue of the negotiations. 
The extensive lists of reservations made it difficult to strike an acceptable balance of 
liberalisation commitments among the negotiating parties. Attempts to find solutions to these 
problems were numerous, but all failed. At the latest, in late 1997, it was clear that the 
liberalisation commitments under the MAI would not exceed the existing commitments 
under the OECD Codes and GATS. In consequence, US business!in particular lost interest in 
the MAI negotiations (Graham, 2000, pp. 34–35; UNCTAD, 1999b, p. 13). 
 
A closely related transatlantic controversy concerned the so-called Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation (REIO) clause and the applicability of the MAI to sub-national 
entities. The EU – and notably the Commission – pushed for the inclusion of a REIO clause 
into the MAI text. The REIO clause stipulates that liberalisation commitments within 
regional economic integration organisations like the EU do not have to be granted to third 
countries under MFN clauses. The EU Member States and the Commission acted very 
cohesively and sought to prevent the MAI from fully multilateralising access to the Single 
Market. The US and Canadian delegation criticised the European demand for a REIO clause. 
They argued that such a clause contradicted the very spirit of the MAI negotiations, as it 
constituted a huge, open-ended and vague carve-out and would allow for the continued 
discrimination against foreign investors in the Single Market. The US delegation particularly 
feared that the REIO clause would enable the EU to circumvent Article 54 TFEU, which 
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stipulates that foreign enterprises incorporated in one Member State had to be treated as 
European nationals. In other words, the US delegation assumed that a REIO clause could 
entail a significant de-liberalisation of access to the Single Market. The US delegation, on 
the hand, vehemently demanded a clause providing for the non-applicability of the MAI to 
sub-national entities i.e. US federal states. The US delegation insisted that it could not 
conclude the agreement otherwise for constitutional reasons. The Member States, and 
notably the Commission, stressed that such a clause would constitute a huge carve-out to the 
MAI and therefore rejected the US demand. The controversy over the REIO and sub-national 
entities clause could not be resolved before the collapse of the MAI negotiations and 
increasingly slowed them down (Graham, 2000, pp. 30–31). 
 
The French demand for a general carve-out for cultural industries became a further problem 
related to the liberalisation of investment flows. The French delegation refused to accept any 
liberalisation commitments or other obligations in the domain of cultural industries. It 
argued that cultural industries were central to national identity and culture. The special role 
of culture for society thus required special treatment under international agreements. Canada, 
Italy, Belgium, Greece and Australia supported the French demand. The US delegation, on 
the other hand, strongly opposed it and rejected the alleged special nature of cultural 
industries for society. The US argued that the demand for a general exception of cultural 
industries served to shelter non-competitive national cultural industries. Japan, New Zealand, 
the Nordic Countries, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands supported the US 
position, as they feared that a too broad carve-out would harm their cultural industries 
abroad (Agence Europe, 1997c). The EU was thus divided on the cultural exception clause. 
As the matter closely tied into debates on the treatment of intellectual property rights under 
the MAI – a jealously guarded domain of Member State competence at this time – it was 
impossible for the Commission to coordinate Member States and define a common strategy 
in this field (Dymond, 1999, p. 35; Graham, 2000, pp. 31–32; Interview, Brussels, 18 
January 2012) 
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Finally, in summer 1996, the so-called extraterritoriality issue became a major dispute 
among the negotiating parties and overshadowed the entire MAI negotiations. The 
Commission and the EU Member States showed great unity in their rejection of the US 
demand to accommodate the Helms-Burton Act (July 1996) and the Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act (June 1996) under the MAI. Most third countries supported the EU position. The Helms-
Burton Act, inter alia, enabled US nationals to bring claims before US courts against foreign 
companies allegedly trafficking in assets expropriated by the Cuban government. The act 
was particularly controversial as it even enabled persons who had not been US nationals at 
the time of expropriation to bring claims. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, on the other hand, 
foresaw the imposition of sanctions on foreign firms which invested or traded in oil and gas 
with Iran or Libya. Most legal experts and negotiating parties agreed that both acts were not 
in conformity and even contradicted core principles of public international law, international 
investment law and the key principles of the MAI. The US assertion of, de facto, exporting 
its legislation to third countries thus caused a severe row between the EU Member States, the 
Commission and the US delegation. The Commission – in the name of the Member States 
and the EU – even warned the US delegation that it would file a claim against the Helms-
Burton Act at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body as the measure violated the US obligations 
under the WTO Agreement. The Commission ultimately desisted from this step, when the 
US government showed its willingness to limit the applicability of both acts against 
investors and firms from the MAI negotiating parties (Dymond, 1999, pp. 37–38; Graham, 
2000, pp. 28–31; Muchlinski, 2000, p. 1047). 
 
The MAI negotiations run into stalemate: In early 1997, technical and political 
disagreements had become very numerous. Observers agreed that the MAI negotiations had 
run into serious problems despite the alleged like-mindedness of the negotiating parties. The 
chairman of the Negotiating Group declared in March 1997 that it was impossible to bring 
the negotiations to a successful end by May 1997 as stipulated by the negotiating mandate. 
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He advised the negotiating parties to extend the deadline of the MAI negotiations for another 
year so as to settle the many disagreements (Dymond, 1999, p. 30). The OECD Council of 
Ministers of May 1997 followed the chairman’s advice. The hope that the extension of the 
negotiating deadline would help to overcome disagreement was soon frustrated. The 
Negotiating Group showed unable to broker compromises in the following months. During 
summer and autumn 1997, the question of up-front liberalisation crystallised as the main 
stumbling block of the MAI negotiations with no agreement between the US and the EU in 
sight (Dymond, 1999, p. 30).  
 
The inability of the Negotiating Group to advance the negotiations at this stage was arguably 
due to the very nature of the MAI negotiations. The MAI negotiations had been conceived 
and carried out at the bureaucratic level without significant involvement of heads of 
governments or ministers. With regard to the US, it is known that Congress never discussed 
the MAI project before the actual collapse of the negotiations. Also, President Bill Clinton 
reportedly never looked into the MAI project despite it being a US-led initiative. Politicians 
from the EU Member States were not involved or interested in the project. The only notable 
exception was the Commissioner for Trade, Leon Brittan. Commissioner Brittan however 
was publically in favour of holding multilateral negotiations on investment disciplines in the 
WTO rather than in the OECD. The absence of political decision-makers from the 
negotiating process was probably fatal to the MAI negotiations at this stage. Many of the 
substantive disagreements were too sensitive for bureaucrats to decide. Hence, the MAI 
negotiations slowly ran into stalemate in the second half of 1997 (Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 
172–173). 
 
6.2.3 Non-Governmental Organisations and the anti-MAI campaign 
NGOs are not of direct relevance to the topic of the study. The NGO community 
nevertheless claims – rightly or wrongly – to have played a decisive role in the collapse of 
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the MAI negotiations. Hence, the involvement of NGOs in the MAI negotiations should be 
mentioned at least briefly here so as to provide a comprehensive picture of the negotiating 
process.  
 
In May 1997 – shortly after the decision of the Council of Ministers of the OECD to extend 
the deadline of the negotiations – a draft text of the MAI was leaked and widely circulated 
among NGOs in OECD countries. Most NGOs reacted with outrage. They criticised the fact 
that the MAI negotiations had been conducted in complete secrecy without democratic 
scrutiny and that the agreement would significantly circumscribe the regulatory space of the 
parties. The MAI was depicted as a treaty dictated by multilateral corporations to the 
detriment of the contracting states and their citizens (Tieleman, 2000, p. 11). The NGO 
community started an internationally coordinated campaign against the MAI in spring 1997. 
The campaign sought to explain the content and potential implications to politicians and 
citizens. In consequence, several trade unions became aware of the issue and pressed their 
governments to include clauses to ensure the non-lowering of social, labour, health and 
environmental standards (Dymond, 1999, p. 30). The USA, France and the United Kingdom 
showed themselves to be sympathetic to these demands, while more orthodox countries like 
Germany or the Netherlands were only ready to accept preambular language on this point 
(De Jonquières, 1998a). Due to the NGO campaign, the general public – in particular in 
France – developed a strong interest in the negotiations. Demonstrations were held outside 
the premises of the OECD in Paris. And the MAI negotiations even became a hotly debated 
topic among cineastes at the Cannes Film Festival of 1998 (Interview, Paris, 1 October 
2012a). The OECD Secretariat was caught off guard by these developments. In an apparent 
reaction of panic, it published the draft text of the MAI in spring 1997 and invited the NGO 
community to consultation meetings (Tieleman, 2000, pp. 12, 15–16). The NGO community 
saw these measures as hypocritical and laconically reiterated its demand to abandon the MAI 
project (Graham, 2000, pp. 47–48). 
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As the opposition from NGOs grew ever stronger during 1997, a well-known structural 
problem of the MAI negotiations came to bear down on them even more strongly. Business 
stood to be the beneficiary of the MAI project, but hardly spoke up for the MAI project. 
American business had lost interest in the project when it had become clear that the MAI 
would not deliver liberalisation commitments beyond existing GATS and OECD 
commitments. European business, on the other hand, had always shown rather lukewarm 
support. And its interest in the project further diminished when it became apparent that the 
MAI would include special clauses regarding social, health and environmental standards. 
European business felt that the MAI would set a lower level of investment protection and 
post-establishment treatment than normally afforded under Member State BITs. It again 
became evident that the MAI negotiations were mostly a government-driven rather than a 
business-driven initiative. The lack of business support for the MAI weakened the 
argumentative position of policy-makers in public debates (Graham, 2000, p. 49; Lawrence 
et al., 2006, pp. 171–172; Woolcock, 2003, p. 251).  
 
6.2.4 The collapse of the MAI negotiations – A tale of competence struggles and 
institutional rivalries  
In May 1997, the OECD Council of Ministers had extended the deadline for the conclusion 
of the MAI negotiations for another year in the hope of finally resolving the many 
substantive disagreements, which had surfaced during the first two years. Instead, the 
disagreements further crystallised and the NGO campaign further complicated the 
negotiations. As the year 1997 elapsed, it became evident that the Negotiating Group would 
not conclude the technical work on the MAI within the extended deadline. The Negotiating 
Group announced it would be seeking a political settlement over the remaining controversies 
until April 1998. The political settlement should comprise the broad structures and key 
components of the MAI. The details and technical drafting of the agreement should then be 
completed after April/May 1998 (Dymond, 1999, pp. 30–32). 
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In January 1998, the USA, however, explained that the remaining time was insufficient for 
reaching a political settlement on the many outstanding issues. The Member States and the 
Commission rejected the US view. It was clear to most delegations that the US government 
adopted this new position because it had not been able to renew its fast track authority from 
Congress for the MAI negotiations. Due to the mounting anti-MAI campaign in the US and 
upcoming midterm elections, the US government was not keen on making a fresh attempt in 
the near future. The US government did not want domestic debates on its trade policy 
strategy at this point in time and hence had no intention to either conclude or discontinue the 
MAI negotiations. The main demandeur thus de facto withdrew from the MAI negotiations 
for the foreseeable future (Dymond, 1999, p. 31; Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 172–173).  
 
The Europeans collectively underlined their continuing commitment to a quick conclusion of 
the MAI negotiations in March 1998. The Commission tabled a communication demanding 
the Council of Ministers to adopt a unified position and cohesive negotiating strategy so as 
to bring the MAI talks to a swift and successful end against all odds. The Commission called 
in particular for a common approach regarding the applicability of the agreement to sub-
national entities, a general limitation of the number of reservations, the controversy over 
extraterritorial enforcement of national legislation, and related the definition of national 
security. The EU and the Member States disagreed on all of these points with the US, which 
implicitly suggests that the Commission called for a cohesive stance of the EU vis-à-vis the 
US (Agence Europe, 1997d). The Council of Ministers acknowledged the Commission’s 
communication and enumerated its proper objectives for the remaining month of 
negotiations. The Council reply indicated that the MAI should be applicable to sub-national 
entities, should contain a REIO clause, conform with WTO law, contain the exterritorial 
applicability of national law and should not contain liberalisation obligations exceeding 
GATS commitments. The Council reply, moreover, indicated that France insisted on a 
cultural exception clause, while other Member States were hesitant (Agence Europe, 1997c). 
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European business also called one last time for a swift conclusion of the talks. UNICE 
stressed that the failure to conclude the MAI negotiations in May 1998 would be particularly 
detrimental for European Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), which relied much 
more on transparent and predictable investment conditions than big multinational companies. 
It stressed, moreover, that OECD and WTO negotiations on investment disciplines should 
not exclude each other (Agence Europe, 1998b). 
 
The Negotiating Group continued its frequent meetings until April 1998 without, however, 
engaging in serious negotiations. With the USA de facto withdrawn from the process, it was 
impossible to resolve any outstanding issues. In April 1998, the French government 
demanded a formal suspension of the MAI negotiations. The underlying assumption was that 
any negotiating efforts would be in vain until the midterm elections in the US were over and 
the US government could seek fast-track authority (De Jonquières and Kuper, 1998). The US 
and Canada were sympathetic to the French proposal. Most other negotiating parties rejected 
it, as they feared that a formal suspension would practically kill off the MAI negotiations. 
The OECD Council of Ministers thus extended the mandate of the MAI negotiations without 
setting a new deadline and arranged for the next meeting of the Negotiating Group on 20 
October 1998. The negotiating parties should use the pause in the talks to better 
communicate the advantages of the MAI to their constituencies. Most observers and media 
interpreted this outcome of the meeting of the OECD Council of Ministers, nevertheless, as 
the de facto break down of the MAI negotiations (Denny, 1998; Financial Times, 1998; 
Turner, 1998). And indeed when the 20 October 1998 came, it had become impossible to 
continue with the MAI negotiations. France had declared its withdrawal from the MAI 
negotiation on 14 October 1998 (Marchand, 1998). As France was one of the biggest OECD 
economies and a major hub for foreign investment, the decision seriously undermined the 
MAI project. Moreover, the French withdrawal cast doubts on the EU’s legal ability, and the 
validity of the Commission’s mandate, to further pursue the MAI negotiations (Chatignoux, 
1998; Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 174–175). 
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What caused these developments of autumn 1998? It is often assumed that the NGO 
campaign was the straw that broke the camel’s back and triggered the collapse of the MAI 
negotiations. All interviewed negotiators nevertheless rejected this view. They explained that 
the substantive disagreement among the parties were the underlying reason for the 
breakdown of the MAI negotiations. They elaborated that rather competence struggles and 
institutional rivalries between the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
and the US State Department and, to a lesser degree, between the Commission and the 
Member States were the catalyst triggering the breakdown of the MAI negotiations. Some 
interviewees even suggested that the USTR and the Commission deliberately obstructed the 
MAI negotiations during the third year in order to end the negotiations in the OECD and 
push investment negotiations into other negotiating fora, like FTAs or the WTO. 
 
The USTR backstabs the MAI project of the State Department: The US delegation 
comprised officials from the State Department, the Treasury and the USTR. The State 
Department was traditionally in the lead in OECD negotiations and the main driver of the 
MAI project. The Treasury took part in the talks due to their potential bearing on the 
American financial sector and primarily sought to prevent any liberalisation of market access 
for financial services. The USTR participated as it was normally in charge of international 
investment negotiations and trade policy. Institutional rivalries and competence struggles 
developed early between the State Department and the USTR (Interview, Paris, 1 October 
2012a). The USTR did not hide that it considered the MAI project to be an inappropriate 
interference of the State Department in its policy domain. Moreover, the USTR made known 
that it considered the MAI negotiations a futile project. After the failure to establish 
ambitious investment disciplines in the Uruguay Round, the USTR was convinced that the 
time was not ripe for multilateral negotiations on them. When the first disagreements started 
slowing down the MAI negotiations in the first year, the USTR took it as a confirmation of 
its view. The USTR decided to scale down its involvement in the daily negotiating process. 
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Its officials no longer regularly participated in the meetings of the Negotiating Group, or of 
the expert and drafting group. Instead of focusing on the MAI negotiations, the USTR 
henceforth stepped up its efforts to conclude bilateral trade and investment agreements with 
third countries. While the behaviour of the USTR illustrated already its tense relations with 
the State Department, it did not directly threaten the continuation of the MAI project (De 
Jonquières, 1998b;  Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012a; Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012b).! 
 
The institutional rivalries became critical in autumn 1998. The State Department still held on 
to its plan to conclude the MAI negotiations once the US midterm elections were over. The 
USTR, on the other hand, considered the MAI project as, de facto, failed (De Jonquières, 
1998b). At the same time, debates in France took a critical turn. Trade unions, cultural 
industries, artists and NGOs drew a lot of attention to the MAI project. Anti-MAI 
demonstrations were held in the streets of Paris and media coverage was intense. The MAI 
was depicted in the public debate as the surrender of the state and its citizens to the dictate of 
multinational corporations and their profit-making interests. What is more, some parts of 
French business, like the film industry and audiovisual companies, demanded the French 
government to withdraw from the MAI negotiations. Other parts of the French business 
community were not interested in the negotiating process and public debates as the MAI did 
not promise significant benefits. Moreover, the Communists and the Greens – both part of 
the coalition government with the Socialists – gradually saw the MAI as an election topic. 
During 1998, politicians from both parties started criticising the MAI project and demanded 
– together with NGOs, trade unions, certain business groups and artists – the withdrawal of 
the country from the negotiations (Agence Europe, 1998c; Chatignoux, 1998).  
 
In 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the Socialist Party realised that they stood to lose 
a lot while winning almost nothing from further participating in the MAI negotiations. In the 
eyes of Jospin, the only serious risk of withdrawing from the MAI negotiations was a 
potential deterioration of French-American relations. In autumn 1998, Jospin therefore 
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commissioned his Minister of Economics, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, to discuss with US 
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky the possibility of France dropping out of the 
negotiations. Barshefsky, who was known to describe the draft MAI as a ‘lousy agreement’, 
reportedly signalled to Strauss-Kahn that a French withdrawal would not entail a 
deterioration of French-American relations and thereby clearly encouraged the French 
government to leave the negotiating table. A former MAI negotiator and official of the State 
Department commented that Barshefsky’s position had not been cleared with the State 
Department, which officially led the US delegation. The State Department perceived this as 
an act of betrayal, which contradicted the formal US position (Interview, Paris, 1 October 
2012a; Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012b).!  
 
On 14 October 1998 – one week before the resumption of the MAI talks – Jospin informed 
the Assemblée Nationale that France would withdraw from the MAI negotiations. Jospin 
stressed that French key demands were not met and that the current MAI draft was 
unacceptable. He added that the draft was no longer a suitable basis for the continuation of 
the talks. Jospin declared that instead his government would seek the opening of multilateral 
investment negotiations under the auspices of the WTO. In his view this was a more suitable 
forum for negotiations. Negotiations in the WTO would enable developing countries to 
participate delivering more balanced and equitable results (Chatignoux, 1998). France 
thereby became overnight the Commission’s strongest ally in the Council of Ministers in 
demanding the continuation of multilateral investment negations in the WTO. Jospin’s 
decision to withdraw from the MAI negotiations had not been coordinated with his coalition 
partners – the Communists and the Greens – or with other Member States and the 
Commission (Interview, telephone, 13 June 2013). Although all negotiating parties knew 
about the views and concerns of the French government, Jospin’s abrupt decision came as a 
surprise. Observers speculated that Jospin’s abrupt decision was intended to signal to the 
French public that he did not leave the negotiating table due to pressure from civil society. 
Rather it should look like a deliberate decision of a statesman, which nonetheless remained a 
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political concession to his coalition partners (Lawrence et al., 2006, p. 175; Interview, Paris, 
1 October 2012a). 
 
The Commission as a willing helper of the USTR? The negotiators interviewed for this 
thesis differed over the question of to what extent similar institutional rivalries within the 
European delegation contributed to these developments. Several interviewees underlined that 
the Commission had always remained loyal to the Member States and tried to play a 
constructive role in the MAI negotiations. They nevertheless cautioned that the 
Commission’s public insistence on shifting investment negotiations to the WTO was not 
helpful for advancing the stalling MAI negotiations (Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012a; 
Interview, Paris, 1 October 2012b; Interview, email, 13 January 2014). Other interviewees 
argued that toward the end of the negotiations the Commission and the USTR formed a 
peculiar alliance with the shared objective of obstructing the MAI negotiations and pushing 
investment negotiations back into the WTO, where they both held representation 
monopolies. To that end, the Commission and the USTR arguably reiterated demands which 
were very difficult for the other side to accommodate for constitutional reasons. While the 
Commission emphasised its demand that the USA accept the applicability of the MAI to sub-
national entities, the USTR vehemently rejected the proposed REIO clause. A Member State 
negotiator commented that the permanent confrontation between the Commission and the 
USTR on these issues was unnecessary from a substantive point of view and harmful to the 
overall negotiating dynamics. It amplified the atmosphere of stalemate, which ultimately 
became the pretext for the French withdrawal (Interview, telephone, 3 July 2013). While it is 
difficult to prove which evaluation of the Commission’s role is correct, it is certain that the 
Commission never undertook any actions to bring France back to the negotiating table and to 
re-establish European unity. Instead, the Commission made no secret of its relief and 
satisfaction that investment negotiations would now continue in the WTO. On 21 October 
1998, only one week after the French withdrawal, Commissioner Brittan explained his 
position on that matter to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.  
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“Let me… give you my own views on the issue. It seems to me that we have made strong 
efforts to achieve the kind of transparent framework within the OECD which would benefit 
both the EU economies and those of other MAI participants. The MAI negotiations have 
already done much to clear the ground on investment and to highlight those issues which are 
of key importance to the EU, including civil society. Nonetheless, I have always taken the 
view that the WTO is the best long-term home for this work for which the MAI has already 
provided valuable signposts. In present circumstances the chances of bringing the current 
MAI negotiations to a successful conclusion frankly do not look at all promising.”  
(Brittan, 1998) 
 
The Negotiating Group met several times after the French withdrawal. It did not, however, 
formally continue negotiations on the MAI. It merely consulted on the prospects of 
successfully concluding the negotiations despite the withdrawal of France. Even though 
many delegates publically downplayed the impact of France’s decision, most were aware 
that it was too late to save the MAI negotiations. Without France, the EU was unable to 
negotiate. Without the EU, the MAI project had become useless. On 30 October 1998, the 
British government informed the public that it was following the French example and would 
leave the negotiating table (Denny and Atkinson, 1998). On 3 December 1998, the 
Negotiating Group announced that negotiations on the MAI were no longer taking place. The 
MAI negotiations had collapsed (Lawrence et al., 2006, pp. 174–175).  
 
Summary: The Commission ensured the EU’s involvement in the MAI negotiations by 
invoking fringe and implied competences vis-à-vis sceptical Member States. It managed to 
prove itself as a capable, resourceful negotiator and sought to promote European unity. The 
Commission, nevertheless, preferred holding multilateral investment negotiations in the 
WTO, where it traditionally acts as the EU’s sole voice and does not need to negotiate 
alongside the Member State delegation. It used its agenda setting powers and mobilised third 
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countries to build EU-internal and international support for shifting multilateral investment 
negotiations back to the WTO as part of the Singapore Issues. European business showed 
only moderate support for this bureaucracy-driven project. It did not expect the MAI 
negotiations to deliver significant economic benefits. The Member States, finally, were more 
interested in the MAI project, but sought to keep the Commission and the EU at bay. Under 
the impression of teh Maastricht IGC and Opinion 1/94 (see chapter VIII), national 
investment policy officials worried about the implications of cooperation and delegation in 
the MAI for their competences and were not expecting to reap a better deal if speaking with 
a single voice. So when the MAI negotiations ran into stalemate in late 1997, the 
Commission did not seek to prevent a collapse but adopted a welcoming attitude. Some 
sources even argue that the Commission ‘engineered’ the collapse so as to shift multilateral 
investment negotiations back to the WTO, where customarily acted as single voice. These 
observations support supranational thinking and hypothesis H1 but go against 
intergovernmentalism and hypothesis H2. European cooperation in this investment policy-
making forum was clearly due to the Commission’s resourceful strategizing rather than 
business or Member State preferences.    
 
6.3 The negotiations on the Singapore Issues  
Despite the collapse of the MAI negotiations, the project to establish multilateral investment 
disciplines was not off the table. The immediate reaction of NGOs reflected this fact. In the 
days following the breakdown of the MAI negotiations, more than 300 NGOs published a 
joint letter “A call to reject any proposal for moving MAI or an investment agreement to the 
WTO” (Lawrence et al., 2006, p. 175). The reaction of the NGOs was understandable. As 
mentioned above, France and the Commission called for negotiations on investment 
disciplines in the WTO. And the EU and the USA had agreed in a gentlemen’s agreement in 
1996 that work in the WTO on a binding multilateral investment framework should be 
pending as long as the MAI negotiations were running. From a European – and notably from 
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the Commission’s – perspective, the collapse of the MAI negotiations finally opened the 
door for the launching of veritable investment negotiations in the WTO.   
 
The WTO in the starting blocks: The WTO was already in the starting blocks for taking 
over from the OECD. On the initiative of the EU – or rather of the Commission – and 
Canada, South Korea and Japan, the Singapore ministerial meeting of December 1996 had 
established a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment. The 
working group started meeting in May 1997. Most delegations stressed that the mandate of 
the working group was primarily of an educational nature. In other words, the working group 
should analyse ties between investment and trade, but not engage in preliminary informal 
negotiations on multilateral investment disciplines. During the year 1997, discussions and 
countries’ submissions to the working group evolved around the economic impact of 
investment on home and host economies as well as on trade flows. In spring 1998, the 
working group started discussing the similarities and differences in countries’ international 
investment policy approaches. Throughout the years 1998 and 1999, discussions in the 
working group became more lively, and technical as well as political. Delegates discussed, 
inter alia, the actual need for a multilateral investment framework, and the potential scope 
and definitions of such a framework as well as the cast of a dispute settlement mechanism 
(See document series “WT/WGTI/W/…” at https://docs.wto.org/; WTO, 2002b; Interview, 
Brussels, 24 July 2012a; Interview, telephone, 13 June 2013). The consultations were 
evolving into pre-negotiations on a multilateral investment framework and the collapse of 
the MAI reinforced this trend.  
 
The Member States immediately agree on the Commission as their single voice: The 
EU’s representation modalities in the working group on investment in the WTO were never 
the subject of serious debate in the Council of Ministers. All Member States tacitly agreed 
that the Commission – and more specifically the Directorate General (DG) for Trade – were 
in charge of representing European interests in the WTO inline with the ever-evolving 
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international trade agenda. As one interviewed official put it, DG Trade was then still a 
machinery with the sole purpose of dealing with all WTO agenda items (Interview, Brussels, 
24 July 2012a). The EU-internal distribution of competences was of little importance in the 
WTO context. The Commission was, from the outset of the debates on investment in the 
WTO, the unchallenged sole representative of the EU and its Member States and possessed 
significant authority and influence; notably in comparison to the OECD-based MAI 
negotiations. The interesting twist to this observation is obviously that the Commission was 
central to setting investment disciplines back onto the WTO agenda in 1996. As discussed 
above, the Commission first sought to contain the MAI negotiations, then pushed investment 
disciplines back onto the WTO agenda and arguably played a more or less active role in the 
breakdown of the MAI negotiations. The Commission shaped the international trade agenda, 
which then shaped the EU’s de facto competences. From this angle, the launch of investment 
negotiations in the WTO constitutes an impressive instance of Commission entrepreneurship 
to the end of, inter alia, consolidating the EU’s de facto competences in international 
investment policy.  
 
Cooperation between the Commission and the Member States in the ‘113 Committee’ and 
on-site in Geneva took place in a productive and friendly atmosphere, unlike in the MAI 
negotiations. The ‘usual suspects’ of national and European trade policy officials dealing 
with WTO affairs – not investment policy officials as during the MAI talks – coordinated 
and determined the EU’s approach in investment negotiations. Most Member States adopted 
a welcoming attitude toward investment talks in the WTO. France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany were particularly interested. As expounded above, the French government assumed 
that its interests were better served in the WTO, where negotiations necessarily aimed for 
lower standards and liberalisation commitments. The British government was particularly 
interested in unlocking the financial service sectors of other WTO members. Germany, 
finally, hoped for enhanced investment protection throughout the WTO. Cooperation 
between the Commission and the Member States, and thus European unity, was moreover 
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relatively easy to sustain as many potentially controversial issues were off the table in the 
WTO due to the more modest objectives and scope of investment talks in the WTO in 
comparison to the MAI negotiations (Interview, telephone, 13 June 2013).  
 
The Commission as motor of investment negotiations in the WTO: The general 
convergence of minds enabled the Commission to play a proactive and central role in the 
working group meetings. The Commission reportedly acted as the main driver of discussions 
in the working group. Several observations support this conclusion. On the one hand, the 
Commission was the first party to table a comprehensive working paper and proposal for a 
working agenda (WTO, 1997). The Commission thereby influenced the initial discussions 
and broad direction of deliberations in the working group. On the other hand, the EU tabled a 
high number of working papers. While the Commission submitted 18 papers to the working 
group between 1996 and 2003 on behalf of the EU and its Member States, the US delegation 
merely tabled 6 working papers (see Table 6.1). So whereas the US delegation had often 
taken the lead and decisively shaped negotiations on investment disciplines during the 
Uruguay Round and MAI talks, the US delegation was relatively passive in the working 
group in comparison to the EU (Woolcock, 2003, p. 251). 
 
Table 6.1: Number of meetings and submissions per year by country (selection)  
 Number of 
meetings 
EU Canada Japan South 
Korea 
USA 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 2 2 1 2 1 0 
1998 4 3 1 4 3 5 
1999 5 1 0 1 3 0 
2000 2 2 0 2 2 0 
2001 4 1 2 1 1 0 
2002 4 7 5 6 3 1 
2003 4 2 3 2 1 0 
Total 25 18 12 18 14 6 
Source: Author’s own calculations; http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm.  
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European business shows moderate support: European business was supportive, albeit not 
enthusiastic, of holding investment negotiations in the WTO. UNICE, as well as most 
national business and industry federations, expressed their support for the creation of 
investment rules in the WTO. The newly founded European Services Forum (ESF) 
encouraged European policy-makers to work toward a multilateral investment framework 
under the WTO (European Services Forum, 2003a, 2003b). International Financial Services 
(IFS), the association of English financial service providers, supported investment 
negotiations in the WTO. While being sympathetic to the idea of negotiating a 
comprehensive investment agreement with market access commitments, the main concerns 
of European business were post-establishment treatment and protection standards. It was 
unlikely that developing countries would sign up to ambitious liberalisation commitments 
going beyond the GATS. So as to create added value, investment negotiations should 
therefore focus in particular on post-establishment treatment and protection standards, which 
were not yet comprehensively covered by WTO law (British Parliament, 2004). 
 
In 1999, the developed countries sought to upgrade the consultations on various issues in the 
WTO to a veritable new trade round. The ministers of the WTO countries convened in 
Seattle. The Commission, together with Japan and South Korea, pushed hard for having the 
Singapore Issues, and thus investment, included in the agenda of the new round. The USA 
lent only lukewarm support, while developing countries were hesitant or rejected the 
Commission’s initiative on investment negotiations. The ministers could only agree on the 
formula that Singapore Issues and, notably, investment were important and that all countries 
should show flexibility in their positions on investment and the other Singapore Issues 
(WTO, 1999). The ministerial meeting failed to launch a new trade round due to opposition 
from major developing countries as well as hitherto unseen protests, and even riots, by 
radical social groups, NGOs and other parts of civil society. The failure to launch the new 
round was a serious blow to the WTO and developed countries. Observers questioned 
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whether the WTO – a relatively young organisation – could ever recover from the Seattle 
disaster (Schott, 2000). 
 
The ministers gathered again at Doha in 2001. The ministers this time succeeded in 
launching the so-called Doha Development Round. The inclusion of the Singapore Issues 
and, notably, investment negotiations on the agenda of the new round was one of the most 
controversial issues during the ministerial meeting. As before, the EU, Japan and South 
Korea were the key proponents of the Singapore Issues and investment negotiations, while 
developing countries, under the leadership of India, sought to prevent the inclusion of the 
Singapore Issues on the agenda of the new round. They argued that the working group on 
trade and investment had been commissioned to study the interrelationship between trade 
and investment, which arguably had not yet been finished. Moreover, they questioned the 
ability of developing countries to negotiate and domestically implement complex 
competition, trade facilitation, public procurement and investment disciplines. The 
proponents of the Singapore Issues, on the other hand, pointed to the central importance of 
these issues for the world economy (Kumar, 2003, p. 3178). At the end of the Doha meeting, 
a hard-fought compromise emerged on the Singapore Issues and notably investment. For a 
start, the Singapore Issues should remain on the negotiating agenda of the new round. Hence, 
the working group on trade and investment continued to exist. Its main objective should be 
to elaborate the modalities of investment negotiations i.e. to delimit in detail the main 
elements and objectives of investment negotiations. The WTO ministers should then 
explicitly endorse the modalities for investment negotiations at the occasion of the next 
ministerial meeting in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003 (WTO, 2001).  
 
The Member States criticise the Commission’s obsession with investment: In September 
2003, the ministers re-convened in Cancún to discuss the results of two years of negotiating 
and to eventually endorse the modalities for negotiations on investment disciplines. The EU 
remained the major proponent of negotiations on investment disciplines and the Singapore 
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Issues, whereas many developing and least developed countries became increasingly 
assertive in their rejection of negotiations on investment and the other Singapore Issues 
(Lamy, 2003). What is more, the Member States of the EU supported investment 
negotiations, but attached only low priority to them in comparison to other issues. In EU-
internal discussions, many Member States increasingly criticised the Commission’s 
insistence on the Singapore Issues and investment. The Commission’s insistence arguably 
alienated and antagonised many developing countries, which made compromises on more 
important issues like agriculture or non-agricultural market access more difficult (De 
Jonquières, 2003a). After the collapse of investment negotiations in Cancún, a Member State 
official stated: 
 
“The Commission should have backed off much earlier… Instead of trying pig-headedly to 
impose the Singapore issues on other WTO members, it should have been asking what 
concessions the EU was ready to make to get its demands accepted.” 
(as cited in De Jonquières, 2003a) 
 
Opposition to the Commission’s arguably inflexible negotiating strategy also grew within 
the Member States. The development committee of the British House of Commons, for 
instance, criticised the EU/Commission for their insistence on investment negotiations. It 
demanded the British government to stop strongly supporting the Commission in its efforts 
and to take development objectives more into account. The parliamentarians argued that 
investment disciplines harmed the ability of developing countries to develop and catch up 
(De Jonquières, 2003b). And as it became increasingly unlikely that investment negotiations 
would deliver market access, high post-establishment or protection standards, support from 
European business also shrank (De Jonquières, 2003a). The Doha negotiating mandate for 
the investment working group made it clear that the Doha Development Round could only 
deliver humble investment disciplines if at all, which hampered business interest in the 
Commission-led initiative. At the end of the ministerial meeting, the Commission took 
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internal and external pressures into account. It suddenly gave in and proposed dropping the 
most controversial Singapore Issues – investment and competition – from the round. The 
Commission instead proposed pursuing negotiations on investment and competition 
disciplines on a plurilateral basis outside the round’s single undertaking (European Voice, 
2003). South Korea and Japan, which so far had been the Commission’s allies in this 
domain, had not been consulted on this decision. Taken aback, they refused to follow suit 
and forged a compromise with the developing countries. In consequence, the developing 
countries refused to re-confirm the negotiating mandate for the Singapore Issues, which 
entailed the discontinuation of talks on investment disciplines in the WTO. When the 
Cancún meeting drew to an end, many observers asked whether the Doha Round had, de 
facto, collapsed due to the many controversies and deadlocks on the Singapore Issues, 
agriculture, textiles and non-agricultural market access (De Jonquières, 2003a). 
 
Summary: The EU held markedly increased de facto competences in investment 
negotiations in the WTO in comparison to the MAI negotiations. European business showed 
moderate interest in the investment negotiations at the WTO. The Member States, 
nevertheless, happily cooperated and delegated negotiating on investment to the 
Commission. National investment policy officials had not doubt that it was in the national 
interest to speak with a single voice on all agenda items of the Doha Round including 
investment. Also it was customs that the Commission acted as single voice in the WTO. The 
sudden readiness of the Member States to cooperate thus did not reflect business demands, 
but rather the international negotiating context. As shown above, the Commission had gone 
to great lengths to put investment on the work agenda of the WTO in 1996 and played a 
central role in upgrading the WTO work on investment to proper negotiations. In other 
words, the EU’s increased de facto competences in the Doha Round reflect the Commission 
agenda setting powers and strategic use of international negotiating fora to consolidate the 
EU’s role in international investment policy. These observations again lend support to 
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supranational thinking and hypothesis H1, but contradict partly liberal intergovernmentalism 
and hypothesis H2. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The chapter traced the EU’s involvement in investment negotiations on the MAI in the 
OECD (1995-1998) and in the WTO as part of the so-called Singapore Issues (1996-2003). 
It examined whether supranational thinking and hypothesis H1 or rather liberal 
intergovernmentalism and hypothesis H2 explain the EU’s role in the investment negotiations 
on the MAI and Singapore Issues.  
 
The chapter clearly lends support to supranational thinking and hypothesis H2. The 
Commission acted as policy entrepreneur to consolidate the EU’s role in international 
investment policy. It primarily drew on its agenda setting powers, invoked fringe 
competences and strategically used international negotiating fora to increase the EU’s de 
fatco competences in the examined policy-making instances. Most notably, it pushed 
multilateral investment negotiations out of the OECD into the WTO in order to consolidate 
the EU’s role in international investment policy.   
 
The chapter lends little support to hypothesis H2. European business was only moderately 
interested in the MAI and WTO negotiations. It expected little economic benefits from the 
MAI and was similarly sceptical of the outcomes of the still on-going Doha Round. Hence, 
business lobbying can hardly explain the EU’s central role in these negotiations or Member 
States preferences. In comparison to business and the Commission, the Member States 
showed sincere interest in the MAI project – inter alia because they could negotiate on their 
own behalf in the OECD. They saw no functional need to closely cooperate and moreover 
worried about the Commission’s continuous attempts to extend its de facto and legal 
competences. Hence, they sought to contain the Commission’s roe in the MAI negotiations. 
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As customary, the Member States were, however, ready to cooperate and to delegate 
negotiating to the Commission in the WTO. While this arguably reflected power-maximising 
behaviour and their attempt to reach for the best possible deal in this forum, the continuation 
of multilateral investment negotiations in the WTO was arguably a conscious strategy of the 
Commission to increase the Member States’ readiness to cooperate and to delegate in 
international investment policy-making. Hence, the Member States’ readiness to cooperate in 
this forum primarily reflected Commission entrepreneurship.  
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Chapter VII – Investment disciplines in European Free 
Trade Agreements  
 
 
 
This chapter shifts the analytical focus away from multilateral to bilateral negotiations 
between the EU and third countries on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The chapter 
examines the question of why the Member States started cooperating and empowered the 
Commission to negotiate on investment disciplines in FTA talks since the late 1990s. It 
analyses for this purpose the first FTA negotiations between the EU and third countries to 
cover investment liberalisation commitments and post-establishment provisions32  – the 
negotiations on the EU-Mexico FTA (1996-1999) and EU-Chile FTA (2000-2002) 
(Ceyssens, 2005, p. 266). The comparison between these two negotiations is, moreover, 
particularly interesting due to their differential outcomes. Both FTAs would initially 
encompass ambitious investment provisions, but while the Member States vetoed such 
provisions in the EU-Mexico negotiations in a last minute revolt, they accepted their 
inclusion in the EU-Chile negotiations. All following FTA negotiations encompassed similar 
investment disciplines.  
 
The chapter seeks to evaluate whether intergovernmental thinking and hypothesis H2 or 
rather supranational thinking and hypothesis H1 better account for Member State cooperation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The chapter disregards accession, association and partnership and cooperation agreements. 
Accession agreements typically contain very comprehensive investment provisions. Nevertheless, 
they cannot be considered as part of the EU’s foreign economic policy strategy. They seek to fully 
integrate third countries into the legal and economic regime of the EU. Early association as well as 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements – such as with the former Soviet Republics or 
Mediterranean countries concluded in the 1990s – are of economic and geopolitical nature alike. 
These agreements contain very shallow provisions indirectly touching on investment activities (e.g. 
liberalisation of current or capital accounts), which albeit cannot be considered as a manifestation of a 
proper EU international investment policy.  
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and delegation in investment-related FTA negotiations. While the observations from this 
chapter again primarily lend support to supranational thinking and hypothesis H1, they draw 
a more nuanced picture than previous chapters. It finds that European business, most 
Member States and the Commission indeed supported the idea to include investment 
provisions into FTAs with Mexico and Chile to stop the erosion of the EU’s competitiveness 
on these markets due to existing or planned US FTAs. The Commission thus reached for 
ambitious services and investment disciplines in the negotiations with Mexico. Yet, some 
Member States had second thoughts toward the end of the negotiations and suddenly argued 
that the Commission had overstepped its mandate and vetoed the inclusion of ambitious 
services and investment provisions in order to protect their competences against European 
encroachment. The Commission consequently adopted a more cautious approach in the 
negotiations with Chile. It used its agenda-setting powers to convince the Member States of 
the functional benefits of including ambitious services and investment chapters in the FTA 
with Chile. It, moreover, referred to the EU’s international credibility as driver of investment 
negotiations in the WTO (see chapter VI) to pressure the Member States into accepting such 
chapters. Taking into consideration that the Commission had previously spared no efforts to 
put investment back on the WTO agenda (see chapter VI), an intriguing instance of 
Commission entrepreneurship emerges. The Commission exploited and shaped the 
international trade agenda thereby successfully consolidating the EU’s role in international 
investment policy. The EU-Chile FTA was the first FTA to contain a proper investment 
chapter encompassing commitments for services and non-services sectors. It set a new 
precedent as all following FTAs contain similar provisions.  
 
7.1 A theoretical note on agenda-setting in bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations  
Multilateral and bilateral negotiations differ in important regards. Multilateral negotiations 
involve a high number of states. Hence, agenda-setting is a complex exercise, which requires 
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finely tuned compromises among all involved states. No single country can impose its ideal 
agenda and objectives. The previously discussed breakdown of negotiations on the so-called 
Singapore Issues in the WTO is a case in point. The EU and other developed countries were 
eager to establish multilateral rules for these issues. A sizeable group of developing countries 
opposed negotiations on these issues and ultimately succeeded.  
 
Bilateral negotiations comprise only two parties. The two involved countries often differ in 
their political and economic power. Hence, bilateral negotiations are often characterised by a 
significant degree of asymmetry, which shapes the negotiating agenda. Powerful countries 
insist on negotiating on certain issues, whereas weak countries find it difficult to resist such 
pressure. Weak or small countries often act as demandeur in international economic 
negotiations, and seek access to a larger market. Hence, agenda-setting is often manifestly 
biased in bilateral negotiations and reflects the preferences of the more powerful country.  
 
The EU is no international power in the classic sense. It wields little influence in geopolitics. 
The EU is nevertheless a major power in the international political economy. The size and 
potency of the Single Market provide the EU with considerable bargaining power and 
influence in international economic affairs. The EU is normally the bigger and more 
powerful negotiating party in bilateral negotiations. The involved third country, on the other 
hand, typically acts as demandeur for enhanced market access to the EU’s Single Market. It 
follows that the EU should hold considerable sway over the agenda of bilateral negotiations. 
So if FTA negotiations between the EU and third countries encompass investment 
disciplines, it is reasonable to assume that it reflects to a large extent EU-internal 
considerations rather than the demands of third countries.  
 
This train of thought is important for the thesis. It clarifies that the examination of the 
negotiations on the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTA should shed additional light on EU-
internal factors promoting the EU’s growing role in international investment policy. In 
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theoretical terms, the chapter puts the spotlight on the EU-internal factors driving the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy.  
 
7.2 Investment disciplines in the negotiations on the EU-Mexico FTA  
Debates on an FTA between the EU and Mexico can be traced back to the early 1990s. In 
1991, the EU and Mexico institutionalised their relationship through a first cooperation 
agreement. The agreement should support the democratic and economic reform processes in 
Mexico. It was, however, of symbolic nature. It established general structures for political 
and economic relations between the EU and Mexico, but did not contain noteworthy 
provisions on bilateral trade and investment liberalisation. The shallowness of the 
agreement, notably in regard to bilateral trade and investment relations, reflected a lack of 
European interest. The Mexican government had proposed negotiating a veritable FTA in 
parallel with the political cooperation agreement, but European policy-makers were 
preoccupied with finalising the Single Market, the Uruguay Round and also had to cope with 
the geopolitical turmoil in Eastern Europe (Manger, 2009, p. 106). 
 
7.2.1 The pre-negotiations on the EU-Mexico FTA  
The entry into force of NAFTA between the USA, Canada and Mexico in 1994 
fundamentally changed the situation. For the purpose of this thesis, three effects of NAFTA 
are particularly noteworthy. First and foremost, NAFTA cut or completely abolished tariffs 
for US and Canadian imports to Mexico, making equivalent European imports less attractive 
to consumers. Mexican consumers started switching away from European imports, entailing 
falling market shares for European firms in Mexico. Mexico reinforced this trend by 
increasing tariffs for non-NAFTA members in 1995 and 1999 (Dür, 2007, p. 838). Second, 
under NAFTA Mexico transformed into an ideal entry point, investment and low-cost 
production hub for the US market. Products and services from Mexico benefited from 
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preferential access to the US market (Manger, 2009, p. 97). Third, NAFTA was the first FTA 
to cover ambitious investment liberalisation commitments. These made it particularly easy 
for Canadian and US investors to establish and operate subsidiaries in Mexico. In turn, this 
implies that the relative ease and costs of investing in Mexico deteriorated for European 
firms. European firms incurred through NAFTA a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis US 
and Canadian investors, further eroding their competitive position in the Mexican and 
Northern American economy. 
 
NAFTA spurs business, Member State and Commission interest in an ambitious FTA: 
NAFTA spurred international regulatory and economic competition. This effect was not 
limited to the narrow scope of traditional FTAs. The highly comprehensive scope of NAFTA 
carried international regulatory and economic competition into new policy domains. NAFTA 
thereby extended the standard agenda of FTAs, inter alia, to investment regulation. It 
encouraged third countries to emulate the NAFTA approach and to conclude similarly 
comprehensive FTAs. This effect was indeed observable within the EU following the entry 
into force of NAFTA. In accordance with the intergovernmental hypothesis H1, European 
business started lobbying Member State policy-makers for the conclusion of a competitive 
FTA with Mexico comprising ambitious services and investment disciplines so as to re-
establish a level playing field. Many Member State policy-makers were receptive to such 
business demands, as they grew increasingly worried about the falling European market 
share in Mexico. At the same time, they understood the new interest in the Mexican 
economy as an entry point into the potent NAFTA market. In accordance with the 
supranational hypothesis H1, the Commission welcomed and sought to cultivate the interest 
of European business and the Member States in a competitive FTA with Mexico (Heydon 
and Woolcock, 2009, pp. 109–113, 156; Manger, 2009, pp. 106–118). 
 
Mexico welcomed the new attitude of European business and policy-makers. Mexico hoped 
that an FTA with the EU might help rebalance its current account, stabilise its currency, 
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promote its liberal economic reforms and reduce its dependence on the US economy. The 
Mexican government campaigned for an EU-Mexico FTA and sent several delegations to 
Brussels to advance discussions (Manger, 2009, pp. 96–97). In late 1994, the Commission 
and the Mexican government started preliminary consultations on an FTA.  
 
The Commission uses agenda setting and invokes the evolving trade agenda to push for 
comprehensive FTA talks: In the following months, the Commission constantly underlined 
that the FTA should be ambitious and indeed reach for NAFTA-parity and create a free trade 
area. European business active in Mexico expressed its support for such plans (Agence 
Europe, 1995b; Manger, 2009, pp. 106–107). The Member States welcomed the plan to 
negotiate an FTA. Several Member States, however, signalled that the establishment of a 
free trade area – i.e. the dismantling of all tariffs – would go too far. In February 1995, the 
Commission released a communiqué to the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament, which laid out its vision of the potential cast of a future EU-Mexico FTA. The 
Commission avoided using the term “free trade area” in its communiqué. It nonetheless 
underlined its intention to reach for an ambitious FTA, which would provide for NAFTA-
parity in trade in goods, trade in services, investments and capital movements. The 
Commission warned that a failure to conclude an agreement of NAFTA-parity would result 
in the erosion of EU-Mexico economic relations in the long run. While the proposed agenda 
of the FTA by far exceeded the normal scope of European FTAs and the Union’s 
competences under European law, the Council of Ministers nevertheless endorsed the 
communiqué on 11 April 1995 (Agence Europe, 1995b; Manger, 2009, pp. 106–107). The 
Council, moreover, called for a swift start of the negotiations with Mexico (Agence Europe, 
1995c). In May 1995, the Commission and Mexico signed a solemn declaration, which 
formally documented their intention to start negotiations on a new political and economic 
framework agreement (Manger, 2009, p. 106; Sanahuja, 2000, p. 48).  
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7.2.2 The Commission mandate 
The evolving international trade agenda and consequent systemic pressures shaped the EU-
internal debates on the Commission mandate for the upcoming EU-Mexico FTA. The 
Commission drew up a draft mandate for the so-called EU-Mexico Political Coordination 
and Cooperation Agreement during summer 1995. The agreement should encompass one 
chapter on political cooperation and another on economic cooperation. The economic 
chapter should, de facto, become the EU-Mexico FTA. The Commission used its first-mover 
advantage to put post-establishment treatment and investment liberalisation on the agenda of 
the FTA negotiations. The Commission even briefly toyed with the idea of aiming for the 
inclusion of investment protection provisions into the EU-Mexico FTA, but Germany, the 
Netherlands and, in particular, France signalled their opposition. Such provisions arguably 
interfered too much with their BIT programmes and encroached upon national competences 
(Interview, Brussels, 24 July 2012b). On 25 October 1995, the Commission released a press 
communication which underlined the ambitious and unseen agenda for the economic chapter 
i.e. FTA with Mexico.  
 
“Economic chapter: The Commission and Mexico will gradually establish a favourable 
framework for the development of trade in goods, services and investments, including 
through gradual and reciprocal liberalization, taking account of the sensitive nature of 
certain products and in accordance to the relevant WTO rules. The conclusion of the 
agreement will mark the beginning of a process which in the long-run will lead to the 
establishment of a favourable framework for the development of trade in goods, services and 
investments.” 
(As cited in Agence Europe, 1995d) 
 
The Member States endorse the Commission’s objective to reach for ambitious 
investment provisions: The Council of Ministers discussed the draft mandate in February 
1996. The substantive provisions regarding ‘new trade issues’ like investment, services and 
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capital movements proved to be rather uncontroversial according to press coverage, 
secondary literature and interviews. Given the new regulatory context in Mexico, most 
Member State governments considered it to be in their interest to reach for ambitious 
commitments in these domains. In the end, the mandate provided, nevertheless, for 
negotiations on the liberalisation of service-related investment, services trade and capital 
movements. It thus clearly exceeded the scope of Union competence and previous European 
FTAs or association agreements. The Member State governments, moreover, agreed with the 
implicit assumption of the draft mandate that the Commission would act as their single voice 
in the FTA negotiations across all agenda items regardless of the EU-internal distribution of 
competences. The Member State governments thought that the Commission was in charge of 
negotiating FTAs (Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013). 
 
But the Member States disagree over the timeline of the negotiations: But while the 
remarkably broad substantive agenda of the Commission’s draft mandate did not cause 
veritable frictions within the EU, the Member States were divided over the procedural 
provisions it contained. The Commission and Mexico had agreed that the political and 
economic chapters should be negotiated in parallel in one single phase. This so-called ‘single 
phase’ approach diverged from the EU’s standard ‘two phase’ approach. The EU normally 
first concludes a political cooperation agreement. Depending on the satisfactory 
implementation of this agreement, the EU then eventually concludes a FTA. In the case of 
Mexico, the Commission wanted to speed up the negotiations so as to mitigate the negative 
effects of NAFTA on European business and thus proposed a ‘single phase’ approach. 
Mexico, on the other hand, had insisted on a ‘single phase’ approach in order to make sure 
that any political concessions by Mexico would be balanced by economic and trade 
concessions by the EU (Manger, 2009, p. 107; Sanahuja, 2000, p. 48). 
 
Spain and the United Kingdom – and to a lesser extent Luxemburg, Sweden and Germany – 
supported the Commission’s plan to engage in swift ‘single phase’ negotiations. Of the EU’s 
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Member States, their national business communities had arguably the closest ties with the 
Mexican economy and thereby incurred the highest opportunity costs from NAFTA. In 
March 1996, Spain published a forceful memorandum in favour of the Commission’s 
proposal. It, inter alia, stressed the need for swift negotiations, the reduction of Mexican 
tariffs, investment liberalisation and better investment protection. The memorandum, inter 
alia, raised the problem that the rules of origins of NAFTA had reduced the profitability and 
value of European investments in Mexico (Sanahuja, 2000, p. 48). 
 
France – supported by Austria, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and others – rejected the 
proposed ‘single phase’ approach. They lamented that the effects of bilateral trade 
liberalisation had not been sufficiently studied yet. They demanded to slow down talks with 
Mexico and to return to the ‘two phases’ approach. France voiced the widely shared concern 
that Mexican agricultural produce could displace imports from African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP States) and European overseas territories. It warned that a EU-
Mexico agreement might set a negative precedent and deteriorate the EU’s future bargaining 
position in particular in the upcoming trade negotiations with the Mercosur33. In addition, 
France underlined that it worried about the cumulative effects of the growing number of 
FTAs with third countries. France’s scepticism reportedly reflected its general aversion to 
free trade (Agence Europe, 1996a, 1996b; Manger, 2009, p. 107; Sunahuja, 2000, p. 48; 
Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013a).  
 
The Council Presidency devises a compromise: The Italian Council Presidency, 
nonetheless, managed to strike a compromise between the two camps on 13 May 1996. The 
ministers accepted the Commission’s ‘single stage’ approach! in principle. They amended, 
however, the negotiating mandate so that the negotiating process would, de facto, resemble 
the traditional ‘two phases’ approach. The EU and Mexico should first agree on a so-called 
‘global agreement’. This should enumerate the objectives, issues areas and define the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The Mercsoru is a Common Market between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
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institutional framework of cooperation. The global agreement should moreover contain a 
clause comparable to a ‘fast track authority’ for the Commission and Mexican government to 
engage in subsequent FTA negotiations without further domestic authorisation. The 
ministers cautiously underlined, however, that any provisions of the FTA coming under 
shared competence – like investment, services and capital movements – would still require 
unanimous consent in the Council of Ministers and that the FTA and the global agreement 
would only jointly enter into force in the form of a new EU-Mexico Cooperation Agreement 
(Agence Europe, 1996c). The compromise was satisfactory to for the Commission and both 
camps in the Council of Ministers. The Commission procured a broad mandate, which 
empowered it to act as the EU’s single voice regarding all agenda items including 
investment, services and capital movements. The Member States in favour of swift and 
ambitious FTA negotiations secured a firm mandate to open talks with Mexico, while 
hesitant Member States secured the explicit right to veto the conclusion of the FTA (Agence 
Europe, 1996c, 1996d).  
 
7.2.3 The core negotiations of the EU-Mexico FTA  
The representation modalities of the EU delegation: The EU and Mexico met for the first 
negotiating session on 14 October 1996. The Directorate General for External Relations (DG 
Relex) supported by the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) and the Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG Ecfin) represented the EU and its Member 
States on all agenda items. Trade policy officials of the Member State governments typically 
sat at the back of the negotiating room to observe, take notes and, if necessary, to pass 
written comments to the Commission negotiators (Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013a). 
The Commission embarked on the first negotiating sessions with the objective of swiftly 
agreeing on the cast of the global agreement so as to subsequently launch the FTA 
negotiations. The Commission presented a first draft of the global agreement in October 
1996, which in principle received a positive echo from Mexico. Mexico, nevertheless, 
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criticised the ‘democracy clause’34 and the de facto ‘two phases’ approach proposed in the 
Commission’s draft. Mexico complained that the de facto ‘two phases’ approach ran counter 
to the spirit of the solemn declaration of May 1995 and stressed that the standardised 
‘democracy clause’ was a manifestation of European arrogance (Agence Europe, 1997e, 
1996e; Sanahuja, 2000, pp. 50–51). In June 1997, the Commission and Mexico, nonetheless, 
managed to resolve their differences and agreed on a draft text for the global agreement35, an 
Interim Agreement Concerning Trade and Trade-Related Issues 36  as well as a Joint 
Declaration on Services and Intellectual Property Matters37. Support for the draft texts 
seemed high. The ratification of the global agreement by late 1997 and the subsequent start 
of the FTA negotiations in early 1998 seemed possible (Agence Europe, 1997f; Sunahuja, 
2000, pp. 51–52). 
 
France starts picking fights with the Commission: Several disagreements nevertheless 
surfaced within a week. France was critical of the fact that the draft texts contained more 
commitments on the future liberalisation of trade in goods than on services and was therefore 
biased in favour of Mexico (Agence Europe, 1997g). France, moreover, forged a coalition of 
12 Member States, which criticised the Commission for agreeing to a slightly altered 
‘democracy clause’ in the draft text of the global agreement. They lamented that the 
Commission had overstepped its mandate and warned that they would veto the global 
agreement unless Mexico endorsed the standard clause. Only Spain, the United Kingdom 
and Denmark reportedly thought that that the altered clause of the draft text was in line with 
the mandate of the Commission (Sunahuja, 2000, p. 52). The controversies increasingly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 The EU includes into its FTAs and Association Agreements clauses, which stipulate that both 
parties are committed to the protection of Human Rights and democracy.   
35 The so-called Agreement on Political and Economic Association and Cooperation. 
36 The Interim Agreement was a de facto fast track authority. It should automatically enter into force 
after the conclusion of the global agreement and provided for the establishment of the joint EU-
Mexico committee in charge of the FTA negotiations. 
37 The Joint Declaration, finally, was a peculiar document. It essentially underlined that agenda items 
like investment, services, capital movements and intellectual property rights came under shared or 
national competences and thus were subject to specific negotiating and decision-making rules. Hence, 
the Joint Declaration should be considered as an expression of the Member States’ preoccupation with 
competence questions. 
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delayed the negotiations. The Commission harshly criticised the double standards of certain 
Member State governments, and notably France. It pointed out that earlier that year France 
had decided to not take a position in a similar discussion in the Council on the ‘democracy 
clause’ of the EU-China cooperation agreement (Agence Europe, 1997h; Sunahuja, 2000, p. 
52). In early July 1997, Mexico decided to end this ‘charade’. It accepted the standard 
‘democracy clause’ while releasing a unilateral declaration on the non-intervention of third 
countries in Mexico’s domestic affairs (Manger, 2009, p. 107; Sanahuja, 2000, p. 51). This 
first clash between the Commission, on the one side, and France and sympathising Member 
States, on the other, would set a precedent and the atmosphere for the following two years of 
negotiations. France repeatedly applied the breaks to the negotiations and exhibited its 
hesitant and occasionally destructive attitude during the talks.  
 
The EU and Mexico ratify the Global Agreement: The Council of Ministers consequently 
endorsed the text in late July 1997 and the Commission signed the agreement on behalf of 
the EU in December 1997 (Agence Europe, 1997i; Financial Times, 1997). The European 
Parliament and the Mexican Senate ratified the global agreement in spring 1998. The 
responsible rapporteur of the European Parliament, Miranda de Lage, cautioned that the 
assent of the European Parliament was not a blank cheque for the Commission negotiators. 
While the future FTA did not have to undergo separate ratification again, she underlined that 
the European Parliament expected the future FTA to reach for NAFTA-parity notably in the 
fields of investment, public procurement as well as telecommunications, financial, transport, 
cultural and audiovisual services (Agence Europe, 1998d).  
 
The core negotiations start: The ratification of the global agreement paved the way for the 
launch of the actual FTA negotiations. These started with a first symbolic meeting of the 
joint EU-Mexico committee in mid-July 1998 (Agence Europe, 1998e). The substantive 
negotiations began in November 1998. The joint EU-Mexico committee, which was 
handling the FTA negotiations, established three working groups focusing on 1) market 
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access for goods, 2) services and capital movements and 3) regulatory issues like rules of 
origins, competition policy, public procurement and intellectual property rights (Agence 
Europe, 1998f, 1998g). The first negotiating rounds, until early summer 1999, focused 
primarily on the reduction of industrial tariffs, rules of origin and agricultural tariffs. The 
negotiating focus reflected the main preoccupation of European business, which worried that 
the tariff differentials for European and NAFTA products eroded its market share in Mexico. 
The Commission thus demanded an equal and simultaneous reduction of Mexico’s industrial 
tariffs as foreseen under NAFTA. What is more, the Commission wanted to make sure, 
through new rules of origin, that European exports could easily enter the Mexican market, 
while US and Canadian exporters should find it difficult to free ride on the EU-Mexico 
agreement. The negotiations on the rules of origins were among the toughest of the entire 
FTA talks, as Mexico had already adjusted its policy to the complex rules under NAFTA. 
Finally, Mexico wanted also a bite off the EU’s huge agricultural market, which caused 
frustration for many Southern European Member States (Agence Europe, 1999a, 1999b, 
1998h).  
 
Investment as a secondary issue: Investment-related negotiations in the working group on 
services and capital movements were initially only an issue of secondary importance within 
the overall negotiating process. Several reasons explain this observation. First, services, 
capital movements and investment were less important to European business and the 
Member State governments than tariffs for industrial goods and rules of origin (Interview,!telephone,! 14! November! 2013). The Mexican government, on the other hand, held rather 
defensive interests in these areas and did not push for swift negotiations (Interview, Brussels, 
24 July 2012b). Second, the Europeans, in principle, held an offensive interest – in particular 
in unlocking the Mexican financial and insurance markets – but held no common position 
regarding other sectors (Agence Europe, 1999c; Manger, 2009, pp. 101–103). The lack of a 
common European position slowed down talks and reduced the EU’s ability to press for 
ambitious negotiations. Third, the EU and Mexico wanted to take bilateral negotiations on 
222 
 
investment, services and capital movements slowly in order to see the outcome of the 
negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD as well as the 
next steps in the WTO toward the Millennium Round (Interview, Brussels, 25 September 
2013a). Last but not least, discussions on investment, services and capital movement were 
tedious and slow because they fell under shared or national competence. Decisions required 
unanimous support from all Member States (Agence Europe, 1999d).  
 
The Commission starts pushing for ambitious investment and services provisions: The 
Commission started seriously preparing for negotiations on investment, services and capital 
movement early in autumn 1998. The Commission asked the Member States to draft lists 
indicating the sectors and activities which should be excluded from negotiations on the 
liberalisation of trade in services and capital movements. All Member States – except for 
France – transmitted their reservations to the Commission by the end of the year (Interview, 
Brussels, 25 September 2013a). Mexico and the Commission agreed to exchange their first 
offer for services in spring 1999. Mexico reportedly even proposed to negotiate on 
investment liberalisation beyond service sectors as well as post-establishment treatment and 
protection standards. The Commission, however, insisted on limiting talks to investment 
liberalisation for services so as not to displease the Member States. The negotiating 
guidelines for the Commission reportedly only provided for negotiations on market access. 
As mentioned above, the Member States considered post-establishment treatment and 
investment protection as core elements of their BIT programmes and thus as domaine 
reservé. In parallel, Mexico and the Commission also discussed the liberalisation of capital 
movements, which had an indirect bearing on investment regulation. The Commission 
initially proposed that Mexico transpose the European directive 88/361/EEC on the free 
movement of capital into its domestic legislation so as to free bilateral capital movements – 
including direct investments – between the EU and Mexico. The Mexican government 
rejected the proposal, mostly on symbolic grounds and not due to its content. Mexico 
disliked the European demand to transpose the EU’s acquis communautaires into national 
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legislation (Interview, Brussels, 24 July 2012b; Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013a; 
Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013). 
 
The Commission and the Mexican government exchanged their first offers on services and 
service-related investments in the fourth round of negotiations in May 1999. Initial 
discussions on the European and Mexican offers showed that there was still considerable 
disagreement between the two sides, notably on financial, insurance and maritime services. 
The negotiations made, however, considerable headway during the following rounds in 
summer 1999. Common ground notably emerged regarding capital movements (Agence 
Europe, 1999a). At the seventh round in July, the Commission agreed to the Mexican 
proposal to liberalise services and investments on the basis of a negative list like under 
NAFTA. The Commission supported the Mexican proposal, as it facilitated attaining its 
main goal – to procure NAFTA-parity. The Member States, on the other hand, criticised the 
Commission’s assent to the Mexican proposal as an unnecessary concession to Mexico and 
the NAFTA approach to services and investment liberalisation. The Member States had 
become used to the GATS-like positive list approach and felt that a positive list allowed for a 
more cautious liberalisation of services and investment. In early October, the Commission 
expressed confidence that the new approach of negative lists would pave the way toward a 
compromise on the liberalisation of services and service-related investments between the EU 
and Mexico, but also within the still-divided Council of Ministers (Agence Europe, 1999d; 
Harding, 1999). The eighth round of negotiations in October 1999 should ultimately 
conclude the FTA negotiations. And progress was indeed manifest. The Commission and 
Mexico agreed on liberalisation offers for services and service-related investments in the 
form of a negative list and a rendez-vous clause, which stipulated that the EU and Mexico 
would re-examine their bilateral commitments in this domain after three years so as to adjust 
them to developments in upcoming WTO negotiations. The Commission and Mexico, 
moreover, agreed on provisions indicating an almost complete liberalisation of bilateral 
capital movements including FDI (Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013a). The Mexican 
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Minister for Trade, Herminio Blanco, commented that the issue of services and investment 
“that seemed to have dragged the negotiations out for a long time, have been resolved in this 
eighth round” (Agence Europe, 1999e). Older disagreements like rules of origin, agricultural 
trade and public procurement, however, unexpectedly resurfaced and made the planned 
conclusion of the negotiations impossible. The negotiators thus decided to reconvene for a 
ninth round to close the negotiations in November 1999 (Agence Europe, 1999e). 
 
7.2.4 Clashing over competences on investment regulation 
The weeks between the eighth and ninth round brought considerable turmoil regarding the 
agreed provisions on investment, services and capital movements. Media reports hardly 
covered these developments. They merely indicated that the comprehensive provisions on 
investment, services and capital movements had mostly vanished from the draft agreement 
when the ninth round started. Research interviews shed light on this episode.  
 
The sovereignist backlash of certain Member States: The reasons behind the sudden 
changes to the draft agreement were not the result of a clash between the EU and Mexico, 
but instead one between the Commission and the French government in the ‘113 
Committee’. The French government suddenly objected to the use of negative lists for the 
liberalisation of services and service-related investments (Agence Europe, 1999f). France 
reportedly thought that their use was an unnecessary concession to Mexico. France feared 
that the use of negative lists might entail a much more comprehensive liberalisation of 
services and investments than initially intended. France wanted to keep its bargaining chips 
for the upcoming Millennium Round in the WTO. It demanded the deletion of the negative 
lists. France nevertheless wanted to maintain the rendez-vous clause and endorsed the 
Commission’s spontaneous proposal to integrate a standstill clause on services and related 
investment into the agreement (Agence Europe, 1999g; Interview, telephone, 14 November 
2013; Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013a).  
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France, moreover, claimed that the Commission had overstepped its mandate by agreeing 
with Mexico on a comprehensive ‘capital movements’ clause. It expressed criticism that the 
agreed clause would, inter alia, liberalise FDI and portfolio investment flows. France took 
the view that the term ‘capital movements’ in the negotiating guidelines only referred to 
‘transfers of payments’ (Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013; Interview, Brussels, 25 
September 2013a). France’s claim was, however, implausible. The term ‘capital movements’ 
was clearly defined under Community law38, OECD codes and IMF guidelines. According 
to these widely accepted definitions, the term comprised FDI, portfolio investments and 
many other forms of cross-border transactions. It needs mention, though, that these clauses 
merely liberalise the cross-border transfer of FDI but do not liberalise the subsequent act of 
establishment, mergers or acquisitions of subsidiaries in the host country.39 
 
France threatened to veto the entire draft agreement unless the Commission deleted the 
negative lists for services and service-related investments as well as the comprehensive 
capital movements clause. The French threat was credible, as all the clauses negotiated 
within the working group on services and capital movements were subject to unanimous 
endorsement in the Council of Ministers. France was, initially, on its own with these 
demands. But what had started out as an isolated French veto soon grew into a broad 
majority of Member States. France skilfully convinced, but also pressured, other Member 
State governments into supporting its position. In the end, only the Commission and Spain 
still sought to save the controversial provisions. They, nevertheless, had to give into the 
demands of the French-led coalition so as to save the rest of the draft agreement (Interview, 
Brussels, 25 September 2013a; Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013; Manger, 2009, p. 
119). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 See, for instance, the annexes of Directive 88/361/EEC, which provide an inconclusive albeit 
binding definition of the term.  
39 For more information see for instance Hindelang (2009) and OECD (2002). 
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France’s opposition reflected competence concerns as well as the government’s general 
protectionist attitude in international economic affairs. Interviewed negotiators recalled that 
France was clearly worried about the implications of comprehensive service, investment and 
capital movement provisions for its national competences and sovereignty. It feared that 
such provisions might set a precedent which could entail a limitation of its legal 
competences in the long run. France is traditionally more preoccupied with its national 
competences and sovereignty than many other Member States. Interviewees moreover 
stressed that the French government, under the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, was 
sceptical of globalisation, free markets and trade. The French government repeatedly voiced 
concerns over a too comprehensive liberalisation of bilateral trade and consequently applied 
the brakes to the FTA negotiations. The year before – in September 1998 – the Jospin 
government had, moreover, withdrawn from the MAI negotiations in the OECD without 
prior coordination with its European partners and triggered the collapse of the negotiation 
(see Chapter V) (Interview, Brussels, 25 September 2013a; Interview, 14 November 2013). 
These observations are important for this study. They suggest that while the expanding 
international trade agenda and the Commission promoted the extension of the EU’s de facto 
competences, government preferences on the whole still sought to contain an extension of 
the EU’s de facto competences in this policy-making sphere.  
 
The negotiators reconvened for a ninth and last round in November 1999. The round had a 
twofold focus. On the one hand, the Mexican and Commission negotiators sought to resolve 
the outstanding disagreements on rules of origin, public procurement and the like. On the 
other hand, they had to deal with the considerable damage to the investment, services and 
capital movement sections of the draft agreement. It seems that the debates between the EU 
and Mexico on the latter issues were relatively uncomplicated. Investment, services and 
capital movements were no priority for Mexican negotiators. Rather, certain Member States, 
like Spain and the United Kingdom, had pushed for these issues during the negotiations. The 
absence of media coverage regarding these issues therefore suggests that the crucial 
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discussions on the consolidation of the investment, service and capital movement provisions 
evolved behind the scenes among the Member States rather than between the Commission 
and Mexico. The FTA was finally initialled in December 1999, signed in March 2000 and 
gradually entered into force between October 2000 and February 2001 (Agence Europe, 
2000a, 2000b; European Commission, 2014a). 
 
The Commission seeks to safe the investment provisions: So which investment-related 
provisions does the final EU-Mexico FTA40 actually contain? As discussed above, the FTA 
could have delivered highly ambitious investment, services and capital movement 
disciplines. Or as a Commission official phrased it, the EU-Mexico FTA could have 
contained a “sexy investment chapter better than NAFTA” (As cited in Manger, 2009, p. 
119). The Council of Ministers, on the initiative of France, nevertheless put a stop to these 
provisions. But despite this unseen EU-internal clash, the FTA still comprises – arguably by 
accident – several noteworthy investment-related commitments. First, the FTA provides for 
NAFTA-plus investment market access to Mexican service sectors. Why is that? The FTA 
liberalises bilateral trade in services across all modes of supply on the basis of MFN and NT. 
European service providers entering the Mexican market must thus receive equal treatment 
to Canadian and US service providers under NAFTA. What is more, the FTA does not 
contain a negative or positive list for the liberalisation of services trade but a standstill 
clause. The standstill clause prohibits the introduction of new trade barriers across all modes 
of supply. Taking into consideration that in 1999 Mexico’s unilateral market access 
commitments clearly exceeded its commitments under NAFTA or the GATS, the standstill 
clause locked in a considerable level of openness. Two caveats nevertheless apply to this 
reading of investment commitments in the EU-Mexico FTA. The FTA entirely excludes 
trade in cabotage, maritime, air transport and audio-visual services. On the other hand, the 
Commission and Mexico never drew up a schedule of the commitments under the MFN and 
standstill clause. The exact scope of the commitments thus remains opaque and very difficult !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 For text of FTA see European Commission (2001). 
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to enforce. It is difficult for European business to rely on the FTA (Heydon and Woolcock, 
2009, pp. 95–96; Interview, telephone 14 November 2013).41 Second, the FTA contains a 
special chapter for the liberalisation of trade and investment in financial and insurance 
services, which explicitly provides for NAFTA-parity across all modes of supply. European, 
Canadian and US banks thus enjoy the same market access and treatment in Mexico. The 
special deal on financial and insurance services reflects the greater lobbying activity of, 
notably, British and Spanish banks during the negotiations (Manger, 2009, pp. 115–117). So 
while the last-minute deletion of many investment provisions from the FTA draft casts 
doubts on the intergovernmental hypothesis H2, the preservation of the financial services 
chapter underlines that business lobbying nevertheless shaped Member State cooperation and 
delegation to a certain degree. Third, the FTA contains a rendez-vous clause for service 
trade, which provides for the continuation of negotiations on liberalisation commitments 
within three years. The EU and Mexico albeit have never used the rendez-vous clause.42 
Finally, the FTA also contains a rendez-vous clause for the chapter on capital movements, 
which provides for the continuation of negotiations within three years. The ultimately agreed 
chapter on ‘investments and related payments’ is rudimentary. It provides for the free 
transfer of payments, recalls the commitments of the parties under OECD codes and 
encourages the parties to conclude BITs so as to complement the FTA (European 
Commission, 2001).43 
 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
What theoretical conclusions may one draw on the basis of this account of the EU-Mexico 
negotiations? The observations lend greater support to the supranational hypothesis H1 than 
to the intergovernmental hypothesis H2. The entry into force of NAFTA spurred international 
economic competition and significantly shaped European preferences on a FTA with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41 See Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the services part of the FTA.  
42 See also Article 35 of the services part of the FTA. 
43 See also Chapter IV, title III of the services part of the EU-Mexico FTA.  
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Mexico. NAFTA gradually eroded the market share of European firms in Mexico and at the 
same time transformed Mexico into an ideal entry hub into the US and Canadian market. 
European business thus started lobbying Member State and European policy-makers, who 
showed receptive to these demands. In consequence, many Member States developed a 
sincere interest in concluding a competitive FTA of NAFTA parity i.e. comprising ambitious 
investment provisions. The Commission was eager to satisfy the demands of the Member 
States and European business. It used its agenda setting powers and invoked the evolving 
trade agenda to secure a firm mandate providing for services and investment provisions in 
the FTA with Mexico. As the Member States were calling for a FTA of NAFTA parity, they 
did not object the Commission’s draft mandate and immediately agreed to cooperate and 
delegate negotiating on these agenda items. Only toward the end of the negotiations, several 
Member States and notably France started having second thoughts and worried about the 
implications of a FTA with far-ranging services and investment provisions for their 
competences. They claimed that the Commission had vastly overstepped its mandate and 
pressured the Commission to drop these provisions from the draft FTA. The Commission 
had to give into these demands to avert a veto against the whole agreement in the Council of 
Ministers but nevertheless managed to save substantial investment commitments. So while 
the EU-Mexico negotiations seem to confirm at first a business-centred liberal 
intergovernmental explanation and hypothesis H2, the decisive final episode and outcome of 
the negotiations clearly lend support to the supranational hypothesis H1. 
 
7.3 Investment disciplines in the negotiations on the EU-Chile FTA  
The negotiations on the EU-Mexico FTA were the first attempt to include investment 
provisions into an FTA between the EU and a third country. As examined above, the 
Member States were initially supportive of this plan but then had second thoughts. The 
investment, service and capital movement provisions of the EU-Mexico FTA are therefore 
less ‘visible’ and comprehensive than initially agreed between the Commission and Mexico. 
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The negotiations between the EU and Mexico are certainly an interesting episode in the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The negotiations between the EU 
and Mexico become, however, even more intriguing if analysed in comparison to the 
negotiations on the EU-Chile FTA. These negotiations started around the time of the 
conclusion of the EU-Mexico FTA in late 1999 and came to an end in early 2002. The EU-
Chile FTA is the first European FTA to contain comprehensive investment commitments in 
service and non-service sectors. Taking into consideration the proximity in time between the 
two negotiations and the marginal importance of the Chilean economy in comparison to the 
Mexican economy, one must wonder why the EU-Chile FTA finally encompasses ambitious 
investment commitments. This section traces the negotiations on the EU-Chile FTA. It finds 
that Commission entrepreneurship as enshrined in the supranational hypothesis H1 best 
account for the Member State cooperation and delegation on investment provisions in this 
forum. The Commission used its agenda setting powers, expertise and exploited the 
international trade agenda – which it had previously shaped as shown in chapter VI – in 
order to convince the Member States to accept so far unseen provisions on investment in the 
EU-Chile FTA.  
 
7.3.1 The pre-negotiations on the EU-Chile FTA  
The plan to negotiate a EU-Chile FTA was born out of similar considerations as the EU-
Mexico FTA. Following Chile’s democratisation in the late 1980s, the country pursued a 
liberal economic and trade policy strategy. It reduced trade and investment barriers and 
sought to attract foreign investors. In 1995, Chile intended to join NAFTA but failed due to 
opposition within the USA. In consequence, Canada signed an FTA with Chile in 1996 and 
Mexico updated its FTA with Chile in 1998. In 1997, Chile and the USA announced their 
plan to negotiate on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Manger, 2009, pp. 169–
170). The EU was no bystander in this process. The EU concluded a first shallow and rather 
symbolic cooperation agreement with Chile in 1990. In 1996, the EU and Chile concluded a 
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more comprehensive ‘Framework Agreement for Cooperation’. The framework agreement 
documented the intention of the EU and Chile to conclude an FTA in the near future and 
constituted the first step in the EU’s traditional ‘two phases’ approach to FTA negotiations. 
The framework agreement came into force in 1999 (Dür, 2007, p. 844; Manger, 2009, pp. 
169–172).  
 
European business worries about a US-Chile FTA and lobbies for EU-Chile FTA: As 
Manger (2009) and Dür (2007) analyse in depth, the proliferation of comprehensive 
competitor FTAs created systemic competitive pressures. In accordance with the liberal 
intergovernmental hypothesis H2, European business consequently started lobbying receptive 
Member State and European policy-makers to conclude a comparable FTA with Chile. In the 
early 1990s, the Chilean government had invited foreign companies to invest in Chile so as 
to diversify and modernise its economy. US firms had mostly ignored Chile’s campaign to 
attract foreign investment and know-how. European, and in particular Spanish, service 
providers – due to their linguistic and cultural proximity – had nevertheless followed Chile’s 
courting and had invested heavily in the banking, telecommunications and energy sectors 
(Manger, 2009, pp. 159–161). By the mid-1990s, several Spanish banks, telecommunication 
and energy companies had acquired commanding market shares and considerable stakes in 
Chilean service companies due to their first mover advantage in service sectors with strong 
network effects and oligopolistic market structures. Their investments showed to be highly 
profitable. Many Spanish companies realised higher margins in Chile than through their core 
activities in Europe (Manger, 2009, p. 165). The Spanish service providers thus observed the 
debates on the FTAA with great suspicion. They feared that the liberalisation of bilateral 
economic relations between the US and Chile might attract US competitors and endanger 
their dominant positions and profits in Chile. Spanish service providers therefore became the 
central supporters of an EU-Chile FTA. As these companies already held dominant positions 
in the Chilean economy, they were hardly interested in enhancing market access. They 
voiced demands which sought to cement their dominant market positions. First, the FTA 
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should codify and lock in Chile’s current level of openness. Chile’s openness was based on 
unilateral decisions and not bound by international commitments. Spanish service providers 
apparently feared that Chile might re-introduce protectionist measures against European 
firms after the conclusion of a highly comprehensive NAFTA-like US-Chile FTA. Second, 
most companies stressed that an EU-Chile FTA should contain MFN and NT clauses for 
service providers. These clauses should guarantee European companies at least the same 
treatment and market access as US firms under a potential future US-Chile FTA. Third, 
Spanish banks lobbied for the lifting of the 20% ceiling on foreign content for Chilean 
pension plans. The issue was arguably the only demand from service providers for additional 
market access (Dür, 2007, pp. 845–846; Manger, 2009, pp. 174–177). In contrast to the 
negotiations with Mexico, manufacturers and exporters of goods seem to have hardly 
lobbied for an FTA with Chile due to its small market size and low tariffs. 
 
7.3.2 The Commission mandate 
The Commission seizes the opportunity and tables a comprehensive draft mandate: In 
line with the supranational hypothesis H1, the Commission was responsive and proactive in 
order to satisfy and exploit these business demands. To speed up the negotiating process, it 
submitted to the Council of Ministers a comprehensive draft mandate for the EU-Chile FTA 
negotiations in July 1998 – well before the entry into force of the ‘Framework Agreement’ 
(Dür, 2007, p. 847; Manger, 2009, p. 172). The Member States, on the other hand, were slow 
to react and examined the draft mandate only during the weeks prior to the EU-Latin 
America Summit in June 1999. This Summit brought together the EU, its Member States, the 
Mercosur countries and Chile. The main purpose of the summit was to evaluate the prospects 
of a region-to-region FTA between the EU and the Latin American countries. The idea of 
such a region-to-region FTA reflected the fact that Chile had applied for accession to the 
Mercosur. European policy-makers thus wanted to conduct the EU-Chile and EU-Mercosur 
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negotiations in parallel in order to fuse them in case Chile acceded to the Mercosur in time 
for the conclusion of the negotiations (Agence Europe, 1999h, 1999h).  
 
The Member States agree on investment but fight over the timeline: First discussions in 
the Council of Ministers on the Commission’s draft mandate prior to the EU-Latin America 
Summit showed that the Member States did not disagree so much over the substance of the 
draft mandate but, once again, over the proposed timing. Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden 
and Germany pushed for the swift adoption of both mandates for the EU-Chile and EU-
Mercosur negotiations. They intended to use the upcoming summit as a platform to launch 
the FTA negotiations. Other Member States did not share their enthusiasm for these FTA 
negotiations. In particular, France and Ireland acted as brakemen in EU-internal debates 
(Dür, 2007, p. 847). France argued that FTA negotiations with major agricultural exporters 
like Chile and the Merocsur countries could only start once the EU had completed the reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policies. With regard to Chile, French wine producers feared 
competition with cheap Chilean produce. France also warned that Chilean agricultural 
produce might drive produce from French overseas territories and ACP countries out of the 
market. Greece, Italy and Ireland shared these concerns. On the other hand, France also 
stressed that it was bad timing to launch bilateral trade negotiations only a few months 
before the Seattle ministerial meeting of the WTO and the planned opening of a new 
multilateral round. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands agreed with France on this 
point. Germany, which held the Council Presidency, proposed setting 2003 as the deadline 
for the conclusion of the FTA negotiations with Chile and Mercosur. This compromise 
should give the EU more time to observe developments at the multilateral level and advance 
the CAP reform, but also provide for a clear timeframe. France and the United Kingdom 
rejected the proposal. They suggested starting with non-tariff negotiations on issues like 
investment, services, intellectual property rights, competition rules and rules of origin in the 
near future and to delay negotiations on industrial and agricultural tariffs until the WTO talks 
had delivered results (Agence Europe, 1999h, 1999i, 1999j).  
234 
 
 
In early June 1999, the European Council finally took a decision on the matter. The heads of 
states instructed their trade ministers to provide the Commission with mandates to open both 
FTA negotiations at the occasion of the EU-Latin America Summit. Their decision was 
based on an elaborate substantive and procedural compromise between the promoters and 
opponents of the FTA negotiations. The Commission should initially negotiate with Chile on 
non-tariff barriers and issues like investment, services and capital movements. In a second 
phase – after summer 2001 – the Commission should then start negotiations on the reduction 
of tariffs. The sequencing should enable the Commission to take developments in 
agricultural negotiations in the EU-Mercosur and planned WTO talks into account. The 
procedural linkage was reportedly a concession to France to gain its support for the opening 
of the FTA negotiations (Agence Europe, 1999h, 1999h). Second, the mandate instructed the 
Commission to reach for an ambitious liberalisation of investments and services. The 
explicit mention of investment and services reflected the fear of European service providers 
that the conclusion of a comprehensive NAFTA-like US-Chile FTA in the following years 
might translate into discrimination against them. Following a pre-emptive logic, European 
service providers thus demanded European policy-makers to seek the conclusion of an 
equivalent agreement with Chile. The mandate nevertheless clarified in an unusual degree of 
detail that the relevant chapter and liberalisation commitments should build on a positive list 
(Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013; Agence Europe, 2001a). The mandate’s emphasis 
on the positive list approach was arguably an anticipating concession and first omen of the 
looming clash between the Commission and France over the negative list approach three 
months later in September 1999. It needs mention here that no source suggests that the 
Member States ever seriously discussed special representation modalities for these issues. 
The Member States seem to have assumed from the outset that the Commission would, as 
customary, act as their single voice in FTA negotiations regardless of the EU-internal 
distribution of competences. The Council of Ministers ultimately endorsed the mandate in 
time for the EU-Latin America Summit, which formally opened the FTA negotiations 
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between the EU, Chile and Mercosur. In conclusion, it must be mentioned that the slow 
reaction of the Member States to business demands for a EU-Chile FTA does not directly 
contradict the intergovernmental hypothesis H1 but does not lend strong support to either.  
 
The examination of the intergovernmental debates on the Commission’s mandate lends 
greater support to the supranational hypothesis H1 than to the intergovernmental hypothesis 
H2. The Commission strongly pushed for a swift opening of comprehensive negotiations. 
Yet, its draft mandate clearly reflected the intention to build stable and enduring support for 
comprehensive FTA negotiations. The Member States – under considerable pressure from 
national business lobbies – were mostly supportive but also harboured concerns regarding 
competences and too far-ranging liberalisation commitments.  
 
7.3.3 The core negotiations on the EU-Chile FTA 
The EU and Chile met for the first symbolic consultations in November 1999. As usual in 
FTA negotiations, the Commission spoke on behalf of the Member States on all agenda 
items including investment, services and capital movements. DG Relex was in the lead of the 
overall negotiating process, but DG Trade handled technical negotiations. The Member 
States typically sent officials to observe the negotiations, take notes and support the 
Commission on the spot. The joint EU-Chile negotiating committee agreed to structure the 
negotiations in three working groups: 1) trade in goods, 2) services and investment, and 
finally 3) regulatory issues like rules of origin, public procurement, intellectual property 
rights and so on. The joint EU-Chile negotiating committee and the working groups should 
meet five times per year for five days. European sources reported that they expected the 
negotiations to take around three to four years. Chilean representatives, however, expressed 
their hope of finishing the negotiations within two years, before the second EU-Latin 
America Summit in 2002 (Agence Europe, 2000c; Mulligan, 2000). 
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The first round of substantive negotiations between the EU and Chile took place in March 
2000 in Santiago de Chile. The negotiators established the working groups and agreed on a 
preliminary timetable for the talks (Agence Europe, 1999k). The second and third rounds, in 
June and November 2000, focused on the exchange of technical information on the parties’ 
respective trade policies and regulations (Agence Europe, 2000d). The fourth round of 
negotiations, in March 2001, brought considerable progress. Chile and the EU made the first 
attempt to draft parts of the future agreement, notably on rules of origins, standards, 
intellectual property rights, public procurement and alike (Agence Europe, 2001b, 2001c). 
Several Commission negotiators recalled that the EU-Chile negotiations were an easy 
enterprise as the Chilean negotiators were highly trained, very eager and Chile had already 
unilaterally dismantled many critical trade barriers (Interview, Brussels, 24 July 2012b; 
Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013). 
 
Thanks to the Chilean and Commission entrepreneurship, the EU-Chile negotiations, 
moreover, made a procedural leap forward in spring 2001. While the first rounds of 
negotiations between the EU and Chile had been fruitful, many observers felt that the 
procedural linkage of the EU-Chile talks with the EU-Mercosur and WTO negotiations 
considerably decelerated the talks. The Mercosur negotiations had started but hardly 
progressed. The WTO negotiations had not even been launched as planned, due to the 
disastrous failure of the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle. The Chilean government came 
to the conclusion that it was necessary to set the EU-Chile negotiations on an independent 
negotiating track so as to prevent stalemate. In summer 2000, the Chilean minister of foreign 
affairs thus toured with the support of the Commission the Member States to convince his 
European partners to delink the EU-Chile negotiations from the EU-Mercosur and WTO 
negotiations. In October 2000, the Commission requested the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament to adjust its negotiating mandate accordingly (Agence Europe, 2001d; 
Manger, 2009, pp. 172–173). The Council of Ministers was, however, divided on the matter. 
The sequencing and linking of the EU-Chile FTA negotiations had been a concession of 
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favourable Member States toward hesitant ones. France and other mostly Southern European 
Member States had specifically asked for the sequencing and linking of the EU-Chile FTA 
negotiations in exchange for their assent to the EU-Chile FTA in order to prevent a too far-
reaching liberalisation of agricultural trade. After lengthy discussion, the Council and the 
European Parliament nonetheless bought into the Chilean and Commission’s arguments and 
accepted the request in spring 2001 (Agence Europe, 2001d; Manger, 2009, pp. 172–173). 
They changed the mandate and set the EU-Chile FTA negotiations on an independent track. 
The willingness of the Council to revise the mandate reportedly was due to the 
Commission’s pedagogical campaigning and attempts to explain the greater negotiating 
context. It moreover raised awareness in the Council that after the failure of the Seattle 
ministerial meeting the EU may have to develop a stronger bilateral strategy and profile as 
the prospects of further multilateral liberalisation were dim. The Commission’s proactive 
attitude allowed the EU-Chile FTA negotiations to progress, which ultimately consolidated 
the EU’s role in international investment policy (Manger, 2009, pp. 172–173; Interview, 
Brussels, 25 September 2013a; Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013). 
 
Early 2001 brought another important change. France passed the rotating Council Presidency 
on to Sweden. While the French government under Lionel Jospin was critical of economic 
liberalism and the FTA negotiations, Sweden was a liberal trading nation in favour of the 
FTA negotiations. Sweden, moreover, typically sided with the Commission in EU-internal 
debates on trade policy. The incoming Swedish Council Presidency identified the 
advancement of the FTA negotiations with Chile as a priority of its term. The Swedish 
Presidency understood that the main obstacles to a swift conclusion of a comprehensive and 
ambitious FTA with Chile were not located outside the EU but in Member State capitals. 
Many national administrations mistrusted the Commission and Brussels, had an aversion to 
free trade and sought to protect their competences against European encroachment. Sweden 
– in close cooperation with the Commission – came to the conclusion that they had to step 
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up efforts to convince the Member States of the benefits of an ambitious EU-Chile FTA 
(Interview, telephone, 26 January 2012b). 
 
7.3.4 Commission entrepreneurship for comprehensive investment disciplines 
Sweden and the Commission subsequently acted as policy entrepreneurs and devised a 
campaign to build and to maintain a broad consensus among the Member States for 
ambitious investment, services and capital movement provisions. In accordance with the 
supranational hypothesis H1, the Commission drew on its agenda setting powers and 
technical expertise to build trust and exploited the evolving international trade agenda to that 
end.  
 
In more concrete terms, Commission officials and Swedish diplomats and Commission 
negotiators reportedly toured Member State capitals – and in particular Paris – in order to 
build confidence and to inform national administrations about the merits of such a 
comprehensive FTA. Sweden and the Commission felt that this approach reflected the EU’s 
best economic interests. What is more, the campaign at the same time also consolidated the 
Commission’s role and the EU’s de facto competences in international investment policy. 
This instance of joined policy entrepreneurship of the Commission and Council Presidency 
thus echoed functional and power considerations. It needs mention that European business 
reportedly did not propose or lobby for this initiative (Interview, telephone, 26 January 
2012b).  
 
Agenda setting, building trust and invoking the evoling trade agenda: The primary 
objective of the joint initiative of Sweden and the Commission was to prevent another clash 
on investment, service and capital movement provisions, as had been the case at the end of 
the EU-Mexico negotiations (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009, p. 112). Swedish diplomats and 
Commission negotiators sought to ensure continuous support for the Commission’s 
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negotiating mandate and results in these domains. They reassured Member State 
administrations that the positive list approach used in the EU-Chile talks allowed for greater 
control over the liberalisation of services and service-related investment than the negative 
list approach used in the EU-Mexico talks. They, moreover, added that – at the behest of the 
Member States – the EU was pushing for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in 
the WTO. The official EU position stipulated that the new round should seek a further 
liberalisation of services trade and extend the WTO regime toward the so-called Singapore 
Issues – investment, public procurement, competition and trade facilitation. The Swedish 
diplomats and Commission negotiators explained in meetings with sceptical Member State 
governments that the EU could not credibly advocate a comprehensive new round, if the 
Member States vetoed the inclusion of comparable disciplines into the EU’s FTAs. The very 
raison d’être of FTAs in the multilateral trade regime was to enable countries to go beyond 
WTO commitments and to reach for a broader and deeper liberalisation of their economic 
relations. This line of argument was reportedly quite effective with Member State 
governments and in particular with the French government. In the run-up to the FTA 
negotiations with Mexico, the Mercosur and Chile, France had constantly reiterated that its 
trade policy priority were the upcoming WTO negotiations. In consequence, France could 
hardly veto an ambitious service chapter in the FTA with Chile, if it intended to remain 
credible (Interview, telephone, 26 January 2012b). 
 
Swedish diplomats and the Commission negotiators used the same argument in order to 
convince the Member States to finally include investment provisions for non-service sectors. 
They reiterated that the EU was formally seeking negotiations on ‘investment’ per se – i.e. 
investment across all economic sectors – in the upcoming WTO round. So if the EU wanted 
to be seen as a credible actor in related WTO debates, the EU had to reach for similar 
provisions in its FTAs. Swedish diplomats and Commission negotiators proposed 
negotiating on a comprehensive positive list on ‘establishment’, which should codify 
investment liberalisation commitments for services and non-service sectors. From the point 
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of view of regulators, as a Swedish diplomat elaborated, such an encompassing approach to 
investment made much more sense than the artificial distinction between service-related and 
non-service-related investments. Sceptical Member States – and notably France – found it 
again difficult to object to this logic. Only two years before, France had withdrawn from the 
MAI negotiations in the OECD by arguing that negotiations on investment should continue 
in the WTO as part of the Singapore Issues, because the WTO was a more suitable forum for 
such talks. This remained France’s official position in the Council of Ministers in the 
following years. Hence, it would have been contradictory for France to veto the inclusion of 
such provisions in the EU-Chile FTA (Interview, telephone, 26 January 2012b). 
 
The efforts of the Swedish Council Presidency and Commission facilitated EU-internal 
debates on the FTA negotiations. Commission negotiators commented that the EU-Chile 
negotiations took place in an atmosphere of much greater trust between the Commission and 
the Member States than the previous EU-Mexico talks (Interview, Brussels, 24 July 2012b; 
Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013). At the fifth negotiating round between the EU 
and Chile in July 2001, the EU was thus able to present its first full offer to Chile. It 
proposed to do away with 100% of industrial tariffs and 93% of agricultural tariffs within ten 
years of the FTA coming into force. It furthermore proposed that all commitments on non-
tariff barriers – for instance establishment/investment and services – should take immediate 
effect (Agence Europe, 2001e). The consequent discussions between the EU and Chile 
showed that both parties agreed on most aspects of the offer. In consequence, Commission 
President Romano Prodi and the Chilean President Ricardo Lagos announced in September 
2001 that it might be possible to close the negotiations by the end of the year (Agence 
Europe, 2001f).  
 
The optimism of Commissioner Prodi and President Lagos was premature. In October 2001, 
the sixth round of negotiations saw further in-depth discussions on tariffs, services and other 
non-tariff issues. The discussions shed light on three points of persisting disagreement 
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among the parties. First, Spain demanded access to Chile’s territorial waters for European 
fishery fleets, which Chile was unwilling to grant. The so-called Swordfish Issue became the 
most difficult issue of the entire negotiations. Second, France, Greece and other wine 
producing Member States demanded that Chile adjust to the European regime for the 
protection of geographical indicators. Third, the Commission demanded greater 
liberalisation commitments in financial services from Chile. While Chile did not 
categorically refuse to further open its financial sector for European companies, it insisted 
that it would first negotiate on this matter with the USA before taking on further 
commitments. The Commission dismissed the Chilean point of view and underlined that the 
EU would not adjust to US rules later on. The disagreements could not be resolved during 
the sixth round (Agence Europe, 2002a, 2001a; Manger, 2009, pp. 173–174). The EU and 
Chile therefore held another three negotiating rounds in January, March and April 2002, 
which finally closed all chapters and ultimately even resolved the above-mentioned points of 
disagreement (Agence Europe, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f). The negotiations on the 
EU-Chile FTA drew to an end in time for the second EU-Latin America Summit in May 
2002. The agreement was signed in November 2002 and entered into force in February 2003 
(European Commission, 2014b). 
 
The conclusion of the EU-Chile FTA marks a milestone in the emergence of the EU’s 
international investment policy for several reasons. First, the EU-Chile FTA contains 
comprehensive commitments on market access for investors in services44 and non-services45 
sectors like agriculture, mining and manufacturing. Investors generally benefit from MFN 
and/or NT under the FTA. The commitments are scheduled in the form of a GATS-like 
positive list. This list did not significantly enhance market access for European investors in 
Chile, but it codified and consolidated the existing degree of openness. It is therefore much 
easier for investors to use than the EU-Mexico FTA, which merely includes a standstill 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 See Annexe VII of the EU-Chile FTA.  
45 See Annexe X of the EU-Chile FTA.  
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clause regarding service-related investment but no consolidated schedule. The inclusion of 
investment commitments in non-service sectors, moreover, marks the ‘emancipation’ and 
emergence of a proper European approach to the regulation of investments in FTAs, which is 
independent from the regulation of services trade. Second, the EU-Chile FTA also partly 
liberalises the movement of key personnel.46 The establishment of investments not only 
requires the transfer of capital, but also the ability of investors to manage and build their 
affiliates. The movement of key personnel is thus crucial to investment liberalisation. Third, 
the EU-Chile FTA includes a clause encouraging Chile and the Member States to conclude 
BITs.47 The FTA thus seeks to establish an encompassing investment framework. Finally, 
the EU-Chile FTA provides for the liberalisation of capital movements – including FDI, 
payments and profits – under specific commitments as well as under the relevant OECD 
codes.48  
 
7.3.5 Conclusion 
To summarise, the analysis of the EU-Chile FTA negotiations primarily lends support to the 
supranational hypothesis H1. Since the launch of the pre-negotiations, the Commission was 
highly proactive and sought to quickly advance the project in EU-internal debates and in 
talks with Chile. Once the core negotiations on the EU-Chile FTA had started, the 
Commission in cooperation with the Swedish Council Presidency acted as determined policy 
entrepreneurs in order to ensure the inclusion of an ambitious and so far unseen investment 
chapter in the FTA. To that end, the Commission drew on its agenda setting powers and 
technical expertise to build trust and to convince the Member States of its policy agenda. 
What is more, it invoked the evolving trade agenda and notably the WTO agenda in order to 
increase pressure on the Member States to accept the inclusion on non-service investment 
commitments. The intriguing twist to this observation is obviously that the Commission had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 See Annexe X of the EU-Chile FTA, pp. 1,212-1,220. 
47 See Article 21(b) of the EU-Chile FTA.  
48 See Articles 164 and 165 of the EU-Chile FTA.  
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been the main promoter of investment negotiations in the WTO once the MAI talks had 
broken down. The policy entrepreneurship of the Commission reflected both functionalist 
and power considerations. The Commission was convinced that it was in Europe’s best 
interest to conclude an ambitious FTA with Chile. It, however, also wanted to ward off 
another humiliating defeat against the Member States and consolidate the EU’s role in 
international investment policy.  
 
As stipulated in the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2, European business was 
interested in the EU-Chile FTA talks and pushed for investment provisions. European 
business worried about the detrimental effects of a planned, highly ambitious FTA between 
the USA and Chile. Most observers, however, agree that the Member States’ acceptance of 
the comprehensive and so far unseen investment chapter in the EU-Chile FTA primarily 
reflected the Commission’s campaigning rather than European business lobbying. The 
decision of the Member States to cooperate and to delegate negotiating on international 
investment disciplines to the Commission thus confirms supranational rather than 
intergovernmental and business-centred causalities.   
 
7.4 Beyond Chile – Investment provisions in bilateral EU agreements 
The negotiations on the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTAs were the first bilateral trade 
negotiations between the EU and third countries to cover comprehensive investment 
commitments. At the same time, the Member States negotiated on the Treaty of Nice (2000-
2001) and ultimately held the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003). While the 
Nice Treaty extended the Union’s exclusive competence under the Common Commercial 
Policy toward the regulations of services trade and service-related investments, the draft 
constitution even proposed to generally bring FDI regulation under exclusive Union 
competence. Taken together, these events triggered reflections in the Council of Ministers 
about the EU’s long-term strategy on international investment. The ‘113/133 Committee’ 
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reportedly established an expert group which examined, in cooperation with the 
Commission, the cast of investment chapters in future EU trade and investment agreements 
(Interview, Brussels, 24 July 2012a; Interview, telephone, 14 November 2013). 
 
In 2006, the Commission presented its so-called Minimum Platform on Investment (MPoI). 
The MPoI codified and standardised in many regards the investment approach adopted in the 
EU-Chile FTA. It proposed a single chapter on establishment i.e. investment for future EU 
trade and investment agreements. Investment liberalisation should proceed on the basis of a 
GATS-like positive list. Investors in liberalised sectors should benefit from MFN and NT at 
the pre- and post-establishment stage and have the right to send key personnel to their 
affiliates in host countries. The MPoI, moreover, proposed the inclusion of a non-lowering of 
standards clause into the establishment chapter. The clause would prevent countries lowering 
their social, health, labour or environmental standards to the end of attracting additional 
inward investments. The MPoI laid out the first comprehensive EU approach to market 
access and post-establishment treatment under future EU trade and investment agreements. It 
did not, however, contain any provisions on investment protection as typically found in 
Member State BITs or NAFTA-like trade and investment agreements (European 
Commission, 2006).  
 
The MPoI was not in use for long. In December 2007, the Member States signed the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which replaced the failed Constitutional Treaty. Article 207 TFEU finally 
provided the EU with the exclusive competences to regulate FDI. It arguably empowered the 
EU to conclude full-fledged trade and investment agreements covering market access, post-
establishment treatment and investment protection provisions. The Council of Ministers 
consequently instructed the Commission to reach for comprehensive investment chapters – 
covering market access, post-establishment treatment and investment protection – in the 
FTA negotiations with Malaysia, Singapore, India, Canada and the USA. The negotiations 
on the EU-Canada FTA (CETA) are reportedly the most advanced talks. CETA is likely to 
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become the EU’s first highly comprehensive FTA and will thereby set a new European 
standard for international investment regulation.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the FTA negotiations between the EU and Mexico as well as the EU 
and Chile. It sought to answer two questions. First, why was the EU allowed to negotiate on 
investment provisions with these countries? And second, why does the EU-Mexico FTA 
contain only limited investment provisions, whereas the EU-Chile FTA encompasses 
significant investment commitments?   
 
The analysis finds that supranational thinking and hypothesis H1 better account for the EU’s 
growing de facto competences in FTA negotiations than liberal intergovernmental thinking 
and hypothesis H2. In both cases, the Commission was eager negotiate a comprehensive 
FTA. It pushed proactively for ambitious investment disciplines and sought to speed up 
negotiations in EU-internal debates and negotiations with Mexico and Chile. European 
business was also interested in the conclusion of ambitious FTAs and – in contrast to all 
other examined international negotiations – lobbied policy-makers to that end. At first, the 
Member States showed similarly interested in the conclusion of ambitious FTAs with inter 
alia investment provisions. Toward the end of the negotiations with Mexico, certain Member 
States, however, suddenly blocked the inclusion of ambitious service and investment 
provisions due to competence and sovereignty concerns. In order to ward off another clash in 
the EU-Chile negotiations, the Commission subsequently used its agenda-setting powers, 
technical expertise and the evolving trade agenda. It toured Member State capitals and 
stressed that the EU could not credibly negotiate and push for investment provisions in the 
WTO, if it did not include such disciplines in its FTAs. The argument reportedly worked 
well as the Member States had previously called for ambitious WTO negotiations. Taking 
into consideration that the Commission had been the main promoter of investment 
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negotiation in the WTO, the observation constitutes an intriguing instance of Commission 
entrepreneurship across international negotiating fora. The Commission’s tour of Member 
State capittals built trust and pressured the Member States in maintaining their support for 
such disciplines. The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship was successful. The EU-Chile 
FTA became the first bilateral trade agreement of the EU to contain a proper investment 
chapter. It set a new standard and all following FTAs contain similar investment provisions. 
The extension of the EU’s de facto competences in international investment policy toward 
bilateral negotiations with third countries thus manifestly reflected Commission 
entrepreneurship.  
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Chapter VIII – The evolution of the EU’s legal competences 
in international investment policy 
 
 
 
The previous chapters examined the EU’s involvement in multilateral and bilateral 
investment negotiations since the 1980s despite the Union’s manifest lack of legal 
competences to regulate international investment flows. The present chapter complements 
the preceding analysis. It traces the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment policy as enshrined in European primary and secondary law since the 1950s. The 
chapter builds on the assumption that the evolution of the EU’s de facto competences 
influences the EU’s legal competences. If the Member States informally cooperate to 
regulate an issue area, it should create functional pressures to formalise cooperation inter alia 
to ensure swift and effective policy-making as well as regulatory coherence (see chaper III). 
De facto competences are defined as informal temporary Member State cooperation in daily 
policy-making, whereas legal competences are defined as formal permanent Member State 
cooperation. As discussed in the analytical framework, informal temporary cooperation 
normally preceds formal permanent cooperation among the Member States in EU foreign 
economic policy (Klein, 2013). De facto and legal competences should thus be considered as 
consecutive and interdependent stages of Member State cooperation. In short, if the EU 
holds de facto competences in a policy domain, it should promote the extension of the EU’s 
relevant legal competences.  
 
The chapter finds that supranational thinking and hypothesis H1 best describe intensifying 
Member State cooperation. The Commission persistently used its agenda-setting powers, 
invoked implied competences, pointed to the evolving trade agenda and the EU’s growing de 
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facto competences and had strategic recourse to legal review in order to make the Member 
States agree to permanent cooperation and an extension of the EU’s legal competences in 
international investment policy. The Commission’s astounding insistence reflected 
functionalist as well as power considerations. The Commission thought that international 
investment complements and substitutes classic trade and should therefore come under the 
scope of the CCP. At the same time, it sought to assert control over the last major issue area 
of foreign economic policy not yet integrated at the EU level. The Commission’s policy 
entrepreneurship showed only limited success for many years, as the Member States sought 
to contain the EU in this policy domain. The breakthrough under the Lisbon Treaty, which 
finaly brought the regulation of FDI under the scope of the CCP, reflected Commission 
entrepreneurship as well as the procedural particularities of the Convention. The Convention 
method limited Member State and technocratic control over Treaty revisions and thereby 
facilitated Commission entrepreneurship.  
 
The chapter lends no support to intergovernmental hypothesis H2. European business was 
ambivalent or divided over the question of whether international investment policy-making 
should be integrated at the EU-level. Business lobbying cannot be considered as a driving 
force behind the extension of the EU’s legal competences. The Member States, moreover, 
were persistently opposed to extending the EU’s legal competences in this domain. They 
sought to defend their last stronghold in foreign economic policy-making in the form of 
national BIT programs against European encroachment. The Member States ultimately and 
unwillingly accepted an extension of the CCP to FDI regulation due to the Commission’s 
smart manoeuvring in the special setting of the Convention.   
 
A brief note on the purpose and place of this chapter in the overarching structure of the 
thesis is appropriate here. It has been suggested that the analysis of the EU’s legal 
competences should be chronologically integrated with the analyses of the international 
investment negotiations. The analysis of the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty, for instance, 
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should follow the examination of the Uruguay Round. This suggestion is convincing at first 
sight, but neglects analytical problems. First, many negotiations took place in parallel. A 
truly chronological account would be very confusing for the reader. Second, the Convention 
on the Future of Europe, which ultimately initiated the extension of the CCP to FDI 
regulation, actually sits at the end of a long chain of international investment negotiations 
and EU-internal debates. The purpose of this chapter is indeed to shed light on the way 
toward, and debates during, the Convention leading to the CCP reform. To analyse the 
Convention after the chapters on international investment negotiations actually constitutes a 
logical endpoint of the thesis.  
 
8.1 First steps – The EU and international investment regulation from the 
1950s to the 1980s 
Veritable debates on the EU’s role and legal competences in international investment policy 
did not start before the late 1980s. International investment was a marginal phenomenon and 
of limited economic importance before then (see Chapter II). Neither European business nor 
policy-makers took a strong interest in international investment policy in general or the EU’s 
role and competences in particular. EU-internal policy-making debates, nonetheless, touched 
twice on this issue during the first three decades of European Integration. First, the 
preparatory debates on the Treaty of Rome briefly raised the question of the EU’s role in the 
regulation of international investment flows. Second, the Commission proposed the creation 
of a European export policy in the 1970s, which would, inter alia, encompass the conclusion 
of investment protection agreements between the EU and third countries. The Member 
States, however, rejected the Commission’s plans. While these debates appeared in isolation 
and were not part of broader reflections on a EU international investment policy, they 
nevertheless lend support to supranational thinking and indirectly to hypothesis H2. 
Institutional dynamics such as functional spill-overs exerted pressure on the Member States 
to cooperate in international investment regulation.   
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8.1.1 The Treaty of Rome  
The Treaty of Rome did not provide the EU with legal competences in the regulation of 
international investment flows. The preparatory debates on the Treaty of Rome nevertheless 
touched on the issue. The publication of the Spaak Report in April 1956 marked the kick-off 
for in-depth discussions on the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the EU. The 
Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Italy – had commissioned an intergovernmental 
committee headed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, to evaluate 
and further develop the plan to create a Common Market. The report discussed the 
objectives, overarching rules and institutions of a Common Market (Bakker, 1996, pp. 30–
33). 
 
The report’s section on the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) did not touch on investment-
related questions. Instead, it exclusively focused on the establishment of a customs union, a 
common external tariff and the abolishment of import and export quotas vis-à-vis third 
countries (Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, 1956, p. 75). This 
focus reflected the then still limited working agenda of the GATT. Issues like international 
investment, trade in services or technical barriers to trade did not become the subject of 
GATT discussions before the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
The need for an external capital regime? The report, nonetheless, touched upon the EU’s 
potential role in the regulation of international investment flows in its section on the free 
movement of capital. The report stipulated that the Common Market should provide for the 
free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. The free movement of capital – a 
scarce production factor in post-war Europe – should promote its efficient allocation, 
stimulate economic growth and welfare gains (Comité intergouvernemental créé par la 
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conférence de Messine, 1956, pp. 92–93). The report, however, cautioned that the 
liberalisation of capital movements – including foreign direct investment – would require 
several accompanying actions49 and, notably, the creation of a common external capital 
regime. The absence of such a regime, the report warned, would create a regulatory gap. 
Capital could enter and exit the Common Market through Member States with liberal 
external capital regimes and then flow into Member States with more protectionist external 
capital regimes.  
 
« Le […]  obstacle, c’est la possibilité que les capitaux passent d’un pays vers un autre, non 
pour s’y investir mais pour échapper vers l’extérieur au bénéfice d’une inégalité dans la 
rigueur des contrôles. La liberté de la circulation des capitaux à l’intérieur du marché 
commun appelle donc dans les relations avec les pays tiers une certaine attitude commune 
qui  […]  au stade finale, aboutirait à une égale liberté ou à un dégrée de contrôle 
équivalent.» .50 
(Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, 1956, pp. 93–94) 
 
The report implicitly advised the states to empower the EU to regulate market access for 
foreign investors to maintain regulatory coherence across the Common Market. Since the 
EU’s very inception, institutional dynamics in the form of spill-overs thus exerted pressure 
on the Member States to cooperate in international investment regulation. The question of 
intensifying integration emerged without business lobbying and Member State preferences 
favouring such a step. So while Commission entrepreneurship did not promote an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 The Spaak Report stresses that the creation of a Common Market for Capital would require 1) the 
harmonisation of capital taxation to prevent capital flight, 2) the harmonisation of monetary policies 
to prevent exchange rate fluctuations and 3) the creation of structural development funds in order to 
channel capital back into less competitive regions of the Common Market.   
50 “The problem is that capital may flow from one country to another not for investment purposes but 
to exit the Common Market by taking advantage of varying national external capital regimes. The free 
movement of capital within the Common Market thus requires at the final stage a common approach 
in relation to third countries which should end in a common level of openess or degree of control.” 
Author’s own translation. 
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intensification of Member State cooperation in this domain yet, the observation nevertheless 
lends support to supranational thinking. 
 
The Member States reject the creation of an external capital regime: The Spaak Report 
became the basis for negotiations on the Treaty of Rome, which were held between June 
1956 and March 1957. The governments followed the recommendations of the Spaak Report 
in regard to trade policy. They provided the Union with the exclusive competence to regulate 
the Common Market’s external trade relations in Article 113 EC. The wording of Article 113 
EC clearly reflected the as yet limited understanding of trade policy of the 1950s and did not 
encompass the regulation of international investment flows. The governments followed only 
partly the recommendations of the Spaak Report in regard to capital movements due to 
sovereignty concerns. They did not provide the EU with competences to regulate capital 
movements between the Common Market and third countries. This diversion from the Spaak 
Report is not surprising. The Member States adopted a cautious approach to the liberalisation 
of capital movements within the Common Market. While Articles 67-73 EC in principle 
liberalised capital movements, Article 69 EC underlined that the free movement of capital 
was only a subordinate Treaty freedom. The liberalisation of capital movements should only 
proceed to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market for goods and 
services (Bakker, 1996, pp. 42–44; Ohler, 2002, pp. 1–3; Usher, 1992, pp. 35–37). What is 
more, the articles regarding the free movement of capital should not be directly enforceable 
but require the implementation of secondary legislation (Ohler, 2002, pp. 1–3). The Member 
States waited almost three decades before enacting any significant implementing legislation 
so as to advance the liberalisation of capital movements within the Common Market. The 
manifest hesitation of most Member State governments reflected their worries that a 
liberalisation of capital movements would undermine their Keynesian macroeconomic 
policies, taxation regimes and, lastly, sovereignty (Bakker, 1996, pp. 32–36). It was only 
with the demise of the Keynesian economic paradigm and the emergence of the neoliberal 
one in the 1980s that the Member States revised their positions on capital movements. In 
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conclusion, the Treaty of Rome did not provide the EU with its first legal competences in 
international investment policy, but the examination of the preparatory debates already 
pointed to the importance of institutional dynamics in the long-term evolution of this policy 
field.  
 
8.1.2 First debates on European BITs in the 1970s 
Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the EU’s legal competences in 
international investment policy did not resurface as a topic in EU-internal discussions for 
more than a decade. Only the debates on the creation of a European export policy and related 
Opinion 1//75 of the ECJ brought the topic up again. While previous EU-internal debates 
had only indirectly touched on the EU’s competences in international investment regulation, 
these debates indeed focused on whether and how the EU could regulate the activities of 
international investors under the CCP. The debates constitute a first instance of Commission 
entrepreneurship to the end of consolidating the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment regulation. 
 
The Commission proposes a European BIT program: In late 1972 and 1975, the 
Commission published two draft regulations, which sought to establish a European export 
policy as an integral part of the CCP (Deutscher Bundestag, 1976; Johannsen, 2009, pp. 5–6; 
Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1977, pp. 54–59). One draft regulation foresaw the creation of a 
European investment guarantee agency. The agency should provide investment guarantees to 
European investment projects in third countries. The Commission explained in its proposal 
that joint investment projects of investors from different Member States had insufficient 
coverage through national schemes. The European scheme should be complementary. The 
investment guarantees should insure investors against non-commercial investment risks like 
war, riots, expropriation, payment restrictions and major exchange rate fluctuations. Access 
to common investment guarantees should be conditional on the existence or conclusion of 
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investment protection agreements i.e. BITs between the EU and the concerned third 
countries (Johannsen, 2009, pp. 5–6; Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1977, pp. 54–59). The 
Commission’s proposal thus emulated the German approach to international investment 
policy. The German government had conceived of BITs in order to lower its financial 
exposure under state-backed investment guarantees (Interview, Berlin, 17 February 2012; 
Poulsen, 2010, pp. 555–557). The Commission’s draft regulation referred to Article 113 EC 
as the competence basis for the creation of the EU investment guarantee agency and the 
conclusion of EU BITs covering post-establishment treatment, protection and compensation 
standards.  
 
The Commission’s strategic recourse to legal review: In July 1975, the Commission 
stepped up pressure on the Member States to accept its draft regulations and to acknowledge 
the EU’s competence over export policy through the strategic recourse to legal review by the 
ECJ. It called on the ECJ to assess in Opinion 1/75 the EU’s legal competences to enter into 
the so-called “Understanding on a Local Cost Standard” drafted in the OECD. This 
gentlemen agreement sought to establish ground rules for export policies including 
investment guarantee schemes in order to prevent unfair international competition among 
OECD exporters and investors. The Commission argued that the EU should adhere and 
enforce the OECD standard on behalf of the Member States due to its exclusive competence 
over export policy under the CCP. The ECJ partly confirmed the EU’s competence under 
Article 113 EC to adhere to the agreement and to harmonise Member States’ export policies. 
Lawyers interpreted the ECJ’s Opinion as an encouragement and wakeup call for the 
Commission to get active and to regulate in this domain as foreseen in the CCP provisions 
(Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1977, pp. 56–57). 
 
The Member States reject the Commission’s call for a European BIT program: The 
Member States did not receive the draft regulations and Opinion 1/75! well. They were 
unwilling to create a European export policy. The Council criticised the Commission’s draft 
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regulations and argued that the CCP provisions and Opinion 1/75 provided for the 
harmonisation of national export policies but did not call for the creation of a complementary 
EU policy. The German government stressed that national export policies provided sufficient 
coverage to all European investment and export projects. The German Bundestag warned 
that the creation of an EU investment guarantee scheme would bear incalculable financial 
risks for German taxpayers and was unacceptable. The French government sought to protect 
its competences and sovereignty. The EU was entitled to harmonise national policies, but did 
not hold the necessary competences to become a proper actor in this domain (Johannsen, 
2009, pp. 5–6; Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1977, pp. 56, 59). To conclude, the episode points to a 
first instance of determined policy entrepreneurship of the Commission. In accordance with 
hypothesis H1, the Commission used its agenda setting powers and legal recourse to pressure 
the Member States into acceptance. Opinion 1/75 and the CCP provisions, however, did not 
entail a legal necessity to create a EU BIT program, which the Member States pointed out to 
keep the Commission at bay.  
 
8.2 The Treaty of Maastricht 
The previous section highlighted two isolated instances of EU-internal discussions, which 
touched on the EU’s legal competences and role in international investment policy. They 
imply that since the EU’s earliest days, institutional dynamics such as spill-overs and 
Commission entrepreneurship played a pivotal role in promoting the EU’s involvement and 
legal competences in international investment policy. Focused in-depth discussions on the 
scope of the EU’s legal competences to regulate international investments albeit only really 
started with the Uruguay Round (see Chapter IV) and the intergovernmental conference 
(IGC) on the Treaty of Maastricht in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The negotiations during 
the IGC on the Treaty of Maastricht touched directly and indirectly on the EU’s legal 
competences in this domain. The Commission again acted as policy entrepreneur and 
pointed to the evolving trade agenda in the GATT (see chapter IV) and invoked implied 
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competences – or in its own words sought to ‘clarify’ the EU’s existing legal competences – 
so as to consolidate the EU’s role inter alia in international investment policy. In the absence 
of business support for such plans, the Member States blocked the Commission’s attempt. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, nevertheless, provided the EU with implicit shared external 
competences to regulate market access for investment ‘by accident’. The Member States 
finally created a common external capital regime for the emerging Single Market for capital, 
which necessarily affected the regulation of international investment flows. The EU’s legal 
competences thus grew due to unintended institutional interactions and spill-overs. Both – 
the debates on the CCP reform and the creation of an external capital regime – lend support 
to supranational thinking and hypothesis H1, but contradict the liberal intergovernmental 
hypothesis H2. The drivers of European Integration were clearly the Commission or 
institutional dynamics, whereas business was little active and the Member State governments 
acted as brakemen. The following section traces these debates and develops the argument in 
more detail.  
 
8.2.1 Unsuccessful Commission entrepreneurship to ‘update’ the CCP  
Commission entrepreneurship through agenda setting, invoking implied competences, 
the evolving trade agenda and the EU’s de facto competences: The Member States 
convened for the IGC on the Treaty of Maastricht between December 1991 and February 
1992. In March 1991, the Commission published a report on the functioning of the EU and 
advisable modifications to the European Treaties so as to prepare the IGC and facilitate 
negotiations. The Commission used its agenda setting prerogative to highlight vis-à-vis the 
Member States the CCP as an area in urgent need of reform. The Commission proposed to 
rename the CCP the ‘Common Policy of External Economic Relations’. It stressed that the 
new external economic relations policy would encompass the regulation of trade in goods, 
services, export policy, intellectual property rights, capital movements, investments, 
establishment and competition through trade agreements and autonomous measures. It 
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underlined that the EU would be competent to regulate investment liberalisation as well as 
investment protection (Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States, 1991a, pp. 16, 28–29). 
 
The Commission, moreover, emphasised that the EU had always held implied legal 
competences in these areas. Advancing a teleological interpretation of the CCP provisions, it 
argued that the proposed modifications only sought to consolidate and to clarify the EU’s 
implied competences. They did not substantially broaden the scope of the EU’s legal 
competences in foreign economic relations (Conference of the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States, 1991a, pp. 16, 28–29). The Commission argued that the 
main purpose of the EU’s competences under the CCP should be the effective representation 
of the EU’s Single Market regime in GATT negotiations. Hence, the scope of the CCP – as 
intermediary between the Single Market and the GATT regime – had to be congruent with 
the agenda of GATT negotiations (Eeckhout, 2011, p. 28). 
 
Finally – and relatedly – the Commission pointed out that the EU already held de facto 
competences over these issues in the Uruguay Round (see chapter IV). It was thus only a 
matter of formalising existing realities. The proposed modifications would finally end the 
long-lasting controversy with the Member States over the scope of the CCP and would 
ensure the effective ‘representation of the union on the external scene and notably in 
dealings with international organizations’ (Conference of the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States, 1991a, p. 28).  
 
European business shows little interest: In contrast to the assumptions enshrined in the 
liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2, European business showed fairly little interest in 
debates on the reform of the CCP. The archive of the Council of Ministers contains the 
formal submission of UNICE to the IGC (Conference of the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States, 1991f, p. 9). The UNICE position paper of 10 April 
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1991 did not exclusively focus on the reform of the CCP. It discussed the views of UNICE 
on all Treaty chapters and advisable changes. The paper remained comparatively vague on 
the CCP, which implies that the CCP reform was not a priority for European business. The 
only substantive demand from UNICE to European policy-makers was that trade policy 
measures should be subject to qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers so as to 
ensure swift and effective decision-making (Conference of the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States, 1991f, p. 9). The paper thus implicitly called upon the 
Member States to bring the scope of the CCP in line with the agenda of the Uruguay Round. 
The absence of any explicit mention of investment regulation suggests that European 
business did not take a strong interest in this particular issue. It needs to be mentioned here 
though that it is difficult to reconstruct the detailed preferences of European business since 
more than two decades have passed. Business federations tend to have short institutional 
memories; most do not archive their documents and their employees typically change jobs 
every few years.  
 
The Member States determinedly reject the Commission’s proposal: Again in contrast to 
the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2, the Member States did not receive the 
Commission’s recommendations during the IGC!well. As reported in Chapter IV, during the 
debates on the Commission’s negotiating mandate in September 1986 the Member States 
had collectively underlined that the Commission’s role as their single voice in the Uruguay 
Round would not prejudge the distribution of legal competences on the new trade issues. 
The Member States obviously felt that most new trade issues came under national 
competence and that there was no functional need to delegate and extend the EU’s legal 
competences. From the Member States’ point of view, the Commission was arguably trying 
to overthrow the EU-internal gentlemen’s agreement not to raise competence questions 
during the Uruguay Round. Instead the Commission exploited the EU’s de facto 
competences in the Uruguay Round, so as to extend the EU’s legal competences under the 
CCP. The Council archive unfortunately does not cover in detail the intergovernmental 
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debates on the Treaty of Maastricht. It does, nevertheless, contain several draft Treaties 
discussed during the IGC. The evolution of these draft Treaties allows for some inference 
regarding the positions of the Member States on the recommendations of the Commission. A 
first draft Treaty of 17 April 1991 maintained the new name of the CCP as ‘Common Policy 
of External Economic Relations’. It stated, however, that the new policy should only cover 
the regulation of trade in goods and services. The Member States directly discarded the 
proposed reference to international investment regulation. Hence, the Member States must 
have immediately concurred that international investment regulation was and should remain 
under national competence. The following Treaty drafts consecutively revoked all other 
proposed modifications to the CCP articles. The final text of the Treaty of Maastricht did not 
contain any changes to the CCP and hence the EU’s competences in foreign economic 
relations (Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
1991b, p. 31, 1991c, p. 30, 1991d, p. 31, 1991e, p. 59; Eeckhout, 2011, pp. 26–27). 
 
In conclusion, the Commission sought to promote an extension/clarification of the EU’s 
legal competences inter alia in international investment policy. To that end, it used its agenda 
setting powers, invoked alleged implied competences and pointed to the evolving trade 
agenda and the EU’s de facto competences over the so-called new trade issues. While 
European business was little interested in the CCP reform, the Member States blocked the 
Commission’s attempts. In the absence of business lobbying and seeing arguably no 
functional need to revise the CCP provisions, they determinedly rebuked the Commission’s 
attempt to revise the gentlemen agreement from Punta Del Este not to use the EU’s de facto 
competences in the Uruguay Round to grasp more power. While the Commission did not 
succeed, the observations mostly lend support to supranational thinking and hypothesis H1. 
Pressure for integration came from the Commission and institutional dynamics rather than 
European business or the Member States.  
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8.2.2 Competence ‘by accident’ – A common external capital regime for the 
Single Market 
The Treaty of Maastricht did not reform the CCP. It, nevertheless, provided the EU with first 
legal competences relevant for the regulation of international investment flows under the 
chapter on capital movements. As mentioned above, the Treaty of Rome in theory liberalised 
capital movements within the Common Market. The liberalisation of capital movements, 
however, was not directly enforceable but required the implementation of secondary 
legislation. The Member States were unwilling to enact measures, which would substantially 
liberalise capital movements within the Common Market, during the first three decades of 
European Integration. Most Member States feared that a liberalisation of capital and current 
accounts would trigger capital flights and exchange rate fluctuations, which would 
undermine their Keynesian macroeconomic policies and ability to tax (Interview, Paris, 19 
October 2011; Bakker, 1996, pp. 32–36; Ohler, 2002, pp. 1–3). 
 
The neoliberal turn in European politics: The Member States reconsidered their stance on 
the liberalisation of capital movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1970s, 
the Member States had to deal with profound economic crises. Keynesian macroeconomic 
and monetary policies did not succeed in easing these crises, but instead produced 
stagflation. The failure of Keynesian policies fuelled the emergence of the neoliberal 
economic paradigm in Western countries. The neoliberal paradigm prescribed the reduction 
of state intervention and the deregulation and international opening of national economies in 
order to strengthen market mechanisms and the efficient use of production factors. In line 
with this new paradigm, several Member States unilaterally liberalised capital movements 
(Bakker, 1996, pp. 169–177). In 1982, the European Council, moreover, decided to advance 
and to finalise the Single Market for goods, services, and labour as well as capital by 1992 in 
order to inject a new impetus into the ailing European economy. Intergovernmental debates 
on the liberalisation of capital movements, and thus the creation of a Single Market for 
capital, continued during the mid-1980s (Bakker, 1996, pp. 161–162; European 
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Commission, 1985, pp. 5–6; OECD, 2002, pp. 27–28). The Single European Act (SEA; 
1987) and a new capital movements directive (1986) did not significantly advance the 
liberalisation of capital movements within the EU (Bakker, 1996, pp. 177–181). They, 
nonetheless, underlined the political will of European policy-makers to create a Single 
Market for capital. In 1988, the Commission’s long-standing insistence on a comprehensive 
liberalisation of capital movements finally paid off. The Council of Ministers came around 
and adopted the Commission’s draft directive 88/361/EEC. The directive instantaneously 
liberalised capital movements, obliged the Member States to dismantle their capital control 
systems and finally created a veritable Single Market for capital (Bakker, 1996, pp. 210–
212).  
 
The creation of the Single Market for capital was perceived as a milestone of European 
Integration. European policy-makers nevertheless soon realised that the job was not finished 
yet. Directive 88/361/EEC had dismantled all capital controls and barriers within the Single 
Market. But it had not established a common external capital regime. The directive had thus 
created the regulatory gap, which had already been problematised in the Spaak Report three 
decades earlier in 1956. Capital could circumvent the external capital regimes of rather 
protectionist Member States, like France, by flowing in and out of the Single Market through 
liberal Member States without capital controls, like the United Kingdom. The Council of 
Ministers soon started looking into this problem and possible remedies (Bakker, 1996, pp. 
230–231). In the course of these debates, which started in late 1988 and continued until the 
end of the IGC on the Treaty of Maastricht, two camps formed.   
 
A liberal camp pushes for the ‘erga omnes’ principle: The first camp wanted the creation 
of an external capital regime based on the ‘erga omnes’ principle. In other words, the 
unconditional liberalisation of capital movements within the Single Market should be 
extended toward third countries. The Commission and a majority of Member States – 
namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy – supported this plan. Three 
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considerations informed their position (Bakker, 1996, pp. 230–231). First, the freeing of 
capital movements to and from the Single Market was thought to enhance the functioning of 
market mechanisms and thus to promote welfare. Second, an open Single Market for capital 
should bolster the confidence of investors in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and force 
the Member States to pursue sustainable budgetary policies. Third, several Member States 
had unilaterally liberalised their capital markets during the 1980s and were unwilling to 
partially close them again (Hindelang, 2009, pp. 24–30; Ohler, 2002, p. 39). 
 
Other Member States campaign for a preferential and reciprocal liberalisation: The 
second camp favoured a common external capital regime based on a differential and 
reciprocal liberalisation of capital movements between the Single Market and third countries. 
The United Kingdom and France were the main supporters of this position. The United 
Kingdom held a strong offensive interest in this domain due to its important financial 
services sector. It wanted a liberalisation of capital movements vis-à-vis third countries on 
the basis of reciprocity. The British government worried that a liberalisation of capital 
movements based on the ‘erga omnes’ principle would deprive the EU of its bargaining 
power in international negotiations on market access. France, on the other hand, felt that 
only close partners should enjoy free access to the Single Market for capital (Bakker, 1996, 
pp. 193, 230). 
 
The liberal camp prevails: In the end, the former camp prevailed during the IGC debates. 
Article 57 EC implemented the ‘erga omnes’ principle. It comprehensively liberalised all 
capital movements between the Single Market and third countries. Article 57 EC, moreover, 
stated that the EU – but not the individual Member States – could reimpose temporary 
capital restriction in the event of major economic and monetary turmoil in a Member State or 
in order to comply with international sanctions (Hindelang, 2009, pp. 37–38; Usher, 1992, 
pp. 42–43, 46–47). After the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECJ and expert 
lawyers concluded that Article 57 EC provided the Union with a shared, implicit, external 
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competence to regulate market access regarding extra-EU FDI flows (Dimopoulos, 2011, p. 
78). The new, shared competence of the EU did not translate into heightened European 
regulatory activity in this domain. From a policy-makers perspective, the main consequence 
was that the individual Member States had to be careful to individually regulate and to 
conclude international agreements in this domain. Once the EU would start regulating extra-
EU capital movements, the Member States would lose their ability to individually regulate 
and would need to cooperate under the umbrella of the EU to enact measures in this domain. 
The Maastricht Treaty thereby created an essential building block for an EU international 
investment policy although neither the Member States nor the Commission had aimed for 
this. The EU acquired its first legal competence in international investment policy very much 
by accident as a product of a functional spill-over (necessity to create a common external 
capital regime) and unintended institutional effect (shared, implied external competence to 
regulate market access of FDI). While these observations neither confirm hypotheses H1 or 
H2, they nevertheless suggest that supranational integration dynamics better account for this 
advancement in European Integration than intergovernmental concepts.  
 
8.3 The Commission calls on the ECJ to recognise the EU’s legal 
competences 
During the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States had immediately brushed off 
the Commission’s attempt to ‘clarify’ the allegedly highly comprehensive scope of the CCP. 
But despite this first political defeat, the Commission remained determined to have the 
Member States recognise the EU’s exclusive competence under the CCP to regulate all new 
trade issues of the Uruguay Round, including international investment. In accordance with 
the supranational hypothesis H1, the Commission sought to invoke alleged implied 
competences, the evolving trade agenda and made strategic use of legal recourse in order to 
make the Member States accept the EU’s alleged legal competences over international 
investment policy-making. By 1995, the Commission and the Member States opposed each 
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other in two legal proceedings before the ECJ, which in essence examined the scope of the 
CCP and inter alia the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy. In contrast 
to hypothesis H2, the Member States determinedly rejected the Commission’s claim and 
harshly criticised the Commission’s power-maximising behaviour. The pleadings of the 
Commission and the Member States provide important insights into the dynamics behind the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. This section remains silent on 
business preferences, as European business hardly ever takes an interest in technical, legal 
proceedings at the ECJ.  
 
8.3.1 Opinion 1/94 – The Commission seeks to revisit its Maastricht defeat 
Opinion 1/94 was, in essence, a continuation of the IGC debates on the scope of the CCP. 
After eight years of negotiations, the GATT parties had finally concluded the Uruguay 
Round in April 1994. The outcome of these lengthy negotiations was the WTO Agreement, 
which encompassed in its annexe, inter alia, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). As could 
be expected, the Commission and the Member States disagreed over the question of whether 
the scope of the CCP was sufficiently broad to enable the EU to conclude the WTO 
Agreement and its annexes or whether it had to be concluded as a mixed agreement under 
participation of the individual Member States. In April 1994, the Commission decided to 
refer this legal question to the ECJ (Eeckhout, 2011, p. 27; Koutrakos, 2006, p. 41). 
 
The Commission invokes the EU’s implied and de facto competences and the evolving 
international trade agenda: In accordance with hypothesis H1, the Commission invoked in 
its submission to the ECJ alleged implied competences and pointed to the evolving trade 
agenda in order to claim exclusive Union competence over the conclusion of the WTO 
Agreement and its annexes. Mixed ratification under participation of the Member States was, 
it argued, not a legal necessity. The Commission developed a twofold justification for its 
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position. First, the CCP articles had to be interpreted in a teleological manner. In other 
words, the authors of the Treaties had conceived the CCP in 1956/57 in order to ensure the 
effective representation of the Union in trade negotiations and notably in GATT talks. 
Hence, the legal scope of the CCP had to evolve in line with the international trade and 
GATT agenda. The Commission had advanced the same argument during the IGC debates 
(Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 40–41). Second, the Commission added that the Union also held 
implied, exclusive, external competences regarding all issues covered in the WTO 
Agreement and its annexes under other Treaty chapters (Eeckhout, 2011, pp. 87–89). It 
needs mention that although the Commission’s submission did not explicitly dwell on the 
Union’s legal competences in international investment policy, it contained the implicit claim 
that the Union held comprehensive competences in this domain. The WTO Agreement and 
its annexes covered investment liberalisation (GATS) and post-establishment treatment 
(TRIMs & TRIPs Agreements), which accordingly had to fall under exclusive Union 
competence (Johannsen, 2009, p. 7). The Commission’s teleological interpretation of the 
CCP, moreover, implied that it was only a matter of time before all aspects of international 
investment policy would come under Union competence. As Chapter IV reported, the USA 
had indeed embarked upon the Uruguay Round with the objective of creating a 
comprehensive multilateral investment framework. The USA failed to convince many 
critical countries of its plan during the Uruguay Round. But the idea of creating a 
comprehensive multilateral investment framework within the GATT/WTO was not off the 
table in 1994.   
 
The Member States determinedly reject the Commission’s claim to competence: The 
Member States rejected the Commission’s position and arguments. They demanded a mixed 
ratification of the WTO Agreement and its annexes. The submission of the Council of 
Ministers – i.e. the entirety of the Member States – and the individual submissions of the 
United Kingdom, France, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark 
underlined that the broad scope of the WTO Agreement and its annexes fell partly into the 
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scope of the CCP, other EU policies and national policies and competences. They criticised 
in particular the Commission’s overbearing claim that the Union held the exclusive 
competence under the CCP to conclude the GATS and TRIPs Agreements. The Member 
States assumed that these agreements, which inter alia affected international investment 
regulation, came predominantly under national competence (European Court of Justice, 
1994). The Council, moreover, harshly rebuked the Commission for its alleged attempt to 
extend the Union’s competences under the CCP through the backdoor after the failure to 
convince the Member States to acknowledge an extensive interpretation of the CCP during 
the IGC debates.  
 
“At the intergovernmental conference on Political Union, the Commission had proposed 
such an extension of Community competence. The concept of a common commercial policy 
was to be replaced by that of a common policy of external economic relations, comprising in 
particular ‘economic and trade measures in respect of services, capital, intellectual 
property, investment, establishment and competition’ with the possibility of extension of that 
ambit. This policy was to fall within the exclusive competence of the Community […] The 
Community was to be exclusively represented by the Commission in its relations with non-
member countries and international organizations and at international conferences […] The 
Commission is seeking in its request for an Opinion to have implemented by means of 
judicial interpretation, the proposals which were rejected at the intergovernmental 
conference on Political Union.” 
(European Court of Justice, 1994, pp. I–5306) 
 
The ECJ reprimands the Commission’s attitude: The ECJ delivered its Opinion on this 
matter in November 1994. To the great surprise of most observers, the ECJ sided with the 
Member States. It found that the Union did not hold all necessary competences to conclude 
the WTO Agreement and its annexes either under the CCP or under other Treaty chapters. 
267 
 
Hence, the WTO Agreement and its annexes had to be concluded as mixed agreements.51 
Although Opinion 1/94, at first sight, was perceived as an objurgation of the Commission, 
observers soon interpreted the quite startling ruling as a fierce wake-up call to the Member 
States to finally take up their responsibility and to make political decisions regarding the 
modernisation of the CCP (Dimopoulos, 2011, pp. 85–86; Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 46–48; 
Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999, pp. 491–493). Like the submissions of the Member States and 
the Commission, the ECJ ruling did not examine in detail the Union’s competences in 
international investment policy. It, nevertheless, shed some light on the EU’s legal 
competences in this domain. First and foremost, Opinion 1/94 advanced a non-teleological, 
textual and thus narrow interpretation of the CCP. The ECJ thereby refuted the 
Commission’s claim that the new trade issues, including international investment regulation, 
already came under the scope of the CCP. Second, the ECJ ruled that GATS mode III – i.e. 
establishment – did not come under the scope of the CCP (Eeckhout, 2011, p. 30; Johannsen, 
2009, p. 7). It followed from this clarification that investment liberalisation in general was 
unlikely to fall under exclusive Union competence under the CCP. And finally, the ECJ did 
not challenge the EU’s competence to conclude the TRIMs Agreement. The TRIMs 
Agreement regulated trade-related post-establishment treatment standards. The ECJ’s silence 
on this issue implied that the EU was, at least partly, competent under the CCP in this 
domain of international investment policy. In conclusion, Opinion 1/94 was a telling attempt 
by the Commission entrepreneurship to extend the EU’s legal competences to new trade 
issues including investment regulation, but the Member States and the ECJ determinedly 
rebuked the Commission for its activism.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 For a detailed analysis see for instance Eeckhout, 2011, pp. 27–35; Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 40–48. 
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8.3.2 Opinion 2/92 – The Commission claims competence over post-
establishment treatment 
Opinion 1/94 had only indirectly touched on the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment policy. Shortly after delivering Opinion 1/94, the ECJ rendered Opinion 2/92 in 
March 1995. Opinion 2/92 is of great interest to this study, because it essentially examined 
the EU’s competence to regulate post-establishment treatment. Opinion 2/92 sought to 
identify the adequate competence basis for the EU’s adhesion to the ‘Third Revised Decision 
of the OECD on National Treatment’ (hereinafter the ‘Third Revised Decision’). The Third 
Revised Decision was a gentlemen’s agreement among OECD countries, which stipulated 
that OECD countries should grant established investors from other OECD countries national 
treatment. The Commission and the Member States again disagreed over the competence 
basis for the EU’s adhesion to the Third Revised Decision. This legal controversy translated 
into the more practical question of whether the EU alone or the EU and the Member States 
together should formally adhere to the Third Revised Decision. Belgium ultimately decided 
to refer this question to the ECJ in 1992 (Vedder and Folz, 1997, pp. 510–511). 
 
The Commission invokes implied competences and the international trade agenda: The 
Commission advanced the view that the EU was exclusively competent to adhere to the 
Third Revised Decision. It presented several, highly interesting arguments to justify its 
position. First, the Commission argued that the Third Revised Decision was, in essence, a 
trade policy measure coming under the scope of the CCP. It elaborated that international 
investment was a modern form of trade. International investment, on the one hand, 
substituted traditional trade through local business and production activities. On the other 
hand, international investment complemented traditional trade as it generated intra-firm 
trade. The NT obligation enshrined in the Third Revised Decision, the Commission argued, 
sought to increase investment activity and hence trade in goods and services. The 
Commission’s line of argument implied that all aspects of international investment policy – 
market access, post-establishment treatment and protection – were in essence trade policy 
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measures falling under the scope of the CCP. Second, the Commission advanced once again 
its well-known teleological interpretation of the CCP. The Commission explained that the 
main purpose of the CCP was to ensure the effective international representation of 
European interests and the Single Market at the international level. As international 
investment was a modern form of trade and becoming a standard agenda item of 
international trade negotiations, international investment regulation should come under the 
CCP. Finally, the Commission added that should the court disagree with the previous 
arguments, the EU nevertheless held an implicit, exclusive, external competence to adhere to 
the Third Revised Decision under Article 57 TFEU (capital movements) and Article 100 
TFEU (approximation of legislation) (European Court of Justice, 1995, pp. I–543–546). 
 
The Member States fight back: Several Member States refuted the Commission’s position 
and justifications. Their submissions to the ECJ draw an intriguing picture of Member State 
views on the EU’s role and competence in international investment policy, which in many 
regards complement missing information on detailed Member State positions from the IGC 
on the Maastricht Treaty. First, the Belgian, Greek, Spanish, French and British rejected the 
claim that the EU was competent to adhere to the Third Revised Decision under the CCP. 
Some Member States elaborated that international investment was not a modern form of 
trade and could thus not be regulated under the CCP. Other Member States added that the 
Third Revised Decision would not affect trade flows and could thus not be considered to be a 
trade policy measure falling within the scope of the CCP. Second, Belgium, Greece, France, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom explained that Article 57 TFEU (capital 
movements) was the more pertinent competence basis for the EU to adhere to the Third 
Revised Decision. They, however, discarded the Commission’s view that the EU held an 
implied, exclusive, external competence under this Article. The Third Revised Decision, 
rather, came under shared competence (European Court of Justice, 1995, pp. I–542–549).  
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The ECJ balances the views: The ECJ developed a nuanced argument. It ruled that the 
Member States and the EU were jointly competent to adhere to the Third Revised Decision 
for several reasons. First, the Third Revised Decision was indeed a trade policy measure 
coming under the CCP as regards its effects on extra-EU investment flows. Second, it was 
also a measure relating to the free movement of capital as regards its effects on intra-EU 
investment flows. Third, the ECJ clarified that the EU held not an implied exclusive but 
rather an implied shared competence under Article 67 TFEU (capital movements). The ECJ 
expanded that the EU could not assert such an implied competence under the ERTA 
Doctrine. European secondary legislation had not yet fully penetrated and covered this 
policy domain (European Court of Justice, 1995, pp. I–542–549). In summary, Opinion 2/92 
clarified that the EU was indeed competent to regulate post-establishment treatment of extra-
EU FDI under the CCP. Even more importantly, the ECJ seemed to implicitly recognise the 
Commission’s claim that international investment was a modern form of trade. This implicit 
recognition did not, however, have consequences for policy-making. It is indeed noteworthy 
that the Member States continued concluding hundreds of BITs despite the EU’s partial 
exclusive competence regarding post-establishment treatment.  
 
Conclusion: Which theoretical lessons can one draw from the examination of Opinions 1/94 
and 2/92? The section impressively demonstrated how the Commission sought to act as 
policy entrepreneur in order to have the Member States accept the EU’s legal competence 
inter alia over international investment regulation. It had recourse to legal review through the 
ECJ to revise its Maastricht failure and invoked implied competences and the evolving trade 
agenda to that end. The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship echoed functional and power-
maximising behaviour. These observations lend support to the supranational hypothesis H1. 
The Member States, however, determinedly and successfully fought back. They rejected the 
Commission’s claims that the EU held an implied competence and that the EU had to hold 
competences for functional reasons. They, moreover, rebuked the Commission for its 
strategic recourse to legal review. The ECJ partly agreed with the Member States. 
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Hypothesis H2 thus does not accurately depict integration dynamics in this policy-making 
instance.  
 
8.4 The Treaty of Amsterdam  
The debates on the scope of the EU’s legal competences in foreign economic relations and 
international investment policy did not end with Opinions 1/94 and 2/92. In early 1995, the 
Member States arrived at the conclusion that they needed to amend the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The so-called Treaty of Amsterdam should enhance the democratic legitimacy and 
effectiveness of European policy-making in light of the future Eastern Enlargement. The 
Council of Ministers asked the Commission, as customary, to submit a report on necessary 
reforms of the EU and its Treaties. The Commission used this occasion to problematise once 
again the EU’s legal competences in foreign economic relations, in general, and in 
international investment policy, in particular (European Commission, 1995b, pp. 1–7).  
 
The Commission uses its agenda-setting powers, invokes the evolving trade agenda and 
de facto competences: The Commission’s report of May 1995 analysed in considerable 
detail a reform of the CCP. It first lamented that the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty had 
missed the chance to modernise and to extend the legal scope of the CCP. The recent rulings 
of the ECJ had further narrowed the scope. The standard agenda of international trade 
negotiations largely exceeded the EU’s legal competences. As the EU held, however, de 
facto competences over these issues, the legal situation considerably complicated the 
negotiating process and EU-internal decision-making. The Commission warned that this 
situation limited the effectiveness of European policy-making and harmed European interests 
in the world economy. Hence, the Commission advised the Member States to extend the 
scope of the CCP so as to bring it in line with the standard agenda of international trade 
negotiations and its de facto competences. It stressed that the CCP should cover, in 
particular, the regulation of services trade, intellectual property rights and FDI. It observed 
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that FDI had become increasingly important for the world economy and had a trade 
complementing and substituting effect. The Commission cautioned that the continuous 
conclusion of BITs between the Member States and third countries undermined the exercise 
of the EU’s competences regarding the regulation of capital movements and the EU’s trade 
policy interests. It explained that many third countries conditioned their market access 
commitments for trade in goods and services on the amount of received direct investment. 
Whereas other countries could easily adjust to the new importance of FDI in trade 
negotiations, the EU was paralysed (European Commission, 1995b, pp. 57–58).  
 
The Commission explained its position regarding international investment regulation in even 
greater detail in a communication which it released only few weeks before the publication of 
the above-mentioned report. The communication was entitled “A level playing field for 
direct investment world-wide”. It clearly sought to influence EU-internal debates on the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, as well as the MAI negotiations, which were just beginning (see 
Chapter VI). The Commission underlined in this document that neither the EU nor the 
Member States possessed the necessary legal competences to negotiate NAFTA-like, state-
of-the-art international investment agreements covering investment liberalisation, post-
establishment treatment and protection. European investors therefore increasingly suffered 
from competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis Japanese and US investors in a key domain of 
international economic competition. The Commission derived from this analysis that the EU 
and the Member States had to closely cooperate and to pool their competences in 
international investment policy. The EU should, moreover, start negotiating state-of-the-art 
bilateral investment agreements i.e. BITs. In the long run, the EU and the Member States 
should jointly work toward the creation of a multilateral investment framework in the WTO 
or OECD (European Commission, 1995a, pp. 1–14). The Commission continuous 
campaigning for an extension of the EU’s legal competences is in line with the supranational 
hypothesis H1. 
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The Member States ring-fence their competences: The Member State positions regarding 
the Commission’s proposal to reform and extend the CCP toward international investment 
policy are, unfortunately, less well documented. It is, nonetheless, possible to establish two 
important observations, which contradict the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2. First 
and foremost, the Member States showed only marginal interest in a reform of the CCP 
during the IGC debates in 1996 and early 1997. Only the IGC submissions of Germany, Italy 
and Sweden mention the general intention to discuss the CCP (European Parliament, 1996a, 
1996b, 1996c). Other Member States did not enumerate the CCP as a priority for IGC 
debates. Second, drawing on the above-examined Opinions 1/94, 2/92 as well as Member 
State behaviour during the MAI negotiations (see Chapter VI), one may safely conclude that 
most Member States met the Commission’s proposal to extend the scope of the CCP, inter 
alia, to investment regulation with considerable hesitation. On these occasions, the broad 
majority of Member States refuted demands to reform the CCP both in order to preserve 
their national competences and because they considered these issues to be unrelated to 
international trade (European Court of Justice, 1995, pp. I–542 – I–549; Johannsen, 2009, p. 
8).  
 
The Irish Council Presidency, which chaired the IGC in the second semester of 1996, 
nonetheless tried to take the Commission’s recommendations to reform the CCP into 
account. Its first discussion paper of 5 December 1996 proposed to the Member States the 
permanent empowerment of the Commission to negotiate on investment, services trade and 
intellectual property rights in the WTO. The Member States should remain competent to 
regulate these issues in domestic settings and to negotiate in other international fora like the 
OECD, IMF and World Bank (Conference of the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States, 1996, pp. 78–80). Despite this pragmatic approach, the Member States – and 
in particular France – remained determined to protect their competences against European 
encroachment. The proposal of the Presidency was quickly discarded in IGC debates. One 
may recall here that at the same time, the British, Dutch, French and German governments 
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went as far as to reject coordination with the Commission during the MAI negotiations on 
issues like investment protection clauses, because they were determined to stop European 
encroachment onto their competences (Interview, Brussels, 18 January 2012; Johannsen, 
2009, p. 8). The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, did not reform the 
CCP. A new paragraph of Article 113 TEFU merely empowered the Council of Ministers to 
decide by unanimity to extend the scope of the CCP to the regulation of services trade and 
intellectual property rights. It did not provide for such a possibility regarding international 
investment regulation. The Council, however, never availed itself of this possibility so that 
the Treaty of Amsterdam did not have a noteworthy impact on the CCP or the EU’s legal 
competences in international investment regulation (Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 59–60). These 
observations contradict the intergovernmental hypothesis H2 and once more suggest that 
supranational thinking and hypothesis H2 better account for integration dynamics in this 
domain.  
 
8.5 The Treaty of Nice  
The Treaty of Amsterdam was a more than humble agreement. Most experts agreed that the 
Treaty failed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU or to streamline EU policy-
making in light of the upcoming Eastern Enlargement. So as to prevent a paralysis of the EU 
after the Eastern Enlargement, the Member States soon decided to hold yet another IGC. The 
IGC should reform and streamline the European Institutions and European policy-making. 
The IGC on the Treaty of Nice started in February 2000 and came to an end in February 
2001. As during the previous IGCs, the Commission pushed for a reform of the CCP and an 
extension of the EU’s legal competences to international investment regulation.  
 
The Commission uses agenda setting, invokes the evolving trade agenda and de facto 
competences: In early 2000, the Commission again submitted to the Council of Ministers a 
report on advisable reforms of the EU and its Treaties. The Commission further adapted its 
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rhetoric on a CCP reform to the overarching purpose of the IGC, namely to prepare the EU 
for the Eastern Enlargement. The Commission underlined that the CCP had to be extended 
toward the new trade issues, including international investment regulation, in order to ensure 
qualified majority voting on trade policy measures in the Council of Ministers. It expanded 
that as investment, services trade and intellectual property rights had become standard 
agenda items of trade negotiations the EU held de facto competences in these domains. But 
as the the CCP did not cover these issue areas, the EU had to conclude modern trade 
agreements as so-called mixed agreements, which required unanimous endorsement in the 
Council of Ministers as well as national ratification. In other words, the CCP had devolved 
during the 1980s and 1990s from a policy domain coming under the ‘community method’ 
and qualified majority voting toward a policy domain governed by intergovernmental 
processes and unanimity voting. The Commission warned that the ‘mixity’ of modern trade 
agreements would considerably complicate negotiations and slow down their ratification in 
an EU-25. A reform and extension of the CCP to, inter alia, international investment 
regulation was thus inevitable in order to keep the EU governable (European Commission, 
2000, pp. 25–27).  
 
The Member States stand firm against the Commission yet again: The Member States 
remained hesitant regarding the Commission’s recommendations. Unfortunately, the archive 
of the Council of Ministers again does not contain detailed information about specific 
Member State positions during the IGC. A series of progress reports nevertheless 
demonstrates how the proposed extension of the CCP to international investment regulation 
was gradually scrapped during the negotiating process. A first progress report of 3 
November 2000 contained two reform options for the CCP, which still foresaw the extension 
of the EU’s legal competences to ‘investment’ regulation (Conference of the representatives 
of the governments of the Member States, 2000a, pp. 23–28). The reference to investment 
was consequently narrowed down to ‘direct investment’ and put into brackets in the 
following progress report of 23 November 2000 (Conference of the representatives of the 
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governments of the Member States, 2000b, pp. 34–37). The reference then was entirely 
deleted in the progress report of 30 November 2000, which contained the final wording of 
the CCP provisions of the Nice Treaty (Conference of the representatives of the governments 
of the Member States, 2000c, pp. 39–42).  
 
Competence by accident: Despite the Member States persistent opposition to provide the 
EU with explicit legal competences in international investment policy, the Treaty of Nice, 
nevertheless, provided the EU with its first exclusive legal competences under the CCP to 
regulate certain international investment flows. Article 133 TFEU52 of the Treaty of Nice 
finally brought the regulation of trade in services and intellectual property rights under the 
scope of the CCP.  
 
Soon after the conclusion of the IGC on the Nice Treaty, lawyers started discussing whether 
the notion of trade in services in the revised Treaty provisions was congruent with the notion 
of trade in services under GATS and therefore comprised the regulation of GATS mode III. 
At first, lawyers denied this assumption. They argued that the Treaty contained distinct 
chapters on establishment and capital movements, which had to be considered as the 
paramount competence basis for any EU measures in this domain (Johannsen, 2009, p. 9).  
 
Later the opinion juris formed that the Member States had indeed intended to empower the 
EU to participate in GATS-like negotiations on services trade (Cremona, 2003, pp. 68–70; 
Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 61–62). It needs to be mentioned here that although the Nice Treaty 
brought the regulation of services trade and intellectual property rights under the scope of the 
CCP, relevant measures basically remained subject to unanimity voting. The Treaty 
contained numerous exceptions and carve-outs; notably for cultural, social, health and 
educational services.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 The Nice Treaty changed the numbering of Articles. The CCP provisions shifted from Articles 110-
116 TEC/TFEU to Articles 131-134 TFEU.  
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Policy substance and integration dynamics: The extension of the scope of the CCP to the 
regulation of services trade and intellectual property rights allows for two important 
conclusions. First, the Member States manifestly attached great importance to continuing 
their national BIT programmes and thus rejected the Commission’s proposal to generaklly 
extend the CCP to investment regulation. Second, the Member States were less opposed to 
cooperating on the liberalisation of service-related investments, which was not covered by 
national BIT programs and moreover promised immediate welfare gains to national business. 
The outcome of the Nice Treaty thus suggests that polic substance indeed shaped integration 
dynamics and Member Stste preferences. The Treaty of Nice entered into force in 2003 and 
provided the EU with an exclusive competence to regulate market access for service-related 
investments (Koutrakos, 2006, pp. 61–62). To conclude, the section lends again support to 
the supranational hypothesis H1 and casts doubts on the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis 
H2.  
 
8.6 The Treaty of Lisbon  
The Treaty of Nice, much like the Treaty of Amsterdam, was considered a failure. Policy-
makers and lawyers agreed that it did not prepare the EU for the upcoming accession of 12 
new Member States in 2004 and 2007. The signatures under the Treaty of Nice had not yet 
dried, when in December 2001, the European Council of Laeken therefore decided to 
embark on another attempt to reform the EU and the Treaties. The heads of state and 
government judged that the classic intergovernmental method of Treaty revisions had shown 
inefficient, ineffective and undemocratic. They decided to approach a further Treaty revision 
through the so-called ‘Convention method’, which had been conceived and successfully used 
for the elaboration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 
1999/2000 (Deloche-Gaudez, 2001; European Convention, 2003a).  
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The Convention method changes the dynamics of Treaty revisions: The ‘convention 
method’ considerably differed from the classic intergovernmental method of Treaty 
revisions. Instead of technocrats and high-ranking diplomats engaging in intergovernmental 
bargaining and exchanges of concessions behind closed doors, democratically legitimised 
politicians and generalists argued and deliberated in public over necessary reforms of the EU 
for the good of European citizens. The overarching objective, procedural rules, professional 
background and self-perception of the involved policy-makers of such a convention thus 
stood in stark contrast to classic IGCs (Deloche-Gaudez, 2001). As the following paragraphs 
will show, these procedural differences decisively promoted the extension of the EU’s legal 
competences to FDI regulation. 
 
The so-called Convention on the Future of Europe53 met between 28 February 2002 and 20 
July 2003 in order to elaborate the draft text for the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (hereinafter the ‘Constitutional Treaty’). The draft text was then sent to the Member 
States for final discussions and ratification. The Convention comprised 15 delegates from the 
Member State governments, 13 delegates from the governments of the candidate countries54, 
30 delegates from the national parliaments, 26 delegates from the national parliaments of the 
candidate countries, 16 delegates of the European Parliament and 2 delegates from the 
Commission. The 102 delegates took decisions by consensus. The delegates of the candidate 
countries could fully participate in the debates, but could not block a consensus reached 
among the delegates of the current Member States. Most delegates were politicians i.e. not 
specialised technocrats. The Committee of the Regions, and the European Social and 
Economic Committee as well as its national counterparts, were invited to participate in the 
Convention as observers. A Praesidium of 12 delegates – led by former French President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – chaired the Convention. The 102 delegates met two for days per 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 For a first-hand report of a key delegate of the Convention – however in French – please see 
Lamassoure (2004). 
54 This group encompassed the 12 new Member States, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 as well 
as Turkey.  
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month in public plenary sessions and more often in 11 issue-specific working groups in order 
to discuss advisable Treaty changes (European Convention, 2003a). 
 
8.6.1 Commission entrepreneurship in the open and behind the scenes of the 
Convention  
At the beginning of the Convention, the main work was carried out in the working groups. 
The CCP came under the responsibility of working group VII on external action, whose 
delegates showed little interest in discussing a reform of the CCP. Most delegates were 
politicians and found trade and investment regulation dull and too technical. They primarily 
focused on issues of ‘high politics’. The on-going Iraq War, moreover, deeply divided the 
European governments, citizens and the delegates of working group VII. Hence, the 
discussions in this working group mostly revolved around the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Convention, 
2002a, p. 3; Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011). 
 
The Commission uses agenda setting, invokes the evolving trade agenda and de facto 
competences: On 15 October 2002, the Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, addressed 
working group VII. In accordance with the supranational hypothesis H1, he used the 
Commission’s agenda setting powers to point to the need to bring the CCP in line with the 
international trade agenda. He made a determined plea to convince the delegates of the 
necessity to finally bring all new trade issues under qualified majority voting and the scope 
of the CCP. Pascal Lamy stressed, in his rather non-technical speech, that the CCP was a 
major success story of European Integration. The EU had become an effective and accepted 
representative of Europe’s trade policy interests in the world. He nevertheless warned that 
the current scope of the CCP increasingly undermined the efficient and effective 
representation of European interests in the world economy. Bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations increasingly focused on the regulation of investment, services trade and 
280 
 
intellectual property rights. While the EU spoke with a single voice on these issues i.e. held 
de facto competences, such modern negotiations and argeements were subject to unanimity 
voting within the Council of Ministers. Decision-making by unanimity made it easy for third 
countries to divide and paralyse an enlarged EU with 25 Member States. Decision-making 
by unanimity might thus translate into the exclusion of such provisions from European trade 
agreements, which would ultimately harm European interests in the world economy. Pascal 
Lamy urged the delegates to extend qualified majority voting to all modern trade policy 
issues. Lamy thus de jure demanded an extension of the scope of the CCP to investment 
regulation as well as a dismantling of the many carve-outs of Article 133 TFEU applying to 
services trade and intellectual property rights. Lamy stressed that such a reform was 
necessary to preserve the EU’s ability to speak with a single voice in international trade 
negotiations. He did not mention at this occasion that the Commission had previously fought 
had to include these new trade issues into on-going WTO and bilateral FTA negotiations. 
Finally, he called on the delegates to extend the powers of the European Parliament under 
the CCP and to increase the involvement of civil society in CCP policy-making. The last 
request of Lamy arguably sought to calm down NGOs and civil society, which had violently 
expressed its discontent with the world trading system during the Seattle and Genoa 
ministerial meetings of the WTO and G8. (European Convention, 2002b, pp. 5–7; Interview, 
Brussels, 12 October 2011). It has also been speculated that Lamy thereby tried to strike a 
deal with the European Parliament, which should support his push for an extension of Union 
competences.  
 
Lamy’s efforts to convince the delegates of working group VII of the need for a 
comprehensive reform of the CCP were moderately successful. The final report on ‘external 
action’ of working group VII of 16 December 2001 recommended that all measures relating 
to services trade and intellectual property rights should in future be subject to qualified 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers. There was also support for the proposal to 
extend the involvement and powers of the European Parliament under the CCP. The final 
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report of working group VII, however, ignored Lamy’s advice to extend the scope of the 
CCP to international investment regulation. The following plenary session approved the 
recommendations and sent them to the Praesidium. The Praesidium should then elaborate a 
first draft text of the Constitutional Treaty on the basis of the recommendations of the 11 
working groups of the Convention (European Convention, 2002c, pp. 7–8). 
 
The Praesidium acts on its own authority and adds the FDI reference: The Praesidium 
of the Convention convened for a decisive meeting on 23 April 2003. The purpose of this 
meeting, which took place behind closed doors, was to examine the recommendations of 
working group VII and to transpose them into a revised chapter on ‘external action’ for the 
Constitutional Treaty. With regard to the CCP, the Praesidium decided to divert from the 
recommendations of working group VII!on an important point. The Praesidium proposed in 
its draft CCP articles to extend qualified majority voting also to the regulation of FDI. The 
proposal also extended the scope of the EU’s legal competences to FDI regulation. The 
Praesidium briefly explained its diversion from the recommendations of working group VII 
by reiterating the Commission’s longstanding argument that investment flows supplemented 
trade in goods and underlay a significant share of commercial exchanges today (European 
Convention, 2003b, pp. 53–55; Johannsen, 2009, pp. 9–10; Krajewski, 2005, pp. 102–106).  
 
Commission entrepreneurship through agenda setting behind the scenes: How did the 
Praesidium arrive at this decision? It was reported that John Bruton, delegate of the Irish 
Parliament and Praesidium member, proposed extending qualified majority voting under the 
CCP to the regulation of FDI. He reportedly stressed that FDI disciplines had become a 
standard issue of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO (see Chapters IV and VI) and 
bilateral FTA negotiations (see Chapter VII). It was necessary to extend qualified majority 
voting under the CCP to FDI regulation, as Bruton explained, in order to enable the 
Commission to effectively use its long-standing de facto competences and to represent the 
EU’s interests in these fora. The President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and 
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the delegate of the Commission and Praesidium member, Michel Barnier, enthusiastically 
supported the proposal. In the discussion which followed, Michel Barnier, moreover, 
stressed that the revised CCP articles should not only extend qualified majority voting to 
measures regarding FDI but also contain a firm basis for exclusive Union competence in this 
domain (Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011; Ceyssens, 2005, p. 273; Meunier, 2013). 
 
European investment policy experts have been puzzled about John Bruton’s dedication to 
bringing FDI regulation under the scope of the CCP and exclusive Union competence. It is 
indeed surprising that a member of the Irish Parliament and former Irish minister proposed 
these modifications, since Ireland is the only Member State which has never concluded a 
single international investment agreement. What is more, the Irish government later showed 
to be among the most determined opponents to the FDI reference in the revised CCP articles. 
It is, moreover, remarkable that Bruton did not refer to the layman’s concept of ‘international 
investment’ but used the expert concept of ‘FDI’. Hence, one must wonder why John Bruton 
was so concerned with this issue and whether he acted on his own behalf. Many Member 
State and even Commission officials seem to believe that the Commission had, behind the 
scenes, asked John Bruton and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to propose and support this 
modification as supposedly neutral, non-suspect parties. The observation becomes even more 
intriguing, if one takes into account that Bruton convinced his colleagues of the necessity to 
add a FDI reference by refereeing to the evolving WTO and FTA agenda and the EU’s de 
facto competences in these fora. As reported in chapters VI and VII, the Commission had 
spared no effort to push investment on the agendas of the WTO and FTA negotiations. Now 
it arguably made Bruton point to these negotiations and the EU’s role in them in order to 
extend the EU’s legal competences. This reading of the outcome of the Praesidium meeting 
of 23 April 2003 would point to a decisive and elaborate instance of Commission 
entrepreneurship and strongly support the supranational hypothesis H1.  
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The Member State delegates oppose the Praesidium decision: Following the drafting 
exercise of the Praesidium, the delegates of the Convention reconvened for plenary sessions 
to discuss the Praesidium’s draft text of the ‘external action’ chapter. The delegates were 
highly interested in the draft chapter on ‘external action’ and even in the therein-included 
revised CCP articles. They tabled some 1,000 amendments regarding the entire chapter on 
‘external action’ and 100 amendments regarding the revised CCP articles. Thirty-one 
amendments concerned the proposed extension of qualified majority voting and the scope of 
the CCP to FDI regulation. Almost all amendments demanded the deletion of the FDI 
reference. The amendments document broad opposition to the FDI reference across Member 
States, political camps and political institutions.55 
 
The delegates of the British, French, German, Irish and Spanish governments tabled 10 
amendments regarding the FDI reference. The British government argued that FDI 
regulation was not a matter of trade policy or customs union and should thus be deleted. The 
French government stressed that the chapter on the movement of capital already assigned to 
the EU a shared competence in the domain of FDI regulation. The German and Spanish 
governments merely commented that investment promotion and protection was, and should 
remain, a national competence. The Irish government expressed criticism that the purpose of 
the FDI reference remained unclear and should be deleted (European Convention, 2003c). A 
Convention participant interviewed for this thesis recalled that only the delegate of the 
German government supposedly understood the implications of the FDI reference for 
Member States’ international investment policies and their BIT programmes. The opposition 
of France, the United Kingdom and Ireland mostly reflected their intention to protect their 
competences and sovereignty against European encroachment. The Spanish delegate 
reportedly supported France so as to gain political capital in consequent discussions on 
voting rights in the Council of Ministers (Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011). These 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 For access to amendments please see the website of the European Convention http://european-
convention.europa.eu/ 
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observations cast strong doubts on the validity oft he liberal intergovernmental hypothesis 
H2. 
 
Delegates of the European Parliament tabled 6 amendments regarding the FDI reference. A 
collective amendment of several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) indicated that 
the FDI reference should be deleted, because FDI regulation was not a matter of trade policy 
and the reference would trigger an immense and probably unintended increase in EU 
competence. Several other amendments tabled by MEPs merely demanded the deletion of 
the FDI reference without explanation (European Convention, 2003c).  
 
Delegates of the national parliaments tabled 8 amendments regarding the FDI reference. 
Most of these simply demanded the deletion of the FDI reference without explanation. Few 
amendments highlighted that FDI regulation was either a shared competence under the 
Treaty chapter on capital movements or should remain a national competence (European 
Convention, 2003c).  
 
The large number of amendments regarding the draft chapter on ‘external action’ 
overwhelmed the Praesidium, which declared that it was impossible to discuss all of them 
within the timeframe of the Convention. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing therefore called upon the 
delegates to prioritise their demands. Only the most important amendments should be 
examined in the plenary session (Krajewski, 2005, pp. 104–105; Interview, Brussels, 12 
October 2011). Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s demand de facto saved the FDI reference from 
deletion. No delegate considered the FDI reference to be sufficiently important to prioritise it 
and to demand further discussions. Joschka Fischer, the delegate of the German government 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, reportedly decided, for instance, to ignore voices from the 
German Ministry of Economics in charge of international investment policy, which asked for 
the deletion of the FDI reference. Instead he invested his political capital into his favourite 
project – the creation of the post of a European Minister of Foreign Affairs (Interview, 
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Brussels, 12 October 2011). The example illustrates how technocrats’ lack of access to the 
Convention debates shifted the focus of debates away from low politics toward high politics. 
As no delegate had prioritised the FDI reference and asked for further discussion, the 
Praesidium interpreted it as tacit agreement to the revised CCP articles and included them in 
the final draft text. The draft text of the Constitutional Treaty was adopted and sent to the 
European Council for concluding intergovernmental negotiations and ratification on 18 July 
2003 (Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011). 
 
8.6.2 Sectorial preferences – ambivalent and divided 
What role did European business play in these debates during the Convention? European 
business seemed generally little involved or interested in the debates on a reform of the CCP. 
What is more, the preferences of European business were ambivalent and divided. Business 
lobbying can neither account for the Praesidium’s decision to add the FDI reference to the 
CCP articles nor for Member State preferences mostly opposing this decision. The 
observation casts considerable doubts on the validity of the liberal intergovernmental 
hypothesis H1. 
  
Only UNICE – today BusinessEurope – voiced its support for an extension of the CCP to 
FDI regulation. On 28 February 2002, UNICE released, in its capacity as formal observer to 
the Convention, a position paper enumerating its views on the Constitutional Treaty. UNICE 
advised extending qualified majority voting, and thereby the scope of the CCP, to FDI 
regulation.  
 
“In the context of the next Inter-Governmental Conference, UNICE strongly supports an 
extension of qualified majority voting to issues of major importance to business, such as 
286 
 
international negotiations and agreements on services, intellectual property rights and 
foreign direct investment.“ 
(UNICE, 2002, p. 6) 
 
UNICE’s firm statement in support of an extension of the scope of the CCP to FDI 
regulation is quite remarkable. Many national member federations seemed much less 
interested and partly even opposed the proposed extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. The 
Confederation of British Industries (CBI), for instance, published its own position paper, in 
which it stressed that the EU should indeed play a role in international investment policy. It 
elaborated, however, that the Member States should remain competent in the core domains 
of international investment policy like investment protection.  
 
“There is a good case for the extension of Community competence and [qualified majority 
voting] to cover negotiations on foreign direct investment. However, certain areas, such as 
bilateral investment treaties, decisions on inward and outward investment, export promotion 
and export financing would need to be ring-fenced.“ 
(CBI, n.d., p. 4) 
 
German business was reportedly also critical (Tietje, 2009b). The German Federation of 
Industries (BDI) expounded its hesitation in detail in a position paper, which it released later 
on the occasion of the discussions on the Commission’s draft for the so-called 
‘grandfathering regulation’.56 The BDI explained that German business worried that future 
international investment agreements negotiated by the EU might not attain the high level of 
investment protection of German BITs. German business also feared that the competence 
transfer might raise question marks over the continued validity of German BITs and thereby !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 See European Commission, 2010b. 
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increase investment risks and costs. German business, moreover, lamented that trade and 
investment disciplines should not be included in the same agreements. Investment 
negotiations were about setting legal standards, whereas trade negotiations were about 
bargaining over market access concessions. The BDI manifestly worried that high 
investment protection and post-establishment treatment standards might be traded off for 
enhanced market access commitments. Finally, interviewed BDI officials added that German 
business also generally preferred keeping policy-making at the national level, because they 
perceived the EU’s political landscape as opaque and difficult to navigate (BDI, 2010; 
Interview, Berlin, 16 February 2012; Interview, Brussels, 26 January 2012a; Interview, 17 
February 2012, Berlin). 
 
Other major business federations, like the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (Medef), 
the Italian Confindustria, the Spanish CEOE, the Polish Leviathan or the European Services 
Forum (ESF), took little interest in the debates on the CCP and its extension to FDI 
regulation. The Medef, for instance, participated in the Convention in its role as social 
partner in collective wage bargaining. It almost exclusively focused on influencing debates 
on the Single Market and social policies and by and large ignored other policy areas. The 
Medef reportedly only took note of the debates on a reform of the CCP in regard to the 
proposed greater role of the European Parliament in this domain (Interview, Paris, 3 October 
2013). Confindustria and the CEOE reportedly were sympathetic to a greater role for the EU 
in foreign economic relations, because Italy and Spain were gradually losing in influence on 
the international political economy. They did not, however, lobby for a strengthening of the 
EU in this domain at the national or European level and did not hold specific preferences 
regarding the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation (Interview, Brussels, 27 September 
2013a; Interview, Brussels, 27 September 2013b). The Polish Leviathan also adopted a 
generally pro-European attitude during the Convention debates. Polish business sought to 
counterbalance the Eurosceptic attitude of the Polish government. The Leviathan did not, 
however, voice specific demands regarding the CCP. Many other policy areas were much 
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more important to Polish business than international trade and investment regulation 
(Interview, email, 4 September 2013). Finally, the ESF did not seek to influence the 
Convention debates on the CCP despite the investment intensiveness of international 
services trade. The ESF had been created in the mid-1990s to the end of representing 
European service providers in EU-internal debates on WTO and FTA negotiations. Its 
institutional mandate did not allow lobbying on Treaty revisions. The ESF was only 
indirectly involved in the Convention debates through its membership of UNICE (Interview, 
Brussels, 25 September 2013b). 
 
How can one explain the quite determined position of UNICE in favour of a CCP reform and 
extension to FDI regulation in light of the ambivalent and divided preferences of its member 
federations? UNICE adopts its positions by consensus after consultation with its member 
federations. The UNICE position should have at least partly reflected the hesitation of the 
BDI and CBI and lack of interest of many other federations regarding an extension of the 
CCP to FDI regulation. It was reported that the UNICE Secretariat drafted the UNICE 
position paper and circulated it among its member federations prior to the Convention. The 
member federations did not take offense to the proposed UNICE position on the CCP reform 
on this occasion and endorsed the section without much discussion. It was only later in the 
process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty that certain member federations came to the 
conclusion – after having been alerted by their respective governments – that they actually 
preferred keeping international investment policy-making at the national level. These 
federations consequently tried to revise the official UNICE position regarding the extension 
of the CCP to FDI regulation. The UNICE Secretariat and other member federations showed, 
however, unwilling to reopen discussions. The UNICE Secretariat understood that the 
shifting of international investment policy-making from the national to the European level 
would strengthen its position and influence vis-à-vis member federations. Other member 
federations realised that even though they had not proactively pushed for an extension of the 
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CCP’s scope to FDI regulation it was likely to benefit them (Interview, Brussels, 26 January 
2012a).  
 
In conclusion, the observations do not lend support to the liberal intergovernmental 
hypothesis H2, which stipulates that European business lobbied the Member States into 
cooperating and delegating international investment policy-making to the EU. European 
business was generally little interested in these debates. What is more, European business 
held ambivalent and divided preferences on this matter.  
 
8.6.3 The intergovernmental conferences on the Constitutional and Lisbon 
Treaties 
At the end of the Convention in summer 2003, the Constitutional Treaty – and the extension 
of the CCP to FDI regulation – were not yet set in stone. The Member States still had to give 
their formal blessing to the draft text in an IGC, which in principle allowed for the deletion 
of disagreeable articles. The European Council formally received the draft text of the 
Constitutional Treaty on 18 July 2003. It took the following intergovernmental conference 
almost a year, until 18 June 2004, to reach final agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. The 
work of the IGC was so time consuming for two reasons. First and foremost, the Convention 
had not resolved the most delicate disagreements over issues of high politics like national 
voting rights, the definition of the qualified majority for Council votes and the role and 
powers of the EU President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Forging compromises on these 
issues proved to be a herculean task. Second, the Member States still disagreed over many 
technical provisions of the draft treaty. The Convention and its draft text, however, arguably 
possessed democratic legitimacy, which limited the room for manoeuvre for possible 
modifications and intergovernmental trade-offs (Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011). 
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The Member States focus on high politics and unwillingly accept the CCP provisions:  
The revised CCP articles were of little interest during the IGC on the Constitutional Treaty. 
The high politics of founding a European federal state clearly downgraded the CCP to a 
secondary issue. The Member States focused on other more important issues and unwillingly 
accepted the FDI reference as part of a bigger package deal. The IGC, nevertheless, 
introduced two changes to the revised CCP articles. Both amendments clearly reflect the 
preoccupation of the Member States to safeguard their influence, and thus indirectly their 
sovereignty in international investment policy, against European encroachment. First, France 
insisted on preserving the Treaty of Nice’s exception clause regarding cultural and 
educational services. Article 133(6) TFEU of the Nice Treaty indicated that measures 
touching upon trade in cultural and educational services had to be adopted by unanimity in 
the Council. Sweden and Finland consequently insisted on keeping the same clause for trade 
measures affecting health and social services. Second, Portugal and Ireland were still 
opposed to the FDI reference, while some new Member States reportedly welcomed the 
extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. Portugal and Ireland were unwilling to invest a lot 
of political capital in attaining its deletion. Instead they ultimately struck an alliance with the 
like-minded German and French governments. This alliance of small and big Member States 
managed to include a clause providing for the unanimous adoption of FDI-related measures 
in the Council of Ministers (Krajewski, 2005, pp. 104–106; Krenzler and Pitschas, 2005, pp. 
801–802; Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011). Both amendments ran counter to Lamy’s 
plea to strengthen qualified majority voting to ensure the effective and efficient operation of 
the CCP in an enlarged EU.   
 
The Constitutional Treaty was signed on 29 October 2004. The final wording of Articles III-
314 and III-315 of the Constitutional Treaty on the CCP finally brought FDI regulation 
under the scope of the CCP and exclusive Union competence. It empowered the EU to 
pursue a full-fledged international investment policy. The joy among European policy-
makers over this ‘milestone’ in modern European history was albeit short-lived. In spring 
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2005, the French and Dutch public opted in referenda to reject the Constitutional Treaty. The 
negative outcomes of these votes in allegedly pro-European founding Member States made it 
politically impossible to further pursue the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. After a 
reflection period, European policy-makers came to the conclusion that the EU had, 
nevertheless, to be reformed in order to keep it governable after the Eastern Enlargement. 
They decided to hold another IGC on the so-called Reform Treaty, which is today known as 
the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
The intergovernmental conference on the Treaty of Lisbon was held between 23 July 2007 
and 13 December 2007. The objective of the IGC was to preserve most technical revisions 
while cutting back on the symbolic elements of the Constitutional Treaty. In consequence, 
the IGC decided not to reopen discussions on the – in relative terms – uncontroversial and 
technical CCP provisions. It was, moreover, reported that the leadership of DG Trade 
admonished its officials not to draw the attention of the Member States or NGOs to the FDI 
reference of the revised CCP articles. The Commission hoped that the IGC would not 
‘rediscover’ the reference and simply nod it through (Interview, Brussels, 12 October 2011). 
And indeed, in the end Articles 206 and 207 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty simply copied 
former Articles III-314 and III-315 of the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force on 1 December 2009 and finally provided the EU with a firm legal 
competence to pursue a full-fledged international investment policy (Interview, Brussels, 12 
October 2011). 
 
Conclusion – The particularities of the Convention method explain the sudden success 
of Commission entrepreneurship: In conclusion, which factors best account for the 
extension of the EU’s legal competences under the CCP to FDI regulation in the Lisbon 
Treaty? Why did the Commission finally succeed in extending the CCP to FDI regulation 
after so many unsuccessful attempts?  
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The observations from the drafting process of the Lisbon Treaty clearly lend support to the 
supranational hypothesis H1 and oppose the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2. 
European business was ambivalent and divided over the benefits of integrating international 
investment policy at the EU-level. The Member States clearly opposed such steps. The 
Commission, however, acted as policy entrepreneur in the open and behind the scenes. Yet 
again, it used its agenda setting powers and invoked the evolving trade agenda and the EU’s 
de facto competences to emphasise the need to bring FDI regulation under the scope of the 
CCP. While these strategies had delivered only mixed results in previous IGCs, the 
Commission finally succeeded in the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty by skilfully exploiting 
three procedural particularities of the Convention. First, the Convention method structurally 
strengthened the Commission vis-à-vis the Member States. Whereas national technocrats 
were largely locked out of the drafting process, the Commission with its considerable 
technical expertise had direct access to the debates and the Praesidium sessions. Its agenda 
setting powers were thus arguably more important than in classic IGCs. Second, the 
delegates of the Convention were meant to engage in deliberations about advisable reforms 
rather than in customary non-transparent intergovernmental bargains about competences. So 
once the FDI reference had made its way into the CCP provisions – arguably due to 
Commission entrepreneurship and agenda setting behind the scenes – it was impossible to 
simply demand its deletion in the Convention or the following IGCs without an open debate. 
The normal time constrains of such big gatherings meant that only issues of political salience 
could be discussed. Third, the Convention delegates were generalists and politicians, who 
had the self-conception to be the founding fathers of a European federal state. They did 
neither have the technical expertise, nor wanted to waste time and political capital to engage 
in discussions about technicalities such as the FDI reference in the CCP provisions. A 
similar logic also applied in the IGC debates, which continued to focus on high politics and 
should change as little as possible in the transparently and democratically drafted treaty text. 
Hence, the Commission finally succeeded and managed to extend the CCP to FDI regulation 
despite business lethargy and Member State opposition.  
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8.7 Conclusion 
The chapter traced the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in international investment 
policy. Despite the considerable timespan covered in this chapter, a remarkably homogenous 
picture emerges from the analysis. It lends strong support to the supranational hypothesis H1 
and stands in opposition to the liberal intergovernmental hypothesis H2. European business 
generally was little interested in debates on the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment policy. It did not seek to shape policy-maker preferences in this policy domain. 
The Member States persistently opposed the creation of a EU international investment policy 
and sought to protect their competences against European encroachment. The Commission, 
on the other hand, acted as policy entrepreneur promoting an extension of the EU’s legal 
competences so as to establish EU international investment policy. It used its agenda setting 
powers, pointed to the evolving trade agenda and the EU’s de facto competences, invoked 
implied competences and had strategic recourse to legal review in order to make the Member 
States concede to an institutionalisation of cooperation and permanent delegation of 
international investment policy-making to the EU-level. The Commission’s policy 
entrepreneurship reflected functionalist considerations as well as power considerations. It 
sought to remain the effective single voice in the EU’s foreign economic policy despite an 
evolving trade agenda and was generally concerned with the Member States interefering 
with the EU’s foreign economic policy through national BIT programs.   
 
Commission entrepreneurship was only moderately effective before the Convention on the 
Future of Europe. Until the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s legal competences mostly 
grew due to unintended institutional interactions and spill-overs (creation of external capital 
regime, extending CCP to the regulation of services trade). And while the Commission’s 
recourse to legal review in Opinion 2/92 formally recognised the EU’s exclusive competence 
under the CCP to regulate certain aspects of post-establishment treatment, it did not change 
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the situation on the ground as the Member States continued concluding hundreds of BITs 
with post-establishment treatment provisions. The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship – 
based on agenda setting, invoking the evolving trade agenda and the EU’s de facto 
competences – was ultimately successful due to the particularities of the Convention method, 
which increased the Commission’s agenda setting powers, locked out national technocrats 
and prevented opaque intergovernmental bargaining. In this unique context, the Commission 
finally managed to get its way and to extend the CCP to FDI regulation.  
 
In the light of the previous chapters on the evolution of the EU’s de facto competences, it 
needs emphasis that in particular the EU’s growing de facto competences motivated the 
Praesidium of the Convention to add an FDI reference to the CCP articles. John Bruton – 
arguably on behalf of the Commission – suggested that the CCP should encompass FDI 
regulation as the EU had been representing the Member States in relevant WTO and FTA 
negotiations but that the mismatch between the EU’s de facto and legal competences 
threatened the effectiveness of the EU’s representation. Taking into consideration that the 
Commission had previously spared no efforts to put investment provisions on the agenda of 
these talks and to consolidate the EU’s de facto competences, the full extent of Commission 
entrepreneurship becomes visible.  
 
The EU’s use of its new competences in the recent past by and large confirms the findings of 
this chapter. The Commission has been criticised for its heavy-handed and competence-
asserting behaviour in international investment policy-making, for instance in the context of 
debates on the ‘grandfathering regulation’. Business, moreover, was mostly absent from 
these debates. For many decades, it did not undertake any serious attempts to shape policy-
making. A high-ranking Commission official commented to the effect that international 
investment policy-making felt like a ‘blind flight’, because business was almost completely 
disengaged from debates (Interview, Brussels, 25 July 2012). Business woke up to 
investment policy issues only recently and has tentatively sought to make its voice heard in 
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the heated debates on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the 
USA and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. Many 
Member State governments, finally, remain distrustful vis-à-vis the Commission in TPC 
debates. Several governments still argue with the Commission over the scope of the EU’s 
new exclusive competence. It seems likely that several governments will, sooner rather than 
later, ask the ECJ to examine the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence under Article 207 
TFEU, notably regarding investment protection and the regulation of portfolio investments. 
These more recent observations yet again suggest that supranational rather liberal 
intergovernmental thinking account for the European cooperation and integration in this 
domain.  
 !  
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Chapter IX – Assessing business lobbying and global 
regulatory competition through trends in Member States’ 
BIT practices 
!
 
 
The analytical framework developed two competing hypotheses regarding the emergence of 
the EU’s international investment policy. Hypothesis H1 builds on supranational thinking 
and stipulates that the Commission acted as policy entrepreneur and pushed for the 
communitarisation of international investment policy-making for functional and power 
considerations. Hypothesis H2, on the other hand, builds on liberal intergovernmental 
thinking and stipulates that European business lobbied the Member States for a 
communitarisation of international investment policy-making in order to get access to 
competitive state-of-the-art IIA. The previous chapters draw a surprisingly homogenous 
picture. They mostly lend support to hypothesis H1 and challenge hypothesis H2. The 
findings in particular suggest that business lobbying did not play an important role in the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The clarity of this finding is 
unexpected. It runs counter mainstream assumptions on the role of business in international 
investment and foreign economic policy-making and therefore deserves additional attention.  
 
The chapter seeks to cross-validate the finding through simple quantitative methods. How 
does the chapter embark on this endeavour? Hypothesis H2 in essence stipulates that growing 
international regulatory competition motivated business to lobby for a communitarisation of 
international investment policy-making. It is, however, reasonable to assume international 
regulatory competition did not merely materialise in the form of the EU’s growing role in 
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international investment policy, but equally manifested itself in Member States’ international 
investment policies before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In other words, business 
lobbying for internationally competitive IIAs should also have affected the content of 
Member States’ bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as far as possible under the distribution 
of competences prior to the Lisbon Treaty. This reasoning allows for a cross-validation of 
the propositions that business pushed for a communitarisation of international investment 
policy-making by examining whether the BITs of Member States and major competitors bear 
the traces of international regulatory competition.    
 
So how should the content of Member State BITs have evolved over time in the context of 
intensifying international regulatory competition and consequent business lobbying for 
competitive IIAs? To answer this question, one must briefly examine the alleged purpose of 
BITs. BITs arguably seek to enhance the profitability and competitiveness of national 
companies on international markets by lowering the risk premiums for international 
investment activities. By the same token, BITs seek to help countries to attract foreign 
investment, technology and know-how. BITs therefore qualify as ‘regulatory subsidy’. The 
amount of ‘regulatory subsidy’ afforded under a BIT should be determined through the level 
of post-establishment treatment and protection standards enshrined in agreements. The 
amount of the ‘regulatory subsidy’ should increase or decrease as post-establishment 
treatment and protection standards increase or decrease. It follows from this 
conceptualisation that competing countries should seek to match the amount of ‘regulatory 
subsidies’ afforded under their respective BITs so as to maintain a level playing field on 
international markets. The bulk of the literature on EU foreign economic and trade policy 
suggests that the Union’s main competitors on international markets are other major OECD 
economies and in particular the USA. EU foreign economic policy and trade policy is seen to 
form in response to, and to mitigate, the effects of US foreign economic and trade policy 
(Baccini and Dür, 2012; R. Baldwin, 2006; Dür, 2007; Manger, 2009). This train of thought 
allows formulating a liberal intergovernmental sub-hypothesis H2.1: If regulatory competition 
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indeed fuelled business lobbying and ultimately shaped state behaviour in the international 
investment regime, it should have manifested itself not only through growing Member State 
cooperation in international investment policy within the EU but also in a gradual 
convergence of the content of BITs concluded by the Member States and other major OECD 
countries since the 1980s.  
 
This chapter seeks to test hypothesis H2.1. As an analysis of the approximately 3,500 BITs 
signed by the Member States and OECD countries would go beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the chapter examines 475 BITs57 signed by Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Austria, Slovakia, Canada and the USA since 1980. The findings suggest that the 
content of Member State, US and Canadian BITs did not converge over time, but diverged. 
This observation casts doubts over the assumption that international regulatory competition 
and consequent buisnes lobbying decisively shaped national BIT programs and promoted the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The first section develops the 
research design and describes its operationalisation. The second and third sections present 
the empirical findings and draw theoretical conclusions. 
 
Figure 9.1 Independent and dependent variables  
 
 !!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Since the 2000s, the US and Canada negotiated fewer BITs, but started including BIT-like chapters 
into their free trade agreements. The study thus also examines US and Canadian FTAs with 
investment chapters.   
EU’s involvement in international 
investment policy increases in order to match 
IIAs of main competitor countries. Sectoral preferences favouring 
conclusion of ambitious IIAs 
Content of Member State BITs converge 
toward BITs of main competitor countries to 
the maximum extent possible. 
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9.1 Research design and operationalisation  
How does one measure convergence or non-convergence of BITs? And taking into 
consideration the sizeable number of existing BITs signed by the Member States and their 
major competitor countries, how does one select an unbiased sample of BITs for analysis? 
The following paragraphs answer these questions.  
 
9.1.1 Variables for measuring convergence in BIT practices 
BITs are complex legal documents. Convergence or non-convergence cannot be simply ‘read 
off’ these agreements. It is necessary to identify variables which make it possible to detect 
convergence or non-convergence in BITs over time. Which variables are suitable for this 
purpose? It is helpful to recall that the chapter seeks to evaluate whether the ‘regulatory 
subsidies’ provided under Member State BITs and under BITs of their main competitors 
converged since 1980. The amount of the ‘regulatory subsidy’ afforded under a BIT to 
investors should be equivalent to the level of post-establishment treatment and protection 
under each agreement. Convergence or non-convergence in BIT practices should thus come 
to the fore in the articles which, by and large, determine the level of post-establishment 
treatment and protection afforded to investors under a BIT. It follows that this study needs to 
focus and analyse variations in these articles across BITs and over time so as to draw 
conclusions on convergence or non-convergence in countries’ BIT practices. It is fortunate 
for the purpose of this study that BITs are relatively easy to compare. Due to several 
attempts to establish multilateral investment agreements and to develop model IIAs in the 
past58 , BITs are similarly structured, tackle the same regulatory issues and contain 
equivalent articles. Countries, however, use diverging formulations and legal standards in 
their agreements, which arguably affects the level of post-establishment treatment and 
protection afforded to investors.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!58 See, for instance, the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad of 1959 or the draft 
of the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment of 1998.  
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It is impossible to analyse the entirety of articles in BITs. Hence, it is necessary to select 
certain key articles for the purpose of this study. Three criteria guide the selection of key 
articles as parameters. First and foremost, the examined articles should have a significant 
impact on the level of post-establishment treatment and protection afforded to investors. In 
other words, they should jointly determine the amount of the ‘regulatory subsidy’ afforded 
under a BIT.59 Second, the examined articles should be known to vary across countries’ BIT 
practices and thus be prone to variation across BIT practices and over time. Third, the 
examined articles should clearly fall into the pre-Lisbon scope of Member State competences 
so as to make valid comparisons between Member State and third country agreements. 
Finally, the articles should be relatively easy to compare and to code across BITs. Lengthy, 
complex norms are unsuitable for a large-n analysis.   
 
Drawing on these criteria, the following key articles lend themselves as variables for 
measuring convergence or non-convergence in BITs over time. First, BITs contain articles 
which define the term ‘investment’. While some BITs advance very broad definitions, other 
agreements contain limited definitions. These articles are crucial as they function as 
gatekeepers. They determine the economic activities falling under the protection of a BIT. 
The broader the definition of ‘investment’ in BITs, the boarder the applicability of 
investment protection provisions. Second, BITs contain articles which define the minimum 
treatment standard afforded to foreign investors. In contrast to most-favoured nation (MFN) 
and national treatment (NT), the minimum treatment standard is typically an absolute 
treatment standard. It stipulates that host countries must not treat foreign investors worse 
than is acceptable under a specific international standard. BITs typically refer to either the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) standard or treatment in accordance with ‘customary 
international law’ (CIL) (Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013, p. 5). Some BITs also refer to both 
standards albeit in hierarchical order. Such agreements stipulate that CIL encompasses FET; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 For guidance see (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012) 
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this, however, is not generally accepted amongst investment lawyers. FET is sometimes seen 
to provide for a higher minimum treatment standard than CIL. Third, many BITs contain so-
called ‘umbrella clauses’. Umbrella clauses oblige the contracting states to honour 
contractual obligations vis-à-vis foreign investors including commercial contracts. 
Depending on the economic sector of an investment, such umbrella clauses can be of great 
significance to foreign investors. Some BITs do not contain umbrella clauses, while other 
agreements contain limited or unlimited clauses (Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013, pp. 7–8; 
Kommerskollegium, 2011, p. 41). Fourth, BITs contain articles which define the terms direct 
and indirect expropriation. While some BITs advance very broad definitions of these terms, 
others contain narrow definitions. Narrow definitions, in particular of the term ‘indirect 
expropriation’, limit the number of possible scenarios in which states may have to pay 
compensation for expropriation to foreign investors (Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013, p. 7; 
Lavranos, 2013, p. 1,3). Fifth, most BITs provide for investor-to-state arbitration. The 
accessibility of arbitration for a harmed investor, however, considerably varies. The ease of 
access to arbitration influences costs for investors in seeking compensation. Some BITs do 
not impose any obligations on investors who seek to launch an arbitration proceeding. Other 
BITs require investors to first seek compensation through domestic courts. Many BITs 
oblige investors to formally waive their rights to seek compensation through any other 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the event that they launch international arbitration 
(Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013, pp. 9–10; Lavranos, 2013, p. 3). Sixth, some BITs contain 
carve-outs for economic sectors or activities from MFN treatment, NT or the entire 
agreement. The more carve-outs a BIT contains, the fewer investments enjoy the benefits of 
the agreement (Fontanelli and Bianco, 2013, p. 7; Lavranos, 2013, p. 3). Finally, the length 
i.e. word count of BITs varies considerably (Lavranos, 2013, p. 3). While some BITs are 
concise and count merely eight pages, other BITs count fifty. This is not merely the 
consequence of diverging linguistic styles. It arguably reflects underlying differences in 
substance. Lengthy agreements seek to spell out the rights and obligations of states and 
investors in detail, which lowers the level of post-establishment treatment and protection in 
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comparison to short, non-specific BITs. The word count of BITs might thus serve as a proxy 
for convergence or non-convergence in content of BITs. The thesis examines these variables 
in order to establish the level of investment protection under BITs and to compare them over 
time.   
 
9.1.2 Case selection 
It is impossible to examine the entirety of the approximately 2,000 BITs signed by the 
Member States and other OECD countries. Hence, it is necessary to select a representative 
sample of BITs. This raises the question of how to choose an unbiased sample. Several 
criteria must guide the selection of BITs. First, the study must examine the BITs of the main 
competitors of the European economy on international markets. The BITs of major 
competitor countries should have converged toward Member State BITs and vice versa. 
Second, the study must examine BITs signed by countries of different economic and political 
clout. It is sometimes assumed in IR, IPE and economics, that the economic and political 
clout of countries shapes their foreign economic policies and thus, potentially, their BITs. So 
regulatory competition might differently affect states. Third, the study must examine BITs of 
countries which have signed a considerable number of agreements. A high number of BITs 
signals that countries dedicated resources to, and pursued a proactive and conscious strategy 
in international investment policy. Taking these criteria into account, the study analyses the 
BITs signed by the following countries since 1980: the US, Canada, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland, Austria and Slovakia. It needs mention here that the 
study only examines BITs which are freely accessible through the UNCTAD database and 
government websites (Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (DIS) e.V., 2014; 
Government of Canada, 2014; Office of Trade Agreements Negotiation and Compliance, 
2014; UNCTAD, 2014a). In total, the study examines 475 BITs. 
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9.2 Findings – No convergence but divergence in BIT content 
The findings60  suggest that the content of countries’ BITs has diverged rather than 
converged over time. While European BITs have by and large maintained a high level of 
investment protection, Canadian and US BITs have gradually lowered the level of 
investment protection afforded to investors. The finding contradicts the liberal 
intergovernmental sub-hypothesis H2.1 and casts further doubts over the allegedly central role 
of business lobbying in international investment policy-making. The following paragraphs 
discuss the findings for each variable. 
 
Definition of investment: The articles defining the term investment diverged. In the 1980s, 
all BITs contained short and broad definitions of investment. In the 1990s, first Canada and 
then the USA started including more detailed and narrower definitions of investment into 
their agreements. The inclusion of such narrow definitions reduces the scope of BITs. 
Germany, the Netherlands and Poland did not follow this American innovation. The United 
Kingdom, Austria and Slovakia concluded very few BITs with narrow definitions of 
investment, mostly with third countries like Mexico. It seems unreasonable to assume that 
these BITs thus marked a change in their BIT practices, but rather constitute a concession to 
third countries wishing to follow the American approach.  
 
Minimum treatment standard: The articles defining the minimum treatment standard 
afforded to foreign investors also diverged over time. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, all 
examined BITs obliged states to afford at least ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to foreign 
investors. Often the FET standard was combined with other standards like ‘full protection 
and security’. In the early 2000s, the USA started concluding BITs which stressed that the 
contracting states had to treat foreign investors no worse than required under customary 
international law. The standard formulation in US BITs would indicate that CIL 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Annexe II contains the codebook and tables of findings.  
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encompassed the FET as well as ‘full protection and security’ standards while adding 
restrictive and controversial definitions of these standards. Many experts therefore argue that 
the new US standard provides for a lower minimum treatment standard than old-fashioned 
BITs. Canada started following the US innovation in the second half of the 2000s. Germany, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Austria did not follow this trend and maintained the FET as 
minimum treatment standard. The United Kingdom and Slovakia signed very few BITs with 
the new CIL standard in the second half of the 2000s, with countries like Canada, Mexico, 
Colombia and Kenya. Hence, it is again unlikely that these BITs constitute a reorientation in 
their BIT practices, but rather concession to their US-influenced negotiating partners.  
 
Umbrella clauses: The examination of umbrella clauses demonstrates that BIT practices 
have always been diverse in this domain across Member States and third countries. An 
examination of umbrella clauses does not produce clear-cut patterns of convergence or 
divergence in the BIT practices of the Member States, the US and Canada. Germany and the 
United Kingdom included unlimited umbrella clauses into almost all of their BITs since 
1980. Austria and the Netherlands included unlimited or limited umbrella clauses into most – 
albeit not all – of their BITs. US, Polish and Slovakian BITs frequently contained umbrella 
clauses in the past, but they gradually stopped including such clauses into their agreements 
in the course of the 1990s. Finally, Canada never signed a BIT with an umbrella clause.  
 
Definition of expropriation: The BIT practices of the examined countries markedly 
diverged in regard to the articles defining ‘expropriation’ since the 1980s. In the 1980s and 
1990s, all BITs contained broad and vague definitions of the term ‘expropriation’. In the 
2000s, the US and Canada started signing BITs with precise and narrow definitions. 
European countries, on the other hand, continued using broad and vague definitions in their 
BITs. Only the United Kingdom and Slovakia concluded very few BITs with narrow and 
precise definitions of ‘expropriation’. These few BITs cannot necessarily be considered as a 
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reorientation in their BIT practices, but rather seem to be concessions to their negotiating 
partners – namely Mexico, Canada and India.  
 
Ease of access to international arbitration: A similar pattern emerges with regard to the 
provisions on investor-to-state arbitration in the examined BITs. European BITs initially 
provided for unlimited access to investment arbitration. Since the 1990s, some European 
BITs repeatedly included some minor limitations on access to investment arbitration. 
Investors are often required to first engage in conciliation procedures for three to nine 
months. In cases where investors submit a claim to a local court, they might have to 
withdraw the claim and file a request for arbitration before the local court has ruled on the 
matter. Or investors might have to wait for a ruling of first instance from a local court before 
being allowed to submit a claim to arbitration. US and Canadian BITs rarely provide for 
unlimited access to arbitration, but they initially imposed only minor conditions on investors 
seeking arbitration. Since the 1990s, US and Canadian BITs have, however, further restricted 
access to arbitration under their BITs. They often require investors to provide written 
waivers not to pursue claims through any other dispute settlement mechanisms in the event 
that they wish to seek arbitration (‘fork-in-the-road clause’). They also frequently exclude 
arbitration in cases where investors have already submitted a claim to local courts. A few 
BITs even require the exhaustion of local legal remedies. Summarising, there is a general 
trend toward limiting access to arbitration since 1980, but US and Canadian BITs have taken 
a more restrictive approach than European BITs during the last 20 years.    
 
Carve-outs: An examination of carve-outs from BIT obligations draws a picture of constant 
disparity between European and American BITs. All US BITs contain several carve-outs 
from the NT and MFN treatment obligations. Except for Canada’s very first BITs, all 
Canadian agreement contain carve-outs. European BITs, on the other hand, do not contain 
any carve-outs. Hence, the BIT practices of the examined Member States, the USA and 
Canada have not converged or diverged, but have continued to be different.   
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Figure 9.2: Average word count of BITs per five-year period with trend lines 
 
 
Word counts: Finally, an examination of the length of BITs confirms the trend of 
divergence (see Figure 9.2).61 US and Canadian BITs are, on average, longer than European 
BITs. What is more, US and Canadian BITs grew in length during recent decades, while 
European BITs remained relatively stable in length. As explained above, the word count of 
BITs is a useful – albeit obviously limited – proxy for measuring similarity or disparity 
across agreements. The marked differences in length do not only reflect linguistic 
differences but also echo substantive differences. Long agreements arguably contain more 
detailed provisions and carve-outs, which supposedly limit investor rights in comparison to 
short agreements.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 An automatic word count was impossible with a considerable number of BITs due to the available 
electronic format. This reduces the robustness of the findings.  
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9.3 Conclusion 
The findings suggest that Member State, US and Canadian BIT practices did not converge 
since 1980. As Table 9.1 summarises, most variables point to a divergence in BIT practices 
of the examined Member States and the USA and Canada.   
 
Table 9.3: Summary of findings per parameter 
 
The finding contradicts the liberal intergovernmental sub-hypothesis H2.1. It suggests that 
international regulatory competition did not decisively shape states’ BIT programmes. The 
level of investment protection – and thus the amount of regulatory subsidies – afforded under 
the examined 475 BITs clearly started diverging in the 1990s. The USA and Canada lowered 
the level of ‘regulatory subsidies’ provided to their investors, which should have translated 
into lesser competitive pressures in the EU to communitarise international investment 
policy-making. These findings suggest that business lobbying does not decisively shape the 
international investment regime – at least with regard to post-establishment and protection 
standards. Other factors must have shaped states’ BIT programmes. If international 
regulatory competition and business lobbying were not sufficiently intense to affect states’ 
BIT programmes, one must indeed wonder whether it fuelled increasing Member State 
cooperation in this domain. The chapter thereby lends further support to the finding of the 
preceding chapters that business was little interested in international investment policy in 
general and even less in the communitarisation of international investment policy-making.  
Definition of investment Divergence  
Minimum treatment standard Divergence 
Umbrella clauses Growing disparity  
Definition of expropriation Divergence 
Access to ISDS Divergence  
Carve-outs Constant disparity  
Word count Divergence 
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The findings of this chapter deserve some further reflections. Why did the BIT practices 
between Northern American and European countries start diverging in the 1990s? Put 
differently, why did the USA and Canada increasingly lower the level of investment 
protection, while European countries clung on to the traditional ‘invisible’ model BIT of the 
OECD community? The answer to these questions lies in the different experiences of 
European and Northern American governments with investment protection and investor-to-
state arbitration. Most European countries have hardly faced investment arbitration and paid 
compensation to foreign investors or experienced a limitation of their regulatory space due to 
arbitration awards. The USA and Canada, on the other had, have repeatedly faced arbitration 
proceedings. Canada has moreover paid significant awards and has started feeling the 
infamous ‘regulatory freeze’. In response to these experiences, Canadian and US policy-
makers started circumscribing the rights of investors under their agreements so as to 
maintain their regulatory space and to limit their financial exposure under investor-to-state 
arbitration (see Alvarez, 2009, pp. 301–314).  
 
Taking into consideration that until the 1990s the USA, Canada and European countries 
signed by and large identical agreements, one must ask what caused the difference in 
experiences with investor-to-state arbitration. The main reason seems to be the selection of 
partner countries and consequently the different structural exposure to investor-to-state 
arbitration. European countries signed more BITs with third countries but mostly with 
capital-importing developing economies. Hence, investor-to-state arbitration is unlikely to 
hit European states due to the direction of investment flows. The USA and Canada, on the 
other hand, signed agreements with BIT-like provisions including with major capital-
exporting countries – and, most notably, through NAFTA among themselves. The covered 
investment flows are thus bidirectional, which structurally increases the risk of getting sued 
by foreign investors. European policy-makers should carefully evaluate the experiences and 
mitigation strategies of Northern American policy-makers in negotiations on CETA and 
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TTIP with the USA and Canada. The emergence of new economic powers – formerly 
developing countries – and the consequent reconfiguration and reversal of global investment 
flows will render a reform of the European approach to international investment policy, and 
notably investment protection, inevitable.   
Chapter X – Conclusion  
 
 
 
The thesis seeks to explain the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy since 
the 1980s. It tests two competing theoretical approaches and hypotheses so as to account for 
this instance of European Integration. Hypothesis H1 builds on supranational thinking. It 
stipulates that the Commission acted as resourceful policy entrepreneur to advance the 
communitarisation of international investment policy-making. Hypothesis H2 builds on 
liberal intergovernmental thinking. It suggests that European business lobbied Member State 
governments to communitarise international investment policy-making so as to ensure access 
to ambitious, state-of-the-art international investment and trade agreements. The Member 
States should have given into such demands so as to increase their domestic and international 
capabilities ultimately leading to the permanent delegation of international investment 
policy-making to the EU.   
 
To assess the validity of the two competing hypotheses, the thesis examined policy-making 
instances, which decisively shaped the EU’s de facto and legal competences in international 
investment policy. The study traced the EU’s involvement in investment-related negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round, on the Energy Charter Treaty, on the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment and in negotiations on the EU’s first comprehensive FTAs with Mexico and 
Chile. On the other hand, it examined internal debates on the EU’s legal competences in 
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international investment policy in the context of IGCs, legal proceedings and the Convention 
on the Future of Europe. What is the outcome of this comprehensive analysis?  
 
The chapter first provides a brief empirical account of the findings. The second section 
discusses in depth the validity of the two hypotheses and the theoretical implications of the 
empirical observations. The third section extends to analytical focus to questions beyond 
European Integration.  
 
10.1 A brief empirical summary  
The Uruguay Round: The thesis finds that the EU got first involved in international 
investment policy-making in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The USA strongly pushed 
for the opening of a new round with an extensive agenda encompassing talks on multilateral 
investment provisions. The Commission after initial hesitation became a strong proponent of 
these plans and tried to convince European business and the Member States with the help of 
its agenda setting powers. While a critical mass of Member States came to endorse the plans, 
European business was little receptive to the Commission’s campaigning. In 1986, the 
Member States empowered the Commission to negotiate on their behalf in the Uruguay 
Round including on service-related investment liberalisation and certain post-establishment 
treatment provisions. They felt that speaking with a single voice in the GATT negotiations 
would increase their bargaining power and deliver a better deal for Europe. The Member 
States nevertheless put on record in Council debates that their decision to delegate 
negotiating on new trade issues such as investment provisions to the Commission did not 
prejudge any competence questions. The EU played only a marginal role in the consequent 
TRIMs negotiations, as the Commission, European business and the Member States 
expected no significant gains in this domain. The EU, however, played pivotal role in the 
GATS negotiations notably with regard to investment-related provisions. The EU’s central 
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role reflected the Commission’s proactive stance and to a lesser degree Member State 
interest. European business remained disengaged.  
 
The ECT negotiations: The EU and the Commission acquired an even more important role 
in international investment policy during the ECT negotiations. In 1991, the Dutch 
government proposed to establish a European Energy Community comprising the socialist 
Eastern European and capitalist Western European countries. The Member States welcomed 
the project and agreed to cooperate and to speak with a single voice in the ECT negotiations 
for economic and geopolitical reasons. Confronted with the faltering Soviet superpower on 
their borders, they wanted to maximise their bargaining power and influence on Moscow. 
They, moreover, perceived the ECT negotiations as a unique project, which would not set 
precedence for other negotiations neither for policy substance nor policy process. While the 
Council Presidency initially acted as lead negotiator and the Commission played a 
supportive role, the Commission gradually took over the role as lead negotiator – including 
in negotiations on investment liberalisation, post-establishment treatment and protection 
provisions – due to its proactive attitude, expertise, administrative resources and its pivotal 
role in the construction of the Single Market for energy. The ECT was in essence the 
external relations component of this milestone project of the Commission. For this very 
reason, European utilities opposed the ECT project, whereas other parts of the European 
business community were uninterested. European utilities perceived the ECT project as a 
Commission-led attempt to dismantle their monopolies and to introduce third-party-access to 
energy networks. In 1995, the EU ratified the ECT including its investment provisions. The 
ECT is today the only agreement allowing investors to launch arbitration procedures against 
the EU.  
 
The negotiations on the MAI and Singapore Issues: The chapter on the negotiations on 
the MAI and Singapore Issues drew a particularly intriguing picture. The USA pushed for 
the launch of the MAI negotiations in the early 1990s to increase pressure on developing 
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countries to adopt a more cooperative stance in GATT/WTO talks on investment provisions. 
While the Member States endorsed the project, the Commission was hesitant. The 
EU/Commission would have to participate in the MAI talks due to fringe competences, but 
the Commission disliked that it would have to negotiate alongside the Member States – as 
customary in the OECD – and would not act as single voice like in the GATT/WTO. 
European business showed some but no strong interest in the MAI project. Observers 
reported that the MAI negotiations were a government- rather than business-driven project. 
Shortly after the launch of the OECD talks in 1995, the Commission managed in EU-internal 
and international debates to ensure the creation of a WTO working group on investment as 
part of the so-called Singapore Issues. It should ensure the continuation of investment 
debates in the WTO and hopefully serve as nucleus for veritable investment negotiations in 
the future. Cooperation between the Commission and the Member States was confrontational 
during the MAI talks. Many Member States accepted the EU’s involvement in talks on 
issues of shared competence such as investment liberalisation and post-establishment 
treatment but refused cooperation with the Commission on questions of investment 
protection. Under the impression of the Maastricht IGC and Opinion 1/94, the Member 
States’ investment policy officials sought to keep the Commission at bay and to stop it from 
encroaching onto their competences. When the MAI negotiations ran into stalemate in 1997, 
the USTR and the Commission reportedly promoted the collapse of the negotiations so as to 
upgrade the deliberations in the WTO working group on investment to proper negotiations. 
This strategic choice and exploitation of international negotiating fora indeed considerably 
consolidated the EU’s involvement in international investment policy. The Commission 
consequently acted as proactive single voice in the short-lived investment talks of the Doha 
Round in the WTO. The Commission’s role as the EU’s single voice in investment 
negotiations in the Doha Round later helped to justify the inclusion of investment disciplines 
into FTA negotiations and ultimately informed the critical decision of the Praesidium of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe to propose the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. 
The Commission’s strategic choice of negotiating fora for the consolidation of the EU’s role 
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in international investment policy was thus an essential building block in the emergence of 
the EU’s new policy.  
 
The EU in bilateral investment negotiations as part of FTAs: The thesis, moreover, 
examined how the EU came to negotiate on investment provisions as part of bilateral FTAs. 
The thesis analysed the negotiations on the EU-Mexico FTA (1996-2000) and EU-Chile 
FTA (1999-2002), which constitute the beginning of the EU’s bilateral investment strategy. 
The EU-Mexico FTA negotiations were launched as a reaction to the conclusion of NAFTA 
in 1995. NAFTA caused European firms to lose market share in Mexico, while it increased 
at same time the attractiveness of Mexico as an entry point to the US economy. In 
consequence, the Commission, European business and the Member States started supporting 
the conclusion of a EU-Mexico FTA of NAFTA-parity. The Member States empowered the 
Commission to seek negotiations on the liberalisation of service-related investments, post-
establishment treatment and capital movements. The Commission thus agreed with Mexico 
on an ambitious negative list for the liberalisation of service-related investments and a 
comprehensive capital movement clause. Toward the end of the negotiations, France and 
other Member States, however, started worrying about the implications of these provisions 
for their competences. They claimed that the Commission had overstepped its mandate and 
declared to block the conclusion of the FTA unless the Commission deleted the most 
controversial commitments. The Commission had to bow in. The EU-Chile FTA started 
shortly before the clash in the EU-Mexico negotiations. The Commission, European business 
and the Member States alike pushed for the EU-Chile FTA in order to pre-empt an envisaged 
US-Chile FTA. Yet again, the Member States initially agreed in the mandate to include 
service-related investment commitments – however on the basis of a positive list. Once the 
competence clash in the EU-Mexico negotiations had happened, the Commission and the 
Swedish Council Presidency devised a strategy to ensure the continued support for 
investment provisions in the EU-Chile talks. They started touring Member State capitals and 
in particular Paris to build trust. They argued that the EU could not credibly push for 
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ambitious services and investment disciplines in the Doha Round of the WTO – as the 
Council had previously decided – if the EU’s FTAs did not contain such commitments. The 
Member States agreed with the Commission’s line of argument and the EU-Chile FTA 
became the first EU FTA to comprise a proper investment chapter with liberalisation and 
post-establishment treatment provisions. The EU-Chile FTA thereby set a new standard. All 
following European FTAs contain similar chapters. It, moreover, triggered in-depth thinking 
about the EU’s general strategy to investment regulation, which led to adoption of the so-
called EU’s Minimum Platform on Investment in 2006.  
  
The evolution of the EU’s legal competences: The analysis of the debates on the EU’s 
legal competences drew an intriguingly homogenous picture. Since the 1970s, the 
Commission pushed for the extension of the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment policy. It generally problematized the EU’s role in this domain and either 
claimed that the EU was already competent or pointed to the EU’s de facto competences and 
the evolving trade agenda in order to convince the Member States in IGCs to extend the CCP 
to investment regulation. The Commission also repeatedly used recourse to legal review in 
order to force the Member States to acknowledge the EU’s competence, however, only with 
limited success. The Member States persistently opposed to extend the EU’s competences in 
international investment policy. They saw no need to sacrifice competences in this domain. 
Business did not shape the preferences of European or national policy-makers. It was little 
interested and/or divided over the benefits of a communitarisation of international 
investment policy-making. After decades of unsuccessful attempts of the Commission to 
acquire legal competences, it finally succeeded in the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
While it drew on similar strategies as before to win over the Member States (agenda setting; 
invoking of de facto competences; pointing to the evolving trade agenda), it were the 
procedural particularities of the Convention, which made the difference. The Member States 
and notably national technocrats had only limited access to the Convention, which facilitated 
Commission entrepreneurship and paved the way toward the extension of the CCP to FDI 
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regulation. The Lisbon Treaty thus finally established a firm legal Union competence to 
regulate international investment flows.  
 
10.2 A theoretical assessment  
This section evaluates the theoretical implications of the empirical findings. It first clarifies 
to what extent and how the empirical observations challenge liberal intergovernmnetalism 
and hypothesis H2. The section then assesses to what extent the observations confirm 
supranational thinking and hypothesis H1.  !
10.2.1 The limits of liberal intergovernmentalism  
Hypothesis H2 builds on liberal intergovernmental thinking. It reads: European business 
lobbied Member State governments for a communitarisation of international investment 
policy-making so as to ensure access to ambitious, state-of-the-art international investment 
and trade agreements. The Member States gave into such demands so as to increase their 
domestic and international capabilities ultimately leading to the permanent delegation of 
international investment policy-making to the EU. The empirical observations challenge 
hypothesis H2 and liberal intergovernmentalism in several regards. The preceding discussion 
demonstrated that business played only a marginal role in the emergence of the EU’s 
international investment policy. It cannot be considered as the driver behind European 
Integration in this domain. The Member States, on the other hand, occasionally favoured 
cooperation and delegation of international investment policy-making to the EU-level, but 
primarily sought to contain the EU’s involvement in this policy domain. The following 
paragraphs compare step-by-step the propositions formulated in the analytical framework to 
the empirical observations.  
 
316 
 
Business preferences and lobbying: An extensive literature seeks to explain EU foreign 
economic policy and thereby indirectly European Integration in this policy domain through 
business preferences and lobbying (Baccini and Dür, 2012; M. Baldwin, 2006; R. Baldwin, 
2006; De Bièvre and Jappe, 2010; Dür, 2007; Manger, 2009; Young, 2001, 2002; Woolcock 
and Bayne, 2007). Building on this literature, the analytical framework suggested that in 
particular service providers from old and big Member States should have taken an interest in 
international investment policy. They have statistically the highest propensity to outward 
investment, which implies that international investment policy should have the highest 
welfare impacts on them. In a similar vein, they should have shown stronger interest in 
questions related to investment liberalisation than in questions related to post-establishment 
treatment and protection. Investment liberalisation arguably has immediate welfare impacts 
in the form of increased profit opportunities, while post-establishment treatment and 
protection provisions should only have distant and uncertain welfare effects. Finally, they 
should have pushed for procedural shifts in the form of a communitarisation of international 
investment policy-making as the pooling of competences and bargaining power at the EU-
level might have promised to positively affect policy substance in the form of competitive 
state-of-the-art IIAs between the EU and third countries.  
  
The empirical observations challenge the theoretical propositions on the formation of 
business preferences and business lobbying at a fundamental level. European business – 
regardless of economic sectors and home countries – was mostly uninformed, disengaged, 
unorganised and unable to shape policy-making. The thesis casts doubts on the widespread 
assumption in the IPE literature that business generally understands what is beneficial, has 
the political resources to influence policy-makers and ultimately determines countries’ 
foreign economic policies. To the contrary, Chapters IV, V, VI and VIII reported on 
numerous instances, where policy-makers sought to mobilise European business on 
questions of international investment policy-making including a permanent competence 
transfer. As already described by Woll (2008), policy-makers lobbied businesses rather than 
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the other way round. A particularly striking example is the foundation of the European 
Services Forum. The Commission called on European service providers and investors 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s to get organised, to develop informed positions and to 
provide expertise and input to policy-makers on questions related to services trade and 
investment regulation. It was only in the late 1990s that European service providers finally 
came around and founded the European Services Forum after the Commissioner for trade 
Leon Brittan had warned business leaders that service providers would get traded off against 
manufacturers and agriculture in the upcoming Doha Round in case service providers and 
investors remained passive in policy-making debates (Interview, Brussels, 25 September 
2013b).  
 
In accordance with the analytical framework, however, the empirical chapters demonstrated 
that in the very rare occasions where business showed genuine interest in investment policy, 
it cared about investment liberalisation rather than post-establishment treatment and 
protection provisions. Chapter VII on the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTA negotiations 
showed that European business pushed for European action to ensure NAFTA-parity in 
investment access to the Mexican and Chilean economy but was uninterested in questions of 
post-establishment treatment and protection. It needs to be mentioned though that the 
varying interest of business in European action might also be due to the Member States’ 
proactive BIT programs already dealing with questions of post-establishment treatment and 
protection. The findings of chapter IX, nevertheless, imply that business was equally no 
decisive driver behind national BIT programs. Or at least other – mercantilist and political – 
considerations seem to have been of greater importance. The econometric literature on the 
impact of BITs on investment activities partly supports and partly challenges this reading 
(Sauvant and Sachs, 2009; Hallward-Diremeier, 2013; Neumeyer and Spess, 2005; Busse et 
al., 2010; Egger and Merlo, 2007; Colen et al., 2014; Yackee, 2009).  
 
318 
 
Member State preferences: The analytical framework developed the liberal 
intergovernmental argument that Member State governments should have been receptive to 
business demands for greater cooperation and delegation in international investment policy-
making to the extent that cooperation and delegation indeed promised to maximise domestic 
and/or international capabilities. The framework, however, cautioned that the receptiveness 
of the Member States for business demands should have hinged on policy substance and the 
international negotiating context. While the examination of business preferences already by 
and large invalidated the hypothesis H2, it is appropriate for the sake of completeness to 
examine the role of Member State preferences in the emergence of the EU’s international 
investment policy and the validity of the propositions formulated in the analytical 
framework.  
 
First and foremost, the Member States occasionally supported cooperation and delegation of 
international investment policy-making to the EU-level (see chapters IV, V, VI and VII), but 
nonetheless primarily sought to contain the EU’s role in this domain. They only unwillingly 
accepted for instance the extension of the EU’s legal competences under the Lisbon Treaty 
as part of a package deal (see chapters VI and VIII). All in all, Member State preferences 
cannot be considered as drivers behind the emergence of the EU’s international investment 
policy. Yet, the proposition of the analytical framework that policy substance shaped 
Member State preferences on cooperation and delegation was by and large correct. The 
Member States were generally more inclined to cooperate on questions of investment 
liberalisation than on questions of investment protection (see in particular chapter VI). On 
the one hand, the Member States’ hesitation to cooperate on investment protection reflected 
their intention to safeguard their competences and national BIT programs from European 
encroachment. On the other hand, investment protection and notably ISDS may limit the 
regulatory sovereignty of states, which is more sensitive and controversial than investment 
liberalisation in the current neoliberal era. What is more, the proposition of the analytical 
framework that the international negotiating context might have affected Member State 
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preferences has also shown to be by and large correct. The Member States were generally 
eager to cooperate in investment regulation in the ECT and GATT/WTO negotiations (see 
chapters IV, V and VI). The Member States sought to maximise their international 
bargaining power. They were less eager to cooperate in ‘friendlier’ policy-making fora such 
as in the MAI or FTA negotiations as well as in EU-internal debates on the distribution of 
legal competences where the gains of cooperation and delegation were less manifest (see 
chapters VI, VII and VIII).  
 
In conclusion, hypothesis H2 and liberal intergovernmentalism do not accurately depict the 
emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. The empirical observations do not, 
however, invalidate liberal intergovernmentalism per se. They merely suggest that European 
business and the Member States did not consider the communitarisation of international 
investment policy-making to be a welfare and capability maximising step. Hence, this 
instance of European Integration cannot be considered as a business- or government-driven 
process.  
  
10.2.2 Suparanationalism and the conditions for successful Commission 
entrepreneurship 
Hypothesis H1 builds on supranational thinking. It reads: The Commission acted as policy 
entrepreneur pursuing the creation of a EU international investment policy since the 1980s. 
The Commission built support and/or pressured the Member States into cooperation in 
international investment policy by exploiting its agenda-setting powers, the evolving trade 
agenda, by pushing investment negotiations into certain international fora, by invoking 
fringe and implied competences and using legal recourse. Most empirical observations from 
this thesis lend support to hypothesis H1 and supranational thinking on European Integration. 
Commission entrepreneurship must be considered as the main driver behind the emergence 
of the EU’s international investment policy. It persistently sought to consolidate the EU’s 
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role in international investment policy and drew on various strategies to pressure and/or to 
convince the Member States of the benefits of cooperating and delegating international 
investment policy-making to the EU-level. While these strategies decisively promoted the 
consolidation of the EU’s de facto competences in international investment negotiations, it 
was only in combination with the procedural particularities of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe that the Commission finally succeeded in extending the EU’s legal competences. 
The following paragraphs discuss the effectiveness of the Commission’s various strategies in 
consolidating the EU’s de facto and legal competences.  
 
Agenda setting powers: The Commission holds so-called agenda setting powers in EU 
foreign economic policy and Treaty revisions. As a sizeable literature on the principal-agent 
relationship between the Commission and the Member States suggests (see inter alia Pollack, 
2003; De Conceiçao-Heldt, 2009; Kerremans, 2004; Delreux and Kerremans, 2008), the 
Commission can shape the European policy-making debate through its right to initiate trade 
measures, its technical expertise, informational advantages and administrative resources as 
well as its prerogative to submit reports on the functioning of the EU’s various policies to 
IGCs. The agenda setting powers enable the Commission to stir the debate and to potentially 
convince the Member States of the necessity to extend cooperation to new areas.  
 
The empirical observations from this thesis suggest that the Commission’s agenda setting 
powers were instrumental in consolidating the EU’s de facto and legal competences in 
international investment policy. All empirical chapters reported that the Commission pushed 
for debates on the EU’s role in investment regulation and sought to convince the Member 
States to cooperate and to delegate either on a temporary or a permanent basis international 
investment policy-making. The EU’s agreement to the comprehensive agenda of the 
Uruguay Round and its ability to consequently speak with a single voice in investment-
related negotiations for instance echoed the Commission’s campaigning and use of its 
agenda setting powers in EU-internal policy-making debates. The Commission successfully 
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used its agenda setting powers also during the ECT, MAI and FTA negotiations as well as 
the Doha Round in order to strengthen the EU’s role in investment-related talks. While the 
use of agenda setting powers to consolidate the EU’s de facto competences was fairly 
successful in international investment negotiations (see chapters IV, V, VI and VII), the 
Commission’s use of agenda setting powers to extend the EU’s legal competences produced 
only mixed results (see chapter VIII). The Commission problematized the EU’s lack of legal 
competences in international investment regulation in all IGCs since the 1980s but the 
Member States did not follow its recommendation to extend the CCP. It was only during the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (2002/2003) that the Praesidium – but not the delegates 
– showed receptive to the Commission’s pleas to extend the CCP to investment regulation. 
The consequent decision of the Praesidium to extend the CCP provisions to FDI regulation, 
however, reflects not only the Commission’s insistent campaigning and agenda setting in the 
open and behind the scenes but also the procedural particularities of the Convention, which 
are discussed in further detail below.  
 
Invoking the evolving standard agenda of trade policy: The analytical framework 
developed the second and closely related proposition that the Commission problematized 
and exploited the evolving standard agenda of international trade negotiations in the 
GATT/WTO and FTAs to consolidate the EU’s de facto and legal competences in 
international investment policy. The Commission should have problematized in EU-internal 
debates the need to adjust the EU’s de facto and legal competences to the evolving and 
broadening standard trade agenda in order to ensure the effective representation of the EU 
and competitive deals in GATT/WTO and FTA negotiations. The Commission should have 
pointed out that a failure to adjust the EU’s de facto and legal competences in fora where it 
normally speaks with a single voice might impose high opportunity costs in the form of 
foregone bargaining power and suboptimal negotiating outcomes (Young, 2002, 2003). 
What is more, following the logic of Putnam’s two-level game (1988) the Commission might 
even have encouraged third countries to push for investment disciplines in the GATT/WTO 
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and FTA negotiations in order to thereby increase pressure on the Member States to intensify 
cooperation and delegation. 
 
The empirical observations indeed suggest that the Commission frequently invoked the 
evolving trade agenda in order to convince and to pressure the Member States into 
cooperation and delegation of investment policy-making to the EU-level. Chapter IV on the 
Uruguay Round reported that the Commission quickly started sympathising with the USA 
and its plan to launch a comprehensive GATT round including talks on multilateral 
investment disciplines. Hence, it underlined in EU-internal debates the need to study the US 
proposal and to develop an informed joined position and strategy to ensure a good deal for 
the EU. In a similar vein, chapter VII reported how the Commission very effectively pointed 
out that the standard agenda of FTAs had come to include investment disciplines. Hence, the 
EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTAs had to match this development in order to mitigate negative 
effects of third country FTAs on the European economy. Finally, chapter VIII documented 
how the Commission repeated almost ad infinitum in ECJ proceedings, IGC debates and in 
the Convention that the standard agenda of international trade negotiations had evolved and 
broadened, which required the adjustment of the EU’s legal competences to ensure the 
effective operation of the CCP and representation of the EU. While invoking the evolving 
trade agenda was effective in extending the EU’s de facto competences, it had only mixed 
impact on the Member States’ readiness to extend the EU’s legal competences.  
 
Strategic use of international negotiating fora: Along similar lines, the analytical 
framework developed the proposition that the Commission might have pushed for 
international investment negotiations to be held in specific international fora to consolidate 
the EU’s role in foreign economic policy. The EU traditionally speaks with a single voice in 
some, nonetheless, not all international trade policy fora. The Member States for instance 
still speak on their own behalf on most policy issues, which do not clearly fall under Union 
competence, in the OECD or UNCTAD. So if international negotiations on so-called ‘new 
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trade issues’ such as investment take place in the OECD, the Member States are likely to 
negotiate on their own behalf. If similar negotiations take place in the GATT/WTO, the 
Member States are likely to delegate negotiating to the Commission. The Commission may 
have exploited these dynamics to its benefit.  
 
The empirical chapter of the thesis indeed lend support to this proposition. Chapter VI 
reported that the Commission persistently and successfully pushed multilateral investment 
negotiations out of the OECD and back into the WTO. It was weary about its limited role in 
the MAI negotiations within the OECD and favoured WTO-based negotiations where it 
would act as the EU’s single voice. To that end, it built EU-internal and international support 
to create an investment working group in the WTO in 1996. When the MAI negotiations 
stalled in 1997, the USTR and the Commission reportedly promoted their collapse in order 
to push negotiations back to the WTO and to upgrade the deliberations in the investment 
working group to veritable negotiations. The Commission’s efforts were successful and 
indeed crucial for the further consolidation of the EU’s role in this policy domain. The 
Commission acted as single voice in the consequent investment negotiations in the Doha 
Round. Chapter VII, moreover, reported that the Commission could convince the Member 
States to include a proper investment chapter into the EU-Chile FTA by pointing out that the 
EU was no credible actor if it pushed for investment talks in the WTO but did not include 
equivalent investment provisions into its FTAs. What is more, the EU’s involvement in 
investment negotiations in the Doha Round and then FTAs showed later decisive for the 
Praesidium’s decision to propose the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. In hindsight, 
the Commission’s strategic use of different negotiating fora was thus highly effective so as 
to extend the EU’s de facto and legal competences.  
  
Invoking fringe, implied and de facto competences: The analytical framework formulated 
the proposition that the Commission might have invoked fringe, implied and de facto 
competences to consolidate the EU’s involvement in international investment policy. The 
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term ‘fringe competences’ refers to competences, which are of undisputable yet of indirect 
importance for the regulation of an issue area. The term ‘implied competences’ refers to the 
legal reasoning that for the sake of regulatory coherence the EU must hold implied external 
competences to regulate an issue area, if it is competent to regulate the same issue area 
within the EU. The term ‘de facto’ competences refers to policy-making arrangements where 
the EU is already strongly involved in a policy domain but does not yet hold firm legal 
competences. If the Commission invokes ‘de facto competences’ to justify the EU’s 
involvement in international investment policy-making, it basically refers to precedencies 
and demands for continued cooperation and delegation for the sake of regulatory coherence. 
Invoking fringe, implied or de facto competences should have increased pressure on the 
Member States to cooperate and to delegate international investment policy-making at least 
partly to the EU.  
 
The empirical chapter of the thesis repeatedly uncovered instances, where the Commission 
successfully invoked fringe, implied and de facto competences to consolidate the EU’s role 
in international investment policy-making. Chapter V on the ECT negotiations reported that 
the Commission stressed its legal and de facto competences in trade and energy policy to 
ensure and to extend its role in the ECT talks including on investment disciplines. Chapter 
VII on the MAI negotiations documented that the Member States only unwillingly accepted 
the Commission and EU’s involvement in this negotiating forum but had to give in as the 
Commission invoked legal fringe competences. Similarly, chapter VIII reported that the 
Commission argued in numerous ECJ proceedings, IGCs and in the Convention that the EU 
already held implied and de facto competences over international investment regulation, 
which required formalisation to ensure the continued effectiveness of EU policy-making. 
Invoking such competences was rather successful as the chapters on the ECT, MAI and FTA 
negotiations as well as debates on the EU’s legal competences demonstrated.  
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Strategic recourse to legal review: The analytical framework finally developed the 
proposition that the Commission might have used strategic recourse to legal review in order 
to make the Member States cooperate and delegate international investment policy-making 
to the EU.  In case of dispute over the EU’s legal competences with the Member States, the 
Commission should have called on the ECJ to recognise the EU’s full or partial competences 
in this domain.  
 
Chapter VIII on the evolution of the EU’s legal competences identified three instances, 
where the Commission had strategic recourse to legal review in order to have the ECJ 
recognise the EU’s legal competences and thereby to force the Member States to cooperate 
and to delegate international investment policy-making to the EU-level. The empirical 
observations, however, suggest that legal recourse was the least effective tool to advance the 
EU’s involvement in international investment policy. In 1975, it asked for Opinion 1/75 in 
order to increase pressure on the Member States to accept its proposal for European export 
policy including a EU BIT program. While the ECJ recognised a general Union competence 
in this domain, it clarified that the CCP provisions only provided for a harmonisation of 
national export policies rather than the creation of a European policy. In 1994, the 
Commission asked for Opinion 1/94 to confirm its highly comprehensive teleological 
interpretation of the CCP so as to ratify the WTO Agreement. While Opinion 1/94 only 
indirectly touched on the EU’s competence to regulate investment flows, the Commission’s 
teleological interpretation of the CCP implied that investment regulation would fall sooner 
rather than later under Union competence. It came as a surprise when the ECJ sided with the 
Member States and advanced a restrictive literal interpretation of the CCP. The Opinion 
implied that the CCP was unlikely to generally cover investment regulation. Finally, the 
Commission sought to establish the Union’s legal competence over post-establishment 
treatment of international investments in Opinion 2/92 in 1995. It argued that international 
investment flows were a modern form of trade. The regulation of international investments 
should therefore be dealt with under trade policy. Many Member States rejected this claim, 
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but the ECJ agreed with the Commission’s line of argument with regard to extra-EU 
investment flows. The Commission was, however, politically unable and/or unwilling to use 
its legal victory to consolidate the EU’s role in international investment policy. The Member 
States continued concluding hundreds of BITs with post-establishment provisions despite 
Opinion 2/92.  
  
Assessing the conditions for successful Commission entrepreneurship: The empirical 
assessment suggests that supranational thinking and the concept of Commission 
entrepreneurship accurately describe the emergence of the EU’s international investment 
policy since the 1980s. The preceding paragraphs suggest that the Commission drew on 
various strategies to consolidate the EU’s role in international investment policy. So which 
strategies were most effective in extending the EU’s de facto as well as legal competences?  
 
Commission entrepreneurship to extend the EU’s de facto competences in international 
investment policy was fairly effective and relied on all above discussed strategies. The most 
effective strategies to consolidate the EU’s role in international investment negotiations 
were, however, agenda setting, invoking the international trade agenda and fringe 
competences as well as the strategic use of international negotiating fora. The Commission 
always used its agenda setting powers and invoked the changed realities of world trade in 
order to convince the Member States of the necessity to cooperate. The Commission also 
frequently invoked fringe and implied competences in order to force the Member States to 
cooperate and to delegate international investment policy-making. At least once – but with 
considerable success – the Commission made strategic use of different negotiating fora. In 
contrast to studies by Schmidt (1998) and Woll (2006), strategic recourse to legal review 
was little helpful to foster cooperation and delegation. It did neither create new effective 
legal obligations on the Member States to cooperate and to delegate, nor shift Member State 
preferences in favour of cooperation. To the contrary, the Commission’s attempts to use 
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legal review manifestly deteriorated the working atmosphere and undermined trust as the 
chapters on the MAI and FTA negotiations reported.   
 
Commission entrepreneurship to extend the EU’s legal competences was only little 
successful for many years. The Commission used its agenda setting powers, pointed to the 
evolving trade agenda, invoked the EU’s long-lasting de facto competences and used legal 
review to extend the Union’s legal competences. However, the Member States resisted the 
Commission’s arguments and pressure to extend the EU’s legal competences in numerous 
IGCs and ECJ proceedings. Only classic spill-overs occasionally extended the EU’s legal 
competences into fringe areas of investment regulation. It was only due to the procedural 
particularities of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002/2003) that the Commission’s 
policy entrepreneurship finally succeeded.  
 
The procedural particularities of the Convention come to play: Yet again, the 
Commission used agenda setting, referred to the evolving trade agenda and the EU’s long-
standing de facto competences in international investment regulation during the Convention. 
As discussed in chapter VIII, the Praesidium followed the Commission’s arguments – 
presented by an allegedly neutral Praesidium member – and decided on its own authority to 
include a FDI reference into the CCP provisions. Once the reference was in the Treaty draft, 
it showed difficult to delete it. The transparent, democratic ambition of the Convention 
required a discussion on the deletion of the reference. Time for discussion was, however, 
notoriously short and was allocated under investment of considerable political capital. The 
delegates were mostly politicians and perceived themselves as the founding fathers of a 
European federal state. They focused on questions of high politics and were unwilling to 
spend their time and political capital on the many technical demands from domestic 
administrations. Once the FDI reference had made its way into the final draft treaty, the 
political costs of deleting it in the consequent IGCs even rose. The draft treaty was after all 
the product of a democratic process. Hence, the Member States unwillingly accepted the 
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revised CCP provisions without significant amendments. In conclusion, the Convention 
method limited Member State and technocratic control over Treaty revisions, which 
facilitated Commission entrepreneurship.     
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Table 10.1 Summary table of findings  
 Uruguay Round Energy Charter Treaty MAI & Singapore Issues Free Trade Agreements Legal competences  
Sectorial preferences Limited business interest in 
investment-related 
negotiations. Budiness is 
hardly informed, organised 
and mobilised. 
No business interest in ECT 
project. European utilities 
opposed to liberalisation 
commitments, limited support 
for protection provisions.  
Limited business interest in 
MAI negotiations, as 
European investors primarily 
want improved investment 
climate in non-OECD 
countries.  
Moderate business interest in 
seeing NAFTA-parity in 
investment liberalisation 
commitments in EU-Mexico 
FTA.  
Strong business interest in 
EU-Chile FTA to lock in 
openness of service sectors.  
Limited business interest in 
IGC and legal debates. 
Mostly generic statements 
demanding effectiveness of 
CCP. Partly ambivalent 
voices for preserving Member 
State competences. 
Government preferences Strong government interest in 
cooperation so as to take 
advantage of collective 
bargaining power and 
coherent representation. 
Strong government interest in 
cooperation so as to exert 
greater influence on transition 
of Soviet Union and unlock 
Soviet energy resources. 
Limited government interest 
in cooperating in MAI talks. 
They prefer speaking on their 
own behalf as customary in 
OECD.  
Moderate government 
support for cooperation as 
customary in WTO-based 
negotiations  
Ambivalent government 
preferences. At first 
supportive of Commission 
plan to reach for NAFTA-
parity for services and 
investment; than suddenly 
sovereignist backlashes.   
No government support for an 
extension of the CCP to 
investment regulation. The 
procedural particularities of 
the Convention significantly 
weaken Member State 
opposition and pave the way 
to a complex package deal 
comprising an extension of 
the CCP to FDI reference.  
Commission 
entrepreneurship & 
employed strategies 
Agenda-setting: 
Campaigning vis-à-vis 
Member States and business 
to endorse US proposal for 
comprehensive round.  
Evolving trade agenda: 
Commission invokes 
evolving trade agenda to 
justify mandate.  
 
Agenda-setting: Proactive 
attitude and high ambition 
enable Commission to acquire 
a central role in negotiating 
process. 
Fringe competence: 
Commission successfully 
underlines teh EU’s fringe 
and de facto competences 
over trade and energy policy.  
 
Agenda-setting: Proactive 
and ambitious attitude enable 
Commission to play a central 
role in MAI and WTO.  
Fringe competences: 
Commission invokes fringe 
competences in trade and 
capital movements to ensure 
participation in MAI talks.  
Strategic use of negotiating 
fora: Commission pushes 
negotiations into WTO to 
consolidate its influence and 
the EU’s role in investment 
policy.   
 
Agenda-setting: Commission 
is proactive and ambitious to 
build and then to maintain 
consensus for ambitious 
investment disciplines in 
FTAs with Mexico and Chile.   
Evolving trade agenda: 
Commission invokes 
evolving trade agenda to 
justify NAFTA-parity with 
regard to services and 
investment. It invokes teh 
previously shaped WTO 
agenda to ensure continued 
support for investment 
provisions.  
 
 
Agenda-setting: Commission 
puts reform of investment on 
agenda of IGCs, Convention 
and ECJ proceedings.  
Implied competences: Claim 
that EU is already competent 
under CCP.  
Evolving trade agenda: 
Emphasis on need to bring 
CCP in line with evolving 
trade agenda.   
De facto competences: 
Insistence on the EU’s long-
lasting involvement in 
investment regulation.  
Legal Review: Attempts to 
force recognition of EU’s 
legal competences through 
ECJ.  
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Figure 10.2: A chronology of the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy 
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10.3 The contributions of this thesis beyond the study of European 
Integration 
The preceding section summarised the empirical observations and assessed the 
validity of the ex ante hypotheses and of their underlying theoretical schools. So far 
the thesis focused on the classic supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism 
debate. The present section extends the analytical debate beyond this narrow focus.  !
10.3.1 Agency and the transmission of systemic pressures into foreign policy 
outcomes 
!
The thesis shed light on a remarkable period of Commission entrepreneurship. The 
Commission’s instrumental role in the emergence of the EU’s international investment 
policy and reform of the CCP allows for an important theoretical finding and contribution. It 
relativises the significance of systemic pressures like the evolving international trade agenda 
on foreign economic policy. A sizeable neo-realist and merchantilist IPE literature focuses 
on systemic explanations for countries’ foreign economic policy choices (Keohane, 1984; 
Krasner, 2976; Krasner and Web, 1989, Oatley, 2011; Ravenhill, 2008). Many scholars also 
seek to explain the EU’s foreign economic policy through systemic pressures from third 
countries, international regimes and global markets (see for instance Dür, 2007; Manger, 
2009). They typically suggest that the EU emulates and elaborates on the foreign economic 
policy approaches of major competitor countries. Many scholars do not examine in detail the 
causal mechanisms, which link the global economy and foreign economic policies of third 
countries to changes in EU foreign economic policy. They simply assume that actual or 
predicted losses in competitiveness and market share on third markets shake up European 
business and government administrations to adjust EU foreign economic policy in order to 
mitigate and ward off welfare losses.  
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The thesis discussed in detail how systemic pressures in the form of an evolving 
international trade agenda shaped the EU’s foreign economic policy. While it lends support 
to the fundamental assumption that structural pressures shape the EU’s foreign economic 
policy, it adds a new causal ‘layer’. The thesis demonstrated how the Commission 
transmitted such systemic pressures into EU policy-making. The Commission drew the 
attention of national policy-makers and business communities to systemic pressures and 
underlined the need to accordingly adjust the EU’s foreign economic policy. It seems 
unlikely that the systemic pressures would have affected EU foreign economic policy to the 
same degree, if the Commission had not problematised them in EU-internal debates. Chapter 
VII on the FTA negotiations with Mexico and Chile is a case in point. While the Member 
States ultimtaly blocked ambitious investment disciplines in the EU-Mexico FTA 
negotiations despite strong competitive pressures deriving from the entry into force of 
NAFTA, they accepted such disciplines in the EU-Chile FTA thanks to the Commission’s 
pedagogical campaigning. The thesis thereby underlines the importance of agency in the 
transmission of systemic pressures into policy-making debates and, lastly, policy outcomes. 
Business and governments do not necessarily realise or recognise the need to adjust EU 
foreign economic policy to changes in the international environment. The Commission – as 
negotiator and administrator of EU foreign economic policy – must occasionally mobilise 
decision-makers and stakeholders. In more theoretical terms, systemic pressures emanating 
from the world economy do not get automatically transmitted but may require agency and 
policy entrepreneurship to affect policy outcomes. 
 
10.3.2 Historical institutionalism and endogenous agency-driven institutional 
change 
Establishing the significant role of the Commission in the transmission of systemic pressures 
into foreign economic policy outcomes does not only enhance our understanding of EU 
foreign economic policy-making. The findings also ameliorate our knowledge of how 
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institutions like the CCP change over time. The thesis suggests that the Commission not only 
‘faithfully’ transmitted structural pressures into policy-making debates and outcomes. It 
proactively cultivated and reinforced systemic pressures in order to advance its policy and 
institutional agenda despite Member State hesitation. It for instance pushed multilateral 
investment negotiations out of the OECD into the WTO so as to consolidate the EU’s role in 
international investment policy. The Commission then successfully argued that – as the EU 
was dealing with and pushing for investment disciplines in the WTO – the EU also had to 
reach for ambitious investment disciplines in bilateral FTA negotiations in order to stay a 
credible trade actor. Ultimately, the Commission then claimed during IGCs and the 
Convention that the international trade agenda – as enshrined in the WTO and FTA agendas 
– had come to include investment disciplines, which required a modernisation of the CCP. 
So the Commission strategically transmitted, cultivated and manipulated systemic pressures 
in order to see the EU’s legal competences extended and increase its powers.  
 
These findings are of great value for historical institutionalist research. Historical 
institutionalism seeks to explain institutional stability and change. Institutions are defined as 
rules of the game, which shape the preferences and structure the interactions of agents and 
thereby shape policy outcomes. Historical institutionalism draws on concepts like critical 
junctures, path dependence and, in particular, positive feedback processes in order to account 
for episodes of institutional change as well as stability. The concept of positive feedback 
refers to self-reinforcing social processes and institutions. The proliferation of new 
technologies like QWERTY keyboards illustrates the argument. The more people get used to 
QWERTY keyboards, the more difficult it gets over time to change the layout of keyboards. 
For many years, scholars of historical institutionalism suggested that positive feedback 
processes should increasingly stabilise institutions over time and keep them on a stable 
development path. They assumed that institutional change could only come about due to 
exogenous shocks from the extra-institutional environment. Only exogenous shocks could 
arguably trigger the breakdown of positive feedback processes and thereby trigger 
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institutional change (Pierson, 2004; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Pollack, 2004; Thelen, 
1999). According to this view, the CCP – as an institution in political science terminology – 
should only change if the international trade regime or adjacent policies change.  
 
Scholars of historical institutionalism have increasingly challenged the assumption that 
institutional change is necessarily the consequence of exogenous shocks. They express 
criticism that the analytical focus on ‘exogeneity’ externalises the explanatory challenge. 
Instead of examining why certain institutions are more prone to change than others, scholars 
look for explanations elsewhere. Several scholars have therefore developed theorems of 
endogenous institutional change. Pierson, for instance, has pointed out that the endogenous 
properties of institutions are crucial in shaping institutional change. He suggests that the 
trigger of institutional change may lie outside of an examined institution, but that the 
endogenous properties of this institution consequently determine how it changes (Pierson, 
2004, pp. 83–87). Deeg goes one step further. He argues that positive feedback processes 
might stabilise institutions in the short- and medium-term. They might, however, cause 
institutional change in the long run. Deeg illustrates his argument with regard to the German 
and Italian financial system. He argues that the intimate ties and cross-ownership between 
banks and industry in these countries stabilised the German and Italian financial system in 
the short and medium-term, but caused a steady decline in banking profits in the long run. In 
consequence, German and Italian banks started looking for new business opportunities, 
which ultimately set the German and Italian financial sector on entirely new development 
paths (Deeg, 2005, 2001). Streek, Thelen and Mahoney, finally, underline that institutions 
are competitive, social systems. They govern the interactions of agents. While some agents 
might feel that the institutional status quo benefits them, others might favour institutional 
reform in order to enhance their power and/or welfare. It follows from this ‘social’ view that 
institutions are likely to be subjected to endogenous contestation and pressure for reform 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  
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The observations from the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy confirm 
Streek, Thelen and Mahoney’s argument on endogenous contestation and institutional 
reform. The observations, moreover, shed light on how change-oriented agents might pursue 
their objective and push for a reform of institutions. The Commission clearly contested the 
setup of the CCP prior to Lisbon. It wanted to reform the CCP for functional reasons but also 
in order to extend its powers vis-à-vis the Member States in foreign economic policy. The 
Member States, on the other hand, were unwilling to reform the CCP and to cede powers to 
the Commission and the EU in this domain. In order to attain its objective, the Commission 
consequently shaped the extra-institutional environment – and in particular the international 
trade agenda – to increase functional pressures on the Member States to accept a reform of 
the CCP. In more abstract terms, the Commission acted as a reform-oriented agent, which 
exploited and promoted shifts in the extra-institutional environment in order to advance a 
reform of the contested institution.  
 
10.3.3 A note on methodology – Integration as a process of daily polic-making 
and intergovernmental bargaining 
The thesis documented an intriguing episode of Commission entrepreneurship. As discussed 
above, it ameliorates our theoretical understanding of EU foreign economic policy-making, 
institutional change and European Integration. A brief methodological note is advisable here. 
The thesis could not have delivered these insights if it had opted for the methodological 
standard approach in European Integration research. Most scholars typically seek to explain 
either Member State cooperation in daily policy-making or outcomes of grand 
intergovernmental bargains on Treaty revisions during IGCs. They seek to disentangle these 
two policy-making spheres in order to lower the level of ‘noise’. As this thesis showed, 
Member State cooperation in daily policy-making indeed follows a different logic than grand 
intergovernmental bargains in IGCs. The analytical separation of these spheres thereby 
allows for the generation of more elegant and parsimonious theories of European Integration 
 336 
like Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism. At the same time, however, researchers trade 
off empirical depth.  
  
This thesis opted for greater empirical depth. It deliberately combined the analysis of daily 
policy-making and grand intergovernmental bargains on Treaty revisions. It built on the 
assumption that temporary Member State cooperation in daily policy-making and grand 
intergovernmental bargains are interdependent. The EU’s de facto competences should shape 
the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in a given policy-domain. Put differently, 
focusing only on IGC debates is likely to blur the long-term causalities shaping the EU’s 
legal competences. What is more, if the purpose of research is to explain European 
Integration and the EU’s growing role in new policy domains, it is misleading to only focus 
on grand intergovernmental bargains in IGCs. European Integration progresses most of the 
time through informal policy-making and temporary Member State cooperation rather than 
grand intergovernmental bargains in IGCs and Treaty revisions (see Klein, 2013).  
 
The greater empirical depth and comprehensive analytical approach of this thesis drew a 
diverse and intriguing picture of all examined explanatory factors. Most significantly, it 
unveiled a whole array of Commission attempts and strategies to extend the EU’s de facto 
and legal competences. It found a remarkable level of business lethargy and pointed to 
decisive while ambivalent government preferences. The methodological standard approach 
could not have produced these insights. It would have led to incomplete or even erroneous 
conclusions regarding the emergence of the EU’s international investment policy. This thesis 
thus makes the plea to approach European Integration through a broader analytical lens. A 
broad analytical approach is, in particular, necessary if our empirical understanding of a 
policy domain – as is the case for the EU’s involvement in international investment policy – 
is as yet limited. Theoretical parsimony is certainly to be welcomed, but only if it allows us 
to formulate correct assumptions about reality.  
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10.3.4 Business and the international political economy 
After this excursion to questions of methodology and research design, it is appropriate to 
dwell more on the remarkable lethargy of European business in international investment 
policy and the theoretical implications of this finding. The thesis showed that business was 
little interested in international investment policy per se and even less in debates on the 
communitarisation of international investment policy-making. Only negotiations on 
investment liberalisation commitments occasionally mobilised European investors and 
triggered business lobbying. Negotiations on post-establishment treatment and investment 
protection did not trigger any noteworthy business interest.  
 
The finding has a noteworthy theoretical implication for IPE research. The international 
investment regime seems to be a bureaucracy-driven, neo-mercantilist rather than business-
driven, liberal regime. Many critiques of the international investment regime assume that 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are the main shapers and promoters of IIAs (Gus Van 
Harten, 2007; Monibot, 2013; Pauly et al., 2014; Yackee, 2009). MNEs arguably push 
governments into signing IIAs in order to encounter better investment conditions abroad and 
to bring claims against host countries before international arbitration bodies rather than 
national courts. The findings of this thesis suggest – at least with regard to European 
companies – that this claim is not valid. Government administrations seem to quite freely 
determine the content and partner countries for IIAs. National investment policy officials 
interviewed for this thesis confirmed this assessment. They reported to hardly ever talk to 
business representatives on IIAs. To determine potential partner countries for IIAs, they 
reported to examine national outward investment statistics. They also indicated that if they 
received applications for investment guarantees, they checked whether a BIT with the 
concerned host country was in place. If not, the officials would approach the country and 
propose the conclusion of a BIT in order to keep the exposure of the taxpayer under national 
 338 
investment guarantee schemes low (Interviews, Berlin, 16 & 17 February 2012). While these 
findings on the drivers behind the conclusion of BITs are only of a preliminary nature, they 
raise important questions for future IPE research. How can one explain the existence of some 
3,500 IIAs today? If not business, who pushes for the conclusion of these agreements within 
and outside governments? Who defines the content of these agreements? Why do 
governments of capital-exporting economies pursue BIT programs and arguably limit their 
regulatory space under public international law, if business does not care? And finally, and 
perhaps more importantly, what is the role of international investment lawyers and 
arbitrators in the proliferation of IIAs and the evolution of the international investment 
regime?  
 
The finding also has important policy-making implications. The lack of business interest in 
international investment policy – and in particular in post-establishment treatment and 
protection standards – suggests that policy-makers can re-balance state and investor rights 
under IIAs without facing high opportunity costs in the form of foregone investment activity 
and economic growth. This insight is important for the EU’s approach to IIAs in general and 
to the negotiations on TTIP and CETA in particular. Some Member States cling onto their 
old-fashioned approaches to investment protection and demand the Commission to copy 
their ‘gold standard’ BITs. The Commission, on the other hand, cautions that the EU as a 
whole is also a capital importer. It must ensure that European agreements are not exclusively 
tailored to the needs of capital-exporting Member States, but also protect the right to regulate 
of capital-importing Member States. The findings of this thesis may mediate in this – at 
times heated and ideological – controversy. They imply that the EU might indeed re-balance 
state and investor rights without having to fear a negative impact on investment activity.   
 
Finally, the fact that business was little informed and implicated in international investment 
policy-making arguably inter alia due to its technicality raises generally questions about the 
role of business in today’s global political economy. All major barriers to international trade 
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and economic integration are of considerable technicality nowadays and their dismantling 
may have only uncertain welfare effects. If business is unable to apprehend their economic 
importance and/or unwilling to invest resources so as to develop and to defend informed 
positions on such questions, one must indeed rethink our current perception of the global 
political economy as a classic liberal regime. Rather it seems that we live in a neo-
mercantilist era, where powerful government administrations design the global political 
economy without proactive societal input and initiative. To conclude, more research on the 
preference formation and influence of societal groups and business in modern ‘regulatory’ 
foreign economic policy is needed.  
 
10.3.5 Concluding thoughts and outlook 
The EU’s international investment policy is bound to become a major external policy of the 
EU in the coming years. Even though the EU is now indisputably in the driver’s seat and the 
Member States have lost their legal ability to individually act in this policy domain, many 
legal issues and political questions remain unanswered as yet. What will be the main 
priorities of the EU’s future international investment policy? What will future European IIAs 
actually look like? How will the EU deal with questions of shared financial liability between 
Member States and the EU under ISDS in practice? Are other Member States liable in case 
one Member State – in the context of a sovereign default for instance – refuses to pay 
compensation following an ISDS award? How can interpretative coherence of EU law in 
ISDS proceedings be ensured, if the Member States insist on defending their own cases? 
And how should the customary screening of inward investments for national security 
purposes be dealt with? These questions may appear dry and technical – notably to political 
scientists – but might prove to be of considerable political salience in the years to come.  
 
What is more, not only the EU’s new policy but also the international investment regime per 
se is likely to move much more into the focus of the academic and political debate in the 
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coming years. The current debates on investment regulation under TTIP are likely to be only 
a foretaste. The steady increase in investment arbitration proceedings also against OECD 
countries since the mid-1990s, the undeniable flaws of today’s ISDS procedures and the 
sizeable awards to investors will transform international investment regulation into a 
fashionable academic and ‘hot’ political issue. The pending case of Vattenfall (Sweden) vs 
Germany (II) (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Hoffmann, 2012), concerning the country’s 
nuclear phase-out, as well as the recent enormous award of some $50bn in the case Yukos 
Universal Limited (Isle of Man) vs Russia (ITA Law, 2014) show the general public quite 
plainly the significant power of arbitration bodies and influence of the international 
investment regime on domestic politics. In the light of this increased attention, the 
international investment regime is likely to undergo profound changes in the next few years. 
The EU is bound to play an important role in this process as the world’s biggest emitter and 
recipient of international investment flows.  
 
The thesis is likely to help us better understand both issue areas – the further development of 
the EU’s international investment policy and the EU’s role in the evolving global investment 
regime. It closes a significant gap in the IPE literature and research on EU foreign economic 
policy. It comprehensively documented and explained the EU’s role in international 
investment regulation since the 1980s. It shed light on the key actors, their structural 
preferences and strategies in international investment policy-making. This knowledge should 
be a solid basis for responding to some of the questions raised, and facilitate future IPE 
research and political discussions. 
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Annexes 
Annexe I: Confidential list of interviewees 
!
Date 
Country / 
Organisation Institution 
Location of 
interview Position Name 
05.10.11 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  
12.10.11 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  14.10.11 France Sciences Po Paris 
  
19.10.11 USA 
State Department & 
American Chamber of 
Commerce Brussels 
  19.11.11 OECD Economics Department Paris 
  
11.01.12 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  12.01.12 Belgium Wilmer Hale Brussels 
  
13.01.12 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  
18.01.12 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  26.01.12a 
 EU BusinessEurope Brussels 
  26.01.12b 
 Sweden Ministry of Foreign Affairs Telephone 
  
16.02.12 Germany 
German Federation of 
Industries Berlin 
  
17.02.12 Germany 
German Ministry of 
Economics Berlin  
  
18.07.12 EU 
European Commission, 
Cabinet (trade) Brussels 
  
24.07.12a EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  
24.07.12b EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  
25.07.12 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
  01.10.12a 
 OECD / USA 
Investment Department / 
State Department Paris   
01.10.12b 
 OECD Investment Department  Paris 
  12.06.13 United 
Kingdom / 
France 
International Chamber of 
Commerce London  
  
13.06.13 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Telephone 
  17.06.13 Germany Ministry of Economics Telephone 
  03.07.13 Austria Ministry of Economics Telephone 
  04.09.13 Poland Leviathan Email 
  
24.09.13 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Brussels 
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25.09.13a EU 
European Commission, DG 
Relex Brussels 
  25.09.13b Belgium European Services Forum Brussels 
  
26.09.13 
United 
Kingdom 
Confederation of British 
Industries Telephone 
  
27.09.13a Spain 
Confederación Española de 
Organizaciones 
Empresariales Brussels 
  27.09.13b Italy Confindustria Brussels 
  
03.10.13 France 
Mouvement des entreprises 
de France Paris 
  
11.10.13 
United 
Kingdom / 
EU 
University of Oxford / DG 
Trade Oxford 
  
28.10.13 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Relex Telephone 
  04.11.13 OECD Trade Department Paris 
  
14.11.13 EU 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Telephone 
  13.01.14 OECD Investment Department  Email 
  16.01.14 EU DG Energy London 
  
27.01.14 Belgium 
European Commission, DG 
Trade Telephone 
  04.02.14a Norway Ministry of Finance Telephone 
  
04.02.14b 
Energy 
Charter 
Treaty  Secretariat, Legal Unit Telephone 
  
02.04.14 
United 
Kingdom CityUK London  
  !
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Annexe II: Code book for Chapter IX 
Definition of investment: The following labels are attributed to articles on the minimum 
treatment standard. Unlimited asset-based definition = 1; Open-list definition with 
exceptions = 2.  
 
Minimum treatment standard: The following labels are attributed to articles on the 
minimum treatment standard. CIL = 1; CIL + other standard = 2; FET + other standard = 3; 
FET = 4; Any other standard = 5.  
 
Expropriation: The following labels are attributed to articles on expropriation. Prohibition 
of direct and indirect expropriation on the basis of a broad definition of expropriation = 1; 
Prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation on the basis of a restrictive and detailed 
definition = 2.  
 
Umbrella clauses: The following labels are attributed to the diverging casts of umbrella 
clauses. No umbrella clause = 1; conditional umbrella clause = 2; generally unconditional 
umbrella clause = 3. If countries have concluded several BITs in one year, the aggregate 
label reflects the average label.  
 
Access to investor-to-state arbitration: The following labels are attributed to the articles 
on ISDS provisions. Unlimited access to arbitration = 1 ; Limited access to arbitration = 2 
(e.g. fork in the road clause, wait for until ruling or first instance court of host country before 
access to arbittation, only possible to file arbitration request before first ruling of host 
country court, exhaustion of local remedies); No access to arbitration = 3.  
 
Sectoral carve-outs: The labels are cardinal numbers. The label of a BIT is the count of 
economic sectors and economic activities excluded from NT and MFN obligations under the 
BIT or the overall scope of the agreement. For instance: if a BIT does not contain sectoral 
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carve-outs, the label is 0. If a BIT excludes financial services and maritime transport from 
the MFN and NT obligation, the label is 2. If a BIT contains a complex schedule of carve-
outs, it is indicated in the form of x.  
 
Word count of BITs: The labels are cardinal numbers and results of word counts. All words 
of the BIT are counted. For instance: if a BIT contains 2,000 words, the label is 2,000. While 
many BITs are available in the form of text-enabled PDF or word documents allowing for a 
quick word count, some BITs are only available in plain PDF documents excluding an 
automatic word count. Such BITs are ignored in the database and carry the label 0.  
 
Asterisk (*): It indicates that the observations refer to the investment chapter of an FTA 
rather than an alone-standing BIT.   
 
US BITs  
 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
Count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment  
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1983 Senegal 5614 1 3 3 1 2 14 
1984 DR Congo 5685 1 3 3 1 2 16 
1985 Morocco 3985 1 3 1 1 2 13 
1985 Turkey 3654 1 3 3 1 2 11 
1986 Bangladesh 5700 1 3 3 1 2 13 
1986 Cameroon 4688 1 3 3 1 2 13 
1986 Egypt 5679 1 3 1 1 2 13 
1986 Grenada 3051 1 3 3 1 2 13 
1990 Congo 5057 1 3 3 1 2 16 
1990 Poland 6223 1 3 3 1 2 19 
1990 Tunisia 3431 1 3 3 1 2 15 
1991 Argentina 4710 1 3 3 1 2 12 
1991 Slovakia  5617 1 3 3 1 2 20 
1991 Sri Lanka 4407 1 3 3 1 2 20 
1992 Armenia 3249 1 3 3 1 2 17 
1992 Bulgaria 3938 1 3 3 1 2 20 
1992 Kazakhstan 3756 1 3 3 1 2 19 
1992 Panama 4578 1 3 3 1 2 11 
1992 Romania 5528 1 3 3 1 2 21 
1993 Ecuador 4452 1 3 3 1 2 22 
1993 Kyrgyzstan  3700 1 3 3 1 2 21 
1993 Moldova 4585 1 3 3 1 2 21 
1994 Estonia 3866 1 3 3 1 2 20 
1994 Georgia 3768 1 3 1 1 2 9 
1994 Jamaica 3865 1 3 3 1 2 20 
1994 Mongolia 3599 1 3 3 1 2 18 
1994 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 4389 1 3 3 1 2 12 
1994 Ukraine 4200 1 3 3 1 2 22 
1995 Honduras 4105 1 3 1 1 2 17 
1995 Latvia 3993 1 3 3 1 2 16 
1995 Albania 3984 1 3 1 1 2 13 
1996 Croatia 4438 1 3 1 1 2 12 
1997 Azerbaidjan 5108 1 3 1 1 2 6 
1997 Bahrain 3961 1 3 1 1 2 7 
1997 Jordan 4238 1 3 1 1 2 10 
1998 Lithuania 4314 1 3 3 1 2 18 
1998 Mozambique 4138 1 3 3 1 2 10 
2001 Bolivia 4226 1 3 1 1 2 4 
2003 
Czech 
Republic 5157 1 3 3 1 2 19 
2003 Chile*  3319 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2003 Singapore* 3926 2 2 1 2 2 x  
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Canadian BITs 
 
2004 Australia* 4394 2 2 1 2 3 x 
2004 Costa Rica* 5363 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2004 Morocco* 4691 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2004 Nicaragua * 5901 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2005 Uruguay 7873 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2006 Colombia* 5215 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2006 Oman* 7118 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2007 South Korea* 5953 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2007 Panama* 6058 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2007 Peru* 5686 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2008 Rwanda 13439 1 2 1 2 2 x 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
Count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Acess to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1989 Russia 2437 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1990 Poland 2519 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1991 Argentina 2937 1 3 1 1 2 0 
1991 Hungary 2637 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1994 Ukraine 5655 2 3 1 1 2 11 
1995 Philippines 5990 1 3 1 1 2 7 
1995 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 5726 2 3 1 1 2 7 
1996 Barbados 3223 2 3 1 1 2 6 
1996 Ecuador 5631 2 3 1 1 2 7 
1996 Egypt 5702 2 3 1 1 2 7 
1996 Panama 5842 2 3 1 1 2 5 
1996 Venezuela 6142 2 3 1 1 2 11 
1997 Armenia 5554 2 3 1 1 2 7 
1997 Croatia 5784 2 3 1 1 2 11 
1997 Lebanon 5945 2 3 1 1 2 10 
1997 Thailand 6332 2 3 1 1 2 11 
1997 Uruguay 5720 2 3 1 1 2 10 
1998 Costa Rica 6370 2 3 1 1 2 11 
1999 El Salvador 6191 2 3 1 1 2 10 
2006 Peru 14929 2 2 1 2 2 2 
2009 
Czech 
Republic 6561 1 2 1 2 2 1 
2009 Jordan 15696 2 2 1 1 2 x 
2009 Latvia 8774 2 2 1 2 2 7 
2009 Romania 9081 2 2 1 2 2 7 
2010 Slovakia 6303 1 2 1 2 2 1 
2011 Kuwait 10738 2 2 1 1 2 x 
2012 China  10012 2 2 1 2 2 x 
2013 Tanzania 13828 2 2 1 2 2 x 
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German BITs 
 
2013 Benin 12965 2 2 1 2 2 x 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1980 
Papua New 
Guinea 0 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1981 Bangladesh 0 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1982 Lesotho 2641 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1982 Mauretania 0 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1982 Panama 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1984 Burundi 3311 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1984 Dominica 0 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1984 Somalia 0 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1985 Saint Lucia 3077 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 Bulgaria 1235 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 Nepal 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 
Saint Vincent 
and 
Grenadines 0 1 3 3 1 3 0 
1987 Bolivia 3471 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 Uruguay 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Guyina 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Hungary 0 1 x 3 1 1 0 
1989 Poland 2475 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Russia 3167 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Serbia 3025 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 Cape Verde 2168 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 
Czecheslovaki
a 0 1 3 3 1 X x 
1990 Swaziland 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Albania 2100 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Argentina  0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1991 Chile  4102 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Mongolia 2042 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Estonia  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Jamaica 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Kazakhstan 2012 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Lithuania 872 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Slovakia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Belarus 2025 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Georgia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Latvia 1324 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Paraguay 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Slovenia  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Uzbekistan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
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1994 Barbados 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Costa Rica 2134 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Kuwait 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Moldova 3249 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Namibia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Armenia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Azerbaijan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Ghana 2211 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Honduras 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 India  0 1 3 2 1 1 0 
1995 Peru 3096 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 South Africa 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Zimbabwe 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Algeria 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Burkina Faso 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Cuba 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Ecuador 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Hong Kong 2568 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Kenya 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Laos 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Nicaragua 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Qatar 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Romania 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Saudi Arabia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Ukraine 2139 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 UAE 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Venezuela 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Vietnam 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Croatia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 El Salvador 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Kyrgyszstan  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Lebanon 3724 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Philippines 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Turkmenistan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Gabon 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Mexico 3249 2 3 2 1 2 0 
1999 Cambodia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Botswana 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Nigeria 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Sri Lanka 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Morocco 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Mozambique 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Ethiopia 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
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British BITs 
 
2002 Iran 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
2003 China 2857 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Indonesia 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
2003 Tajikistan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2004 Libya 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2004 Thailand 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2005 Afghanistan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2005 Egypt 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2005 Timor Leste 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2006 Guinea 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2006 Madagascar 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2006 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
2007 Bahrain 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2007 Jordan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2007 Oman 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1980 Bangladesh 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1980 Philippines 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1980 Senegal 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1980 Sril Lanka 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1981 Malaysia  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1981 
Papua New 
Guniea 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1981 Paraguay 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1982 Belize 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1982 Cameroon 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1982 Costa Rica 2733 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1982 Yemen 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1983 Panama 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1983 Saint Lucia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1985 Haiti 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 China 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 Malta 2625 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 Mauritius 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 
Antigua and 
Barbuda  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 Benin 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 Dominica 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 Hungary 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 Jamaica 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1988 Bolivia  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1988 Grenada 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
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1989 Ghana 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Guyana 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Congo 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Russia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Tunisia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 Argentina 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1990 Burundi 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 
Czech 
Republic 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 Mozambique 1713 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 Nigeria  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Bahrain 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Mongolia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Turkey 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 UAE 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Armenia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Barbados 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Honduras 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Lithuania 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Nepal 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Peru 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Ukraine 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1993 Uruguay 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1994 Albania 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Belarus 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Ecuador 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Estonia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 India 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Kyrgisztan  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Latvia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Pakistan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Tanzania 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Bulgaria 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Cote d'Ivoire 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Cuba 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Georgia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Kazakhstan  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Laos 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Oman 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Swaziland 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Turkmenistan 1179 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Venezuela 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Zimbabwe 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Azerbaijan 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Chile 0 1 3 3 1 2 0 
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Dutch BITs 
 
1996 Moldova 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Nicaragua 2978 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Slovenia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Croatia 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 South Africa 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Tonga 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Hong Kong 2443 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Uganda 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1999 El Salvador 2867 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1999 Ethiopia 3053 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1999 Kenya 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1999 Lebanon 1971 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Angola 2183 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Sierra Leone 1595 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 1749 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Vietnam 3165 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Vanuatu 1952 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2006 Mexico 3552 2 2 1 2 2 0 
2010 Colombia 0 2 2 1 1 2 0 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1984 Sri Lanka 2390 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1984 Malta 2498 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1985 Yemen 1107 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1985 Philippines 1883 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1986 Turkey 1585 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1987 Hungary  1904 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1988 Uruguay 1353 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1988 Pakistan 1958 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1989 Russia  1287 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Ghana 1508 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Slovakia 1827 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Jamaica  2312 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 
Czech 
Republic 2187 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Cape Verde 2299 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1992 Poland 2349 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Paraguay 2164 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Nigeria 2078 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Hong Kong 2067 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Estonia 2123 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Bolivia 2203 1 3 1 1 1 0 
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1992 Argentina 2672 1 4 3 1 2 0 
1993 Venezuela 1974 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Vietnam 1947 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Ukraine 1345 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Romania 1917 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1994 Peru 2279 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Lithuania 2036 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Latvia 1695 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Indonesia 2884 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Bangladesh 1990 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Albania 2263 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 South Africa 2663 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Mongolia 1774 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Moldova 2251 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 India 2518 1 3 2 1 1 0 
1995 Belarus 2087 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Zimbabwe 2613 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Uzbekistan 2060 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Slovenia 2490 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1996 Egypt 2363 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Jordan 2369 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Tunisia 1782 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Mexico 2711 2 3 2 1 2 0 
1998 Macedonia 2202 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Georgia 2257 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Croatia 2248 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1998 Chile 2831 1 3 2 1 2 0 
1998 Brazil 2640 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1998 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 2647 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1999 El Salvador 2524 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1999 Ecuador 1749 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1999 Cuba 2527 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1999 Costa Rica 2916 1 3 3 1 2 0 
1999 Bulgaria 2876 1 3 3 1 2 0 
2000 Uganda 1872 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Panama 2350 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Nicaragua 1968 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 China 2250 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 
Burkina 
Faso 2232 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Tanzania 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 
Mozambiqu
e 2187 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Kuwait 2834 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Honduras 2478 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Guatemala 2244 1 3 3 1 1 0 
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2001 Benin 2210 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Tajikistan 2118 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Namibia 2211 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Lebanon 2457 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Kazakhstan 2237 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Gambia 1772 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Belize 2272 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Zambia 2360 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 South Korea 1626 1 4 1 1 3 0 
2003 Mali 2498 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Malawi 1973 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Laos 2305 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Ethiopia 2208 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2003 Eritrea 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Cambodia 2386 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2005 Suriname  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2005 Armenia 2441 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2006 
Dominican 
Republic 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2007 Serbia 2981 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2007 Burundi 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2007 Bahrein 2289 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2007 Algeria 2239 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2009 Oman 1903 1 3 1 1 1 0 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1987 
Belgium & 
Luxembourg 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1987 Great Britain 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1988 Austria 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1988 China 1904 1 3 1 1 3 0 
1989 France 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1989 Germany 3644 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1989 Italy  0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1989 South Korea 1534 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1989 Sweden 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1989 Switzerland 1401 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1990 Canada 2519 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1990 Denmark 3050 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 Norway 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1990 USA 4927 1 3 2 1 2 0 
1991 Argentina 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1991 Australia  3782 1 3 1 1 2 0 
 374 
 
 
Austrian BITs 
 
1991 Uruguay 2597 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1992 Greece 0 1 5 1 1 1 0 
1992 Hungary 2746 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1992 Lithuania 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1992 Netherlands  2349 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1992 Spain  0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1992 Thailand 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1993 Estonia 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1993 Latvia 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1993 Portugal 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1993 UAE 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1994 Bulgaria 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1994 Kazakhstan 1500 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1994 Morocco 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1994 Vietnam 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1995 Chile 2447 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1995 Croatia 1105 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1995 Egypt 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1995 Mongolia  0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1996 Finland 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1996 India 2721 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1997 Jordan 1766 1 4 1 1 1 0 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1985 China 0 1 4 3 1 3 0 
1985 Malaysia 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1988 Hungary 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1988 Poland 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1988 Turkey 0 1 4 2 1 1 0 
1990 
Czech 
Republic 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1990 Russia  0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1990 Slovakia 2217 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1991 Cape Verde 2356 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1991 South Korea 2260 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1992 Argentina 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1992 Morocco 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1993 Albania 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1993 Paraguay 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1994 Estonia 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1994 Latvia 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1995 Tunisia 0 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1995 Vietnam 0 1 3 2 1 1 0 
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1996 Kuwait 0 1 5 3 1 1 0 
1996 Lithuania 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1996 Romania 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1996 South Africa 0 1 3 2 1 1 0 
1996 Ukraine  0 1 3 2 1 1 0 
1997 Bolivia 2555 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1997 Bulgaria 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1997 Chile 3302 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1997 Croatia 3247 1 4 3 1 1 0 
1998 Mexico 4988 2 3 2 1 2 0 
1999 India 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2000 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 3155 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Azerbaijan  0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Bangladesh 2114 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Cuba 3176 2 3 3 1 1 0 
2000 Uzbekistan  3311 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Armenia 3281 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Belarus 3611 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2001 Belize 4506 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Egypt 2659 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2001 Georgia 4132 2 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Iran 2341 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Jordan 3133 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Lebanon 3778 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Moldova 1972 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2001 Mongolia 2550 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Oman 2965 1 3 3 1 2 0 
2001 
Saudi 
Arabia 2399 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2001 Serbia 2047 1 4 2 1 1 0 
2001 Slovenia 3056 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 Macedonia 2800 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2001 UAE 2151 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Libya 3246 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Malta 3038 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2002 Philippines 2965 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2002 Yemen 2200 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2003 Algeria 1993 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2003 Namibia 4046 1 3 3 1 1 0 
2004 Ethiopia 3841 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2006 Hong Kong 2782 1 3 3 1 1 0 
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Slovakian BITs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of 
signature Country  
Word 
count 
Definition 
of 
investment 
Minimum 
treatment 
Umbrella 
clause 
Expropri
ation 
Access to 
ISDS  Carve-outs 
1990 Finland 0 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 France 3277 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1990 Switzerland 1541 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1991 Norway 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1993 Hungary 2280 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1994 Indonesia 2097 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1994 Netherlands 1886 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1994 Romania 2395 1 3 3 1 1 0 
1995 Portugal 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1997 Cuba 2453 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1997 Egypt 2240 1 3 1 1 1 0 
1998 North Korea 2142 1 4 1 1 1 0 
1999 Israel 2845 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2004 Serbia 2294 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2005 Belarus 2898 1 4 3 1 1 0 
2005 Bulgaria 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2005 China 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2005 South Korea 2819 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2006 India 3479 1 3 1 2 1 0 
2007 Mexico 2436 2 2 1 2 1 0 
2007 Morocco 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2008 
Bosnia-
Herzegovin
a 2469 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2008 Croatia 2753 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2009 Lebanon 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 
2009 Turkey 1972 1 4 1 1 1 0 
2010 Canada 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 
2011 Kenya 2868 1 3 3 1 1 0 
